Sovereignty, Political Identity, Equidistance

Listen to the article. 

I.  Sovereignty and Security

Much has been said in our public discourse about the complacency of both the Armenian public and the state regarding the security arrangements of the past 30 years, a view I mostly share. This security arrangement, which over time heavily pivoted toward Russia, obscured our understanding about the complexity and diversity of Russian engagements, the diversity of their interests in our region and in the immediate neighborhood. Consequently, Armenia held inflated expectations about the Russia-led security structures, specifically the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Armenia’s economic overdependence on Russia, by way of bilateral and regional institutional engagements, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, further consolidated the Russian pivot and consequently significantly narrowed Armenia’s diversification capacities. While Russia was a full-fledged member of the global economy and a more cooperative and engaging participant in international relations in a different global order, these tilts obscured the risks of enhanced dependency.

Developments since the 2010s have prompted gradual, and now accelerated changes to the global order, diverging significantly from the one we once knew. In this transitory post-unipolar world, Armenia’s adjustments have been inadequate. Among the multiple developments, the wars in Syria, Georgia and Ukraine stand out as directly relevant to Armenia, with the ensuing changing patterns of global and regional power competition.

Combined with the previous points, Armenia developed a sense of excessive self-confidence about itself and the sustainability of the status quo, which presumably would allow the country to survive in an environment of adversarial relations within its neighborhood.

The capacities of resilience of Armenia’s state institutions and society as a whole revealed significant flaws. There were many factors and drivers, including deficient public institutions, an inadequate and dependent justice system, unequal business and economic opportunities, corruption, a corroded education system, slow infrastructure development and so on. The list is expandable, and it is neither useful nor fair to attribute these shortcomings to any single cause. It would also be an oversimplification and an unfair exaggeration to claim that the state and its public institutions have entirely failed. Over the past 30 years, Armenia’s capacities have significantly evolved. It is certainly a country much different from what it was in 1991, at the inception of our independence. The fabric of the Armenian state and society is, indeed, complex, elaborate, multifaceted and pluralist, and should be recognized and respected as such.  

With all their strengths and weaknesses, they represent a new starting point for us today. However, the capacities, political will and leadership to address the deficiencies and problems within the state and society have long been obscured by what I call a sense of hubris. Consequently, the lessons served were harsh and painful.

Out of this hubris we have been slow to adjust to the changing realities and initiate bolder moves toward repositioning ourselves in regional affairs. This is particularly true in relation to the developments concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While this is a matter for a separate and a more elaborate discussion, one that is underway and will continue for good reason, a few short points are relevant here. 

By delegating ownership of the resolution process entirely to Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh gradually lost a sense of reality and the limits of what was possible. This situation since 1998 (which may have seemed a natural thing at the time) has also firmly transformed the essence of the problem from that of existential physical security for its people and the ensuing priority of its status, to that of a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the eyes of the international community it has been entrenched exactly in the context of the latter. It should also be said that the various conflict resolution templates put on the table diluted the timeline for the resolution of the status issue, the fundamental priority for Armenia and Artsakh. This prolonged uncertainty created significant risks, allowing Azerbaijan to employ “salami tactics”, extracting incremental concessions from Armenia while steadily exacerbating its security environment without delivering on the key priority for us.

While the political leadership in Armenia at all times broadly sustained a necessary degree of realism about these realities, the public-political discourse was more intransigent and expectations were unrealistically inflated. Extensive and bolder conversations about the realities and the scope of the possible were muted in favor of prioritizing domestic power stability and continuity (not rocking the boat) and overconfidence in the established security arrangement. Hence, the broad space for intransigence.

This claim does not in any way suggest that everything depended on Armenia or that it is squarely Armenia’s fault. In fact, Azerbaijan was precisely the party to blame for the failure of previous significant opportunities of a breakthrough, whether in Kazan, and on many other occasions before and after Kazan, leading up to the 2020 war. Azerbaijan’s long standing designs on the use of force are an absolutely credible claim, while an occasional self-deprecating tone in our own domestic discourse often eclipses Azerbaijan’s belligerence.

The wars in Georgia and Ukraine (first Crimea, and now), have brought the international prioritization of the principle of territorial integrity closer to home. The war in Syria,  the subsequent crises in Libya and the East Mediterranean, and the intense rivalry in the Black Sea basin (which only escalated further following the current war in Ukraine) have amplified Turkey’s growing regional assertiveness and strategic competition with Russia. This evolving reality significantly raised the likelihood of such competition spilling over into the South Caucasus. Some analysts chose to call it a cooperative competition, which, combined with the capacities of Turkey to lock Azerbaijan in the equation, securing mutual benefits, has left Russia, to put it mildly, “more flexible” at Armenia’s expense.

At this moment we are a defeated party. We are not an exception in the history of nation-states. Admitting it is a prerequisite for building a viable and serious strategy for the future. The emotional aspect of the defeat is deeply painful. However, it is the imperative of realism, rationalism and coolheaded, unemotional political calculation and action that will define our future. As a nation-state, we must move beyond relying primarily on moral appeals to justice or the condescending favor of a “big brother.” Our future will be determined by our own deliberate actions. So long as we breathe sovereignty, we are compelled to act exactly as a sovereign state with the full use of the tools and means available to a nation-state, both in domestic, regional and international affairs. It requires expanding the boundaries of pragmatism, rationalism and realism in our public debates and public perceptions, expanding the maturity and the resilience of our national institutions and our capacities.

Presently we are facing two sets of existential challenges. The first set is immediate and short-term, spanning weeks, months or a year or two. It concerns the heightened external risks to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia. It also concerns the formulation and pursuit of realistic parameters for the future of Artsakh. The risks of a renewed escalation remain high, war has not been written off as an option. War, as organized violence inflicting massive human suffering and most severe costs on human life, should be rejected and resisted. However, if thrust upon us, a war must be fought to reject and resist the imposition of the will of the enemy and to defend our nation and our freedom. While avoiding a war is imperative, the necessity of leadership, solidarity and national consolidation, the rally around the flag, are vital.

The second concerns the long-term endurance of Armenian sovereignty and political independence. For the long term, Armenia needs a pursuit of national objectives for the sustainability of its sovereignty with a vision for the next 20 to 25 years at a minimum, including the capacities of adaptation to the external environment. Such capacities are strongly rooted, first of all, in the order of priorities at home. I firmly believe in civil freedoms, democracy, the rule of law, and in state and public institutional resilience as ultimate requisites for the security and development of our nation. I do not see a contradiction between liberalism and patriotism, between democracy and the protection of the historical legacy of our national identity. Pursuing survival of a national identity by way of accepting dependency and external domination at the expense of freedoms, reduces the whole notion of identity to a mere survival of an ethnic group, or rather, the hope of it. Our own long history and our proclivity for a long memory delivers many important lessons in this respect.

Freedoms serve the sustainability of strong sovereignty. In the existing international system of states, sovereignty is the most adequate foundation for the protection and flourishing of a national identity. Consistent and resolute cultivation of a political identity (or the political part of the national identity) of the nation is a critical priority. The political identity of a genuinely free nation is rooted in the unshakable resolve to defend freedom at a collective/national level against any foreign domination, direct or indirect, in any shape and form. It is rooted at the individual level, driving the pursuit and defense of a societal framework hinged on individual freedoms, justice, equal opportunity and personal endeavor.

Combined with these considerations, pragmatism and acceptance of the realities of geography, regional geopolitics and our status as a small nation compel a closer evaluation of the strategic viability of Armenia’s regional equidistance as an instrument of national security, a buffer and moderation tool in the regional power competition. The pursuit of equidistance from regional powers should not be confused with neutrality, but should embrace and address the significant challenge of complex and varied relations among the three regional powers, the three intraregional states of the South Caucasus, and between all of them together.

The next rippling circles of foreign policy engagements need to hinge on the two central themes of Armenia’s national priorities. The first concerns consolidation and strengthening of Armenia’s democratic political identity as the foundation for sustainable sovereignty and national development. This determines Armenia’s foreign policy agenda with the like-minded nations. While geographically on the northern fringes of West Asia, geopolitically Armenia’s location remains firmly European. However, Armenia needs an equal measure of realism and pragmatism to distinguish between means and ends in broader extra-regional entanglements. The second priority is ensuring the solid and sustainable foundations of our national security through regional peace, regional interactions and regional balance of power, best served by the concept of equidistance. For this purpose, Armenia’s toolkit of international engagements, both bilateral and multilateral, needs to be calibrated pragmatically, with these central priorities in mind.

Armenia, like all small nations, who are the most vulnerable to global political storms, must be deeply cognizant of the present tectonic shifts in the international order. In the immediate future, the revival of old (or perhaps not old at all) imperialist instincts so conspicuous in our region is compounded by the return of transactional power politics on the global stage. The challenges of uncertainty in rewriting the rules of engagement among global powers, middle powers, and between them open a dangerous space for a complete breakdown of the present international system with devastating consequences for many of the more than 100 small nations. Armenia’s bargaining power should be measured realistically. It is far from favorable at the moment. The priority, therefore, appears to be carving out and sustaining the necessary space for survival. Achieving this requires a foreign policy centered on the concept of regional equidistance, reinforced through agile and tireless bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, regionally and beyond. This must be combined with revamped defense capabilities and accelerated action, domestic reforms at home to advance Armenia’s geopolitical and geo-economic appeal. Generating external interest and demonstrating Armenia’s strategic appeal are critical to securing its sovereign presence in the region and in the world. Further elaboration follows on the notions of political identity, regional equidistance and the rippling circles of foreign policy.

As a final point, in my discussions with friends and colleagues, much has been said about the experiences of Israel, Germany or Japan, Singapore or other nations, some small, others shaped by the legacy of defeat in major wars. I personally am a great admirer of the history of Finland between 1945 and 1975. Austria and Ireland also offer compelling lessons. However, I believe each nation walks its own historical path. While past or present examples may provide valuable insights or guidance, they are never suitable for replication. National strategic thinking, national strategies and policies are strictly a national experience, shaped by a particular state’s specific circumstances within the state of play in the global and regional order.

II. Sovereignty and Political Identity

I tend to adhere to the school of thought in which foreign policy is commonly understood as a derivative of domestic strategic objectives and priorities, adjusted to its other determinants, including geography, size and the regional and broader international environment. Reversing these sequences significantly undermines a nation’s ability to effectively pursue its sovereign interests. In our national discourse, we often allow such distorted perceptions to take hold, framing Armenia’s future in terms of alignment with one power or another, ultimately creating fertile ground for subordinating our national interests to those of others.

The concepts of sovereignty and political independence must be more deeply ingrained in our national collective mind as essential instruments for advancing national interests since the Treaty of Westphalia, and especially after WWII and the end of the Cold War.  Armenia must foster a continuous extensive national dialogue, education and broad consensus on the indispensability of sovereignty and political independence as the most effective pursuit of the national objectives of sustainable security and development. Cultivating this collective mindset towards the protection of sovereignty and political independence is crucial for public engagement in state building and for strengthening the institutions of an independent nation-state.

Apart from the defense of national identity, it is equally important to cultivate a strong political identity, at the heart of which is the deeper sense of determination to protect national freedom and the fundamental principles of political, social and economic life in the country. As a group with distinct national, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious identity we have a centuries’ old history, and have been subjugated for long periods to external powers and empires. Against the background of self-preservation and continuity of such national identity in times of subjugation, it has consciously or unconsciously weakened our collective sense of national freedom as a distinct and, I would argue, a superior component in defining national identity. It is the political component of our collective national identity. It defines our political identity. Prioritization of the firm collective political identity of the nation, which values collective national freedom and rejection of external powers in the determination of national life, is the significant condition for sustaining a place in the enduring international system of nation-states.

The recognition, promotion and protection of a strong political identity shapes the collective national psychology, transcending the narrow interpretation of national identity and generating a sense of patriotism rooted in the defense of national freedom. This broader embrace of sovereignty serves as a foundation for shaping national policies that reinforce Armenia’s independence and self-determination. It is from such a deep embrace of freedom that elevates the  construction of effective national and state institutions, the pursuit of justice and equal opportunities, the development of infrastructure and the economy, the pursuit of quality education. It also shifts the collective national perception of Armenia in the system of states, transforming the disturbing but enduring national debates, which tend to argue about which direction or dominant power Armenia should align with.

Furthermore, the question concerning the organizing principles of political, economic and social life within the nation should equally be addressed. It also requires a deeper transcendence of national identity, determined not simply within the confines of ethnicity, language, religion or culture. Determining the internal political identity of a nation made up of individuals valuing individual freedoms is the key to unlocking the national talent and collective pursuit of prosperity and security. Internal political identity consolidates the sense of national patriotism, which directs it in the defense of not merely collective ethnicity, language, etc., and not just the defense of collective independence and freedom, but of the value of personal liberty enjoyed within national sovereignty.

If there is a shared view and consensus about the primacy of personal freedoms and civil liberties within these organizing principles, then concepts such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights and a market economy are elevated from trivial words, no longer used to appease or provoke external actors, and become deeper and true national values worthy of protection.

The protection of  identity within sovereignty and political independence, therefore combines both the national and political components of identity. And such national domestic determinants lay the foundations for the formulation and pursuit of a transformative and strategic foreign policy.

These parameters may identify Armenia’s place and affiliation with countries with similar values, namely the democratic free world. It shapes the respective foreign policy context and content of relations with partners in Europe, the United States and other like-minded nations. In practical foreign policy terms, it implies the use of dialogue, cooperation and engagement for the purposes of strengthening national capacities to protect and defend sovereignty within the adopted political identity of the nation. I often argued before, for example, that Armenia’s Association Agreement with the European Union, botched by Armenia’s leadership in 2013, had less to do with the EU, but everything to do with Armenia, given the powerful transformative nature of normative and regulatory approximation with the EU, aimed at elevating Armenia’s national capacities to higher standards in practically every walk of life. However, we have been trapped into the confrontational geopolitical side of the argument.

It would certainly be naïve to assume that Armenia’s value-based relations with the like-minded world would be one-dimensional and philanthropic on the part of the latter. Their geopolitical interests, including in our region, cannot be expected to be rooted strictly in values. It remains Armenia’s challenge and the most taxing trial to establish and entrench its role as a valuable and indispensable regional and international actor. The leadership in establishing such a role, combined with agile and flexible foreign policy, is strictly Armenia’s act. Therefore, one should certainly be cautioned against interpreting our foreign policy priorities in a narrow and dangerously limited sense of confrontational geopolitics, for one thing we must have learned from own experience is that geography is destiny and choices within the narrow confines of geopolitics are a shortcut to rendering ourselves small change in big transactions. A different level of pragmatism, deeply cognizant of geographic and geopolitical realities, is required. These are the considerations that prompt the idea of rippling circles of foreign policy, starting with the focus on the region and opening up to the concept of equidistance from the regional powers. 

III.  Regional Equidistance and a Balancing Act

Realistically, value-based relations with like-minded nations and regions would not be sufficient to address Armenia’s strategic security challenges. Geography is destiny, and we live in the reality of the region we belong to.

In our region, reality is shaped in a way that comprises three regional powers, Russia, Turkey and Iran, each with a strong regional presence and interests and everlasting rivalry for influence. The three countries of the South Caucasus, namely Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, have never in the past 34 years shared identity the way the Benelux, the Nordic or the Baltic states have. Each country was, in its own way, contributing to the ongoing rivalry of the regional powers. For example, Armenia’s excessive dependence on Russia and absence of relations with Turkey were, in effect, a contributing factor to such rivalries, for which Armenia eventually paid a very high price.

The best Armenia can do is to consider a strategic positioning of equidistance with all the three regional powers. Such equidistance  would aim at discouraging aggressive policies toward Armenia, as well as elevating the interest towards the presence of Armenia in the region as a country with a stable and predictable political, legal and economic framework and environment, a balanced shock absorber of regional interests and rivalries. The notion of political identity, as argued above, is the only viable framework to unlock the full potential of expanding national capacities for development and enhancing its strategic predictability.  The strategic positioning of regional equidistance from regional powers would in its turn serve to protect such identity while increasing Armenia’s political and economic appeal. By maintaining a balanced stance, Armenia can attract greater interest from regional powers, ensuring its role as a balancer and a strategically valuable small regional nation with capacities to absorb their interests. Put simply, aim at national capacities and regional policies positioning Armenia in such a way that makes regional powers disinterested in attacking it, but rather more interested in sustaining it as it is. One should be very careful not to confuse policies of regional equidistance with those of neutrality in a narrower sense. The former requires an active foreign policy and engagement in reformatting Armenia’s existing regional relations.

In pursuit of regional equidistance, Armenia is compelled to consistently elevate its national capacities, entrench effective and democratic state and national institutions. It must put into place reliable and favorable legal frameworks, trade, economic and taxation regimes, an independent court system, enhance its infrastructure, support and promote its growing technology and banking sectors, bolster its educational system to become a hub for regional innovation, attracting investments from both East and West and elevating its role in regional and global value and supply chains. Not least of all, its identity in the entirety, as discussed above, should make Armenia an attractive destination for regional tourism, capitalizing on our vast culture, heritage and civilizational imprint. Simply put, why attack Armenia, when it is prudent, does not contribute to disturbing the regional balance of power, and is sensibly equidistant and attractive to interact with politically, economically or culturally.

There are two fundamental challenges for the pursuit of the concept of equidistance. First, the institutionalized diversity of Armenia’s dependency on Russia has been structural, covering a broad range of political, security, economic, energy, social and cultural aspects of the bilateral interactions. For a long time Armenia has been a willing replicator of certain strands of Russia’s political culture, especially in light of the latter’s aversion to liberal democratic tendencies in the post-Soviet space. The channels of Russia’s influence on Armenia, both in domestic and foreign policy, have been strong. The unabating imperial instincts of Russia in the post-Soviet space have been manifest in relations with Armenia as well.

The attribution to Russia of the role of protector of the Armenians against the background of an enduring conflict with Azerbaijan and a fear of Turkey’s belligerence clouded our perception of Russia’s broader and vital interests in the region. Russia instrumentalized the role of a protector for the pursuit of its global and regional strategic objectives. These objectives are uninterrupted and aim at reducing and neutralizing big power competition in the region in order to sustain its perceived sphere of influence; they are both geostrategic and geo-economic. It is exactly in light of these broader strategic objectives of Russia that make its relations with Armenia subordinate to the priorities of its global and regional power competition. Hence, the broad space for fluctuations and, whenever necessary, forgoing the vital security concerns of the junior partner, Armenia. To our detriment these realities and the lessons of past history have been ignored.

The blanket over-dependence on Russia has unwittingly made  Armenia a contributor to the regional power competition. Combined with the absence of relations with Turkey, it effectively rendered Armenia as an extension cord of Russia’s resources in the regional rivalry. It effectively reduced Armenia’s maneuvering space and blunted its capacity for a balancing act to absorb such rivalry and mitigate the existential risks to its security. The absence of cohesion and the divergence of geopolitical choices among the three regional states of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan has provided further fertile ground for this. Eventually it worked against Armenia in a most damaging way.

The extension of the power rivalry between Turkey and Russia to the South Caucasus, as discussed earlier, determines additional aspects to the present context of Russia’s relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The situation is further compounded by the fierce, ongoing phase of Russia’s antagonistic relations with the Euro-Atlantic world. Russia’s intense opposition to liberal democratic trends in the post-Soviet space is an additional contributing factor. The primary objective of sustaining a presence in the South Caucasus against the background of Russia’s stretched capacities elsewhere prompts its significantly higher degree of flexibility with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and overall strategic patience towards them. Russia and Turkey share a long history of rivalry. As big regional powers, they think long term and factor into their calculations the long-term fluidity and shifts in ascendancies of power.  Meanwhile, this significantly raises Armenia’s vulnerabilities.

Untangling such relations of over-dependency is a Herculean task. The security and economic risks are significant. However, without reformatting these relations Armenia will be denied any opportunity of regional equidistance, the primary function of which is survival. Regional equidistance does not deny relations with Russia. To the contrary, it embraces such relations, however not in the current form. Russia’s proclivity to comprehend Armenia’s concerns about over-dependency and aspirations for a moderate and balancing regional act would be low. Russia will continue to assert its version of relations. As a big power, it thinks in terms of spheres of influence, of power competition and subordination of interests of smaller states as needed. Moscow is not inclined to accept, for example, that political developments and changes in small nations may be rooted primarily in their domestic dynamics; they consider them as orchestrated essentially by external powers.

Therefore, a degree of political crisis in the process of reformatting relations is inevitable. If unchecked, however,  such a crisis may deliver a mortal blow to Armenia. Careful and sustained engagement with Russia in advancing the agenda for a remodeled relationship should take precedence over a more confrontational approach. Disengagements from such institutional structures of cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, which impede the agenda of equidistance should be pursued with patience and caution. Drastic shifts to alternative alliances should be avoided. History offers examples of Russia’s moderation and acquiescence with small neighbors refraining from contributing to its perceived security threats. The pursuit of these objectives should be complemented and synchronized with the dynamics in relations with all other regional actors and international partners. While doing so, the central theme of pursuit of equidistance must remain distinct from confrontational narratives, including those originating outside Armenia.

The second critical challenge to the concept of equidistance is the absence of relations with Turkey. It is obviously impossible to ignore the strong political, military and economic alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey, which significantly impinges Armenia’s ability to pursue sustainable regional security. The absence of relations with Turkey further aggravates this situation. The establishment of such relations has been and remains a strategic priority in that the establishment of normality and functioning institutional mechanisms for dialogue between the two sovereign states. While unlikely to resolve all historical disputes, it will effectively act as a shock absorber and a platform for regional reformatting of relations and sustainable regional security. It will elevate Armenia’s capacities to navigate regional competition and rivalries and its role as a more effective contributor to regional stability.

Ankara’s policies, aimed at regional advantages for Turkey at the expense of the other two regional powers, Russia and Iran, will only aggravate the vulnerabilities of the region, and of Armenia in particular. Take, for example, the question of the so-called “Zangezur corridor”, which relates to the overt intention of Turkey and Azerbaijan to establish a geographic link between the two at the expense of the territorial integrity of Armenia and the sovereign control of its southern regions. Iran’s fierce opposition to this should be viewed first of all in the context of the deep perception of the significant risks of a shifting regional balance in favor of Turkey. Russia’s current appeasing stance is objectionable for Armenia, as it starkly illustrates how Russia prioritizes its national interest of protecting its presence in the region at the expense of Armenia. Again, history is helpful. It has happened before. Sovereign control of our territory cannot be compromised, as it would be utterly detrimental for Armenia. It would be difficult to expect Turkey to prioritize regional stability at the expense of its own perceived strategic gains. However, Armenia’s priority of establishing relations in the interest of both regional stability and its own security cannot be diminished.

Ironically, normal relations in its conventional sense between Armenia and Turkey as two sovereign independent states is an unknown experience. Historically, such relations practically never existed. Direct dialogue between Yerevan and Ankara has been sporadic, constrained and ineffective. In reality, Armenia was the only country in the region to delegate its relations and dialogue with Turkey to other regional or extra-regional actors. This anomaly has only exacerbated Armenia’s security vulnerabilities, and thereby heightening the strategic priority of establishing direct relations and dialogue with Turkey.

It would be highly arrogant to attempt explaining to Turkey what its own national interest should be regarding the normalization of relations with Armenia. However, the real incentive may lie in the mutual benefit of exploring an entirely uncharted path of direct and regular political and diplomatic relations and dialogue through proper channels between sovereign states. Such relations, of course, will not resolve existing problems and contentions. However, applying mechanisms of diplomacy would certainly expand the capacities of both to regulate and mitigate tensions, coordinate on regional and extra-regional challenges, and gradually augment the list of other national agents, whether political, economic, cultural or intellectual. The genocide is an undeniable fact, but should not remain a constant impediment to state-to-state relations. One might also argue that normalizing relations would constrain others from manipulating Armenia into channeling regional instability. For Armenia, the core strategic objective remains the expansion of its diplomatic maneuverability, reinforcing the principle of regional equidistance, and fostering sustainable regional stability.

Regrettably, at the time of this writing Turkey’s procrastination only contributes to the impression that ongoing bilateral attempts to normalization are just a dialogue for the sake of dialogue. As such, it is a significantly destabilizing approach. Their ongoing insistence on sustaining a direct link between the normalization of relations with Armenia and the Armenia-Azerbaijan agenda is a source of danger for us and the region. This approach sheds light on Ankara’s potential, and perhaps more sinister, objective of taking advantage of a perceived historical opportunity to loop in the Turkic world and challenge Armenia’s sovereignty, if not its physical existence. This represents an existential risk for Armenia, and will inevitably trigger countermeasures involving other actors. In its totality, such a situation is anything but sustainable regional stability. It is a manifestation of collective regional short-sightedness.

One should accept, of course, that politics is also interpersonal. The attempts of normalizing relations with Armenia are challenged, not least, by extensive interpersonal relations and alleged vested mutual interests of the leaderships in Baku and Ankara. It is reasonable to assume that there exists sufficient Azerbaijani leverage on Turkey’s decision making on regional affairs. If so, it is of course for Turkey to resolve such conditions and decide how to move in the region. However, one thing appears obvious. The normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia without the agency of a third party and on its own merit will introduce a significantly new and unprecedented regional reality with all its ensuing effects on relations between all regional actors, on regional balance of power and on sustainable regional stability.

Within the triangle of regional powers, Armenia’s relations with Iran represent perhaps the most convincing case for a potential pursuit of a successful regional equidistance.

Iran’s strategic interests are consistently challenged by continued adversarial relations with the United States and the Euro-Atlantic community, as much as within West Asia. Moreover, the sources of Iran’s primary security concerns are centered in the Middle East, from where its broader confrontational relations spread out, including with the Western world and in West Asia.

The sustained sanctions regime continues to cripple Iran’s capacities and curbs the utilization of its huge economic and energy potential. At the same time, Iran has been demonstrating an impressive ability of a significantly focused pursuit of national interest and an ensuing foreign policy of a highly independent nature. The point is not about whether we agree or disagree with the content and substance of their interests, and it is not the purpose of this discussion to delve into Iran’s relations with actors outside our region. The point is about the utility of their independent action to our relations.

Armenia shares a long history of coexistence and cultural and civilizational bonds with Iran. At the same time, there exists also a divergence of political models and identities, as much as of extra-regional and broader global entanglements. It is in Armenia’s obvious and undisputed interest to see Iran fully integrated in global affairs and the global economy, to see the sanctions regime lifted and its energy, economy and transport potentials brought to effect. However, it is not the case, and has not been for over 33 years since Armenia and Iran established relations. What became possible over the three decades of relations, and both Armenia and Iran can claim equal credit for this, is the highly coordinated, careful and nuanced pursuit of mutual interests and management of bilateral relations through the sequestering of these relations to the extent possible from the broader confrontational environment outside the bilateral context. It required a significant degree of flexibility, as well as sensitivity and respect for the different nature of challenges each country has been facing. It is exactly in this context that Armenia’s relations with Iran illustrate and explain the case for a successful pursuit of regional equidistance.  

As far as the other two countries of the region are concerned, namely Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia’s strategic vision can only be intertwined with the broader vision of regional equidistance vis a vis regional powers. It is also interlinked with Armenia’s relations with strategic partners beyond the region, namely the U.S., but to a greater extent Europe, on the one hand, and the world to the east and south east of the region, on the other. Within this context, cross-regional trade, transport and energy projects, policies and initiatives, so vital in our regional context, are prioritizing the importance of Armenia’s engagement and diversification in regional and global processes. The transport and energy corridors, connecting China, as much as India, East and Southeast Asia with Europe is a case in point. The positive side of the geographic location of Armenia, and of the South Caucasus in general lies exactly in its strategic position as one of the pathways in global value and supply chains.

Strategic interdependence with Georgia has been and remains the pivotal principle of relations with Georgia. Given history, realities and political choices to survive in the region, Armenia and Georgia depend on each other. At times we may have opposite friends and enemies, but this strategic interdependence is inevitable. If one goes down, the other follows. The present vulnerabilities, both global and regional, may in fact further blur the perception of such strategic interdependence in the respective capitals of Georgia and Armenia. Hopefully, vision and wisdom will prevail in both capitals. The present fluctuations in Georgia’s strategic positioning should prompt concern in Armenia. There is an obvious need for enhanced dialogue and coordination to mitigate the risks of deeper segregation of the two nations in the regional and global power rivalry.

At the strategic level the objectives are twofold. First, the compatibility of challenges for both nations, including size, political models, economic structures and other components prompts a serious consideration of building a stronger sense of compatibility of their identities. The practical function of such an ideological objective is to lay the groundwork in the longer term for a more integrated, coherent and cohesive region of the South Caucasus. For this, political leadership, enhanced public engagements and dialogue aimed at a gradual buildup of compatible narratives in favor of a regional cohesion are of great significance. Addressing and dismissing the occasionally transpiring elements of prejudice, arrogance, mistrust and public misconceptions of each other are of particular importance.

Stemming from the first objective, the second should aim at a serious concerted action for a co-penetration and interlocking of the national economies and infrastructure networks of the two nations. This is an equally long term process, both government- and business-led, inducing a fertile ground for pulling resources and augmenting scale. The amplification of mutual interest, as well as of political and economic reasons for the pursuit of this objective requires significant conceptual elaboration. For multiple reasons, stretching this idea to a common market is clearly premature at present, but perhaps not totally outlandish in the future. At present, however, this objective has enough pullbacks to focus on and address head on. Those include ferocious opposition from the regional adversaries of both nations, a lack of sufficient compatibility of business, tax and trade regimes, as well as a weak culture of cooperation.

In respect of relations with Azerbaijan the situation is the most complex, flammable and most nuanced. First, it is difficult to believe that a peace agreement, if it is even reached in the short run, will deliver a genuine peace. Armenia has been and remains a useful enemy for the regime in Baku. Its ultimate priority of securing a sustainable and stable dynasty will not change so long as the ruling family is in power. While a peace agreement may introduce a modest degree of mitigation against escalation, the depth of animosity cultivated against Armenians will not dissipate with a formal paper. It would take at least a generation to change attitudes.

Second, in calculating relations with Baku, one should not be fooled, but realize that the giddy heads in Baku after the war in 2020 will continue to strive to place maximum pressure on Armenia to gain maximum benefits at our expense. In the conditions of a shifting global order such risks are heightened. Realistically, for now, Armenia should aim at alternatives to genuine peace short of war. It may be a combination of policies. On the one hand, such policies should be firmly aligned and intertwined with Armenia’s broader regional and global engagements, with the consistent mitigation of the risks of war as its focus. While doing so, Armenia is also compelled to secure adequate defense capacities and a strength of will to defend itself. Without such capacity and will, efforts to deter the adversary and prevent a war will remain flawed.  The pursuit of confidence building measures across the border to avoid military clashes need to remain on the table. However, the expectations for achieving tangible measures should be moderate.

On the other hand, policies should be adjusted to carefully calibrated bilateral engagements, especially in the field of physical infrastructure and communications, as well as for the management of cross border resources and trade. All of these would aim at a gradual generation of mutual tangible interests.

This second set of policy objectives should not aim high for the moment, as the conditions for a more ambitious visualization of mutual interests are anything but favorable. As far as relations with Azerbaijan are concerned, the current reality precludes a viable prospect of long-term planning. The reality remains combustible and is entangled in the immediate condition of flux and unpredictability. Detection and implementation of short-term measures aimed at opening up space for the next set of steps toward sustainable peace appear the only available practical policy choice.

Perhaps the opening of transport communications might become a contributing factor to a slow generation of bilateral and a broader regional interest. It may not necessitate intense human contacts for the moment. In the present conditions of an enduring animosity, such contacts may turn out to be ineffective, if not outright dangerous. However, mutual interest in securing connectivity between the various geographical parts of each may prove useful for the broader context of mitigating a war and sowing seeds of peaceful co-existence, at least to start with. However, compromising sovereignty in this endeavor is tantamount to accepting annexation. This is a foremost red line.

The management of cross border common resources and trade appears a feasible function, appealing to the immediate daily needs of populations in bordering areas, provided there are populations there, of course. I am not quite persuaded that Azerbaijan shows interest in this. However, in principle, people on the ground are best placed to generate habits of coexistence and co-operation out of necessity and self-interest. As such, they may generate trickle down effects, provided, of course, there is no official obstruction to promoting cross border contacts.  As such, this policy line appears worthy of exploration.

The painful problem of the loss of Artsakh will haunt relations and all sorts of communication. This reality cannot be ignored. The formulation and pursuit of realistic parameters to address the future of Artsakh is an acutely complex and an unbearably emotional challenge. It requires a separate in-depth consideration. Meanwhile, the priority of the de-occupation of Armenia and full restoration of its territorial integrity is immediate. The effectiveness of linking this priority squarely on the border delineation and demarcation process is not convincing. This priority is a stand-alone issue to be dealt with on its own merit.

Under current conditions, Georgia’s role in fostering mutual interest for coexistence can be further enhanced through two-pronged engagement with Armenia and Azerbaijan, laying the groundwork for triangular regional cooperation. This approach involves identifying and prioritizing areas of shared trilateral interest. While those outside decision-making circles may struggle to grasp the full range of possibilities, the potential benefits of pursuing such avenues appear practical.

There is one final point to make by way of adding a historical and international context to the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Everyone was happy in 1984, when French President Francois Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl held their hands in Verdun and bowed their heads to honor the victims of the two devastating wars. This graceful act symbolized a reconciliation between the two nations. It took about 40 years of building the blocks of reconciliation, both at the bilateral and European levels. It took as long to revive a common democratic European identity. Everyone was happy, but the lingering resentment of the older generation, which bore the memory of the wars has not dissipated entirely. The happy ones were those who were reaping the fruits of the mutual interests of France and Germany. This analogy is to illustrate how far Armenia and Azerbaijan are in reaching that moment of genuine peace. It also exposes the concerted action, patience and relentless political will pursued for four decades to arrive at that point in Verdun. In our present condition it is perhaps equally useful to draw history lessons about the perils of appeasement, and to be occasionally reminded that appeasement is not exactly a recipe for peace. The greatest challenge at all times in history has been rooted in the proper and serious assessment of conditions within which a compromise would constitute a viable strategy. There is no intention to cultivate pessimism,  there is no utility in pessimism. The point rather is about focus and resolve to pursue priorities over time and calibrate policies pragmatically.

While considering the concept of regional equidistance and Armenia’s overall regional engagements, it is advisable to treat with utmost caution the so-called 3+3 format currently promoted by the regional powers. It bears some value in that potentially it provides a platform for an enhanced balancing act in regional power rivalry. It may serve as a platform for dialogue aimed at moderation of regional rivalries, the kind of soft-pedalled regional framework for checks and balances. It would be impractical, however, to try and place this dialogue format into an institutional hard shell of lofty regional commitments. Furthermore, conspicuous attempts to instrumentalize such a format for a specific purpose of isolating Armenia (and the other countries of the region for that matter), and truncating its capacities in broader cross regional and international engagements, in particular with the Euro-Atlantic partners, should be resisted. The reasons are obvious, as encapsulating Armenia and the South Caucasus in such a format will lock them squarely in the regional power competition, significantly reducing their bargaining power and consequently intensifying their vulnerabilities.    

The visualization of Armenia’s foreign policy in rippling circles prompts the recognition and importance of reinforced political, diplomatic, economic and other engagements in the neighboring regions. Such neighboring regions are geographically obvious, they include the Black Sea region, the East Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Gulf states and Central Asia. It is not the purpose of this particular discussion to comprehensively elaborate on each of them and on relations with each of the counties within them. However, in broad terms, such engagements require a degree of conceptual reformatting as well. The necessity of formulating our strategic agenda in relation to these regions, to the countries within them, and of firmly attaching this agenda to our security and development imperatives is compelling. 

First, each of these regions represents a natural geographic extension of Armenia and of the South Caucasus to the outer world. In terms of global production, trade, energy and transport links, each of these regions is an indispensable hook to attach ourselves and our region to the global value and supply chains.

Second, like in our own region, the enduring geopolitical realities within each of these neighboring regions continue to be a source of instability within them, and by way of ripples, into the outer world. Each of these regions, like ours, is a playground for global great power competition. Environments of regional instability are mutually penetrating, and therefore, expand the scale of broader vulnerability for each of the nations within each of the regions.

Third, and perhaps most importantly for us, each of these regions, though distinct in form, serves as a battleground for fierce competition among the South Caucasus’ regional powers: Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Through complex and elaborate engagements in each of these regions, mostly competitive, occasionally cooperative in nature, they sustain significant bargaining power against each other. Their capacity to compete and potentially compensate each other cross-regionally remarkably deepens the vulnerability of the smaller actors within the separate regions.

Out of these considerations, the elaborate and targeted engagements with the nations, especially of a compatible caliber, in the neighboring regions should aim at generating upgraded capacities for extending and enhancing Armenia’s global positioning. Equally, the generation of a reformatted bilateral, and also a cross-regional agenda as much as possible should be meant to mitigate the pressures of regional and global power competition on smaller states. It should enable an improved capacity and a coordinated action of the vulnerable states towards their individual and collective balancing act. For example, the initiation and utilization of various interweaving cross-regional mini-lateral platforms of cooperation and dialogue might prove a pragmatic method of mitigating great power rivalries. It is obvious, of course, that the pursuit of the rippling circles of foreign policy requires creativity, augmentation and adaptation of Armenia’s diplomatic capacities. 

IV. Small States in Global Power Competition

Politics and foreign policy in particular are determined by the invisible hand of conjecture, of the unknown, as much as by fluidity. The current conditions of global great power competition are particularly telling. This transitory post-unipolar global order has already generated an environment of global fragmentation and fracture.

 The ongoing political, expert and academic debates about the nature of an emerging new world order are overwhelming. The term used most often is an emerging new multipolar world, although there are alternative terms in circulation as well, such as a redesigned bipolar world order, made up of the United States and China as the most profound global economic, political and military powers. Others argue that while American global dominance remains fundamentally unmatched, the mounting challenges to its power have led to the emergence of a modified unipolar world.

Historians continue to enrich these debates with numerous examples of past global order transformations. The most striking lesson from history is that lasting world orders often emerge and solidify in the aftermath of catastrophic conflicts—such as the Thirty Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, or the two World Wars of the 20th century.

These discussions and historical precedents serve as stark reminders of the enduring realities of great power institutions, balance of power struggles, war, international law, and diplomacy within the state system. Our focus, of course, lies in the lessons for a small state caught in the crosshairs of great power rivalry.

The reality of great powers wielding superior force, a larger share of global influence, and a greater capacity to shape both global goods and threats is enduring and immutable. Their rivalries remain fierce and unrelenting. Unsurprisingly, ongoing debates frequently resurrect the concept of the Thucydides Trap: a structural strain on the world order caused by a rising power challenging an established one, where violent confrontation becomes the rule rather than the exception. This dynamic casts a chilling shadow over the world, but for smaller states, the existential threat it poses grows exponentially.

The current fluidity of the world order reflects the convergence of several tectonic shifts in international relations. Chief among them is the evolving role of the United Nations Security Council, which, despite being the primary institution of collective security since World War II, continues to function on a framework that delegates a significant share of global security responsibilities to its five permanent members. However, the fault lines in delivering such collective security have significantly widened as a result of a manifest mismatch between the realities of the post-1945 world and the present times. A meaningful reform of the Security Council remains an illusion. If the reform may only occur as a result of another global catastrophic conflagration, it only enriches the narrative of the pessimists. Meanwhile, the existing normative values and standards devised to sustain peace and collective security are violated more systematically than ever. The crisis of the existing institutional designs for collective security prompts a considerable fragmentation and compartmentalization of security set-ups, thereby consistently pushing the existing international system to a breaking point. Second, the twenty-first century is a witness to a profound and continuous proliferation and diversification of global power centers, including by way of a speedy reformatting of the Global South. Third, the significant increase of global transnational threats and challenges continues to endanger the whole of the world against the background of a demonstrable lack of capacity or will to a more meaningful concerted global action. Fourth, the unprecedented levels of globalization, migration, technological progress, interdependence and interconnectedness, which having reached its peaks, have been triggering a powerful counteraction and pullback, reviving sentiments of nationalism and entrenchment, protectionism and revision of the limits of free trade and free movement.

This evidently non-conclusive list of global threats and challenges is exactly the source of increased levels of conjecture, fluidity, fragmentation and fracture. The great power institution is under profound stress, the releasing energy of which is experienced most painfully on the edges of tectonic shifts, that is the smaller states.  

The poles, or centers of gravity in a multipolar, bipolar or a partially unipolar world, whichever description suits individual tastes, imply at all times colliding circles of influence and fault lines, made up of the periphery comprising mostly small, often vulnerable states, but also medium sized ones. The historical examples of vulnerable states caught between colliding and interweaving circles of power, what the powers love to call spheres of influence, are abundant.

The most fundamental, and indeed existential, challenge facing smaller nations on the periphery of global power struggles is the risk of being reduced to a bargaining chip, mere collateral in high-stakes geopolitical transactions. This threat is as present today as it has been throughout history. Consider, for example, the evolving narratives on potential resolutions to the war in Ukraine or the draft Russia-U.S. and Russia-NATO treaties proposed by Moscow in December 2021. Armenia, in particular, has a long history of being treated as expendable in the calculations of larger powers.

The trouble for the peripheral world is as much in the definition of global stability, imposed by the central powers, the great powers, as an absence of major military confrontations between them. Such a definition is exactly the source of turning the periphery into a bargaining chip. But what difference does it make to the periphery if they perish as a result of global confrontations, wars, a nuclear apocalypse, and together with all others, or separately as a result of big transactions? They still perish.

Such risks and threats amplify the requirements, instincts, mindsets and skills of the peripheral world, of the small, but also of medium-sized nations for persistently maneuvering into survival and resilience. The present political vocabulary of the analysts is pointedly invoking terminology such as fence-sitting, hedging and balancing. Again, this is not a new phenomenon. The history and experience of Armenia is more than tragic in this sense.

One significant advantage of the present world is an enduring presence and proliferation of multilateralism in international relations, both at global, regional and cross regional levels. Multilateralism is indeed a platform and capacity provider for normative rules, order and predictability. It enhances space for collective bargaining, checks and balances for, and moderation in the behavior of the great powers, whether they are at global or regional level. However, it is certainly not a panacea for the rest, especially for the community of vulnerable small states.

Nevertheless, the rest, the community of small and medium sized nations depend on the rationalist Grotian doctrine of separation of power from security and seeking mechanisms and platforms to absorb, mitigate, moderate an minimize the devastating effects of great powers’ conflict of interests and propensity to see the world in terms of spheres of influence. This is undeniably a common interest for the world of small nations.

It is in the manifesto of the small nations to fear and be skeptical of great powers, to doubt the great powers’ claim of responsible action. Such collective skepticism is the source of their collective interest to pursue checks and balances on great powers through all available means of global, regional and cross-regional multilateralism and through the acquired liberation, emancipation and enfranchisement of small states within the doctrine of equality of states in the international society. Small nations are the primary proponents of the institutions of international law and diplomacy in the system of states, of the international order grounded in predictability, rules and balance of interests, as they have no other defense against great powers. They are the true international confederalists.  

Multilateralism has evolved into a multitude of intertwining and overlapping complex cobwebs of platforms, different in mandate, focus, agenda, scope of participation, etc. This is a challenge in itself to hold the sovereign ship of a small state steady in a troubled ocean of multilateralism. It requires a consistent clarity of national priorities in formulating survival and resilience strategies, to which multilateralism is served. It shouldn’t occur the other way round, when national interests are subordinated to the flows of international and extraterritorially defined agenda.

This complex cobwebs are only proliferating, including the established institutionalized global and regional organizations with the UN at its helm, institutionalized alliances such as NATO, but also a myriad of partnerships, networks, clubs, mini-lateralist frameworks, also at global, regional and cross regional levels. From the viewpoint of small states, in principle they are useful and have a good utilitarian value, also as platforms for balancing and moderation of rivalries. However, the historical examples of the perils of great power competition and breakdown in the capacities of small states to perform a balancing act should consistently remind us of the magnitude of ensuing catastrophes.

The most critical point concerning the place of smaller states in global politics is about clarity in recognition of power and their capacity to pragmatically interpret and adapt power in their own context. Power determined by size, population, economic and military strength a priori determine the vulnerabilities of smaller states. The interpretation and adaptation of power to strategic objectives for a small state should be expected to lead to a strategic vision for constructing and developing capacities for shock absorption and moderation of great power competition, globally or regionally. It should enable the capacity for generating its own role in balancing power competition, a shared interest among stronger powers in the existence and equidistance of the smaller state, and signifying a distinct role for the latter in becoming valuable to big competitors. In other words, it should be able to induce and develop a combined disinterest of the bigger players in the destruction of the smaller player out of their individual interests. Pursuit of such a strategic vision should be expected to lead to defining, as well as practically and pragmatically constructing the power of the smaller state. Such power is built by putting in place stable, sustainable and reliable national institutions, focused, among other things, on the comparative advantages of the smaller state in the region or globally. How could that apply to Armenia? The present discussion was exactly an effort to contribute to an ongoing national debate about the fundamental principles of nation-state building, about navigating Armenia in the complex world as a nation-state and as a member of the society of states. It was an effort to offer boundaries of a national consensus about the fundamentals, while respecting the divergence of methods to pursue national goals.

In conclusion, Armenia’s biggest challenge is to address and change the mindset of dependency on one country, block of countries or regions for security. This is not exactly the mindset of a sovereign state, even though a small one. The dominance of views in the political vocabulary of the nation, which define Armenia’s foreign policy priorities as going in the direction of Russia, or Europe, or whichever other way are signs of immaturity. I previously argued that such mindsets are fitting for liberation movements of nations, which are not states, and who pin hopes exclusively on the benevolence of a big brother. Nation-states cannot think in these terms. These are mindsets of dependency. As a nation-state Armenia will stay exactly where it is and has been, and will stay in the future. To survive as a nation-state, Armenia, a small nation, cannot build its policies on adversarialism, antagonism, conflict or steering rivalries. As a nation, we have many difficult historical injustices to cope with. They will continue to haunt us, and in fact we are not an exception in this regard. However, as a nation-state, if we are to survive as one, we need a truly rational, realist and pragmatic approach, at the heart of which is the consistent development of national capacities to sustain a nation-state: self-reliance, capacity to defend our state, our national and political identities, pragmatic engagements at the regional level, based on the principle of equidistance, as much as the use of value-based relations with like-minded nations to enhance our national capacities and to mitigate security risks to our nation. In short, it is not about Armenia going somewhere, but staying where it is and utilizing in a mature and pragmatic way the available instruments of sovereignty and political independence in order to address strategic security risks and development challenges, and to enhance national capacities of a viable and functional nation-state.

None of this is possible without internal cohesion and stability. For Armenia to succeed as a small state in a complex region, it must address its domestic challenges and political polarization through reasoned debate and discussion commensurate with a stable, sober and rational democratic society. No geopolitical reality is permanent. Small states must adapt to survive. But they must also recognize that change creates opportunities for those who are prepared to seize them. As we look to our future, we should continue to draw inspiration from our history as a resilient and resourceful nation. Armenia can chart a path that ensures its survival and prosperity in a turbulent world.