From November 9 to Article 9: The Anatomy of a Ceasefire Statement

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On November 9, 2020, the 44-day war over Nagorno-Karabakh concluded with a trilateral statement signed by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. This statement not only established a ceasefire but also aimed to regulate the post-war landscape. However, in the four years since, both Russia and Azerbaijan have failed to uphold their commitments. This failure led to the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population in Artsakh. Despite these developments, one particular clause of the statement remains a source of ongoing tension between Armenia on one side and Russia and Azerbaijan on the other.

The Statement 

Article 1 of the November 9 trilateral statement ended the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, stipulating that the warring parties should stop at their current positions. This meant that the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast which Azerbaijan had not captured during the war would remain under Armenian control. The seven regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenian forces had controlled since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War from the 1990s, were to be handed over to Azerbaijan under subsequent clauses. 

This article was violated one month after the statement’s signing when special units of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces attacked and captured the villages of Khtsaberd and Hin Tagher in Hadrut region on December 12, 2020. When the war ended on November 9, 2020, these villages were still controlled by Armenian forces, while Hadrut itself had been taken by Azerbaijan in the beginning of October during the height of the war. 

During a Security Council session the following day, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan emphasized that the attack occurred before Russian peacekeepers had fully deployed in the region. He noted that Azerbaijan halted its offensive only after a small contingent of Russian peacekeepers arrived.

Azerbaijan again breached this article in March 2022 when its Armed Forces entered Artsakh from Aghdam, seizing the village of Parukh and taking positions on the Karaglukh heights. Parukh residents were forced to flee, with women and children from the nearby village of Khramort evacuated earlier on March 15 following threatening actions by Azerbaijani troops. On March 25, Azerbaijani forces deployed Bayraktar drones near Parukh, killing three Artsakh servicemen and wounding 15 others. Clashes continued on March 26 and by March 28, Azerbaijani forces had withdrawn from Parukh, placing the village under the control of Russian peacekeepers. However, Artsakh authorities reported that Azerbaijani forces still occupied a section of Karaglukh, while Armenian forces retained control over most of the area.

Media reports suggested that Russian inaction partly contributed to the Azerbaijani advance. Claims circulated about an agreement to replace Armenian forces in the region with Russian peacekeepers, aiming to de-escalate tensions following Azerbaijan’s actions in March.

Article 2 of the November 9, 2020 trilateral statement stipulated that the Aghdam region would be handed over to Azerbaijan by November 20, 2020. On this date, the Armenian side ceded control of Aghdam to Azerbaijan. In the preceding two days, seven Armenian-populated villages near Aghdam were evacuated, with residents relocating to Martakert and nearby settlements. 

Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the statement governed the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Article 3 stipulated that Russian peacekeepers would be stationed along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin Corridor. The contingent comprised 1,960 servicemen equipped with firearms, 90 armored vehicles, and 380 motor vehicles and units of special equipment.

According to Article 5 of the statement, the command of the Russian peacekeeping forces was to be stationed in Stepanakert to oversee the operation of the mission. Later, it was determined that the mission would have as its headquarters the Stepanakert airport.

The main task of the Russian peacekeeping mission was to ensure the security of the civilian population in Artsakh. However, despite their presence, they failed to prevent Azerbaijan’s systematic threats and harassment, which included constant intimidation of border villages, targeting of farmers, injuring civilians, damaging agricultural equipment, and disrupting farming activities. 

Article 4 of the statement mandated that the Russian peacekeeping contingent would be deployed as the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia withdrew. In July 2022, Armenia’s Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan announced that no conscripted servicemen from Armenia would be stationed in Artsakh. He indicated that the withdrawal of units deployed to assist the Defense Army during the war would be completed by September. Grigoryan also noted that Armenia had ceased conscripting contract servicemen, and that the Artsakh Defense Army was now managing the local recruitment of contract personnel.

Although Armenian officials repeatedly announced that Armenia had no troops in Artsakh, there was no formal declaration of the Armenian Armed Forces’ withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh. However, in November 2022, responding to Ilham Aliyev’s accusations of Armenian forces remaining in Artsakh, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that all Armenian troops had withdrawn. He added that the Artsakh Defense Army was the sole force standing between the Armenians of Artsakh and Azerbaijan’s “genocidal intentions”. 

Despite this, Azerbaijan persistently demanded that Armenia withdraw its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh. This was reflected in the ceasefire agreement signed by Artsakh’s last President, Samvel Shahramanyan, on September 20, 2023, which included a clause about Armenia withdrawing its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh.

Article 4 of the agreement also stipulated that Russian peacekeepers would be deployed in Artsakh for five years, with automatic five-year extensions, unless either party declared its intention to terminate the provision six months before expiry. Following the signing of the agreement, Azerbaijani officials frequently emphasized that the presence of Russian troops in Karabakh was temporary.  

Article 6 of the statement regulated the handover of Kelbajar and Lachin regions to Azerbaijan by November 15 and December 1, 2020, respectively. On November 25, the Armenian side handed over the Kelbajar region (Karvachar) with surrounding villages to Azerbaijan. 

On December 1, the Lachin region was transferred to Azerbaijan. However, the Lachin corridor—a 5-kilometer-wide route connecting Armenia to Artsakh—and the villages of Aghavno, Sus and Berdzor along this route remained under the control of Russian peacekeepers. 

The article specified that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia would collaborate to develop a plan for a new route along the Lachin corridor within three years. This new route aimed to connect Artsakh with Armenia. Once completed, the Russian peacekeeping contingent would be redeployed to secure the new route.

This clause was also violated when Azerbaijan began constructing a new route along the Lachin Corridor in fall 2021 without consulting the Armenian side of its intentions. By July 2022, Baku declared its segment of the route complete. 

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced during a June 27 press conference that construction had not begun on the Armenian side, as the route was not finalized between the parties. However, on August 5, Artsakh’s Minister of Territorial Administration, Hayk Khanumyan, told Aghavno residents to evacuate by August 25—when Azerbaijani forces would replace Russian peacekeepers in the area. On that date, Azerbaijan took control of the Armenian villages of Aghavno, Berdzor, and Sus along the corridor. While Berdzor and Sus had already experienced a significant drop in their Armenian populations after the 2020 Artsakh War, approximately 150 residents still lived in Aghavno at the time of the handover.

Residents were forced to relocate to Armenia and Artsakh. The old Lachin Corridor route remained in use until August 30, several days after its handover, when the new route became operational. Before the Armenian side completed construction of the new route on its territory, the link to Artsakh passed through a temporary road along the Hakari river, then onto a new highway built by Azerbaijan through the villages of Hin Shen and Mets Shen. The Armenian side completed the new road passing through the village of Kornidzor on Armenian territory on March 30. 

The Lachin corridor route was changed before the deadline, without the knowledge of Yerevan authorities. Azerbaijan negotiated with the command of the Russian peacekeeping forces and notified the Artsakh authorities of their decision, who apparently had not shared this information with Yerevan. 

Two months before the handover, Armen Grigoryan had stated that there was still time to find solutions for both the road and the residents. He added that the Armenian side still had over a year to work with the Artsakh government to find solutions.

Over a month later, on August 4, Pashinyan stated that there was no approved plan for a trilateral format involving Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia to redirect the Lachin Corridor. He noted that Yerevan had repeatedly requested such discussions. 

Subsequently, Khanumyan confirmed that the Russian peacekeeping mission had informed Stepanakert about Azerbaijan’s plans for an alternative road, which would run south of the existing corridor. He added that the new road was based on proposals from Artsakh, with only minor modifications. 

The clause guaranteeing free movement through the Lachin Corridor was violated when Azerbaijan imposed a blockade on Artsakh on December 12, 2022. At first, Azerbaijan permitted Russian peacekeepers to transfer limited food and medical supplies into Artsakh. However, as the blockade continued, Azerbaijan increasingly restricted humanitarian deliveries, worsening the situation and pushing Artsakh toward starvation and a severe humanitarian crisis.

The blockade, which lasted over nine months, culminated with a large-scale assault on September 19, 2023. On that day, at around 1 p.m., Azerbaijani Armed Forces launched their offensive under the guise of “anti-terrorism operations.” Using heavy artillery, drones, and airstrikes, they targeted multiple civilian and military sites in Stepanakert and the surrounding areas. This act of aggression claimed the lives of 223 Armenians from Artsakh, including 25 civilians and led to the ethnic cleansing of the entire population.

Twenty four hours later, the Russian peacekeeping command stationed there mediated a ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and the Artsakh authorities, ending hostilities. The terms of the agreement included disbanding local defense forces and initiating negotiations to reintegrate Artsakh’s Armenian population into Azerbaijan. Additionally, the agreement stipulated the dissolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, effective January 1, 2024.

Article 7 of the agreement provided for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent regions under the supervision of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Approximately 40,000 people had been displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh following the 2020 War, and they never had the opportunity to return to their homes. 

Article 8 outlined plans for an exchange of prisoners of war, hostages, other detained individuals and the remains of the deceased.

While Azerbaijan has freed over 200 POWs and detainees since the 2020 Artsakh war, it still holds 23 Armenian hostages. Of these, 16 were captured in 2023, and the remaining seven during the 2020 war. Azerbaijan refuses to disclose the exact number of Armenians it has captured. Armenia’s Investigative Committee claims to have evidence of 32 more Armenians held prisoner in Azerbaijan, which Baku has not confirmed. Additionally, human rights lawyers in Armenia report information about 80 more Armenians captured by Azerbaijan during the war––a claim Azerbaijan has also not confirmed. 

Article 9 of the November 9 trilateral statement remains the only unfulfilled clause and a major point of contention among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. This article mandates the unblocking of all economic and transport links in the region. Specifically, it requires Armenia to ensure safe transport between Azerbaijan’s western regions and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, allowing unhindered movement of people, vehicles, and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of Russia’s Federal Security Service is tasked with overseeing this transport communication. 

Despite accusations from Russia and Azerbaijan that Armenia is not fulfilling its obligation to open regional communications and providing a connection between mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhichevan, Pashinyan has repeatedly stated Armenia’s readiness to grant passage. Furthermore, Armenia has introduced a concept for unblocking communications in the South Caucasus called the “Crossroads of Peace”. 

During a session of the CIS in Moscow on October 8, Pashinyan stated, “the Republic of Armenia is fully prepared to ensure the safety of the movement of goods, vehicles, and people through its territory. This is our desire, our obligation, and we guarantee it.” 

He further emphasized, “all claims that Armenia has somehow agreed to third countries ensuring the safety of communications on its sovereign territory, or that this is provided for in any document, simply do not correspond to reality. Ensuring safety within its territory is the sovereign obligation of any country. This is our responsibility, and we will guarantee it.”

In March 2022, Azerbaijan struck a deal with Iran on constructing a transit route to its Nakhichevan exclave, including both a motorway and a railway. During discussions in Moscow, Pashinyan reiterated Armenia’s willingness to provide transportation links through its territory under conditions similar to those offered by Iran. He added that Yerevan is prepared to streamline certain border control procedures, emphasizing mutual respect, equality, and the principles of sovereignty and jurisdiction of the parties.

However, Azerbaijan insists that Armenia grant a “Zangezur Corridor,” providing unrestricted access to its exclave over Armenian territory. 

In a detailed interview on January 10, 2024, Aliyev explicitly demanded that Baku be allowed to transport cargo, citizens, and vehicles from mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan through southern Armenia without inspection or customs clearance. He also reaffirmed his support for Russian oversight of this route. 

Meanwhile, Armenia’s de jure ally Russia is also pushing for the opening of a route linking Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan under its control. In September, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov strongly criticized Armenia for refusing to open regional communications. He accused Armenia of “sabotaging” the agreement signed by Pashinyan regarding the unblocking of communications through the Syunik region. Lavrov stated that the three deputy prime ministers had agreed that countries would maintain full sovereignty and jurisdiction over routes passing through their territory. He clarified that the route would pass through Armenia’s sovereign territory under the control of the Russian FSB Border Service. 

Pashinyan and other Armenian officials argue that Armenia is not obliged to grant the so-called Zangezur corridor, as Azerbaijan and Russia have violated all clauses of the November 9 trilateral statement. 

At the “Crossroads of Peace: Uniting Security and Democracy” conference in Yerevan on October 12, Armenia’s Prime Minister criticized the selective focus on Article 9, calling it the least relevant part of the statement. 

“It is not acceptable to take one point from the trilateral statement and highlight it, as the statement consists of nine points. Let’s consider the other points: where is the Lachin corridor now, and where are the peacekeepers who, according to the trilateral statement, should be stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh? Where is point seven of the trilateral statement, which states that internally displaced persons and refugees will return to Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas under the supervision of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees? Why have internally displaced persons and refugees not returned and are not returning to Nagorno-Karabakh?” the Prime Minister said, adding that there have been captives in Azerbaijan since 2020 and “the November 9 statement clearly stipulates the return of all people kept in captivity, regardless of whether they are POWs or not.” 

In a recent speech, Pashinyan emphasized the need to consider the events in Nagorno-Karabakh within their broader context. He stressed that the November 9 statement should be interpreted comprehensively, rather than selectively, and criticized Russia, a signatory of the statement, for failing to meet its obligations. Pashinyan further noted that the recent developments in Nagorno-Karabakh contradict the provisions outlined in the statement.

Addressing the interpretations of Article 9 of the trilateral statement by Baku and Moscow, Pashinyan remarked that Azerbaijan frequently portrays the article as being solely about establishing a direct link between mainland Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan exclave. The prime minister clarified that this is a misinterpretation. He explained that the connection between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan is only a subsection of Article 9, which is actually focused on reopening transport and economic routes throughout the region. Pashinyan concluded by stating that it is “illogical and impossible” to discuss one aspect without considering the others.

Regarding Russia’s role in ensuring the safety of the road, Pashinyan said: “There is no mention anywhere in the November 9 trilateral statement that the sovereign jurisdiction of the Republic of Armenia will be limited in any way. That any other country will establish definitive control over even a square centimeter of the territory of the Republic of Armenia. There is no such thing at all, and there cannot be.” 

Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia is responsible for ensuring the safety of transport routes between Azerbaijan’s western regions and Nakhichevan, as well as the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles, and cargo in both directions. He then posed a critical question: “How can Armenia guarantee the safety of the road if a third country is in charge of security?” Pashinyan stressed that, according to the November 9, 2020, trilateral statement, it is Armenia—not any third party—that guarantees the safety of the road.

The Prime Minister also addressed Russia’s role, explaining that it is further detailed in a decree issued by President Vladimir Putin on November 10, 2020, one day after the trilateral statement was signed. Pashinyan interpreted the decree as suggesting that Russian representatives might have a monitoring role, ensuring that Armenia upholds its commitments under the agreement.

Two days after Pashinyan’s remarks, MFA spokesperson Ani Badalyan clarified that Article 9 of the trilateral statement does not specify the physical presence of the Russian Federal Security Service’s Border Guard units.

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