Armenia’s Foreign Policy Reorientation: Pivoting, Diversifying and Hedging
Armenia’s foreign policy reorientation has sent shockwaves throughout the South Caucasus, with these shocks reverberating further into the Transatlantic discourse. As Armenia has directionally pivoted West, and implemented its policy of diversification, a great deal of discussion has sprung as to the scope, depth, genuineness, risks, and the overall tenability of this pivot. The contours of the pivot, the operationalization of the policy of diversification, the de-aligning of the region’s power configurations, and the Russo-Azerbaijani axis’ incessant assault against Armenia’s Western pivot, has produced an overarching question on the wisdom of Armenia’s reorientation: should Armenia pivot or hedge, and in the domain of risk-propensity, how is Armenia going to mitigate the fallout with Russia? As the large body of research demonstrates, this is not an either/or question, and as such, the pivot-versus-hedging postulate is a false dichotomy: one must first pivot before one can hedge, and in this context, until Armenia pivoted out of Russia’s dependency structure, the very idea of hedging would be impossible.
The broader discourse among Armenia’s pundit class, and the general lack of scholarship on the confluence of systemic power dispersion in international relations and the structural shifts this induces in geopolitical developments, has led to a great deal of confusion, misunderstanding, and generally inchoate arguments about Armenia’s foreign policy reorientation: Is Armenia pivoting or should it be hedging, and do commentators actually understand what each entails? In essence, one may surmise whether it is the lack of advanced international relations and security studies in Armenia that has reduced such nuanced and multi-layered foreign policy puzzles to the level of simple, on-the-surface dichotomy: Must Armenia do one or the other? The general lack of understanding between what constitutes pivoting and what constitutes hedging, and the lexical order that requires one to be built upon the other, further elucidates the poverty of foreign policy analysis and international relations scholarship among much, though not all, of Armenia’s pundits and self-proclaimed analysts. This diminished state of qualified expertise, which is compounded by speculation, non-empirical observations, and spurious arguments, has produced another layer of exaggerated and muddled arguments on the risk propensity associated with Armenia’s foreign policy reorientation: either Armenia is irresponsibly alienating its erstwhile security partner(s), or it is blindly seeking a new savior. As such, building on the dichotomously false pivot-hedging presupposition, increased layers of empirically dubious claims are further built one on top of the other, demonstrating a robust disconnect between the actual state of Armenia’s foreign policy reorientation and how this is understood and perceived by the critical public sphere.
In general terms, hedging[1] refers to a “national security or alignment strategy, undertaken by one state toward another, featuring a mix of cooperative and confrontational elements.”[2] The concept of hedging seeks to address such questions as: how do states respond to rising powers that may challenge their security interests, when forming security arrangements how do states guard against the possibility of abandonment, and in the domain of security, how do foreign policy decision-makers cope with security challenges in highly uncertain regional and international environments? An important body of scholarship contends that hedging is a mixed strategy that a smaller state utilizes toward a major or rising power both economically and diplomatically, while adopting fallback security measures.[3] Other findings note that hedging is a security strategy adopted by small states as they navigate triangular relations, while recent research demonstrates that hedging explains alignment politics when small states hedge to pursue limited or ambiguous alignment vis-a-vis one or more major powers.[4] Collectively, hedging is qualified as a way to address security threats while pursuing other interests, yet at the same time mitigating potential security-related threats by cultivating protective options with respect to security alternatives. Thus, governments adopt hedging strategies to mitigate risks they face in international affairs, seeking to hedge against “international security hazards” by preserving strategic ambiguity, forging limited security alignments, and cultivating sufficient capabilities to be relatively self-reliant should security threats materialize.[5]
Thus, based on the extant scholarship, for a small state to be able to develop and implement a policy of hedging, it must have foreign policy independence, be able to engage in strategic ambiguity, be self-reliant in the realm of security, and have limited security alignments. When observing these variables that qualify the capabilities a state must have to utilize a policy of hedging, Armenia possessed none of these variables until 2022. In this context, how can a small state that is subjected to a patron-vassal relationship, in which the given state does not have an independent foreign policy, is incapable of exercising strategic ambiguity, and the entirety of its security architecture is reliant on another state, thus negating security self-reliance, engage in hedging? Satellites cannot hedge, since they are subjected to toeing the line of their patron state, and in this context, until the given state pivots away from the patron state, establishes an independent foreign policy, the capacity to engage in strategic ambiguity, and develop a security architecture that has some semblance of self-reliance, such a state can never engage in hedging. As such, it borders the incoherent to pose the hedging-versus-pivot argument, when basic knowledge of these concepts clearly demonstrate that a satellite state simply cannot hedge. Thus, in the case of Armenia, the Western pivot was a prerequisite and an undeniable necessity if Armenia was ever going to be able to have an independent foreign policy and develop its own security capabilities. For this reason, only after establishing foreign and security diversification can Armenia then develop the capabilities to formulate and operationalize hedging strategies. It is within this context that the pivot-versus-hedging dichotomy collapses, for it cannot be a question of one or the other, but rather, one builds upon the other, and within this lexical order, Armenia had to first pivot, then diversify, and once it has accrued the sufficient capabilities, it can then proceed to developing a policy orientation of hedging.
Qualified within this schematic model, Armenia’s stratagem of pivoting through decoupling, its utilization of co-alignment and segmentation, the direction and non-ideational basis of the pivot, and its access to hard power capabilities in the international market, are precisely the foundational basis that is allowing Armenia to develop foreign policy independence, strategic ambiguity, and potential security independence. In essence, Armenia is on track to potentially formulate a grand strategy of hedging, but it cannot put the cart ahead of the horse, especially considering the quality of the cart and the resiliency of the horse. This, in turn, begs the question: What have been the dividends of Armenia’s pivot and what are the risk factors associated with Russia’s opposition to Armenia’s de-vassalization?
De-Vassalization and the Pivot’s Dividends
From independence until 1997, Armenia was best positioned to develop a strategy of hedging, as it exercised sufficient degree of foreign policy independence, had the leeway to engage in strategic ambiguity, and being the victor in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the environment was fertile for Armenia to develop robust security independence. So where did things go wrong? The “palace coup” of 1998, the subsequent Kocharyan Administration’s abdication of Armenia’s security and foreign policy infrastructure to Russia, and the complete consolidation of Armenia within Russia’s dependency structure through the joining of CSTO in 2001. In sum, within three years, Armenia went from having the potential of being an independent regional actor with strategic ambiguity and diversity of interests to a Russian vassal. As such, Armenia has not exercised an independent foreign or security policy since 1998, and whereas Azerbaijan and Georgia, for example, refused to join the CSTO in 2001 and thus limited their “security alignments,” the Kocharyan Administration did the opposite, reducing and subjecting Armenia as an extension of Russia’s interests. Thus, while Azerbaijan and Georgia have continuously been able to exercise, in relative terms, an independent foreign policy when compared to Armenia, and have thus had exceedingly more leeway to engage in strategic ambiguity and diversification of bilateral partners, Armenia remained stuck under Russian suzerainty. More to the point, Russian suzerainty tolerates very little “leash-slipping” from its satellites, and in this context, not only did Armenia not have any space to practice or develop any form of hedging, but merely entertaining the idea of exercising foreign policy independence was decisively met with systemic pressure and coercive diplomacy.
The case study of Armenia’s negotiations with the European Union in 2013 represents the clearest example. The overt loyalty of the Sargsyan Administration to being a Russian vassal was never questioned or even a subject of inquiry, yet the idea that Armenia might attempt the most minimal act of economic hedging was met with a decisive Russian response: not only was Armenia not “allowed” to sign its Association Agreement with the European Union, but it had to join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. To this end, the idea that Armenia, without decoupling and pivoting away from Russia, could have developed or exercised any form of foreign policy independence, or diversified any of its sectors with other countries, or even contemplated limited strategies of hedging, is empirically unsubstantiated. As such, diminishing the dependency structure that post-Velvet Armenia inherited from the previous illiberal regimes, and establishing foreign and security policy autonomy as a mechanism of capacity building, remain categorical imperatives if Armenia is to exercise the type of independent policies that its South Caucasus neighbors have been exercising the last two decades.
While Armenia’s Western pivot has produced immense dividends with respect to deepening and diversifying relations with various European states, it has also led to the strengthening of relations with the United States, with a collective outcome that has built an important bridge between Yerevan and the Transatlantic partnership. Consequently, not only has Armenia been able to rupture its Russian-imposed dependence structure, it has also ruptured its general isolation both in the region and in the international community. No longer confined to the terms and demands imposed by Moscow, Yerevan, for the first time since 1997, is able to exercise an independent foreign policy that is specific to Armenia’s interests. This confluence of growing international political capital and access to hard power capabilities remain the specific byproducts of its pivot and operationalization of its diversification policy. In more simple terms, Armenia is developing the foundations for capacity-building, resilience, and security self-reliance. In this context, Armenia is neither seeking to alienate or offend its former ally, nor is it seeking a new “savior” or a security guarantor. Rather, Armenia is cultivating a diverse coalition of partners, the objective of which is to co-align and segmentize the wide range of sectors that can enhance its capabilities for self-reliance. Within this framework, de-vassalization and no longer being subjected to Russian suzerainty is not the same as alienating or being anti-Russian. The argument that any action by Armenia that is independent of Russia somehow qualifies as anti-Russian reaffirms an open secret: Moscow does not think Armenia has the sovereign right to shape its own policies. Unfortunately, demanding subservience, in and of itself, as some kind of an intrinsic right, is not the terms of a partnership that is commensurate with the interests of democratic Armenia.
Conclusion
In the domain of accruing dividends, one of the most unique developments produced by Armenia’s Western pivot, and one that can be qualified as an unintended consequence of this strategic reorientation, is the corrosion of relations between Azerbaijan and the West. Contextually, Armenia’s pivot has been designed to enhance its exit from Russia’s dependency structure and provide it access to Western resources, and as such, the pivot was specific to Armenia’s strategic interests in developing numerous and deepening relations with Western capitals. The pivot was not designed under the presumption that the diversification of Armenia’s foreign and security policy, and by extension, Armenia’s strengthening of relations with the West, will result in the erosion of Azerbaijan’s relationship with the West. This inverse causal relationship, while mostly a byproduct of Baku’s hubris and Aliyev’s strategic narcissism, is nonetheless an important dividend that official Yerevan has accrued. In essence, the deepening of Armenia-West relations has triggered an inimical response from Baku: Aliyev neither anticipated nor foresaw the speed in which Armenia would be able to implement the pivot, nor did he anticipate the level of Western support that would be heaved upon Yerevan. This realignment of interests and shifting of relationships has further contributed to the region’s geopolitical pluralism, thus changing the nature and structure of competition in the South Caucasus: the game is no longer rigged, where Baku gets extensive leeway while Russia ties Yerevan’s hands and forces acquiescence.
Footnotes:
[1] For the broader scholarship on hedging, see Tessman, B. 2012. “System structure and state strategy: adding hedging to the menu”, Security Studies, 21(2), 192–231. Medeiros, E. 2005. “Strategic hedging and the future of Asia-Pacific stability”, Washington Quarterly, 29(1), 145–167; Kuik, C. 2016. “How do weaker states hedge? Unpacking ASEAN states’ alignment behavior towards China”, Journal of Contemporary China, 25(100), 500–514; Guzansky, Y. 2015. “The foreign policy tools of small powers: strategic hedging in the Persian Gulf”, Middle East Policy, 22(1), 112–122; Korolev, A. 2016. “Systemic balancing and regional hedging: China-Russia relations”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(4), 375–397
[2] Ciorciari, J.D. and Kaacke, J. 2019. “Hedging in international relations.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 19 No. 3
[3] Tunsjø, Ø. 2013. Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy: Hedging against Risk. New York: Columbia University Press
[4] See Ciorciari, J.D. 2010. The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; and Lim, D.J. and Cooper, Z. 2015. “Reassessing hedging: the logic of alignment in East Asia”, Security Studies, 24(4), 696–727.
[5] Ciorciari, J.D. 2019. “The variable effectiveness of hedging strategies.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 19 No. 3
Security Context
In March, the European Union’s role as a cornerstone in Armenia’s nascent security architecture became consolidated, further reinforcing Armenia’s Western pivot through the deepening of its securitized relations with the EU. An important development was the role the European Mission in Armenia (EUMA) played in disrupting and discrediting the disinformation campaign initiated by Baku to establish the usual pretext for military escalation. Contextually, not only did EUMA’s statement on the facts negate the false Azerbaijani narrative, but more so, it disrupted the international bothesidism that Baku had been accustomed to. The overall transition from economic and soft power configurations to a more robust resiliency approach marks an important turning point in the role of the EU within Armenia’s security diversification.
At the policy level, the European Parliament took the lead in this initiative by passing a resolution calling for the strengthening of Armenia’s defense and hybrid capabilities, which was followed by the Chair of the EU Military Committee developing collaborative measures with Armenia. This was supplemented by the growing schism between Europe and Azerbaijan, as the EU condemned Azerbaijan’s “inflammatory” rhetoric against the “EU, its Member States, EUMA, and Armenia.” While Armenia’s response, quite obviously, was very positive and aligned with the Government’s vision of Armenia proceeding down the path of EU candidacy, the response from Azerbaijan and Russia were uniformly indignant and seemingly coordinated, with Baku lamenting the EU’s “smear campaign” and Russia warning against Armenia’s “path of alliance with Europe.” The Russo-Azerbaijani axis went further into overdrive when Armenia announced an upcoming summit on April 5 between Yerevan, Brussels, and Washington, with Russia and Azerbaijan releasing statements that entailed the exact same language, accusing the West of creating “dividing lines” in the region, NATO-izing the European observation mission, and destabilizing the situation.
Transitioning from the supranational level, Armenia also deepened military relations with Greece, after having fully consolidated its high-level relations with France, with Greece supporting the reforms and modernization of Armenia’s Armed Forces, while also seeking to expand quadrilateral cooperation with France, Cyprus, India, and Armenia. While multilateral and bilateral relations were being cemented between Yerevan and its growing number of partners, Russia and Azerbaijan proceeded to also strengthen their axis. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov credited his “Azerbaijani partners” for keeping Moscow informed of developments, while deriding Yerevan as being ungrateful. Further, as Aliyev and Putin strengthened their bond, Armenia’s Prime Minister noted that leaving the CSTO remains a serious possibility in the future, which was subsequently followed by Yerevan officially informing Moscow that Russian border guards at Zvartnots Airport must be withdrawn by August 1.
Examining the Context
Podcast
Examining the Context: One Must Pivot Before One Can Hedge: Armenia’s New Foreign Policy Independence
Dr. Nerses Kopalyan, author of the monthly series "EVN Security Report" talks about why establishing a Western pivot was crucial for Armenia to achieve an independent foreign policy and enhance its security capabilities. Kopalyan explains why this process involves pivoting first and only then adopting hedging strategies.
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The Festival’s Resilience program will feature a panel discussion with Dr. Nerses Kopalyan, Dr. Anna Ohanyan and others.
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