Russia on Unblocking Communication Between Armenia and Azerbaijan

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While in Baku as part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s delegation, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told Russian TV that Armenia’s leadership is “sabotaging” the agreement signed by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan regarding the unblocking of communications through the Syunik region. “It is difficult to understand the rationale behind such a position,” he said. “The foundation laid in the trilateral meetings and documents remains fully relevant.”

This statement naturally prompted a war of words with Yerevan. Armenia’s Foreign Ministry responded, saying that Lavrov’s remarks “not only cause regret” but also called into question Russia’s “constructive engagement” in the normalization process of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It accused Russia of not upholding the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020 and failing to fulfill its obligations. It said regional communications can open “literally at any moment” within the principles proposed by Armenia known as the “Crossroads of Peace”. It further called on Russia to “refrain from sabotaging through biased statements neither the project nor the efforts to achieve peace in the South Caucasus.”

Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson hit back, saying it is yet another attempt by Yerevan to shift the blame for its “own mistakes and strategic miscalculations onto others.” She said Armenia is acting “under the direction of the West” and missing opportunities to establish transportation links for the benefit of its own economy.

November 9 and Later Trilateral Statements

Lavrov was referring to Point 9 of the November 9/10, 2020 trilateral statement signed by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). It calls for the unblocking of “all economic and transport connections in the region.” The clause referred specifically to links between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan (Nakhchivan) exclave via Armenian territory. It provided for a direct Russian role in the process. The translation provided by the Kremlin says Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards “shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections.” The translation by the Armenian Prime Minister’s office states that “control over transport communication shall be exercised” by the FSB guards.

When Pashinyan and Aliyev met with Putin in Moscow on January 11, 2021 they released a joint statement announcing the creation of a trilateral working group under the joint chairmanship of the deputy prime ministers of the three countries. It was tasked with drawing up a “list and timetable of activities aimed at restoring or building new transport infrastructure facilities necessary for organizing, implementing and ensuring the safety of international traffic carried out across” Armenia and Azerbaijan. Rail and road communication was set as a priority. 

The three leaders met again in Russia on November 26, 2021 to reaffirm their commitment to the implementation and compliance to the two previous trilateral statements, stressing the “necessity of swiftly launching specific projects aimed at revealing the economic potential of the region.” Putin said the leaders held an “in-depth discussion on economic issues, on developing economic ties, and spoke about unblocking transport corridors as the first step,” including both railway and road traffic. Pashinyan added that they have a “common understanding of how the routes will operate.” In their last trilateral statement, on October 31, 2022, the leaders again reaffirmed their commitment to the previous agreements.

Talks 

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Aleksey Overchuk told Rossiyskaya Gazeta on September 30, 2022 that a “lot of painstaking work has been done” within the trilateral working group which he co-chairs, but roads “can only be opened or built after the sides clearly define the legal regime for crossing the border between the countries and for movement on these roads.”

During the negotiations, Overchuk said, a principle was established that the country through whose territory a road passes has sovereignty over it. He said Moscow has always supported the principle and there is “no question and cannot be a question of any ‘extraterritorial corridor’ that would in any way infringe on the sovereignty of any side.” Overchuk clarified that, in practice, entering Armenian territory from Azerbaijan via unblocked or newly built roads will involve border and passport control, similar to entering Armenia from Iran. He did not, however, specify who would be responsible for this control.

Besides the Russian negotiation/mediation track, Armenia and Azerbaijan also discussed unblocking communication routes through EU mediation. When Pashinyan and Aliyev met with European Council President Charles Michel on May 14, 2023 they reportedly “made clear progress in their discussions aimed at unblocking transport and economic links in the region.” Michel insisted that their positions have come “very close”, particularly on the reopening of the railway connections to and via Nakhchivan. The sides agreed to finalize an agreement on the modalities and a timetable, including drawing upon the support of the World Customs Organization.

While Nagorno-Karabakh was effectively blockaded by Azerbaijan, the three deputy prime ministers met in Moscow on June 2, 2023 and reported, in a joint statement, “significant progress in agreeing on the modalities for unblocking transport communications” between Armenia and Azerbaijan. They had reached a “common understanding” regarding the implementation of “specific steps for the restoration and organization of railway communication along the Yeraskh–Julfa–Meghri–Horadiz route.”

Moscow and Baku Align

Simultaneously, Azerbaijan continued to insist on the so-called “Zangezur corridor.” On June 23, 2023, Aliyev explicitly stated that it is a “precondition” for the peace treaty. “This is our rightful demand, especially given that Armenia undertook this obligation in the act of capitulation signed on November 10, 2020. However, this obligation has yet to be fulfilled,” he said.

Following the Azerbaijani takeover of Karabakh and the forced exodus of the entire Armenian population, the issue did not go away. Armenia maintains that the November 2020 statement has been effectively nullified. “Our signature is there, but does anything written there exist in reality today?” Pashinyan asked rhetorically in December 2023. He later said the document is no longer relevant as Russia and Azerbaijan have violated the rest of the provisions related to Nagorno-Karabakh.

In an interview with RBC on October 9, 2023, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin used the phrase “Meghri route” when asked about the “Zangezur corridor.” He said the unblocking of routes will make Armenia a “transport and logistics hub, strengthening and expanding its transport connections with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia,” while Azerbaijan will “gain the ability to maintain uninterrupted and rhythmic transport communication between the two parts of the country.”

Enter “Crossroads of Peace”

Pashinyan has repeatedly said that Armenia will only agree to Armenian control and full sovereignty of all communications passing through its territory. In an attempt to counter the joint Russian and Azerbaijani demand for a Russian-controlled corridor, Pashinyan unveiled his “Crossroads of Peace” initiative in October 2023. His first principle is that all infrastructure, including roads and railways should “operate under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the countries through which they pass.”

At a press briefing on November 9, 2023, Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said Pashinyan’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative “aligns in many ways” with what has been discussed over the past few years within the trilateral working group of deputy prime ministers. She noted, however, that a final agreement has not yet been reached because “some lack the political will to do so,” implicitly referring to Armenia. Zakharova also reminded that, according to the November 9 statement, “control over transport communications” between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave “is to be carried out” by Russia’s FSB.

At an intergovernmental meeting in Yerevan on December 15, 2023, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Overchuk further welcomed Pashinyan’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, saying that a section of Armenia’s North-South Highway is being financed without the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development.

Alignment Solidifies

In a lengthy interview on January 10, 2024, Aliyev made perhaps his most explicit remarks on what Baku has referred to as the “Zangezur corridor.” He demanded transit of cargo, citizens, and vehicles from mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan through southern Armenia “without undergoing any inspection and customs clearance.” He reiterated his support for Russian oversight of the route: “Russian border guards would provide security and control in the 42-43 km area, and this obligation must be fulfilled.” He insisted that this arrangement “does not call into question the sovereignty of any country.” Since Russian border guards are already deployed on the Armenia-Iran border, they can easily be deployed to control the route as well, he said. “It is simply an excuse for not opening this road. We have been waiting for three years. They have accused us of planning to use force to open that road. However, this was an absurd accusation.”

At a press briefing on January 18, 2024, Lavrov said the issue of the “Zangezur corridor” was never mentioned in the trilateral agreements reached by Putin, Aliyev and Pashinyan. He went on to quote the November 9 statement. Lavrov said Pashinyan’s effort to have the same conditions for transit through Armenia as those used for transit from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Iran is not logical. “It is hardly appropriate to compare these routes,” he added.

He said the three deputy prime ministers had agreed that countries would fully maintain sovereignty and jurisdiction over routes passing through their territory. “The route passes through the sovereign territory of Armenia under the control of the Russian FSB Border Service,” he explained. “Procedures for border and customs control upon entry into Armenia from Azerbaijan and exit from Armenia to Nakhchivan were also agreed upon in principle.”

Subsequently, he said, Armenia pulled back from this arrangement. “I do not know what prevented finalizing these agreements on paper […] We are well aware that ‘good’ advice from Western friends is always present in the South Caucasus,” he said, suggesting Western “pressure” on Yerevan.

Lavrov said Armenia is “making new demands regarding security along the route” as they do not want Russian border guards to be stationed there, despite Pashinyan’s signature. “They do not want neutral customs and border control – only their own. This contradicts what was agreed upon.”

At a briefing on February 28, 2024, Zakharova proceeded to blame Armenia for the lack of progress on unblocking of regional communications. “We know that the Armenian authorities have spoken about their readiness to open regional communications based on the principle of sovereignty and jurisdiction, within the framework of equality and reciprocity. Azerbaijan, in fact, has not rejected this approach. […] Unfortunately, this work has now stalled due to the position of the Armenian colleagues.”

She insisted that FSB control of the “Meghri route” is “logical both from the standpoint of optimal movement organization and from an economic perspective” as Russian border guards are already stationed there. She said Moscow does not consider Pashinyan’s “Crossroads of Peace” as an alternative to the “Meghri route”. It rather represents a “broader view” of the future of regional communications.

Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin told Russian media on May 14, 2024, that Russia does not use the term “Zangezur corridor”. Despite the above-mentioned statements, he argued that “Russia does not advocate for the creation of any specific route but rather for the complete unlocking of economic and transport communications in the South Caucasus.” He said that the June 2023 meeting of the trilateral working group had reached a “general understanding” regarding the “restoration and organization” of railway communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan. He said the sides were “on the verge of reaching a comprehensive and balanced agreement,” but the process stalled when Yerevan froze trilateral interaction under Western pressure.

Peace Talks

Elcin Amirbayov, Aliyev’s senior envoy who has been closely involved in the peace talks with Armenia, told RFE/RL on August 7, 2024 that Baku and Yerevan have agreed to put off the issue of transportation routes. “On mutual agreement, we decided to take this paragraph out of the peace agreement and to refer it to a later stage,” he said. Armenia’s Foreign Ministry confirmed the next day that the provision has been removed “by mutual consent.”

Despite this, an Azerbaijani government mouthpiece declared that it is a “temporary measure” and the issue is “far from being resolved.” The “Zangezur corridor”, it said, “will remain a critical topic in future negotiations.”

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