EVN Security Report: August 2023

The Security Context

In the month of August, the security environment for Armenia was primarily defined by the continued blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the security dilemma — both hard security and human security — that the escalating humanitarian crisis exacerbated. The strangulation and collective starvation of Nagorno-Karabakh was augmented by Azerbaijan’s continued attacks against civilian targets. In conjunction with its utilization of hybrid warfare against Stepanakert, Baku also enhanced its kinetic diplomacy stratagem against Yerevan, as it amplified cross-border shootings against military posts within Armenia-proper, targeting EUMA observers as well as killing an Armenian conscript. This was followed by a much larger attack in Sotk, leading to the death of three soldiers. 

As the negotiation process has stalled due to Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin Corridor, Armenia has resorted to the intense diplomatization of the crisis, while at the same time utilizing international institutions. Baku’s response to such developments have been two-fold: to mitigate the international fallout and utilize Russia’s acquiescence to double-down on the blockade. The security context, to this end, has produced four outcomes: 1) the security situation has exponentially deteriorated in Nagorno-Karabakh, with a potential spill-over effect into Armenia; 2) the United Nations has taken a more vocal role in the crisis, as Armenia has utilized the institution’s mechanisms to bring broader international attention to the crisis; 3) France has taken the mantle of championing Armenia’s cause within the international community; and 4) Azerbaijan has deepened its coordination with Russia to consolidate the blockade.  

France’s role has become quite prominent in addressing Azerbaijan’s endeavor of depopulating Nagorno-Karabakh, as its new Ambassador immediately visited the Syunik region, along with the ambassadors of Poland and Czech Republic, while a delegation of French elected officials transported humanitarian aid from France to the Lachin Corridor. France’s posturing has aligned with the broader European diplomatic initiative, as the EU, OSCE, and newcomer Belgium chimed in to criticize Baku, with Aliyev refusing to meet the latter two. Canada and South Korea have also become more directly involved, noting the growing scope of Armenia’s engagements. Underpinning the Western endeavor of stabilization has been the inclusion of the United Nations into the process, with the UN Secretary-General condemning Baku’s behavior, followed by a UN Security Council meeting where the vast majority of UNSC members condemned Baku’s strangulation of Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Armenia’s diplomatization of its security has allowed for the collapse of Baku’s “caviar diplomacy” and a new phenomenon for Armenia: winning the public relations and information battle against Azerbaijan. The security implications of this, however, has been the Aliyev regime’s amplification of kinetic diplomacy and robust increase in cross-border violence. Azerbaijan has consistently opened fire this month on the Armenian positions in Kutakan, Verin Shorzha, Yeraskh, Norabak, and the civilian airport in Kapan, while continuously firing on civilian agricultural work in Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku’s amplification of interstate violence has been enhanced by Russia’s complete abdication of responsibility, with the Russo-Azerbaijani axis blaming Armenia for Baku’s transgressions. This has resulted in Armenia’s continued decoupling from Russia due to Moscow’s strategic obstructionism.          

As Moscow has become systemically sidelined from the negotiation process, and having lost complete leverage over Yerevan due to its alignment with Baku, as solatium, it sought to intensify its control over official Stepanakert, with the resignation of President Arayik Harutyunyan and the appointment of a new commander for its peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. As Harutyunyan’s political faction had become more vocal in its criticism of Russia’s strategic negligence, the more pro-Russian, anti-Yerevan faction has been introduced to head Stepanakert. The security implications of this reshuffle presuppose two feasible scenarios: 1) Russia offering some level of political cover to the new leadership, and 2) further deterioration of the security situation, but at the political expense of Yerevan. 

Aliyev’s Madman Strategy and the Normalization of Coercion

Coercion is not simply an instrument or a diplomatic weapon for the Aliyev regime. It is an intrinsic part of its institutions and foreign policy doctrine and revolves around three precepts: enforceable threats, reputation-building, and making ostensibly extreme threats more credible. This approach in international security studies is qualified as the “madman theory,” which posits that being seen as extreme or exceedingly maximalist can aid a leader in crisis bargaining and force not only the adversary, but other parties to the conflict, to accept the perceived extremism of the actor in order to avoid destruction. Definitionally, the given actor is not qualified as “mad” or “crazy” within the context of having mental health issues, but rather, within the confines of bellicose behavior. Thus, it will prefer and use the most extreme or maximalist option: war and destruction. For this reason, the madman theory is designed as an effective strategy in coercive bargaining, where the perceived extremism of an actor is assumed as the basis upon which engagement with that actor proceeds from. As such, Aliyev’s bargaining posture with not only Armenia, but also the international community involved in the “peace” negotiations, operates off of the logic that if his terms are not met, he reserves the right to wage war. 

In this context, whereas utilization of war, in any negotiation process, is deemed exceedingly extreme or “mad,” in the case of Aliyev, this “madness” or extremism is qualified as credible. The madman strategy, of course, entails two important attributes: the actor must demonstrate a commitment to destructive behavior, and the actor’s threats of escalation or collapse of bargaining must be deemed credible. Thus, in order for the madman theory to work, others must be convinced that the actor in question is, in fact, mad. If the madness, or the extremism, of the actor is not believed, the strategy collapses. It is for this reason that Aliyev cannot back down from his maximalist and extremist posturing: any concession, on his end, would collapse his madman strategy, negating his credibility as a force for destruction. When Aliyev’s madman strategy is applied to a set of empirical observations, the pattern remains remarkably consistent: 1) unless Aliyev gets what he want, he has no other choice but to wage war; 2) the international community accepts that if negotiations do not progress, Aliyev reserves the right to wage war; and 3) Aliyev doesn’t need to justify why he would wage war, the logic off of which everyone is operating has already been established: he is credibly a “madman.”

The madman strategy of Baku, for this reason, has produced four outcomes: 1) it has normalized coercion; 2) it has convinced the U.S. and Europe that if pressured, Aliyev would have no choice but to resort to force; 3) provoking a madman is imprudent, so Armenia must be delicate in its dealings with Baku; and 4) the burden of responsibility is irrelevant, because everyone is dealing with a “madman.” This leveraging of extremism, which has gained credibility due to the asymmetry in power between Armenia and Azerbaijan, has become a self-fulfilling prophecy: the use of force is inevitable because Aliyev reserves the right to use force. The logical outcome of this strategy becomes very straightforward: unless the madman gets what he wants, everyone stands to lose. This has not only intrinsically harmed the peace process, or even the possibility of stability in the region, but more than that, it has convinced the West to have much higher tolerance for Aliyev, since the threshold for tolerating “madness” must be higher. This has not only normalized Baku’s bellicosity, it has also created, intrinsically, an artificial atmosphere of tolerance: the madman must be treated with kid gloves, lest he exercise his madness.  

Neutralizing the Madman Strategy

It is not only within Armenia’s strategic and security interests to neutralize the madman strategy of the Aliyev regime, but also, it is in the fundamental interests of the West to both discredit and invalidate this strategy. In more simple terms, unless the “credibility” of being a madman is discredited, Aliyev will have no incentive to either engage in genuine peace or even the most basic stabilization process. To this end, the madman strategy is precisely designed to obstruct peace, for there can be no peace in the face of extremist or maximalist demands. The solution, to this end, is two-fold: Armenia must contest the madman stratagem through a policy of deterrence-by-denial, while the West must simply change its underlying perception and reject Aliyev’s madman posturing. Why will this work? Because a large body of research that has examined the madman theory has produced overwhelming empirical findings that demonstrate the strategy simply does not work if the madman’s bluff is called.  

One expansive study shows that the use of the madman strategy creates further credibility problems down the line, which, in turn, produces uncertainty and lack of trust. In this context, if the West, for example, buys into Aliyev’s madman posturing, then by definition, the West will also have to conclude that Aliyev can never be trusted to abide by a peace treaty. In this context, either the West calls Aliyev’s bluff, or they negate their own approach through the facilitation of peace talks. Another study concluded that the madman strategy, effectively, is a myth, since it is contingent on perceptivity and pretenses of credibility, but once the madman is confronted and challenged, the facade collapses. A more prominent study found that while the given actor may make rational calculations through extreme preferences, these “situational extreme preferences” may produce some coercive bargaining gains, but will fail to produce tenable long-term outcomes. Similarly, a large-N study found that the madman approach thoroughly harms the general deterrence and security architecture of a region.

Taken in its totality, the West’s tacit acquiescence to Baku’s madman posturing is simply an exercise in naive self-negation. Aliyev is not as “mad” as he presents himself to be; he is neither credible nor does he have the capacity to enforce his threats if he is not helped or enabled; threatening him with consequences will not produce negative or destructive results; and the very process of having a higher tolerance threshold for his extremism contradicts everything that the West is trying to achieve. Armenia, on the other hand, does not have the capacity, in the present, to call the madman’s bluff, but it is building up the resilience to deny his extremist demands. The threat and internecine use of force is the madman’s bread and butter. Take that away from him, and you reveal him for what he is: an insecure bully preying on the weak. From Saddam Hussein, to Slobadan Milosovic, to Muammar Gadaffi, the track record is quite clear. That clarity, unfortunately, has not reached the South Caucasus yet, and until it does, there will be neither peace nor stability in the region.    

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