Calling a Spade a Spade: The ICJ Orders Azerbaijan to Lift Its Blockade

On February 22, 2023, by a near unanimous vote (13 for, 2 against), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Azerbaijan to urgently “take all measures at its disposal to ensure unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo along the Lachin Corridor in both directions.” The ICJ also unanimously rejected Azerbaijan’s counter-request for provisional measures in its entirety. Both decisions were issued on the 73rd day since Nagorno-Karabakh has been under siege after Azerbaijani so-called “eco-activists” set up camp on December 12, 2022, to block the only road linking its Armenian population to the outside world. 

The humanitarian crisis that has since ensued has prompted repeated calls reverberating around the world for Azerbaijan to restore free movement along the Lachin Corridor. Despite this, Azerbaijan’s unwavering response, including before the ICJ, has been to resolutely deny that there is any blockade at all since the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been permitted to pass through. In fact, just a few days prior, at the Munich Security Conference, President Aliyev reiterated: “Since 12 December […] there have been more than 2500 vehicles, including trucks of Russian peacekeepers and the representatives of the Red Cross. Almost 100 medical patients from Karabakh were taken by the Red Cross to Armenia for treatment. So, how can we call it a blockade when there is an open road? And if Armenians in Karabakh try to use this road, I’m sure no one will stop them.” 

Besides the intent for ethnic cleansing evidenced in such rhetoric that the road is open for Armenians who wish to leave Nagorno-Karabakh, these statements ignore the fact that the ICRC’s delivery of humanitarian aid to those afflicted by other blockades — such as in Yemen or Gaza — has never seriously put into question their closed or unacceptably disrupted status. And while the ICJ was careful with how it used the term “blockade” in its decision on Armenia’s request — placing it in quotation marks or preceding it with “alleged” (see Order, paras 9, 24, 31, 41) — it nevertheless unequivocally determined that the Lachin Corridor is not in fact open, but rather so “disrupted” that it “may have a serious detrimental impact on the health and lives of individuals” and that there is thus “a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused” (see Order, paragraphs 54-57). 

The ICJ’s bottom line is therefore: regardless of what terminology Armenia or Azerbaijan want to use to describe the situation, Azerbaijan must act immediately to end the disruption and reinstate free movement along the Lachin Corridor. In light of such a clear conclusion, it would be downright bizarre for Azerbaijani officials to continue to toe the party line that Azerbaijan’s current conduct with respect to the Lachin Corridor is unimpeachable. 

This has not, however, dissuaded Azerbaijani officials from desperately trying to spin the ruling in their favor. Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to France, for instance, seems to have skipped reading the operative part of the order altogether. The same appears to be the case for Azerbaijan’s Agent before the ICJ who, along with Azerbaijan’s entire legal team, was noticeably absent from the courtroom during the reading of the decisions in both Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s cases. Such willful misinterpretations (see also here and here) spark no confidence that Azerbaijan intends to obey the ICJ’s order.

Which leads to the million-dollar question: Can the ICJ’s order be enforced if Azerbaijan refuses to comply with it? 

There is no doubt that the ICJ’s order is binding on Azerbaijan. The ICJ has repeatedly affirmed that its “orders on provisional measures under Article 41 [of the Statute] have binding effect” (see LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of June 27, 2001, paragraph 109) and thus create international legal obligations for any party to whom the provisional measures are addressed (see Allegations of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Order of March 16, 2002, paragraph 84). If a party fails to comply with such provisional measures, the ICJ could eventually order reparations owed by the breaching party during the assessment of the merits of the case (see Application of the Genocide Convention: Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of  February 26, 2007, paragraph 469). 

In other words, if Azerbaijan refuses to comply or in any way engages in conduct that is inconsistent with the content of the order, the ICJ could decide to grant in its final judgment in the overall case of Armenia vs. Azerbaijan a form of reparation adequate to the nature of the continued disruption of the Lachin Corridor. But that could take years, and with the hardships brought on by the blockade accumulating more with each passing day, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh just don’t have that kind of time. 

So, can the order be enforced sooner? Article 94(1) of the UN Charter requires each UN member state to “comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.” Article 94(2) then provides that, “[i]f any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.” It is unclear, however, whether such recourse to the UN Security Council under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter also applies to orders for provisional measures, or whether it is reserved only for final judgments. That being said, should Azerbaijan fail to restore unimpeded movement along the Lachin Corridor as per the ICJ’s order, nothing precludes the UN Security Council from deciding, on its own initiative, to condemn Azerbaijan’s conduct or otherwise impose measures to compel Azerbaijan to abide by the order.

Whether or to what extent Azerbaijan will accept the ICJ’s latest order remains to be seen, though predictions that the Court’s instructions will be largely ignored are not entirely unreasonable. What, if any, consequences Azerbaijan’s possible non-compliance may entail will also depend on the extent of the irreparable harm its continued conduct will likely cause. It can only be hoped that humanitarian considerations will soon prevail to bring an end to this senseless crisis.

Also see