Countering Azerbaijan’s Coercion: Armenia’s Deterrence Strategies

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During a discussion at the Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., on February 4, 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signaled his readiness to drop international legal claims against Azerbaijan. On February 19, he stressed the need for a new Constitution in an address to the Armenian public. To contextually situate the Prime Minister’s statements within the discourse and stipulations made by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, the latter’s two interviews on December 18, 2024, and January 7, 2025 will be considered.

In his first interview, Aliyev identified two unresolved issues in the peace agreement: refraining from international lawsuits against each other and prohibiting the deployment of foreign representatives along the border. He also listed “amending” Armenia’s Constitution and dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group as separate political conditions for signing the agreement. In his second interview, Aliyev escalated his rhetoric, labeling Armenia a “fascist” state and issuing new threats to restrict Armenia’s military capabilities. He further reiterated demands for unrestricted access to Azerbaijan’s exclave, Nakhichevan, through Armenia’s Syunik region.

These interviews not only undermined the prospects of a peace agreement but also fueled discussions on whether Azerbaijan is likely to escalate the situation. In a January 8 interview with Armenpress, Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan responded to Aliyev’s statements, remarking, “Perhaps Baku is attempting to form ‘legitimacy’ for escalation in the region.” Subsequently, on January 23, Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the National Security Council, voiced concerns over Azerbaijan’s actions, stating, “We observe frequent military exercises. In addition, we see intensive flights from other countries, which are most likely transporting military equipment to Baku.”

To better understand the causal relationship between these recent developments, including the statements from both leaders, we will utilize pertinent concepts and terms into our analysis. More specifically, we must distinguish between brutal force and coercion, compellence and deterrence, as well as latent and actual violence. Additionally, it is important to understand how the threats of causing pain and suffering—by targeting an opponent’s key interests and fears—can be used to manipulate the target into adopting the desired behavior without the use of actual force.

In this article, I suggest analyzing the dynamics in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations through the lens of coercive power. I argue that Azerbaijan, constrained by Armenia’s internal and external balancing efforts, leverages coercive tactics to influence the Armenian government’s behaviour. The casualties since the 44-day war, the occupation of Armenian territories, and the mass forced displacement of Armenians from Artsakh have made both Armenian society and government more vulnerable to Aliyev’s threats. Aliyev seeks to exploit these fears, leveraging the threat of inflicting new pain and suffering. With the 2026 parliamentary elections approaching, the Armenian government may be more vulnerable to escalation during the pre-election period. This could prompt Aliyev to become more aggressive to secure more concessions. I examine the risks of dropping international lawsuits against Azerbaijan and highlight their strategic importance.

It is recommended that Armenia, while strengthening its conventional capabilities, also develop a strategy to counter Azerbaijani coercive threats. While Aliyev has managed to swallow Artsakh, he has yet to fully digest it. The preconditions for signing the peace agreement reflect his priorities—and by extension, his vulnerabilities—which should be the focus of Armenia’s strategy.

The Difference Between Brutal Force and Coercion 

The advent of nuclear weapons resulted in significant transformations in security studies. Whereas arms were once primarily seen as tools for achieving political goals through force, they have increasingly been regarded as instruments of influence, even without their actual use. Moreover, expanding on Carl von Clausewitz’s famous phrase, “War is the continuation of politics by other means,” Thomas Schelling argued that military action, when used as bargaining power, is an integral part of diplomacy. 

In his book “Arms and Influence”, Schelling explains the difference between brutal force and coercive power. In the first case, military power is used to seize and conquer—that is, taking the desired asset by force. In the second case, however, the goal is to compel the opponent to concede, making them hand over the desired asset “voluntarily” to avoid the suffering and pain that the military action could bring. Thus, arms are not merely tools for seizing and holding territory by force but also instruments of influence and intimidation, with the ultimate goal of achieving the desired behavior.

Schelling also explains the difference between compellence and deterrence. While deterrence is aimed at preventing, stopping, or dissuading the enemy from taking a certain action, that is, it seeks to prevent a change in behavior, compellence is aimed at forcing the opponent to take a specific action, ultimately seeking to change their behavior. Thus, deterrence is aimed at maintaining the status quo, while compellence seeks to alter it. The concept of compellence is also integrated into alliance typology by defining the obligations of allies. Unconditional compellent alliances require supporting an ally regardless of who initiates the conflict, while conditional compellent alliances stipulate that force is used only if the adversary refuses to meet the stated demands. Thus, while the term deterrence better describes military confrontation, incorporating the concept of compellence into our analysis is crucial for fully understanding the phenomenon of coercive power.

Aliyev’s Shift From Military Actions to Coercive Diplomacy

Efficiently leveraging the power disparity accumulated over the last decades, Azerbaijan took control of a considerable part of Artsakh during the 44-day war. Moreover, building on this success, Aliyev’s regime continued its offensive actions by occupying 200 square kilometers of Armenia’s internationally recognized territory. Last but not least, in a serious violation of international rules and norms, Aliyev kept Artsakh under a blockade for more than nine months and launched a military offensive that resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Armenians in Artsakh and its ultimate absorption. 

These events have caused the Armenian government to seriously rethink its strategy to address the asymmetry in relative power and deter Azerbaijan from future offensives. To strengthen internal balancing, Armenia has significantly diversified its military cooperation, particularly with France, the U.S., India, and a growing number of European countries, acquiring about $3 billion worth of armaments during the last three years. In terms of external balancing, Armenia, through the policy of “Diplomatization of Security”, has consolidated the support of its Western partners—namely, the U.S., EU, and France—to deter Azerbaijan from further escalation. Moreover, the deployment and subsequent expansion of the EU civilian mission along the Armenian-Azerbaijan border has further contributed to Armenia’s security.

These developments have seriously constrained Aliyev from initiating new escalations along the border. Keeping these “obstacles” in mind, Aliyev attempts to leverage coercive power to achieve political ends. Specifically, he threatens to inflict pain and damage on Armenia and its people to force the authorities to yield and comply with his demands. Some of the statements Aliyev made in his last interview clearly reflect these intentions: “The Zangezur corridor must and will be opened.  I have said before that they should not frustrate us and understand that we are the ones who have the final say here. Azerbaijan is the leading economy, the leading military power, and the leading state in the South Caucasus. In today’s world, the power factor is paramount, and no one should forget this.”

Notably, Schelling states that while brutal force succeeds when it is used, the power to hurt is most effective when held in reserve. Continuing with the language of threats and violence, Aliyev labeled Armenia as a “fascist” state and claimed, “Fascism must be eradicated. Either the Armenian leadership will destroy it, or we will. We have no other choice.” This statement reflects Schelling’s concept of coercion, where the threat of future punishment, held in reserve, serves as a bargaining tool. Specifically, Aliyev threatens to use force if Armenia does not comply with his demands. This rhetoric aligns with Azerbaijan’s broader campaign to isolate Armenia diplomatically and deter international support.

Exploiting the Fears of Armenian Society and the Interests of Armenia’s Ruling Party

The main idea of coercive power is to exploit the enemy’s greatest fears, wants and vulnerabilities. Specifically, while pure military strength can be balanced and neutralized by increasing military capabilities—the general principle known as the balance of power—coercion works differently. In coercion, the threat of inflicting pain cannot simply be countered by the opponent’s ability to hurt back, but rather by shaping the opponent’s motives and decisions. Therefore, the coercing side must identify the opponent’s key interests and fears to exert maximum pressure.

The 44-day war, the subsequent escalations along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, and the loss of Artsakh resulted not only in territorial losses but also in significant casualties and mass forced displacement. During the 44-day war, Armenia lost 3,825 soldiers and had 7,888 wounded, including 1,464 permanently disabled. The Jermuk escalation of September 13-14, 2022, resulted in 224 Armenian deaths, with 296 wounded. During Azerbaijan’s September 19-20, 2023, attack on Artsakh, 223 Armenians were killed, including 25 civilians and five minors, while 244 others were wounded, 80 of whom were civilians. In addition, 70 people died during the Artsakh exodus. A subsequent blast at a fuel depot killed 218 people, injured 120, and left 41 missing. Last but not least, over 100,000 Armenians were forcibly displaced from Artsakh due to Azerbaijan’s aggression.

These events have made both the Armenian government and society more vulnerable to Aliyev’s threats, increasing their susceptibility to coercion. Aliyev capitalizes on these fears, leveraging the threat of further escalation and suffering to compel the Armenian government into making concessions. Not surprisingly, Baku’s aggressive rhetoric, which includes territorial claims over Armenian sovereign lands, including the capital Yerevan and Lake Sevan, has become an essential element of its strategy to undermine Armenian morale and weaken national resolve. Furthermore, reports by the Ombudsman of Armenia, including the 2022 “Extraordinary Public Report on the Consequences of Azerbaijani Armed Attacks”, detail Azerbaijan’s deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure.

Beyond targeting societal fears, Aliyev is also leveraging Armenia’s political vulnerabilities, particularly the 2026 parliamentary elections. Any border escalation in 2025 could significantly damage the legitimacy of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government, which is keen to maintain peace and stability during the electoral campaign. Meanwhile, having further consolidated his power through snap elections in 2024, Aliyev enjoys greater freedom of action. Unlike Armenia’s democratic government, which is accountable to public opinion and electoral pressures, Aliyev’s authoritarian rule faces almost no domestic challenges and can afford short-term military casualties without jeopardizing his grip on power.  

How to Counter Aliyev’s Coercion? What Are the Main Vulnerabilities of the Azerbaijani President?

In Aliyev’s case, it is fair to argue that his primary priority is the stability and continuation of his regime. He is also deeply concerned about his international standing and reputation, which are undermined by his authoritarian rule and widespread human rights violations. Furthermore, Aliyev is strongly concerned with protecting his legacy, particularly by consolidating control over Artsakh

One can argue that the conditions for signing a peace agreement expose Aliyev’s strategic priorities—and, in turn, his key vulnerabilities. The four lawsuits filed by Armenia with the European Court of Human Rights, along with one submitted to the International Court of Justice, directly challenge Aliyev’s international standing and reputation. Furthermore, while Aliyev has seized control of Artsakh, these legal challenges hinder his ability to fully legitimize and consolidate that control.

Armenia’s first application to the European Court of Human Rights, filed on February 1, 2022, highlighted violations of conventional rights, such as the right to life, liberty, property, personal and family life, education, and the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment during and after the war waged by Azerbaijan. Additionally, it emphasized the protection of the rights of prisoners of war, individual civilian captives, displaced people, deceased and wounded persons and their relatives, and individuals who lost their property. The second application (April 12, 2022) addressed the unlawful detention of Armenian captives, the flagrant denial of justice in their prosecution and conviction, and the lack of effective domestic remedies for Armenian captives. The third application focused on Azerbaijan’s invasion of Armenia’s sovereign territory, while the fourth addressed rights violations against the Artsakh population during the attacks on Parukh and Khramort as well as the blockade of the Lachin corridor. 

On September 16, 2021 Armenia filed a complaint against Azerbaijan with the International Court of Justice, citing violations of multiple articles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The complaint accused Azerbaijan of engaging in widespread racial discrimination against ethnic Armenians, including the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage. On December 28, 2022, Armenia submitted a request for new provisional measures, accusing Azerbaijan of blocking the Lachin corridor and cutting off the region’s supply of essential goods, including food, medicine and fuel.

Aliyev acknowledges that these complaints and accusations challenge the legality of his actions. Depending on various factors—such as increasingly unfavorable external circumstances—these legal cases could be used against him or his successors, further undermining the legitimacy of how he reclaimed Artsakh.

Furthermore, Aliyev has observed how the Armenian Genocide issue has influenced Turkey’s international standing, creating diplomatic challenges. For instance, the 1987 European Parliament resolution explicitly called on Turkey to acknowledge the Genocide as part of a broader political dialogue and even linked its refusal to obstacles in its EU accession process. Moreover, the U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide in 2021 was also seen as intertwined with broader geopolitical tensions between the two states, including Turkey’s acquisition of Russian S-400 missile systems. Additionally, it’s worth mentioning that while the Armenian Genocide has no international legal implications, the reality is different in the case of the Artsakh issue. Recognizing these precedents, Aliyev understands that similar legal and diplomatic mechanisms could, at the very least, be used against him in different contexts. With this in mind, Aliyev is also pushing for the final dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. Its continued existence implies that the Artsakh issue could resurface one day. 

Recommendations

To effectively monitor the developments in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, we should evaluate the situation through the lens of coercive power as well. Armenia should consider developing its own coercive strategy to counter Azerbaijan’s similar tactics by targeting the regime’s core vulnerabilities. Notably, while Azerbaijan holds an advantage in conventional military capabilities due to its superior financial resources, Armenia has the potential to create real challenges for Aliyev’s regime in the realm of coercive strategies and asymmetric tactics.

It is essential to identify the key fears and vulnerabilities of Aliyev’s regime, including concerns over regime continuity and stability, international standing and reputation, and cementing the current status quo regarding Artsakh while eliminating any risks to it. The dropping of international claims against Azerbaijan should be assessed within the broader context of negotiations, as it represents the loss of one of Armenia’s deterrence measures. As already mentioned, the four lawsuits filed by Armenia with the ECHR, along with one filed with the ICJ, not only challenge Aliyev’s international standing and reputation but also hinder his ability to fully consolidate control over Nagorno-Karabakh by creating a sense of uncertainty about the future.

Armenian political officials, the expert community, and civil society must enhance their understanding of coercive tactics in order to develop an effective strategic communication framework. This will enable them to engage with the wider public to increase public resilience and counter Azerbaijani narratives. It is important to keep in mind Thomas Schelling’s idea: “War appears to be, or threaten to be, not as much a contest of strength as one of endurance, nerve, obstinacy and pain.”

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