Beyond the Drone Hype: Unpacking Nagorno-Karabakh’s Real Lessons

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) War of 2020 served as a stark reminder of the transformative role Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are playing on the modern battlefield. Azerbaijan’s military success during the 44-day conflict underscored the pivotal role of drones, arguably emerging as the linchpin of its strategic advantage over Armenia. For some observers, drones represented the primary, if not sole game-changer, for Azerbaijan, signaling that drones are shaping the future of warfare.

However, this article challenges the overemphasis surrounding drones, advocating for a sober and critical analysis. It asserts the importance of striking a balanced assessment of UAVs’ true impact, avoiding both overestimation and underestimation. While acknowledging the undeniable efficacy of UAVs, the focus should be on understanding the wider implications of this experience. Analysts have identified crucial takeaways, particularly pertinent for Western states:

1. Air Superiority Challenged: Drones have enabled comparatively weaker states and non-state actors to harness intelligence, logistical support, and strikes from the air. This perspective has challenged the traditional notion of air dominance by states with formidable military capabilities.  
2. Rethinking Air Defense: Western states have historically relied heavily on their undisputed air superiority and invested less in robust air defense mechanisms. However, with the emergence of drones, major armed forces must now not only revalue the conventional air defense systems designed to counter aircraft and missiles but also on innovative solutions combating drones which are much smaller than conventional aircraft and can fly at low altitudes with minimal detection. In recent years, Electronic Warfare (EW) has undergone significant development, emerging as a crucial component of anti-drone aerial defense. EW encompasses the strategic utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as radio, infrared, and radar signals. EW capabilities enable the disruption, denial, and degradation of adversaries’ ability to leverage these signals.

The key takeaways for Armenia, however, necessitate a vigorous reassessment, followed by thoughtful adoption of policies in alignment with these insights. Let us first take a look at the drone operations in the skies over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Buzzing Skies of Nagorno-Karabakh 

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan used drones during the conflict. Armenia primarily employed domestically developed systems, including the Krunk and X-55 light reconnaissance drones, as well as HRESH loitering munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles designed to loiter over a target area before engaging it. 

In contrast, Azerbaijan brought to the conflict an extensive arsenal of unmanned aerial systems, ranging from loitering munitions including the Harop, Orbiter 1K, Orbiter-3, and SkyStriker, to reconnaissance UAVs such as the Hermes 450, Hermes 900, Heron, Aerostar, and Searcher. Harops inflicted significant harm to the Armenian air defense systems and other mobile military targets. As an anti-radiation weapon, it autonomously targets radar emitters. It can also be manually targeted through an electro-optical sensor. However, the linchpin of Azerbaijan’s aerial capabilities was the Bayraktar TB2, a formidable Turkish-manufactured tactical armed UAV system that carries precision laser-guided munitions.

While the system is formidable, it is by no means invincible. For instance, in 2020 Turkey reportedly lost at least 16 TB-2s in Libya alone. At least two TB-2s were either crushed or hit over Nagorno-Karabakh. Another weakness of drones in general is that adversaries can take control by jamming or spoofing signals, crashing or even taking over and landing them. Nonetheless, this particular weapon offers significant benefits, largely due to its comparatively low cost, estimated at around $2 million, including ground stations and associated infrastructure. 

Surveillance and reconnaissance represent the most common applications of drones, which typically incorporate photo, video, or other data collection sensors. Intelligence gathered by drones also plays a crucial role in guiding artillery and other strike operations. Moreover, drones’ capacity to collect visual material significantly enhances propaganda efforts, a tactic notably exploited by Azerbaijan throughout the 2020 conflict. Additionally, drones are instrumental in directing and executing strikes. 

What truly amplifies the efficiency of weapons is the human element. Strategic deployment of tactics often makes all the difference. Thus, Azerbaijan reportedly employed repurposed old Soviet An-2 biplanes, converted into remotely piloted drones. These decoy aircraft were used to deceive Armenian air defense systems, coaxing them to reveal their positions by engaging what appeared to be an easy target. Once the targets were pinpointed, Harop, loitering at higher altitudes, would engage the exposed air defense systems. Similar tactics were utilized during the first Lebanon war in 1982. Israel Defence Forces drones drew anti-aircraft missile fire and located missile sites.

Drones Over Ukraine

In Ukraine, various drone systems are used, spanning from small-scale models like the 12-cm wingspan Black Hornet to UAVs with wingspans exceeding 15 meters. Retrofitted quadcopters for commercial purposes are seemingly ubiquitous in the Ukrainian battlefields. Ukrainian forces have notoriously been utilizing drones both for reconnaissance purposes and by attaching small-scale explosives for targeted strikes against adversaries. However, Russian efforts to neutralize this tactic through jamming and spoofing of these rudimentary devices have compelled Ukraine to reassess its strategies and resources. Consequently, they have begun assembling new drones from scratch, allegedly including jamming-resistant and autonomous AI-powered models capable of carrying bombs.

In terms of military UAVs, Ukraine prominently employs armed systems like TB-2, whereas Russian forces utilize counterparts such as Orion, Orion-2, and Sirius. One of the most notable aspects of this conflict is the proliferation of civilian drones. While these drones do not last in the battlespace, their low cost and accessibility make them expendable assets. Additionally, both sides employ loitering munitions. Russia has predominantly employed the Iranian-produced Shahed-131.

Ukraine has already established itself as a hub for drone development and manufacturing, with joint private-public partnerships driving innovation and adaptation of drones for military purposes. As a result, the Ukrainian drone industry is primed to expand its global footprint, offering combat-proven systems for export. This competitive landscape is fueled by Russia’s swift adaptation to drone tactics since the war’s onset. Russia has notably bolstered its defense capabilities and introduced its own drone technologies. Consequently, both sides are engaged in a relentless pursuit of ingenuity and engineering prowess, with Ukraine as the underdog nation, leveraging its limited resources and decentralized, start-up-like engineering hubs, while Russia seeks to leverage its extensive state industry to counter its innovative adversary.

Drones in the Israel-Hamas Conflict 

Israel has long been a leader in military drone technology. By 1989, Israel had developed its first attack drone. Amidst the ongoing conflict with Hamas, Israel faces the challenge of adapting drone technologies to urban warfare. However, a detailed analysis of this adaptation is beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, we will briefly examine drone usage in this conflict relevant to our discussion.

Israel employs a variety of drones, ranging from larger Herons manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) to the Elbit Hermes 450. Larger drones are utilized for airstrikes, which have become increasingly common, including in the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, Israel deploys smaller drones capable of closer surveillance and the use of loitering munitions. Among these is the Skylark, a smaller and easily transportable drone intended for battalion-level operations. The intelligence gathered by Skylarks aids artillery in coordinating fire against targets.

Hamas has also adapted commercial drones for attacks, exposing a significant vulnerability in Israel’s air and ground defenses. While Israel has upgraded its Iron Dome system to detect larger UAVs, many Hamas drones still evade detection. To address this, the Israeli army is testing a laser-based system designed to intercept smaller drones and short-range rockets.

Drones Didn’t Win the War

Having analyzed the contemporary use of drones in various conflict zones, it becomes crucial to contextualize the role they played in Azerbaijan’s success. It is important to note that Azerbaijan’s victory was not solely attributed to unmanned airpower. Undoubtedly, technological superiority played a significant role, but Azerbaijan also demonstrated tactical proficiency, which allowed them to outmaneuver their adversaries who, in comparison, lacked tactical acumen.

In line with military doctrines prevalent in NATO, Azerbaijani troops, backed by active Turkish support, showcased adept combined operations. These operations involved infantry advancing following preparatory artillery fires, complemented by the effective deployment of armed UAVs.

Azerbaijan’s tactical success was further underscored by Armenian tactical failures. For example, available footage suggests that Armenian armor formations disregarded fundamental tactical operating procedures, contributing to their strategic setbacks. As one commentator observed, the Armenian challenge did not stem from the failure of their tanks, but rather from fielding incompetently trained and equipped military forces that left themselves vulnerable.

The situation was further compounded by the lack of effective air defense coverage, exacerbated by Azerbaijani strikes targeting systems such as the S-300 and ZSU-23-4. This left Armenian ground targets vulnerable and exposed to Azerbaijan’s advance. 

An important question arises: why didn’t Armenia prepare properly? The 2020 conflict was not the first time Azerbaijan used UAVs. The Four-day War in April 2016 served as both a testing ground and a basis for Azerbaijan’s larger aerial warfare strategy in 2020. This should have alerted Armenia to address the devastatingly effective means and tactics of drone warfare. However, Armenia failed to adapt to these new challenges. Not only did Armenia neglect to obtain and develop its own UAVs, but it also failed to establish effective EW capabilities. Even after the brief border skirmish in July 2020 along the border between Armenia proper and Azerbaijan, the Armenian military command failed to acknowledge the increasing threat of UAVs.

However, despite the perception that Azerbaijan’s success was mainly attributed to drone warfare, the reality dispels this notion. The war was predominantly fought through conventional means, with service people employing various strategies and weaponry. The significant casualties suffered by the Azeris, with thousands killed and wounded, underscore that this was not a conflict won predominately through the effects of massive drone strikes. Azerbaijan’s ground forces had to engage in casualty-intensive battles against a determined adversary. They ultimately secured success through high casualties and sheer persistence.

While drones certainly played a pivotal role in tipping the balance in favor of Azerbaijan, they alone did not secure victory—far from it. It is essential to recognize that UAVs should be viewed as part of the overall arsenal of armed forces, rather than as magic bullets capable of achieving military miracles. 

Azerbaijan’s military success was a combination of factors, including tactical proficiency and strategic planning. Modern warfare is a multifaceted campaign, depending on doctrines that encompass comprehensive and holistic systems, integrating technology, strategy, tactics and training. It is these factors, working together, that help achieve objectives effectively, rather than relying on a particular weapon or tactic. 

Major Takeaways 

Following the Four-day War in April 2016, Armenia failed to seize the opportunity to adapt its air defense systems with a focus on countering drones. It is fair to assert that aging Russian-produced systems may not have posed significant threats to modern UAVs. Only the Tor system posed a threat to Bayraktar TB-2 and Israeli-made drones, but the system’s quantity was limited compared to what was necessary to establish a robust defense with overlapping fields of fire to provide adequate cover. 

In terms of key takeaways, indeed, Armenian commanders often disregarded basic camouflage, concealment, and combat-field-craft rules, serious misconduct on its own. Yet, improving combat-field-craft alone would not have resolved the problem. UAVs conduct extensive sweeps of an area using sophisticated cameras to locate even concealed targets.

The only viable solution is to create an interception umbrella of mobile weapons. This would cover a large area for maneuvering ground forces. Additionally, one weakness of remotely piloted drones is the potential to override controls by jamming or spoofing signals sent by the operator. This brings electronic warfare to the forefront. 

Following the assertion that the drone overemphasis was exaggerated, it is important to recognize that Azerbaijan had almost complete air superiority in Nagorno-Karabakh. The capability of their drones to exploit a specific gap in Armenian air defense allowed them freedom in the air. As they continued to destroy Armenian air defense assets, this gradually provided operational freedom to use manned aircraft as well. This gap in air defense was caused by Armenian missteps rather than being inherent to the essential nature of drone warfare.

It is unlikely that the gap can be completely closed, as conventional air defense systems against larger objects such as aircraft and missiles, as well as anti-drone systems, may not achieve absolute denial of air. Armenia needs to invest in anti-drone equipment that can effectively detect and neutralize small-sized drones. However, even the most advanced equipment is hardly effective in untrained hands. This investment should be followed by rigorous training for units to deploy and maneuver with the new equipment, and to operate their own drones within that defense umbrella. 

Undoubtedly, UAVs offer substantial tactical capabilities and advantages. However, they do not fundamentally transform the capability or utility of airpower on the battlefield. The outcomes witnessed in Nagorno-Karabakh were not necessarily superior to those achieved by air forces in previous conflicts where drones were not utilized but airpower was handled effectively. If either side had deployed a modern and robust air force, the outcome would likely have been similar, if not even more decisively in favor of the side with superior air power. Nonetheless, the role of UAVs provides valuable lessons that should in no case be overlooked. 

• Drones are now within reach for states with limited budgets, including non-state actors, leveling the playing field in drone warfare and challenging the dominance of larger states. Conversely, states and non-state actors lacking the resources for a robust conventional air force can still acquire significant air battle capabilities. This dynamic is particularly relevant in conflicts between relatively evenly matched sides.
  This was exemplified in the case of Azerbaijan, which, despite its oil wealth, currently cannot afford a potent and modern conventional air force. While Armenia may not match Azerbaijan’s budget, countering the UAVs utilized by Azerbaijan is not inherently beyond Armenia’s means.
• Another significant takeaway emerges at the tactical level, particularly relevant in the context of Azerbaijan’s strikes in Nagorno-Karabakh. Tactical units must be well-trained in active defense against threats that manage to evade the broader air defense network. Traditional tactical air defense systems may still prove effective against larger UAVs. However, the challenge becomes increasingly complex as the drone size decreases, and even more so as adversaries deploy drone swarms. 
• The concept of air control, in its most comprehensive form, primarily focuses on countering air and missile threats at higher flight levels. The key players in this arena are advanced sensors and weapons systems like the Patriot and S-400 air defense systems. However, UAVs typically operate at lower altitudes, presenting challenges in detection, targeting, and engagement before they pose a threat. There are two primary methods for neutralizing a drone: kinetic engagement and electronic interference, which disrupts the communication signal between the drone and its operator(s). A more sophisticated variation of this tactic involves hacking into the drone’s system and assuming control of its commands. 

Conclusion

This article aims to challenge the hype suggesting that UAVs turned Azerbaijan’s campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh into a walk in the park. While drones have certainly secured their place in military arsenals and provided significant assistance to Azerbaijan, they have not fundamentally altered the paradigm of warfare. Conventional tactics and weapon systems remain relevant, and UAVs have not rendered them obsolete. Instead, the hostilities in 2020 revealed significant missteps on Armenia’s part, both tactically and strategically. 

Another pressing issue is the need for a fundamental shift in how UAVs are utilized on the Armenian side, as well as ongoing training. Even the most advanced weaponry is ineffective in untrained hands. This underscores the importance of effective defense systems targeted specifically at UAVs.

It is essential to recognize that no single weapon can revolutionize warfare alone without vision and strategic planning. UAVs are merely an emerging and rapidly evolving component of modern warfare equipment. Their usage must be contextualized within a corresponding military doctrine and strategy. Armenia overlooked the evolving tactics of modern warfare, including basic ground engagement rules and the significant potential of drones, resulting in a high cost for the nation. 

In contrast, while Azerbaijan invested heavily in drones, it did not overlook ground forces in terms of capacity and tactics either. The survival of Armenia hinges on developing a robust military. While drones can provide Armenia with sufficient air capabilities in the absence of a large conventional air force, relying too heavily on them, or at the expense of tactically pertinent weapons systems, would be another detrimental mistake.