Fairy Tales, Textbooks and Territorial Claims: Weaving the Myth of “Western Azerbaijan”

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The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on March 13 that the draft “Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan” had been finalized and negotiations had concluded. The ministry said that the peace agreement was ready for signing after Armenia accepted Azerbaijan’s proposals on the two remaining articles. These articles reportedly included Baku’s demands to withdraw international lawsuits and prohibit third-party monitors or troops along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

Following the agreement’s finalization, Azerbaijan intensified its disinformation campaign. While this campaign had been active before the March 13 announcement—mostly through media outlets affiliated with the Azerbaijani government—it gained momentum when Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) became directly involved. The MoD has since issued numerous false and baseless press releases alleging that Armenian forces have been firing across the border from various locations.

Between March 16 and the end of April, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense released 26 reports—16 in March[1] and 10 in April.[2]. Before this period, only one such statement had been issued in 2025—on March 5. These releases are all available on Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence website. 

The Armenian Ministry of Defense refuted all these press releases, stating they did not reflect reality. The Armenian MoD, in line with the Prime Minister’s Office, has repeatedly offered to investigate any evidence of Azerbaijani claims. Azerbaijan has not yet responded to these offers. In contrast, the Armenian side issued two statements—on March 31 and April 20—providing photographic evidence of Azerbaijani forces firing at residential buildings in Armenia’s Syunik region.

Azerbaijan’s flood of disinformation suggests it has no genuine interest in signing the peace agreement—even after Armenia’s unilateral concessions. This reluctance became more apparent when Deputy Foreign Minister Elnur Mammadov, just one day after the agreement text was finalized, declared that discussions about the venue for signing the agreement were “still premature.” Mammadov added that Azerbaijan is awaiting both constitutional amendments in Armenia to remove 1990s-era territorial claims and the formal dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. 

For international observers, it may seem puzzling why Azerbaijan refuses to sign the treaty when all points have been finalized—primarily through Armenia’s unilateral concessions. What is behind Aliyev’s strategy of delaying the signing? Is there a broader plan or ambition that negotiations alone cannot achieve? Let’s take a closer look at what might be unfolding behind the scenes of this tightly controlled and increasingly authoritarian state.

While Aliyev and other Azerbaijani officials cite the Armenian Constitution as the main obstacle to signing the peace agreement, they simultaneously promote a dangerous and absurd narrative, one that Aliyev has pushed more aggressively since December 2022. This narrative refers to the Republic of Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan,” based on the false and baseless claim that “Armenia was never present in this region before. Present-day Armenia is our land.” While some observers might dismiss this rhetoric as mere political propaganda, a closer examination of Azerbaijani school textbooks and broader societal trends reveals a more troubling reality: this narrative is becoming institutionalized within the education system, teaching the next generation of Azerbaijanis that neighboring Armenia is their “ancient land”. 

To understand what lies behind Azerbaijan’s authoritarian regime, we examined recent changes in the country’s educational system following the 2020 Artsakh War. Our analysis looks beyond political rhetoric and propaganda to investigate what Azerbaijani schoolchildren are actually being taught, revealing the leadership’s true intentions toward Armenia and the Armenian people. We reviewed history textbooks, developments in higher education, and even newly published children’s fairy tales—all of which reflect the narrative being instilled in the younger generation. These changes emerged after Aliyev emptied Nagorno-Karabakh of its Armenian population through war in 2020, followed by blockade, ethnic cleansing, and forced deportation in September 2023. Our findings reveal that for Aliyev, Nagorno-Karabakh was never the final objective. The takeover of the region, now devoid of Armenians, has only fueled more dangerous narratives—ones already deeply embedded in Azerbaijan’s education system.

Changes in Azerbaijan’s History Textbooks: Timeline and Implementation

Several months after the trilateral ceasefire agreement of November 2020, in May 2021, President Ilham Aliyev ordered the inclusion of the Second Karabakh War in school and university history textbooks. For the 2021-2022 academic year, a new subject titled “Zəfər tarixi” (History of Victory), focusing on Azerbaijan’s military campaign during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, was introduced for ninth-grade students.

This course glorifies the 2020 war and maintains the portrayal of Armenians as “enemies.” While the portrayal of Armenians as adversaries is not new in Azerbaijan’s education system—previously justified as reflecting an ongoing conflict—this narrative has gained new momentum, even after the military resolution and the forced displacement of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh.

A significant development occurred when the concept of presenting the Republic of Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan” was added to the curriculum in 2024. During a meeting with the so-called “Western Azerbaijan Community” in December 2022, President Ilham Aliyev stated:

“Now that the Karabakh conflict has been resolved, this is the issue on our agenda. Of course, it was premature to talk about it before the Karabakh conflict was resolved. But we should not waste any time now. A Concept of Return should be developed. Again, it should be a peaceful concept…”

This statement makes it clear that Aliyev understood both the implausibility and geopolitical risks of this territorial claim within his wider expansionist agenda. He deliberately avoided discussing it publicly while the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remained unresolved.

In May 2024, MP Malahat Ibragimgizi from the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party confirmed that raising the issue of “Western Azerbaijan” would have complicated the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict if discussed earlier. She emphasized that Stepanakert needed to be “liberated” before attention could shift to the next goal. Now that it is under Azerbaijani control, she stated, it is time to speak openly about this new objective. She added:

“Before creating a section on Western Azerbaijan, textbooks about its history, culture, and art should be included in the curriculum. This process should be organized comprehensively. First, awareness must be raised through books—our Western Azerbaijan history should be rewritten and added to textbooks.”

This demonstrates deliberate strategic planning: first resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, then pivot to broader territorial claims. This sequence suggests that the ”peace” process serves to buy time or cover for longer-term objectives.

Now let’s take a look at the revised textbooks of Azerbaijan. We selected extracts from current textbooks that refer to the Republic of Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan”. Notably, Azerbaijani school children begin studying history in the 5th grade. In the most recent textbook, published in 2024, page 110 states:

“Between 1948 and 1953, our compatriots living in the Armenian SSR were deported from their ancestral lands, while Armenians living abroad were resettled in their places. This was how the Soviet leadership ‘rewarded’ the people of Azerbaijan, who had played a major role in the victory over German fascism.

“In 1988, the final stage of deportation began. Hundreds of thousands of our compatriots were forcibly expelled from their ancestral lands, and many Azerbaijanis were killed during the deportation. By 1991, no Azerbaijani population remained in the Armenian SSR, that is, in Western Azerbaijan. The Soviet leadership turned a blind eye to all of this, and the crimes committed against Azerbaijanis were covered up.

“The Armenian SSR was established in the western part of historical Azerbaijani lands. Recently, the leadership in Moscow transferred a portion of the lands belonging to the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR, including areas such as Sharur-Derelayaz and Western Zangezur. As a result, Azerbaijan was separated from Nakhchivan. Our compatriots, who were forcibly displaced from their ancestral lands, later formed the Western Azerbaijan Community. This community advocates before international organizations for the protection of our historical heritage in Western Azerbaijan and for the rights of the displaced population. They continue to fight for their return to their homeland.

“During Soviet rule, autonomy was granted to the Armenian population living in the mountainous part of Karabakh. However, at that time, our compatriots living in Armenia were not afforded similar rights. In 1988, the leadership of the Armenian SSR demanded that Karabakh be transferred to them. This territorial claim was rejected by Azerbaijan. The Soviet leadership, however, pursued a pro-Armenian policy in this matter as well.”

In the same textbook, on page 111, there is another reference using similar language: “Thus, the expulsion of the population from Western Azerbaijan and the events that unfolded in Karabakh highlighted the need for the creation of an independent state, as the leadership of the USSR failed to take a fair stance. On October 18, 1991, the establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan was announced…”

The term “Western Azerbaijan” appears again on page 112 of the 5th-grade Azerbaijani textbook. The passage reads: 

“The Christian population of Albanian origin in Karabakh was gradually subjected to Armenianization. It is no coincidence that the Armenians themselves refer to the deeply rooted Christian population living in Karabakh as ‘converted.’

“The leaders of the Armenian SSR repeatedly sought to annex this territory, but their efforts were unsuccessful. At the end of the 20th century, the leadership of the USSR changed. Taking advantage of this shift, Armenia began making territorial claims against Azerbaijan. The forced removal of Azerbaijanis living in Western Azerbaijan began. Armenian nationalists gathered in Yerevan and other cities, chanting slogans such as ‘Armenia without Turks’ and ‘Reject the Turks!’ All of this was part of a premeditated and insidious plan:

1. Azerbaijanis should be completely expelled from Western Azerbaijan.
2. The mountainous part of Karabakh should then be annexed to the Armenian SSR.
3. Later, the issue of annexing Nakhchivan to Armenia should be raised.” 

Azerbaijani history textbooks actively propagate the idea that the neighboring Republic of Armenia is “Azerbaijani historical land” or “Western Azerbaijan” from the moment schoolchildren begin studying history. This educational approach reveals that generations are being taught a deeply troubling and potentially dangerous expansionist narrative—one that questions the very legitimacy of Armenia’s existence in the South Caucasus.

The textbooks consistently portray Armenians as “enemies”, “hated enemies”, “fascists” and “disgraceful enemies”. These terms, often used by President Ilham Aliyev in his public communication, have been systematically incorporated into the education system. On page 143 of the same textbook, there is a direct quote from a speech by President Aliyev delivered on October 18, 2021, which states:

“Anyone visiting Fuzuli these days can see the manifestations of Armenian savagery. Fuzuli is the worst destroyed district. There is not a single safe village here, not a single safe building. The city of Fuzuli has been completely razed to the ground. You probably remember this quite well. The Azerbaijani people remember that we could not find a single building to hoist our flag after the liberation of Fuzuli. Our flag was finally hoisted on a pole outside a military unit. Everyone who comes here can see Armenian savagery, Armenian vandalism, and no one can deny it.”

As evidence shows, hate propaganda begins as early as the foundational stages of education, reinforced by direct quotes from President Aliyev and repeated references to Armenian territory as “Western Azerbaijan”—a fabricated and deeply dangerous term with no political, geographical, or historical legitimacy.

Now let’s take a look at the Azerbaijani general education history textbook for 8th grade, which was revised and republished in June 2023. On page 109, there is a section titled “The Khanates of Western Azerbaijan.” The accompanying text reads:

“The khanates that emerged in Western Azerbaijan were distinguished by their strategic location and position along international trade routes. For this reason, they were subject to attacks by neighboring khanates and foreign states.

“What was the political and economic situation in Western Azerbaijan—specifically the Iravan and Nakhchivan khanates—at that time?

“Iravan Khanate: The Iravan Khanate was founded in the mid-18th century by Mir Mehdi Khan Afshar (1747–1752). In 1755, Hasanali Khan Qajar became the Khan of Iravan, marking the rise of a dynasty from the Qajar tribe.

“Population of the khanate: The population of the Iravan Khanate consisted primarily of Azerbaijani Turks, described as the oldest inhabitants of this land. This is supported by place names from the period, accounts from European travelers who visited Iravan at the time, and even Armenian historians.

“The first arrival of Christians—who made up only a small portion of the population—occurred in 1441, in connection with the transfer of the Armenian Catholicosate from Cilicia to the Iravan region of Azerbaijan, specifically to Uchkilse (Echmiadzin). Prior to this transfer, there were reportedly no Armenian settlements or lands in the region. Later, the Armenian Catholicosate expanded its territory by seizing lands belonging to local Azerbaijanis through various means.”

Ironically, but not surprisingly, the same wording appears on the official website of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense, in a section titled “History of Irevan.” It reads:

“The territory of the Irevan Khanate had always been part of Azerbaijan from the most ancient times, except during periods when the land was occupied by various invading empires. These lands were also among the regions most densely populated by Azerbaijani Turks. Until the Russian conquest in the early 19th century, Azerbaijani Turks constituted the absolute majority of the Irevan Khanate’s population. It should be noted that until the Armenian Catholicosate was moved to the Irevan (Chukhursad) region in 1441, there had been no Armenian villages or land parcels in this area. Even the very village of Uchkilse (Vakarshabad), the headquarters of the Armenian Catholicos, was gradually taken from the Azerbaijani Turks by Armenians through various means, beginning in 1443.”

For context, the Yerevan Khanate—with its large Muslim population—did indeed exist historically under Persian Empire rule until the Persian-Russian War of 1826–1828, when the region came under Russian control. This historical entity, however, bears no connection to the modern Azerbaijani state. While Azerbaijan’s territorial claims on Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, have long been present in its official discourse, these claims are now being actively promoted in a new way: as part of a broader, more organized expansionist narrative under the label of “Western Azerbaijan.”

Let’s examine the 11th grade history textbook, revised and published in 2023. Page 117 contains the following passage:

“Thus, in the 1920s and 1930s, under the guise of Soviet national policy, a significant part of the historical lands inherited from the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR), against the will of the Azerbaijani people, was transferred to Soviet Armenia and Georgia. As if the creation of a state called Armenia—at the expense of the city of Yerevan and the surrounding lands—was not enough, a significant portion of Azerbaijani historical territories was ‘donated’ to the neighboring republic through the direct intervention of Moscow and the incompetence of Azerbaijani Bolsheviks, whose minds were clouded by the ideas of ‘internationalism.’ This process continued in the following decades.”

The wording here again questions the legitimacy of the Armenian Republic’s existence. On page 113 of the same book, in the section on Azerbaijan’s Sovietization period, there is a sub-section titled “Our Lands Are Being Divided.” The following text reads:

“The re-occupation of northern Azerbaijan by Russia further strengthened Armenia’s territorial claims against the republic. The Dashnak government, which had failed to achieve its goals during the APR period and was ultimately defeated, intensified its policy of seizing Azerbaijani lands (Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhchivan, etc.) with the comprehensive assistance of Soviet Russia. According to the agreement signed between Soviet Russia and the Armenian Dashnak government in August 1920, the Sharur-Daralagyaz region was given to the Armenian Dashnak government, and Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and the mountainous part of Karabakh were declared disputed territories.”

The narrative continues on page 115 with the following passage:

“It was no coincidence that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue dragged on for so long. During this period, discussions were repeatedly held between the party and Soviet bodies, and various proposals were put forward. The indecision of the Azerbaijani communists at the time, pressure from Moscow, and, in some cases, the representation of both sides by Armenians (there were a significant number of Armenian nationalists who had become Bolsheviks in the leading bodies of the AK(b)P) had a decisive impact on the issue. Finally, on July 7, 1923, the Central Executive Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR issued a decree ‘On the Organization of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.’ This created the conditions for the dismemberment of the Karabakh lands and paved the way for Armenia to reassert its claims to this territory in the future. However, no similar steps were taken for the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis living in Soviet Armenia, which was established at the expense of historically Azerbaijani territories.”

Once again, we see the promotion of a false, expansionist narrative—the claim that Armenia was created on “Azerbaijani lands.” Our purpose is not to prove Armenia’s antiquity or its numerous references in ancient sources. Instead, we seek to highlight an alarming trend: the propaganda embedded in the education system, which essentially encourages young Azerbaijani students to believe that the neighboring country “belongs to them.” This mindset fosters the idea that dying for the “motherland” or “lost homeland” would be honorable should the leadership initiate an aggressive war. 

For a more comprehensive picture, we examine examples from both recent fairy tales and higher educational institutions that promote the narrative of “Western Azerbaijan.”

What Fairy Tales Are Told in Azerbaijan?

Bahram Bagirzade, is a director, actor, publicist and artist, and is a member of the “Bakılı oğlanlar” Fun and Jokes Club, according to the official website of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population. He is well known for his fairy tales. One of his recent works, “Irevan for Children,” was featured on his Instagram page.

According to Bagirzade’s post, the story “tells about the history of the emergence and flourishing of the ancient city of Irevan, the former capital of the great Azerbaijani Irevan Khanate. For centuries, brave and hardworking Azerbaijanis lived on this land. They cultivated fields, erected fortresses, studied sciences and built mosques, created works of art and paved roads, connected the banks of turbulent rivers with bridges, and fought enemies for the freedom of their land. After reading the book Irevan for Children, children will learn about the most interesting events that took place in this Azerbaijani khanate.”

Bagirzade—who is publicly promoted by the Azerbaijani state, including the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection and the state information agency AZERTAC—is actively promoting the idea that the capital of Armenia is in fact an “ancient Azerbaijani city.” This narrative is being targeted at very young children, some of whom may not yet know how to read or attend school.

To illustrate the extent of this narrative further, consider another of Bagirzade’s fairy tales, titled “Tbilisi for Children.” A post about this book on the author’s Instagram page reads:

“In honor of the visit of the President of Georgia, Mikheil Kavelashvili, to Azerbaijan, the creative team of Bahram Bagirzade prepared the book Tbilisi for Children! This is not just a gesture of politeness, but a declaration of sincere love for sunny Tbilisi and its hospitable residents—a city that has become almost a second home for Bahram Bagirzade. The author will carefully lead young readers through the labyrinths of history, revealing the secret corners of this ancient and majestic city, beautiful at any time of the year. Tbilisi is a rare pearl that has managed to preserve, thanks to its residents, a unique atmosphere of warmth and hospitality, a quaint pattern of cozy streets, and the enticing aroma of national cuisine. Bahram Bagirzade sincerely hopes that young readers will love Tbilisi as much as he does.”

In the fairy tales by the same author, Azerbaijan’s two neighboring states receive strikingly different portrayals. Armenia’s capital is depicted as an “ancient Azerbaijani city,” while Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, is presented as a warm and friendly neighbor. This contrast demonstrates how Azerbaijani state-sponsored authors continue to reinforce territorial ambitions toward Armenia.

Higher Education’s Role in Spreading Revisionist Claims

In October 2023, an announcement on Azerbaijan’s state university website stated: “The Center for Western Azerbaijan Studies has been established at Baku State University (BSU). The BSU Scientific Council has made a decision on this. It was noted that the ideas voiced by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, during a meeting with members of the West Azerbaijan Community on December 24 of the previous year, and the preparation of the ‘Concept of Return to West Azerbaijan,’ also present a number of tasks for scientists and educators. The Center, established under BSU, will conduct various studies and systematic research related to Western Azerbaijan. Its activities will include organizing international conferences, scientific seminars, debates, publishing books, and maintaining strong relations with the West Azerbaijan community.”

This announcement demonstrates the institutionalization of this expansionist concept, implemented under President Aliyev’s directive––an unprecedented move.

In March 2024, Azerbaijan’s State Pedagogical University made a similar announcement about opening the “Western Azerbaijan Research Center.” The announcement on the university’s website stated:

“The Center intends to establish relations with all state and non-state structures dealing with Western Azerbaijan and to operate in a coordinated manner. The Center for Western Azerbaijan Studies plans to structure its work in two main directions:

-Scientific research

-Organization of educational activities

This includes conducting scientific research on different stages of the history of Western Azerbaijan and providing scientific and methodological support in this field.

The Center will particularly focus on studying historical periods related to the mass forced displacement of Azerbaijanis from their homeland by Armenians…” 

This initiative stems directly from Aliyev’s directives, particularly following the 2020 war and following October 2022, when Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan during the Prague summit. While this recognition was likely intended to facilitate a peace agreement, it instead triggered escalating territorial claims. 

Historical context shows that Azerbaijanis had a significant presence in Soviet Armenia. Soviet censuses data reveals that 160,841 Azerbaijanis lived in Soviet Armenia in 1979,[3] though this number decreased to 84,860 by 1989.[4]

At the same time, Soviet Azerbaijan’s Armenian population in 1979 comprised 352,410 people (excluding Nagorno-Karabakh) plus 123,076 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh—totaling 475,486 Armenians. By 1989, these numbers had shifted: the Armenian population in Azerbaijan proper decreased to 245,000, while Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population grew to 145,450—totaling 390,500 Armenians across Soviet Azerbaijan.

Conclusion

The concept of “Western Azerbaijan” has nothing to do with the rights of Azerbaijani refugees who once lived in Soviet Armenia. While Azerbaijani officials sometimes present it as a humanitarian issue, this narrative neither addresses refugee rights nor parallels the Nagorno-Karabakh issue or the rights of Armenians who were forcibly displaced in September 2023. Instead, it represents an expansionist agenda that President Aliyev has explicitly outlined since 2022. Dismissing the gravity of this narrative is not only naïve—it is dangerous, particularly now that Azerbaijan has formally incorporated it into its education system.

While a discussion about the historical presence of Azerbaijanis in Soviet Armenia merits consideration, it is far more troubling when Armenia’s entire territory is officially presented as “Western Azerbaijan”. This narrative has intensified since the 2020 war and has gained further momentum after the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh’s entire Armenian population—especially as both nations discuss a potential peace agreement and mutual recognition of territorial integrity. 

The inclusion of this narrative in state school curricula, university programs, and even children’s fairy tales demonstrates that an entire generation in Azerbaijan is being raised to believe that Armenia is “Western Azerbaijan” and “belongs to Azerbaijan.” This mindset, shaped by aggressive intentions and expansionist ideology, is actively promoted by an authoritarian regime. The system excludes any genuine peace discourse and suppresses dissent, often imprisoning those who advocate for nonviolence and peaceful coexistence.

Behind the facade of Aliyev’s authoritarian regime lie deeply troubling narratives based on historical revisionism and fabricated facts. These narratives are systematically instilled from early childhood—from preschool through higher education. 

The rhetoric about the Armenian Constitution being an obstacle to a peace agreement serves merely as a pretext—a tool Aliyev uses to delay meaningful negotiations while preparing for further aggression, which he openly signals.

The undeniable truth is that Aliyev’s ambitions extend far beyond Nagorno-Karabakh. His repeated demonstration of broader territorial claims mark a dangerous trend. This development has gone unrecognized by the current Armenian government and remains inadequately addressed by international partners who claim to support peace in the South Caucasus. Timely recognition and action could still prevent potential catastrophes. At its core, this crisis concerns human lives and the possibility of a normalized neighborhood—one that Aliyev and the Azerbaijani leadership are systematically undermining through education and other means. 

To counter this alarming situation, Armenia must shift from a reactive stance in favor of a proactive and assertive strategy—one that defends its sovereignty through border delimitation and demarcation, as well as through legal, factual, and diplomatic channels. Passive in the face of openly expansionist narratives only serves to normalize Azerbaijan’s claims and invite further aggression. The Armenian government needs active engagement from international partners, achievable only through clear and consistent messaging. Instead of repeatedly defending the Armenian Constitution, officials should focus on exposing the developments in Azerbaijan that pose the primary obstacle to genuine peace in the region.

Footnotes:

[1]  16.03.2025, 16.03.2025, 16.03.2025, 17.03.2025, 17.03.2025, 18.03.2025, 18.03.2025, 18.03.2025, 19.03.2025, 19.03.2025, 20.03.2025, 20.03.2025, 21.03.2025, 30.03.2025, 31.03.2025 , 31.03.2025
[2] 01.04.2025, 02.04.2025, 07.04.2025, 9.04.2025, 9.04.2025, 10.04.2025, 11.04.2025, 12.04.2025, 19.04.2025,28.04.2025
[3]  Տես՝ Առանձին ազգությունների թվաքականը Հայկական ԽՍՀ տարածքում 1979 և 1989 թթ․, 1989-ի Հայկական ԽՍՀ մարդահամար, էջ 106.
See: Population of individual nationalities in the territory of the Armenian SSR in 1979 and 1989 (Armenian SSR Census), 1989, p. 106.
[4] Ibid.

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