Brussels Speaks, Baku Ignores

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As Armenian prisoners continue to languish in Azerbaijani prisons, a strongly worded resolution adopted by the European Parliament (EP) in mid-March has quietly receded from headlines. On March 13, the Parliament called for the immediate and unconditional release of Armenian detainees held in Baku, marking one of its clearest and most forceful statements yet on the matter. While the resolution’s limited effect is evident, the question remains: what, if anything, has it changed? This article revisits the resolution, what it set out to achieve, and why its timing still matters. 

Meanwhile, Armenia’s media landscape has been dominated by another major headline, most notably, the now-confirmed finalization of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty text. As with my previous article, which aimed to clarify and explain a resolution addressing the siege of Artsakh, this piece also seeks to provide insight into the potential impact of this latest development. While the EP’s resolutions carry substantial diplomatic influence, they alone seldom trigger immediate action. Keeping this in mind, let’s understand what it can realistically accomplish and where its limits lie.

Immediate and Unconditional 

The EP’s recent resolution, in both its text and the decisive manner in which it passed, embodies the near-ideal aspirations of many Armenians regarding the hostage crisis in Baku. Indeed, the only thing better would be the immediate fulfillment of its demands. While reality remains far from this ideal, the resolution itself is unquestionably better than silence.

European parliamentarians did not mince their words. They explicitly condemned the Azerbaijani trials as “sham” proceedings, with charges carrying potential life sentences – trials which, as the resolution insists, lack any legitimacy or fairness, labeling the detainees as “hostages,” rather than prisoners of war (POWs). By doing so, the Parliament underscores the illegality and politically motivated nature of their detention. While this potentially removes specific protections afforded to POWs under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), given Azerbaijan’s scant regard for IHL, such blunt language represents a commendable act of calling a spade a spade.

The resolution specifies that at least 23 Armenian hostages remain detained in Azerbaijan, including former officials from Nagorno-Karabakh and POWs captured during the 2020 war and the subsequent ethnic cleansing in 2023. It demands their immediate and unconditional release. The Parliamentarians further highlight reports of inhumane and degrading treatment, including the alleged use of prohibited psychoactive methods. The reports detail systematic violations of the detainees’ fundamental rights, such as denial of independent legal representation, interpretation services, family visits, adequate healthcare, and fair trials. The EP demands that Azerbaijan grant immediate medical access in line with international standards and calls for an independent investigation into their mistreatment.

Additionally, the Parliament does not let Azerbaijan’s closure of ICRC and UN agency offices in Baku go unnoticed, emphasizing how this move further isolates Armenian detainees by cutting off independent monitoring and humanitarian support, worsening their already dire conditions.

What stands out even more is the Parliament’s direct call for targeted sanctions under the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against specific Azerbaijani officials responsible for abuses, explicitly naming prosecutors and judges Jamal Ramazanov, Anar Rzayev, and Zeynal Agayev. The resolution urges the ICC to investigate cases of forced displacement, persecution, and ethnic cleansing of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. It also demands full compliance with existing International Court of Justice (ICJ) rulings, requiring Azerbaijan to ensure the safety and humane treatment of prisoners captured during and after the 2020 war. By doing so, the EP reinforces the push for international criminal accountability, leveraging global legal mechanisms to seek justice, and signals that those behind human rights violations cannot remain immune—provided the political will aligns.

The resolution further calls on the EU member state embassies in Azerbaijan to actively monitor trials and conduct regular visits to Armenian detainees. It also urges high-ranking EU officials, including the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, to personally engage with the issue by visiting the hostages.

The Energy Factor

In a highly significant and long-overdue move, the resolution targets the heart of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s regime—its energy financing. The EP calls for the suspension of the 2022 EU-Azerbaijan Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation, insisting that any future agreements be strictly conditioned on concrete improvements in Azerbaijan’s human rights record, the unconditional release of all political prisoners, genuine progress toward peace with Armenia, and respect for the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, including their right to return. The significance of this step is underscored by the fact that Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, had previously called Azerbaijan a crucial partner when signing the energy deal in Baku to double Azerbaijani gas imports to the EU by 2027.

Delivering remarks during the EP plenary session on the resolution, MEP Catarina Vieira (Portugal) challenged the EU’s existing policies towards Baku. “We can’t allow our relations with Azerbaijan to continue as usual and sacrifice our values for economic and energy interests,” she cautioned, pointedly asking, “Haven’t we learned lessons from our past dependency on Russia?” Vieira underscored a crucial lesson that Europe should have already internalized: “It is time to place human rights above cheap oil and gas.”

This cuts to the core of the matter. Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exposed a series of ironies that work to Aliyev’s advantage. While the EU condemns Russia’s aggression and rushes to reduce its dependence on Russian energy, it simultaneously strengthens ties with another authoritarian regime, securing lucrative natural gas deals with Azerbaijan, even during the recent COP29 climate talks.

Yet, the irony runs even deeper. The deals meant to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy may end up benefiting Moscow. Azerbaijan, hosting COP29, did not hesitate to use the global climate summit as a platform to push new fossil fuel agreements with European states. But here is the catch: to meet Europe’s gas demand, Baku has significantly ramped up its own fossil fuel imports from Russia. Nothing could be more cynical than rebranding Russian gas as Azerbaijani and funneling it straight to Europe. One way or another, Moscow wins.

Azerbaijan’s state-owned energy giant SOCAR openly boasts of its plans to ramp up annual gas production from 37 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 49 bcm by 2033—an outright defiance of international climate commitments aimed at reducing fossil fuel reliance. But who worries about climate goals when profits are soaring, especially when COP29 becomes a stage for striking fossil fuel deals? Azerbaijan has secured an agreement to import at least one bcm of natural gas directly from Russia’s Gazprom. Beyond gas, it is also aggressively purchasing Russian crude oil, sharply increasing imports compared to pre-war levels. In other words, business between Baku and Moscow is thriving, thinly disguised as geopolitical maneuvering.

So, What’s Next?

The Parliament’s resolution concludes with a directive to forward the document to key EU institutions, member states, and the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan, ensuring its broad diplomatic dissemination and reinforcing the gravity of its message. While the resolution alone will not resolve the hostage crisis, it raises the political stakes and brings greater international attention to Azerbaijan’s actions. It may not be an immediate game-changer, but it is far from insignificant, providing clear language and accountability measures.

Unsurprisingly, the resolution did not go unanswered. The International and Inter-Parliamentary Relations Committee of the Milli Majlis of the Republic of Azerbaijan sent a formal letter to the European Parliament, protesting against the resolution and rejecting its findings. The letter criticized the Parliament’s stance as biased and politically motivated, underscoring Baku’s refusal to acknowledge the accusations leveled in the document.

For all its outrage, Baku’s protest letter to the European Parliament only reinforces how unusually pointed this resolution was. After years of international statements steeped in vague balancing acts, this one finally spells things out. Azerbaijan is explicitly labeled a human rights violator, and Armenian detainees are recognized as hostages, the most egregious and unlawful form of detention in contemporary terms, spanning social, criminal, international law, and international relations contexts. Trials in Baku are labeled as “sham,” and those running them are explicitly named and called on for accountability. Azerbaijan is recognized as having committed ethnic cleansing through forced deportation in September 2023, with the International Criminal Court being called upon to investigate the situation.

Crucially, the resolution breaks away from the long-standing false equivalency between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The practice of treating both sides as equally responsible and urging them to respect international norms, in the same manner, has long emboldened Azerbaijan’s blatant disregard for international order and human rights.

Finally, the resolution strikes at Azerbaijan’s energy deals with the West. Equally significant is the clear parallel drawn between dealings with Russia and Azerbaijan. The very country that the West considers its primary adversary, Russia, now seems to serve as a model for Azerbaijan, following the same playbook of authoritarianism, human rights abuses and energy-driven leverage. However, the resolution’s political impact should not be overstated. As a non-binding document, its strength lies in the pressure it applies rather than in direct consequences. Whether its calls for sanctions, investigations, and policy shifts translate into action depends entirely on EU member states. Given Europe’s track record of balancing principles with strategic interests, the resolution is a step forward but far from a decisive turning point.

While the EP has a more direct impact on the policies of its respective EU states, the real responsibility now falls on Armenia. It must seize the momentum created by this resolution, using it as leverage to push its agenda and hold the EU accountable for what its democratically elected parliamentarians have endorsed. And here is where optimism fades. Armenia’s unwavering commitment to signing a treaty with Azerbaijan—seemingly at any cost—threatens to undermine any real benefits this resolution could have brought. After all, who will advocate for your interests better than yourself? Yet, Armenia appears to have set its priorities elsewhere, preparing to withdraw all legal cases against Azerbaijan in pursuit of a treaty. This shift in focus raises serious questions about what, if anything, can be gained from the resolution in practical terms.

At this point, making the most of the resolution would mean the EP president forwarding it to the Council of the EU, the European Commission, and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ensuring that some EU member states act on its recommendations. However, once again, much depends on the discretion of external powers. With the Armenian government unwilling to capitalize on this opportunity, the resolution’s impact remains uncertain—better than nothing, but far from what it could have been.

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