Syria: Silence While Massacres Unfold

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Since early March, villages east of Latakia on the Syrian coast have become sites of massacres targeting the Alawite community—the confessional group of former dictator Bashar al-Assad. Reports also confirm Christian victims. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, at least a thousand people have been killed, though the exact toll remains unknown. Social media has been inundated with reports in recent weeks, with some sources placing the death toll between 7,000 and 10,000. These killings were carried out by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militants and other militia groups.

This surge of deadly violence in Syria’s coastal regions has claimed the lives of two Armenians, as the conflict escalates. According to the Syrian-based Gandzasar newspaper, a father and son—Antoine and Fati Boutros—were killed in the suburbs of Latakia after coming under fire. The killings come as part of a broader wave of unrest that has gripped the region since March 6.

Determining an accurate death count has been hampered by authorities imposing a complete blackout on many villages, cutting off electricity, water and supplies. Their objective is evident: to eliminate a population they consider hostile to the new regime while furthering the ethnic and sectarian homogenization of the “new Syria”. The team surrounding President Ahmad al-Sharaa (whose nom de guerre is Julani) is working toward the establishment of an Islamic Republic.

How Did We Get Here?

The killings of Alawite and Christian civilians began on March 4 in Latakia, in retaliation for an ambush. Alawite fighters linked to the former regime had attacked HTS elements attempting to remove them from the area. If the objective was purely military, how can the March 5 helicopter strikes on the Alawite village of Dalieh, east of Baniyas—a sacred pilgrimage site with over a hundred mausoleums and religious leaders? The pattern of violence suggests not merely political purges against former regime officials, but rather a systematic ethnic cleansing campaign.

Events intensified on March 6 when HTS and allied militias entered the coastal region in an attempt to capture the mountain. While some of their forces were caught in ambushes, former regime soldiers and intelligence officers mobilized to counter this threat. The formation of a “Military Council” on the Syrian coast, led by Brigadier General Ghiath al-Dali of the 4th Division commanded by Maher al-Assad, served as justification for this large-scale military operation. However, this purported “Alawite insurgency” lacks the capacity to control the coastal region.

From then on, the massacres escalated, spreading beyond the mountains into mixed-population cities like Tartus, Baniyas, and Latakia, which were home to Sunni, Alawite, and Christian communities.

Perpetrators Protected by the Authorities and the International Community

Since taking power in December, HTS jihadists and their allies have sought to assert their authority over a fragmented Syria. In the south, battle-hardened Druze fighters have maintained their defense and even secured a district in Damascus. In the northeast, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have signed a non-aggression pact with Damascus. In the north, Turkish-controlled areas remain dominated by Syrian National Army (SNA) mercenaries, who are known for their brutality against Syrian Kurds and from which two militias were sent to Artsakh during the 2020 War to fight for Azerbaijan.

The Alawites and Christians—two minority groups—now face an existential threat. Since December, HTS fighters have killed members of both communities without officially claiming responsibility. When they do acknowledge these killings, they justify them as retaliation for the hundreds of thousands of predominantly Sunni victims killed by the former regime.

Media outlets often portray these atrocities as a heavy-handed response to an Alawite uprising in the mountainous northwest, where thousands of former regime soldiers and officers remain entrenched. Yet they overlook a crucial fact: these attacks are perpetrated by a coalition of foreign militias, including Uyghur, Tajik, Uzbek, and Chechen jihadists, alongside the most radical factions of HTS and the Arab and Turkmen militias of the SNA.

If the authorities truly disassociate themselves from these acts, how do they explain the positioning of troops around Alawite villages days before the massacres? Why did they ignore these militias’ widely circulated social media calls for violence and murder?

Why did the national dialogue conference in Damascus, intended to heal the wounds of a 14-year civil war, last only a single day?

As in 1909, when the Turks massacred Armenians in Adana and throughout Cilicia, including the village of Kessab—now under renewed threat—the authorities deflect responsibility by blaming “uncontrollable extremist elements.”

In the aftermath, dozens of Christians have been massacred. A crucial question remains: Were they merely collateral victims, or were they targeted as perceived collaborators of the former regime? The evidence suggests both.

This echoes the events of 1982, when the Israeli army, during its occupation of Lebanon, permitted far right Christian militias—Lebanese Forces and Phalangists—to enter the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila following their leader Bashir Gemayel’s assassination. The militias then proceeded to massacre thousands of defenceless Palestinian civilians.

History repeats itself through Western indifference, if not outright cynicism, particularly from the European Union, which echoes the official narrative that the massacres were a response to an alleged Alawite uprising. The motive is clear: to equate the war crimes of the former regime’s Alawite leaders with those of the new power’s extremist factions.

What Can Be Done?

The tragedy unfolding before our eyes marks the end of any hope for Syria’s peaceful transition. The country has been ravaged by decades of sectarian hatred, intensified by the civil war that began in 2011.

The Alawites remain a significant demographic presence compared to the dwindling Christian population. A federalized Syria, where communities could coexist according to their own values, would offer the least worst outcome for the two million Syrian Alawites and few hundred thousand remaining Christians, who fear a life under Islamic law.

Yet achieving this goal demands effective transitional justice mechanisms to ensure fair trials for all who committed crimes against humanity—whether from the Assad dictatorship or former rebels.

Syria, socially, economically and psychologically shattered, lacks the resources to achieve this vital objective. It needs the support of an international community that has largely withdrawn since the U.S. shifted its focus to its rivalry with China.

Alawites and Christians seek more than mere condemnations. They need a humanitarian corridor to evacuate the wounded and most vulnerable, along with a UN-mandated peacekeeping force to uphold the “responsibility to protect”, a principle repeatedly weakened by decades of violence and impunity.

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