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Russian peacekeepers recently withdrew from ethnically cleansed Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), which is now under full Azerbaijani control. Concurrently, Armenia has formally requested the removal of Russian border guards stationed along its border with Azerbaijan and at Yerevan’s international airport. These Russian forces were initially deployed to maintain stability and prevent further conflict. Their presence at the airport, however, dates back several decades.
These withdrawals symbolize Russia’s retreat from the South Caucasus as it is preoccupied with its war in Ukraine. This offers a chance to consider the initial conditions of their deployment and to reassess our knowledge of their physical presence.
Yerevan Airport
Russian border guards have been stationed at Yerevan’s Zvartnots international airport, Armenia’s principal airport, since independence. According to the Russian state-run TASS agency, Armenian border guards were trained by their Russian counterparts in the early 2000s and have since conducted border control jointly. The Armenian personnel operate under the National Security Service (NSS) and the Russians under the Federal Security Service (FSB).
In 2018, when a group of activists and politicians called for their removal, Hetq asked the NSS about the legal basis of their presence. The NSS referred to the 1992 bilateral treaty, which regulates the presence of Russian border guards along Armenia’s border with Turkey and Iran. Article 4 of that treaty states that Russian personnel were to remain in their places of deployment “until special agreements are concluded” between the parties. Since they were already stationed at the airport, the Russian border guards remained there. Armenia’s Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan has said that their presence was based on “oral agreements”, while according to Factor.am it has been regulated by an otherwise unknown agreement between the Armenian and Russian border guard commands.
On February 21, Factor.am first reported the potential exit of Russian border guards from the airport, citing an unnamed senior Armenian official. A week later, parliament speaker Alen Simonyan told reporters that it “would be correct” for the Russians to leave the airport. On March 6, Security Council’s Grigoryan told reporters that Yerevan had officially asked Moscow to remove its guards from the airport. In a March 12 press conference, Prime Minister Pashinyan said Armenian guards have “gained enough experience and skills to carry out border controls at the airport without the help of the Russian side” and announced that Russians will leave by August 1.
Armenia’s request was officially confirmed by the Kremlin. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova linked it to a “series of unfriendly actions” from Yerevan, adding that the move does not “correspond to the security interests of Armenia and its citizens.”
Apart from being yet another move away from Russia, it may have been motivated by Armenia’s desire to speed up visa liberalization with the EU. Lusine Hakobyan, the co-chair of the EU-Armenia Civil Society Platform, suggested that the EU conditions visa liberalization with Armenia’s control of its own borders, especially border checkpoints and customs.
Russian Border Guards Along Armenia’s Border With Azerbaijan
Since the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian border guards have been deployed in 17 locations across Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan according to Armenia’s Security Council secretary Armen Grigoryan. Alexander Bortnikov, head of Russia’s FSB, said that 11 temporary posts were established to facilitate contacts between Armenia and Azerbaijan and resolve localized conflicts. Hayk Konjoryan, head of the ruling party’s parliamentary faction, said earlier that they are spread across five Armenian regions: Tavush, Syunik, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik and Ararat.
From the beginning, the legal basis of their deployment was questioned. Both Russian and Armenian officials have recently confirmed that it has not been legally regulated. Grigoryan stated that they were deployed based on “oral agreements”, unlike the Russian border guards stationed along Armenia’s border with Turkey and Iran for more than three decades, whose presence is based on a 1992 treaty.
Known areas of deployment of Russian FSB border guards on the Armenian side of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border (interactive version).
Initial Deployment
The deployment of Russian border guards along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan began during the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh. The first visually confirmed Russian outpost was set up in the village of Tegh, near the entrance to the Lachin corridor, where a Russian encampment was first photographed on October 23. Another outpost was set up in Yeraskh, near Armenia’s border with Nakhichevan, by early November. A local official later told RFE/RL that the Russians had arrived there on the “first day” of the war.
On November 13, 2020, three days after the ceasefire, FSB chief Bortnikov stated during a teleconference with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior officials that Russian border guards would be deployed in five locations across Armenia, including near the border with Nakhichevan (Yeraskh and Paruyr Sevak), two in the very south of Armenia (Meghri and Sgrt),[1] and one in Tegh. A week later, on November 20, Bortnikov told Putin and other officials that upon Armenian request, the FSB had deployed an additional 188 guards.
Subsequent Expansion in Syunik
Just over a month after the November 9/10, 2020 ceasefire, Armenian forces withdrew from a sliver of land in the Gubadli and Zangilan districts that had been administered by Nagorno-Karabakh as part of its Kashatagh province. Concurrently, Azerbaijani forces advanced and took positions on the de jure (Soviet-era) border and Russian border guards were deployed in the area. An unsigned and undated document in Russian, leaked online, outlined the deployment of Russian border guards on the Goris-Davit Bek and Kapan-Chakaten highways after the withdrawal of Armenian forces on December 18, 2020. On the same day, FSB chief Bortnikov flew to Yerevan and Baku, presumably to coordinate these events.
The authenticity of the document was not contested by officials. In fact, Armenia’s Defense Ministry released a statement the following day noting that Russian border guards are being deployed on a 21 km stretch of the Goris-Davit Bek highway. This deployment aimed to enhance security for civilian traffic, particularly on the parts of the highway that crossed into de jure Azerbaijani territory. Traffic on this route effectively ended for Armenians in mid-November 2021 after Azerbaijan took control and set up customs checkpoints.
On the eve of the withdrawal, Melikset Poghosyan, governor of Syunik, stated that Russian border guards had also been deployed to the villages of Vorotan and Shurnukh, which were directly affected by the development. Russian FSB guards mediated the de facto border delineation in Shurnukh, where a dozen houses were ceded to Azerbaijan. Russian guards patrolled the entire highway between Vorotan and Srashen for months.
Russian presence continued to expand in following months. By early January 2021, I photographed a Russian encampment set up close to the Kapan airport, located immediately next to the newly-formed border with Azerbaijan that runs through the Voghji River. In mid-February 2021, the regional administration of Syunik said that Russian border guards had set up an additional outpost in the village of Agarak, not far from Kapan, after sporadic gunfire from Azerbaijan.
In early May 2021, Pashinyan informed parliament that the 102nd Russian base had set up two outposts in Syunik, providing “additional security” to the region and Armenia. Later that month, the Armenian government allocated land for the Russian FSB border guard outposts across Syunik: in Tegh (entrance of Lachin Corridor), Shikahogh (south of Kapan), and in the Meghri area (Shvanidzor, Karchevan, and Nrnadzor). When Russia’s ambassador visited Syunik in early June, he stated that Russia had devoted significant equipment and finances for the deployment of additional border guards in Armenia.
Controversies
During Azerbaijan’s September 2022 incursion, a pro-government Armenian outlet claimed that prior to the attack, Russian personnel stationed near Srashen in Syunik withdrew from their outpost, which was then allegedly overrun by Azerbaijani forces according to a video posted by the same outlet.
Perhaps the most controversial area of deployment of the Russian border guards has been Nerkin Hand, a remote village in Syunik where Azerbaijan has advanced significantly in recent years. A Russian outpost was established near the village. According to a November 2023 report by REF/RL, Russian guards there prevented civilian observers of the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) from accessing the area.
After Azerbaijan killed four Armenian servicemen in Nerkin Hand in February 2024, the presence of Russian border guards became a contested issue. EUMA chief Markus Ritter stated that the mission “has access to all Armenian territory” except for Nerkin Hand, where “there are some problems” with access as it is an “area of responsibility” of the Russian border guards. Security Council’s Armen Grigoryan accused Russia of failing to prevent the incident and stated that Armenia will “address” the issue.
Conversely, Narek Ghahramanyan, a local parliamentarian from the ruling party, insisted that Russians have no presence in the village or in the positions around it and only have a checkpoint on a road leading to Nerkin Hand. Armenia’s National Security Service insisted that the EUMA had no problem with access to Nerkin Hand. Pashinyan later said the Russian border guards have no mandate there and “cannot perform any security function there.”
Tavush
At least three Russian outposts are known to have been set up in Armenia’s northeastern region of Tavush in 2021 and 2022. Armenian media long speculated that their presence is linked to the potential handover of Soviet-era enclaves to Azerbaijan. In Voskepar, a base stood near a key highway and the “four villages”, subject to ongoing delimitation and demarcation of the border. In Azatamut, an outpost was set up close to the Soviet-era Azerbaijani exclave of Sofulu and Barkhudarlu.
In August 2021, images surfaced of a small Russian outpost near Voskepar. Armenia’s Defense Ministry confirmed that it would house Russian border guards. Hayk Ghalumyan, governor of Tavush, said they were monitoring the situation, but officials refused to further elaborate on why a Russian guard post was set up there. A ruling party parliamentarian said their deployment was aimed at securing the safety of Armenia’s borders and suggested that Russian outposts could be deployed elsewhere in Tavush. A larger facility was reported to be under construction in August 2022 further north of Voskepar, on the road to Baghanis. It appeared to be functional as of October 2023.
Also in August 2021, first reports came of a Russian outpost in Azatamut, which was confirmed by the mayor, but the government again refused to provide any details. The Russians in Azatamut were reportedly stationed at a building of the rescue services.
In June 2022, another Russian outpost was reported to be under construction in the Berd area, at the abandoned airstrip of Aygepar, very close to the Azerbaijani border. The facility was nearly completed by August 2022, but no Russians had yet been deployed. An Armenian government decree regulated their presence, but authorities said at the time that the base was going to be manned by Armenian border guards, but joint service with Russians was being discussed.
Gegharkunik
Following Azerbaijan’s incursion into Armenia in May 2021, Russians reportedly surveyed the Vardenis area for potential deployment. In early June 2021, Pashinyan stated that Russian border guards had surveyed the entire border area between Sotk and Khoznavar, the section of the border that came under Azerbaijani attack, to determine the optimal locations for their potential deployment. Days later, a local official announced that Russians would be stationed near the village of Kut, east of Vardenis, but their deployment had not materialized more than a month later. Russian personnel were eventually deployed in the area by April 2022.
During the large-scale Azerbaijani incursion into the area on September 13-14, 2022, photos were posted on Telegram showing the Russian border guards’ base (barracks) and a vehicle in Sotk, Gegharkunik targeted and damaged by Azerbaijani artillery shelling. A separate video, also posted on Telegram, reportedly shows a Russian border guard convoy under fire near Verin Shorzha, east of Vardenis. Armenia’s Defense Ministry said in a statement that the FSB vehicles were engaged in humanitarian activities in the area. Azerbaijan denied targeting Russian facilities and vehicles, while Russia’s FSB reported that no personnel were hurt.
Days after the incidents, a CSTO official was shown the damage sustained by the Russian facility in Sotk during his visit to Armenia. It housed 15 men. Analyst Wojciech Górecki noted that Russia’s non-reaction to the incident “proves that it is unwilling to take any action [against Azerbaijan], despite the fact that this harms its prestige.”
Recently, the governor of Gegharkunik revealed that Russian border guards had withdrawn from the region during and after the September 2022 incursion.
Exit
With the recent delimitation of a section of the border in Tavush and ongoing peace talks with Azerbaijan, Pashinyan suggested on April 20 that Russian border guards will leave Tavush. On May 9, less than a day after Pashinyan and Putin met in Moscow, Hayk Konjoryan, head of the parliamentary faction of the ruling Civil Contract party, announced that Russian border guards and other military personnel deployed in Armenia during and after the 2020 war will withdraw. The Kremlin confirmed that such an agreement was reached by the leaders.
Russian border guards reportedly began withdrawing from their outposts in Syunik starting on May 12 and Yeraskh a few days later. On June 5, Syunik’s governor Robert Ghukasyan said that Russians had already withdrawn from Nerkin Hand.
Peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh
The tripartite declaration of November 9/10, 2020 that ended the war in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) entailed the deployment of 1,960 Russian peacekeepers. Their deployment began through Armenian territory. They set up their headquarters around the Stepanakert airport and conducted daily patrols. They remained inactive during the Azerbaijani blockade of the Lachin corridor starting in December 2022 and culminating with Azerbaijan’s offensive of September 19-20, 2023, when it effectively took over Nagorno-Karabakh the entire population of more than 100,000 was forcibly displaced to Armenia. Eyewitness accounts at the time suggested that the Russian peacekeepers withdrew from their positions minutes before the attack in several locations and an Armenia’s government-affiliated outlet claimed that they had provided the coordinates of Armenian positions in Artsakh to Azerbaijan before the attack.
During the Azerbaijani lightning offensive, six Russian troops were killed, including the deputy commander of the peacekeeping mission. Aliyev “offered his apology and deepest condolences” and pledged that the incident “will be thoroughly investigated and all those responsible will be held accountable.” In the aftermath, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu thanked the peacekeepers for their “selfless and professional actions, which helped avoid a greater number of casualties.”
Shortly thereafter, in early October 2023, a Russian diplomatic source told state media that a Russian Defense Ministry delegation will visit Yerevan to discuss the timeline for the withdrawal of peacekeepers. Earlier, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitriy Peskov had said that “This is the territory of Azerbaijan, the issue will be discussed with Baku.” The last update of maps and daily bulletins, previously updated daily, was on January 9, 2024. By then, it referred to the area by its Azerbaijani designation, the “Karabakh economic region” and Stepanakert as “Khankendi.”
First reports of the actual withdrawal of the peacekeepers came from Azerbaijani outlets on April 16, 2024 and was confirmed by the Kremlin the next day. An official ceremony to mark the “completion of the mission” was held nearly a month later, on May 15, at the Stepanakert airport, where the peacekeepers had set up headquarters. Russian Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov said that the presence of Russian peacekeepers “made it possible to establish peace on Azerbaijani soil.” On June 12, Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry announced that the withdrawal of Russian personnel, weapons and equipment had been completed.
To support their operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russian peacekeepers set up two bases in Armenia’s south: in Sisian and Goris. In the former, the Russians set up a presence at a Soviet-era airstrip. When Russian peacekeepers began their withdrawal from Karabakh, a convoy headed into Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh to close down the two bases on April 22 and headed in the opposite direction the next day to withdraw via Azerbaijan. Earlier, in October, Pashinyan had ruled out the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Armenia. “I don’t see any logic in that […] If they leave Nagorno Karabakh, then they have to go to Russia,” he said. “There is no legal basis and justification for their stay in Armenia and there cannot be.”
Footnotes:
[1] Spelled Sygyr (Сыгыр)/Sygyrt (Сыгырт) in Russian sources, it is a height/mountain between 1371 m and 1488 m above sea level, located on the Syunik-Zangilan border. It is labeled as Sygyrt (Сыгырт) in a Soviet military map, Saghird (Սաղիրդ) in a 1980s geographic dictionary, Sgherd (Սղերդ) in a 2007 Armenian geographic dictionary. It was officially renamed in 2006 from Sghrt (Սղըրթ) to Sgherd (Սղերդ) by an Armenian government decree. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev claimed on the last day of the 2020 war that Azerbaijani forces had captured the height.
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