To Boycott COP or Not?

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Only two months remain to increase pressure on Azerbaijan, which the United Nations entrusted with organizing COP29, from November 11-22, 2024. As the event approaches, this decision is drawing growing global condemnation. Numerous political leaders and NGOs equate it to giving a free pass to the dictatorial Aliyev regime, accused of ethnic cleansing in Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh.

In France, the political class is growing increasingly agitated. In December 2023, eight French officials published an opinion piece in the La Tribune Dimanche, titled “COP 29 in Baku, a Meeting of Shame and Dishonor.” On March 29, the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Regional Council adopted a motion titled “Our region will not participate in COP 29 organized in Baku.” Two months later, on May 24, the Paris City Council unanimously passed a resolution urging France to boycott this conference. Xavier Bertrand, president of the Hauts-de-France region, issued a similar call on May 19, following revelations about Baku’s interference in the New Caledonian crisis aimed at destabilizing France.

In the United States, Democratic Senator Ed Markey on June 11 called on the Biden administration and the international community to leverage COP29 to secure the release of all prisoners of war and hostages held by Azerbaijan. After highlighting Baku’s multiple human rights violations, he emphasized, “If Azerbaijan claims to want peace, what it really wants is to act with impunity while being rewarded by the United States and the international community (…).”

Aside from these few voices, Western governments are complicitly silent.

Baku’s dismal record on climate and environmental issues is well documented. In response, NGOs and political ecology actors are preparing a counter-offensive against what appears to be “greenwashing.” The Europe Ecology – The Green party in France, for instance, does not intend to stand idly by in the face of the Aliyev regime’s propaganda. Without any shame, the regime issued a decree in December declaring 2024 the “Year of Solidarity for a Green World.”

While there is little hope that governments will react or boycott this summit, a historic opportunity may be opening for defenders of justice, freedom, and the environment.

Activists supporting a free Artsakh must emphasize the right to return and the release of Armenian prisoners and hostages to all participants at COP29 more than ever.

The numbers speak for themselves: Azerbaijan ranked 7 out of 100 in the 2024 global freedom index by Freedom House, scoring 0/40 for political rights and 7/60 for civil liberties. Meanwhile, Reporters Without Borders placed Azerbaijan at a dismal 164th position out of 180 countries in 2024, down from 151st in 2023. In their latest reports, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlight issues such as the blockade and ethnic cleansing in Artsakh, the catastrophic state of public freedoms, press freedom, and instances of torture and ill-treatment in prisons.

Defending Integral Ecology

In this uneven struggle, the issue of ecology remains a fundamental issue. Relevant organizations must meticulously document pollution trends in the Caspian Sea, the Absheron Peninsula, and the rest of the country caused by intensive gas and oil extraction. They must also highlight the air pollution resulting from abnormally high levels of greenhouse gas and carbon dioxide emissions.

Ecology here extends beyond protecting the soil and air; it also has human and civilizational dimensions. The Azerbaijani regime is actively erasing traces of the millennia-old Armenian presence in the region, as evidenced in the cultural genocide in Nakhichevan in the last century and the ongoing destruction of Armenian heritage in Artsakh. Another overlooked issue is the plight of Azerbaijan’s national minorities. While Baku proudly displays harmonious relations among Jewish, Russian Orthodox, and Turkic-speaking Shia majority communities, it neglects to promote Lezgin or Talysh culture and largely ignores the Kurdish issue dating back to the Soviet era.

According to Minority Rights Group, Azerbaijan is a mosaic of 13 ethnic groups, which make up about 5% of the total population. According to the 2019 census, Azeris constitute 94.8% of the population. Among the minority communities, Lezgins (1.7%), Talysh (0.9%), and Russians (0.7%), form the larger minorities. Several smaller minorities, each representing less than 1% of the total population, include Avars (0.5%), Turks (0.3%), Tatars (0.2%), Ukrainians (0.1%), Georgians (0.1%), Jews (0.1%), Udis (0.1%), and Tsakhurs (0.1%).

The Lezgins are a Caucasian people who speak Lezgian, a Northeast Caucasian language. They primarily live in northern Azerbaijan. While the Azerbaijani government’s census reports approximately 180,300 Lezgins in the country, Lezgin organizations estimate their population to be between 600,000 and 900,000. This discrepancy could be due to many Lezgins claiming Azeri ethnicity to avoid discrimination in employment and education. 

In 1992, a Lezgin organization called Sadval (Unity) was established to promote Lezgin rights. It is an irredentist movement with the explicit goal of creating a Lezgin state in the Lezgin-inhabited territories of Dagestan and Azerbaijan. Another Lezgin organization in Azerbaijan, Samur, advocates for cultural autonomy.

Lezgins have long faced unemployment and insufficient land for grazing and cultivation. Their frustration peaked in 1992 when approximately 105,000 refugees from the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) war were resettled on Lezgin lands. Issues related to land, employment, language, and lack of internal autonomy have fueled a desire for self-determination, increasing tensions between the Lezgins and the Azerbaijani government. 

The Talysh, another minority group living in the southern regions bordering Iran, are reportedly sent to the front lines to fight against Armenians, where they experience higher than average mortality rates.

Few remember the Kurds of Azerbaijan and the relative cultural freedom they enjoyed until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Kurdish community in Azerbaijan numbers around 70,000 people––less than 1% of the total population of 9.9 million. From 1923 to 1930, an autonomous Kurdish region called “Red Kurdistan,” existed in Azerbaijan, between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan’s borders with Armenia to the west and Iran to the south. However, Joseph Stalin later deported most of the Kurdish population of Transcaucasia to Kazakhstan.

One thing is certain today: unlike the Armenian parliament, which includes representatives from the Assyrian and Yazidi communities, the Azerbaijani parliament lacks elected officials capable of adequately representing its numerous minorities.

As COP29 draws attention to the Aliyev regime, advocates for the Armenian cause must keep the right of return for the people of Artsakh at the forefront of their agenda. They face the daunting task of linking this struggle with the previously discussed issues, which together portray Azerbaijan as a pariah state. Despite this, it has managed to position itself as an indispensable player in the international system.

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