EVN Security Report: August 2024

There has been much concern, by virtue of uncertainty and a general desire to mitigate unpredictability, of what the future of U.S. foreign policy holds after the 2024 presidential elections, and specifically, what U.S. foreign policy towards the South Caucasus and Armenia would look like. While we have ample information and knowledge to qualify and gauge what a possible second Trump presidency may look like, to date, there remains no developed study or a triangulation of the existing body of data in seeking to conceptualize what a potential Harris presidency’s foreign policy will entail for Armenia and the South Caucasus. To presuppose that it will be a continuation of the policies of the Biden Administration will be an oversimplification that fails to consider two important variables: first, each new Administration comes to power with its own agenda, even if there may be overlap with its predecessor; and two, whereas Biden, by his predisposition, is a Cold War warrior seeking to gently maintain American hegemony while mitigating for the rise of challenging actors, Harris is not part of the Cold War foreign policy ethos, and will most likely display policies more akin to the Obama Administration, while also seeking to disrupt, and by extension, be more confrontational against the rise of authoritarian actors questioning America’s dominance of the international political system. 

If elected, the Harris Administration’s foreign policy configurations are going to be defined by three general frameworks. First, whereas in the past foreign and domestic policy were generally separated in the United States, the level of polarization in the country, however, and the degree of politicization of every policy, has blurred the lines between foreign policy-making and domestic political pressures. Thus, with the exception of the U.S. directly having boots on the ground in overseas wars, domestic political dynamics did not robustly affect foreign policy-making in the past. This no longer is the case, and Harris’ foreign policy orientation will have more domestic intervening variables than has been the case in the past with previous presidents. What does this mean? We can expect the values and ideational factors that shape Harris’ views, and that of her electoral base, to shape and define her broader foreign policy visions.

Second, the overt anti-authoritarianism of the Democratic party, but more specifically, of the Democratic leadership, and the confluence of Trump’s fondness for the likes of Kim Jung-Un, Victor Orban, Vladimir Putin, and Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Democratic establishments visceral resentment of such leaders, is going to shape the foreign policy posturing of a Harris Administration. Harris made this more than clear in her acceptance speech at the DNC Convention. 

And third, Harris will most likely be more hawkish and selectively interventionist in her foreign policy approach than the Biden Administration has been, specifically on matters of human rights and violations of international norms that qualify as direct threats against American interests. Considering the reticence that the Biden Administration has displayed in directly confronting or being tenably aggressive when confronting revisionist actors on the international stage, a Harris Administration will be more aggressive and confrontational, but do so strategically and selectively. Namely, whereas we saw more talk and less action from the Biden Administration when confronting authoritarianism or human rights violations, a Harris Administration will be the inverse of this. As one prominent international relations scholar has noted, “Harris favors a hawkish human rights foreign policy.” 

A large body of scholarship demonstrates that during times of crisis or foreign policy disputes, female-led states are more likely to forcefully escalate the disputes than male-led governments. A recent survey of nearly 380 prominent international relations experts and scholars, which included a fusion of realists and liberals, Democrats and Republicans, showed that nearly 70% trusted Harris to handle major international crises as president. In other studies designed to measure and qualify the war-proneness of male-led polities versus female-led polities, the broad data and the statistical results demonstrate that woman-led states have engaged in war with more frequency than states led by men. A Harris Administration not only satisfies the qualifying criteria, but also demonstrates robust increase intensity on specific priority areas, such as human rights and democracy-support.

Triangulating Harris’ career, her foreign policy statements, her policy orientation, her selection of advisors, and the persistent values of her base of supporters, three assumptions may be proposed with respect to what a Harris foreign policy doctrine will look like: 

1. Similar to Biden and Obama, Harris will seek to strengthen transnational and international alliances, while more aggressively using these systems to reinforce U.S. hegemony;
2. Whereas Biden sought limited foreign confrontation, or refrained from escalatory posturing, Harris will be both more confrontational and selectively escalatory on core issues that define her foreign policy priorities;
3. Harris will be more forceful with authoritarian allies, and directly aggressive with non-allies or perceived enemies, since for the Harris doctrine, the fight against authoritarianism started at home against Trumpism, so it will, and by prerogative must, continue unto the foreign policy stage.

What will the consequences and potentially substantive effects of the Harris Administration’s foreign policy be on the post-Soviet space, the South Caucasus, and more specifically, Armenia? Utilizing the characteristics and foundational basis of a potential Harris doctrine, the following developments, in the domain of probability, can be gauged as high-probability outcomes.

Russo-Ukraine War

1. A Harris Administration will be exceedingly quicker and more robust in providing assistance and support to Ukraine against Russia, and in this context, the United States will be more active in strengthening Ukraine’s capabilities, and by extension, prolonging the Russo-Ukraine War.

2. Harris’ Administration will provide Ukraine access to more advanced weapons systems, be more assertive in offering stronger firepower to Kiev, and grant permission for these systems to be used against targets within Russia-proper.

3. A Harris Administration will more aggressively consolidate the Euro-Atlantic alliance against Russia, and more specifically, be more insistent that European partners increase and enhance their support for Ukraine; hesitancy by certain NATO members from more vigorously supporting Ukraine, or obstructionist behavior by Hungary, as examples, will be met with a more stern response.

Georgia

4. Considering the pending results of Georgia’s upcoming Parliamentary elections in October, a rigged or unfairly-executed election by Georgian Dream will elicit a more punitive response by Harris’ Administration once coming to power. While the Biden Administration has been rhetorically harsh and diplomatically stern in its response to Georgia’s democratic backsliding, it has refrained from any concrete or direct actions that would qualify as sufficiently punitive. A more harsh and punitive course of action is to be expected from a Harris Administration.

5. While the Biden Administration has loosely coordinated its criticism of Georgian Dream with the EU, it has not prioritized developments in Georgia to the extent to which it will undertake collaborative actions against Ivanishvili and Georgia’s leadership. A Harris Administration will be more active and interventionist in Georgia’s affairs, and will more aggressively utilize its coordination and collaboration activities with the Europeans to achieve preferred outcomes.

Azerbaijan

6. Azerbaijan’s belligerent posturing and its persistent bellicosity will not be treated the same way as it has been with the Biden Administration. Namely, while the Blinken State Department has done a commendable job in utilizing diplomatic capital to deter Baku, while drawing certain red lines that Aliyev has shown to be reluctant to cross, these have not been sufficiently robust to either force Aliyev to sign a peace treaty, or engage in constructive behavior that can lead to a just and equitous peace. Noting the contours of Harris’ foreign policy orientation, Aliyev will not only fall into the club of autocrats that her Administration will detest, but the formation of the Russo-Azerbaijani Axis, and the attempt by Baku and Moscow to maintain the region’s authoritarian orbit, will be viewed as a direct threat to U.S. and Euro-Atlantic interests in the region. Concomitantly, whereas the Biden Administration has noted concerns, reservations, and frustrations with the Baku-Moscow tandem, its response has been measured and at times overly courteous of Baku. The Biden Administration has refrained from assuming a more rigid posture in the face of Baku’s obstructionist and destabilizing behavior. Unsurprisingly, this is commensurate with the Biden Administration’s doctrine of non-confrontation and non-escalation. However, as noted, qualifying the potential Harris Administration’s doctrine as being the inverse of this, a more confrontational and escalatory posture against Azerbaijan, and the Russo-Azerbaijani Axis, is to be anticipated.

7. Whereas the Biden Administration’s objective has been to weaken Russia in the region, and by extension, diminish Russian influence and capabilities in the South Caucasus, Harris will more intensely enhance the support for mechanisms and processes in the region that speed up and amplify this decline. In this context, the primary difference between Biden and Harris will be the magnitude of action, and further, less tolerance for actors that seek to strengthen or expand the region’s authoritarian orbit. As such, the divergence of U.S.-Azerbaijani interests will become even more elucidated, triggering further fissures and cracks in US-Azerbaijani relations under a Harris Administration. 

8. In its totality, relations between the United States and Azerbaijan will further deteriorate, especially when considering the level of animosity from Baku against the relatively tolerant Biden Administration. Aliyev’s blatant and public support of Trump and his continuous criticisms of the Biden-Harris Administration will not go unnoticed in a Harris-Walz Administration. In the confluence of such developments, a more forceful Harris Administration, that is less tolerant of Baku’s endeavor of destabilizing and growing authoritarianism in the region, will further worsen U.S-Azerbaijan relations.

9. Supplementing the decline in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations will be Baku’s close ties with Moscow. More specifically, Baku’s so-called multivectorism has worked because Washington has allowed it to work, or in more simple terms, because the Biden Administration has been indifferent to it. But for a potential Harris Administration, Baku’s multivectorism will qualify as a euphemism for strengthening Russian objectives in the region, and more so, harming Euro-Atlantic interests and values. 

Armenia

10. Harris’ State Department will continue its existing policies and projects with Yerevan, considering the broad range of projects that have already been developed between the two sides, from the Strategic Partnership to closer military and security engagements to the growing role of the U.S. in Armenia’s energy sector.  

11. While the Biden Administration has been considerably Armenia-friendly, a Harris Administration, by virtue of its perceived strategic goals and foreign policy objectives, will further deepen and enhance this relationship. More so, considering the scope and depth of America’s “defense diplomacy” being implemented with Armenia, the Harris Administration will intensify the scope and level of engagement that such projects entail.

12. Armenia’s Western pivot will be more assertively nurtured by a Harris Administration, since Armenia qualifies not only as the most democratic country in the region, but also because it faces the greatest threat from its anti-West neighbors. A Harris Administration will play an even more active role than the current role that the Biden Administration has played in supporting Armenia’s doctrine of diversification. In this context, Harris’ Administration will incentivize and offer monetary and institutional support for partner states that are engaging or supporting Armenia’s diversification policies. 

13. Armenia will receive more funding and technical support in enhancing its resilience capabilities, and Harris’ Administration will deepen its working relationship with the EU (after the foundations were set in the April 5 meeting), to strengthen the objectives and goals of the trilateral endeavor. 

14. The probability of receiving military assistance, both lethal and non-lethal, exponentially increases under a Harris Administration, considering the state of the Strategic Partnership, the deepening and trust in US-Armenia relations, and the growing depth and scope of America’s “defense diplomacy” with Armenia.

15. A Harris Administration will not reopen the Artsakh issue and will separate, much like the Biden Administration, relations with the Republic of Armenia from matters and issues that were specific to Nagorno-Karabakh. In this context, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue will be a closed matter for the Harris Administration, and one that they will not seek to revisit. This remains consistent with continuous U.S. Administrations going back to the 1990s, and in this context, a policy change on this topic remains highly improbable. In more simple terms, the Harris Administration is going to deem the issue as having been “resolved,” and will refrain from revisiting the matter. 

16. For the U.S., and also for the incoming Harris Administration, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is and will be perceived as being precisely designed by Russia to be persistent and continuous, since conflict persistence favored and continues to favor both Russia’s presence and interests in the region, as well as curtailing the region’s capacity for political and democratic growth. While this is, indeed, painful for the Armenian side, a reopening of the contours of the conflict will be deemed by Harris’ Administration as being contradictory to America’s strategic interests. 

17. A Harris Administration will very likely increase aid to Artsakh refugees and be more active in engaging on the matter, considering the relative passivity of the Biden Administration. Harris’ State Department can be expected to enhance programs of support to help strengthen and grow the resilience of the refugee population. 

18. There should be no expectations that the Harris Administration will relitigate the 2020 Artsakh War or seek to reverse the developments of 2023.

19. In its totality, the Harris Administration’s overarching policy approach towards Armenia will be defined by three pillars: enhancing Armenia’s resilience (both hard and soft power capabilities), supporting democratic institutionalization and consolidation, and providing diplomatic cover and support against its predatory neighbors. 

Examining the Context

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