Deterrence and Coercion: Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Diverging Defense Postures

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Between 2021 and 2025, both Armenia and Azerbaijan expanded their military budgets, procurement strategies, and international defense partnerships. However, they differ from each other in both scale and intent. Azerbaijan continues an aggressive military build-up, while Armenia focuses on targeted modernization in response to defense threats by Azerbaijan. 

From Survival to Strategic Resilience

After the 2020 Karabakh War, Armenia announced its intention to undertake comprehensive defense reforms. However, Russia obstructed these initial efforts, aiming to weaken Armenia’s combat capabilities and maintain its military dependence. By 2022–2023, Russia’s war in Ukraine—combined with its failure to honor bilateral and CSTO security commitments to Armenia, and its role in the 2020–2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crisis—led Yerevan to fundamentally rethink its defense strategy and international partnerships.

The Transformation of the Army 2024–2035 concept lies at the heart of Armenia’s evolving defense strategy. This initiative aims to professionalize the armed forces, strengthen territorial defense, modernize doctrine and force structure, and diversify defense partnerships. Moving away from its Soviet-era, conscription-heavy legacy, Armenia is building a flexible, high-readiness force grounded in democratic oversight, strategic planning and modern capabilities. The reforms enhance strategic communications, command-and-control functions, and joint operational capacity. Meanwhile, Armenia is building defensive fortifications along its borders to deter further military incursions and territorial encroachment by Azerbaijan.

The foundation of this transformation lies in establishing a territorial defense system that mobilizes trained reservists under regional commands to counter external threats. This model strengthens local resilience while supporting regular army units. Simultaneously, military education is advancing through the professionalization of non-commissioned officers (NCOs), new career pathways, and modernized curriculum aligned with NATO and Western standards.

Armenia is also enhancing civilian oversight of its defense sector through increased procurement transparency, participation of women in the armed forces, and integration of human rights in military training and operations. The Ministry of Defense is also reshaping its internal culture to emphasize merit, professionalism and ethical conduct. This cultural transformation is essential for rebuilding institutional credibility and restoring public confidence after multiple military setbacks.

One of the most persistent internal challenges remains the high number of non-combat casualties in peacetime, including deaths from accidents, alleged suicides, and other violent incidents. These cases largely stem from inadequate oversight, weak command responsibility, and entrenched sociocultural norms within the military hierarchy. Tackling this issue is crucial not only to protect service personnel but also to boost morale, restore trust in the reform process, and align Armenia’s armed forces with principles of human rights, dignity, accountability, and institutional resilience.

A broader Comprehensive Defense and Security Concept under development complements these military-specific reforms. This strategic framework will integrate defense modernization with wider national security priorities, including cyber defense, energy security, and foreign policy alignment. The goal is to position Armenia’s defense strategy within a whole-of-society approach that builds resilience and reduces systemic vulnerabilities in an increasingly volatile region.

Defense Narratives by Azerbaijan and Armenia

In parallel with its military conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan used “salami tactics” for creeping annexation of around 220 square kilometers of Armenia’s border areas, including strategic heights, in 2021-2022. Through incremental steps too minor to trigger strong international backlash individually, Azerbaijan has pursued a broader agenda of expansionism and regional hegemony. Besides, Azerbaijan is employing a strategy of “compellence”, a concept in international relations that refers to forcing an opponent to act (e.g., yield territory, drop lawsuits) through the credible threat of harm, including a military attack if they don’t comply. This tactic plays a major role for coercion in peace negotiations, enabling Azerbaijan to seek concessions from Armenia. Baku is also demanding the withdrawal of the EU Mission in Armenia that is serving as a soft deterrent for Armenia’s border security and territorial integrity. Even after Armenia agreed on Azerbaijan’s terms for the peace agreement, Azerbaijan is obstructing the signing of the peace agreement. At the same time, Aliyev has stated that “[u]ntil a peace agreement is signed the stability is not here.” This suggests that Azerbaijan is not genuinely pursuing peace, but instead waiting for a favorable moment to launch another military offensive against Armenia and pursue further territorial gains consistent with its expansionist agenda.

Azerbaijan’s leadership, particularly President Ilham Aliyev, portrays Armenia’s defense reforms as an “arms race,” a “regional threat,” and a “dangerous path.” His assistant Hikmet Hajiyev—who serves as a de facto national security adviser—has called for unilateral restrictions on Armenia’s military capabilities, comparing the situation to post-Gulf War Iraq. Yet, it is not even contested that Azerbaijan initiated wars and military offensives against Armenians—launching offensives in both Nagorno-Karabakh (2016, 2020, and 2023) and in Armenia (2021–2022). While the origins of the first Karabakh war remain disputed, Armenians maintain that their actions in that conflict constituted self-defense, despite their eventual victory. Baku has attempted to legitimize these demands by portraying Armenia as an aggressor, occupier, and even a “fascist” country. Aliyev’s rhetoric branding Armenia a “fascist” state mirrors Russian President Vladimir Putin’s portrayal of Ukraine as a “Nazi state” to justify calls for its demilitarization—both leaders seeking to legitimize their own militaristic posture. 

Azerbaijan has launched information warfare against all partners providing defense support to Armenia, accusing them of preparing Armenia for war and destabilizing the region. Aliyev has sought to delegitimize Armenia’s defense partnerships with France, India, the EU, and the U.S. by accusing them of supplying “lethal weapons” to Armenia. He urged France and other weapons-supplying countries to cancel their contracts and ensure the return of weapons already delivered. “This is our condition. Let them take it as they please,” he said. In reality, only France and India have provided armaments aimed at strengthening Armenia’s deterrence against potential Azerbaijani aggression. EU assistance through the European Peace Facility remains strictly limited to non-lethal support, while U.S. engagement consists of two joint military exercises since 2024 and training initiatives focused on soft skills. Though EU and the U.S. support remains modest, it has nevertheless prompted an aggressive disinformation campaign. Both have firmly rejected Azerbaijan’s claims that they have provided lethal military aid to Armenia. 

Aliyev himself highlighted Azerbaijan’s military superiority and its rapidly growing defense budget, announcing that the country’s military spending for 2025 would reach an unprecedented $5 billion. He underscored that this significant investment is vital for safeguarding national security and reinforcing Azerbaijan’s regional dominance. He warned “that foreign powers and weapons won’t shield it from Azerbaijan’s ‘Iron Fist,’ as seen in the 2020 war and 2023 anti-terrorist measures.” According to Aliyev, military power now dictates international politics, and nations that adapted to this reality early have secured stronger and more stable positions on the global stage.

Azerbaijan’s real intention is to see Armenia unable to defend itself against its potential offensives and unsupported by international partners. Aliyev appears concerned that support for Armenia’s defense deterrence capabilities could reduce the significant military imbalance and larger power disparity, revealing Baku’s intention to either launch military offensives or use the threat of military force against Armenia. Aliyev’s claim—that support for Armenia’s defense sector undermines peace in the region—contradicts the principle that a just and equitable peace is more achievable and sustainable between countries with balanced military capabilities. Aliyev perceives Armenia’s rearmament not as a security concern but as a challenge to Azerbaijan’s regional dominance. Therefore, Azerbaijan may resort to aggression to maintain its hegemonic position in the South Caucasus.

Armenia, in contrast, has unequivocally recognized Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity within its Soviet-era borders, renounced any claims to Nagorno-Karabakh, and committed to resolving the de-occupation of its internationally recognized territory occupied by Azerbaijan—through peaceful delimitation rather than military means. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has emphasized the principle of self-defense, stating that every sovereign state has the right to defend its territory. Highlighting the disparity between the two countries’ defense capabilities, Pashinyan noted that Azerbaijan’s military budget is three times larger than Armenia’s and includes the acquisition of non-defensive weapons. He questioned whether Azerbaijan’s systematic threats and military build-up signal a revanchist policy. He has underlined that without aggressive intent from Azerbaijan, there is no risk of escalation. To deter potential land attacks, he has pointed out Armenia’s need for defensive artillery and missiles. Since late 2024, Yerevan has repeatedly proposed establishing a bilateral arms control mechanism—a proposal that Baku has so far ignored. 

This contrast underscores the manipulation of strategic narratives: while Azerbaijan instrumentalizes discourse to justify coercion and sustain military superiority, Armenia focuses on defensive measures against external threats, emphasizing sovereignty, deterrence, peace and border delimitation. This imbalance in narrative strategy parallels the broader asymmetry in capabilities and intentions between the two states. 

Comparison of Military Budgets

The military budgets of Armenia and Azerbaijan reveal a stark imbalance. Azerbaijan’s budget grew from $2.6 billion in 2021 to an all-time high of $3.77 billion in 2024, with projections reaching $4.9 billion in 2025. It has projected sustained high spending through 2029, allocating 8.11 billion manats (approximately $4.7 billion) for defense in 2026. Armenia’s budget, while increasing from $600 million in 2021 to a projected $1.7 billion in 2025 (around 6% of its GDP), remains significantly smaller. This threefold spending gap highlights Azerbaijan’s overwhelming advantage, fueled by hydrocarbon revenues, enabling it to maintain military superiority while Armenia struggles to rebuild its defense capacity after the 2020 war.

Defense Partnerships and Arms Acquisitions 

Over the period of 2011–2020, Russia emerged as the largest exporter of major arms to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It supplied 94% of Armenia’s major arms and 60% of Azerbaijan’s. According to Aliyev, by 2018, Azerbaijan had spent an estimated total of $5 billion on military equipment from Russia. Israel, Belarus and Türkiye were the second, third and fourth largest suppliers of major arms to Azerbaijan from 2011 to 2020. The volume of Azerbaijan’s arms imports during this period, estimated by SIPRI, was 8.2 times higher than that of Armenia. This significant disparity in arms imports has resulted in a military imbalance between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

Azerbaijan’s defense partnerships and intention to launch a domestic military industry signal a long-term strategy for regional dominance. Prior to the 2020 war, this military imbalance stemmed from battlefield victories and strategic alliances, particularly with Russia, which constrained Armenia’s rearmament by restricting access to defense resources. However, Armenia’s recent diversification of defense partnerships and new armament acquisitions has shifted this dynamic. 

Azerbaijan’s arms acquisitions demonstrate its focus on offensive capabilities and power projection. In 2024, Azerbaijan signed $2.2 billion in arms import contracts, ranking 16th globally. Its arsenal includes Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci heavy combat drones from Türkiye, loitering munitions and Barak-MX 8 Air Defense systems from Israel, JF-17 C Block III multirole fighter jets from Pakistan, and Leonardo M-346 Master jet trainers and C-27J Spartan military transport aircraft from Italy. The country has also acquired 48 155-mm Nora B-52NG self-propelled guns from Serbia and 70 DITA 155mm self-propelled artillery systems from Slovakia. Turkish and Israeli military companies have upgraded Azerbaijan’s Soviet-era equipment, including Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft, T-72 main battle tanks, ZSU-23-4 Shilka anti-aircraft guns, and 9K33 Osa short-range surface-to-air missile systems. In September 2023, Azerbaijan, working with the Russian “peacekeeping” contingent, confiscated military equipment, weapons, and ammunition from the Nagorno-Karabakh defense force.

In June 2025, Azerbaijan confirmed a substantial acquisition of 40 JF 17 C Block III fighter jets—a joint Pakistani-Chinese production under a $4.6 billion deal, marking a significant enhancement of its air combat capabilities. This has caused increased concern and generated debate how Armenia should respond to this move. Some analysts have suggested that Armenia faces a strategic choice between two options in response to Azerbaijan’s recent acquisition of JF-17 fighter jets. Yerevan’s decision will likely hinge between the higher-cost French Dassault Rafale multirole jets and the more affordable Indian Su-30MKIs. In this context, it is important to analyze recent India–Pakistan military confrontations, particularly in light of mixed reports regarding the performance of JF-17s versus Rafales and Su-30MKIs, to draw relevant lessons for Armenia’s procurement strategy.  

Azerbaijan is expanding its domestic defense industry through technology transfers and joint ventures with Serbia, Slovakia, Türkiye and Israel––particularly in drone technology and surveillance systems. Baku has announced plans for a military-industrial complex through licensed production, signaling long-term ambitions for military self-sufficiency.

Armenia, meanwhile, has focused on targeted, defense-oriented acquisitions to rebuild its deterrence capabilities and diversification of its defense partnerships. Following the 2020 war, Armenia signed defense contracts worth approximately $400 million with Russia in 2021 for various military equipment. However, delivery of these weapons faced significant delays due to Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, production constraints, and its apparent reluctance to support Armenia’s deterrence against Azerbaijan. Armenia received the first batch of ordered equipment in early 2024. It is not known until now whether Russia has delivered the order fully. 

Armenia has diversified its defense partnerships to reduce reliance on Russia and suspended its CSTO partnership after the organization’s failure to support it against Azerbaijan’s creeping annexation and military offensives. Following tensions in its military alliance with Russia, the suspension of Armenia’s CSTO membership, and Russia’s struggles to meet its own military needs, Armenia has concluded defense deals with India and France. India has become Armenia’s largest defense supplier, while France has emerged as the first NATO and EU country to sell military equipment to Armenia.

Under a $2 billion defense deal, Armenia’s procurements from India include 155-mm ATAGS towed guns, 72 155-mm MARG self-propelled guns (SPG), Pinaka multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), Akash surface-to-air missiles (SAM), Zen anti-drone systems, Konkurs-M anti-tank missiles, four mobile Swathi artillery-locating and counter-battery radars, as well as small arms and ammunition. 

From France, Armenia has procured Bastion armored vehicles, three Thales-made Ground Master-200 radars, Mistral short-range air defense systems, and 36 CAESAR howitzers––NATO-standard artillery systems expected. 

Military Exercises and Non-Lethal Defense Support

Armenia

Beyond arms transfers, France plays a vital role in supporting institutional aspects of Armenia’s defense reform through mentoring military institutions and training senior officers. The partnership, as officials note, is “not only about military procurement… but also about training,” reflecting a long-term investment in building Armenia’s capabilities and professionalism in line with NATO standards. During 2023–2024, France dispatched teams from its 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade to Armenia to conduct specialized mountain warfare training for around 30 Armenian troops at the Baghramyan training center in Armavir region, including live-fire and alpine operations drills. In parallel, the Armenian and French defense ministries signed a comprehensive 2025 Defense Cooperation Program in December 2024, which emphasizes continued mountain combat education, joint exercises, and expanded military-technical collaboration aimed at enhancing Armenia’s readiness in its rugged terrain. France has also provided Armenia with non-lethal military equipment, namely Safran night-vision binoculars․ In the near future, France forecasts the delivery of radar systems manufactured by Thalès which can detect enemy aircraft 250 kilometers away. The French military academy of Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan has committed to welcome Armenian military personnel. 

The United States has expanded its non-lethal defense support for Armenia over the past two years. In July 2024, both countries conducted their second Eagle Partner joint military exercise to enhance Armenian forces’ operational readiness for international peacekeeping missions and improve interoperability with NATO forces. The U.S. has provided over $45 million in defense and security assistance, funding armored ambulances, a Cyber Defense Operations Center, and border security infrastructure. Armenia’s cybersecurity capabilities have advanced through its membership in the International Counter Ransomware Initiative and collaboration with U.S. agencies on its national strategy, including creating a National Computer Incident Response Team to align with global digital defense standards. Through formalized bilateral defense consultations, the countries have established a framework for strategic dialogue and long-term cooperation on military training and capability development. While Aliyev made speculative claims in January 2025, the U.S. support has focused on capacity-building rather than providing lethal weapons.

The European Peace Facility (EPF) assistance measure for Armenia, amounting to €10 million, comprises a non-lethal aid package aimed at strengthening ground surveillance, mobility, medical evacuation, and engineering capacities. This was the first EPF allocation to a country still formally within the CSTO, signaling deepening EU strategic trust in Armenia. Despite Azerbaijani disinformation, it is also explicitly defensive in nature. 

Within NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework, Armenia aligns its defense planning with NATO standards through the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and works toward interoperability through the Planning and Review Process (PARP). Armenia contributes to the KFOR mission and participates in defense education and integrity-building initiatives. Armenia also has additional soft defense cooperation with Greece, which provides training to Armenian officers. Poland and Lithuania have also supplied surveillance and communication technologies. The recent 2025-2026 Armenia-United Kingdom Defense Cooperation Plan focuses on enhancing Armenia’s defense capabilities through bilateral consultations, military training (including English-language and capacity-building), and regular strategic dialogue.

The 2024 defense cooperation agreement signed between Armenia and Georgia commits the two countries to deepen multidisciplinary military cooperation through joint consultations, defense coordination, and support for ongoing armed forces reforms aimed at enhancing regional security collaboration. In April-May 2025, Armenian observers joined the Georgia-NATO 2025 brigade-level command and staff exercise at the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center near Tbilisi. This major drill involved 17 NATO member and partner countries, including Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. It focused on crisis response planning, staff coordination, and combined operational readiness. Although only a couple of Armenian observers took part in the exercise, it is worth mentioning that it was the first military exercise since the 2020 war in which both of them participated.

Close cooperation with Greece and Cyprus has led to both bilateral and trilateral agreements, consultations and military exercises, such as the special forces exercise in Nea Peramos in November 2023 and participation in the multinational “Olympic Cooperation-24” exercise in March 2024, aimed at enhancing interoperability with NATO forces. In April 2025, Iran and Armenia conducted a joint counter-terrorism military exercise called “Peace” near the Norduz-Kapan border, with each side operating strictly within its own territory. Drills simulated scenarios of terrorist threats targeting border checkpoints.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan maintains expansive and growing military partnerships—with Turkey, Pakistan, and other actors—as part of a broader strategy to enhance readiness and interoperability. Notably, Azerbaijan and Turkey currently conduct around 10 joint exercises annually, spanning land, special operations, and air defense domains. Most recently, in June 2025, they launched two major exercises in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic: the six-day “Indestructible Brotherhood‑2025” and the 11-day “Mustafa Kemal Aratürk-2025”, involving command‑staff, mechanized infantry, artillery, air defense, and aviation units—demonstrating deep tactical coordination at the Hasret Bridge and across the exclave. Since 2021, Azerbaijan and Turkey have held regular trilateral “Three Brothers” drills with Turkey and Pakistan—focused on special forces, counterterrorism, and amphibious operations. It is worth  noting that Pakistan is the only country in the world that hasn’t recognized Armenia’s statehood and has supported Azerbaijan in all of its offensives against Armenia.

Azerbaijan has maintained defense cooperation with NATO since 1994 through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework and has participated in the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) since 2004, aligning parts of its military structure with NATO standards. This cooperation includes areas such as military education, interoperability, and civil emergency planning. Crucially, Turkey plays a mentoring role in Azerbaijan’s defense transformation, serving as a conduit for NATO-compatible training, doctrinal development, and arms standardization. Senior Turkish officers played a pivotal role in planning and coordinating Azerbaijan’s military operations during the 2020 war, including in air operations and the integration of drone warfare. This close partnership enables Azerbaijan to benefit from NATO expertise through bilateral channels, and their alignment resembles a de facto alliance.

Azerbaijani servicemen took part in the NATO–Georgia Exercise 2025, a computer-assisted, brigade-level command and staff drill held at the NATO–Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center near Tbilisi from April 28 to May 8, 2025. This exercise involved 17 NATO and partner countries, and focused on crisis response planning, small-scale land and cyber operations, and staff coordination. Azerbaijani units—including naval and air force personnel—joined the Resolute Force‑2025 command‑staff exercise in Bulgaria in June 2025, further enhancing interoperability with NATO-style procedures alongside partner armies such as Bulgaria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Greece, and Romania.

In July 2024, Azerbaijan joined Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the “We Are United–2024” joint command-staff exercise held at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and nearby Caspian Sea zones. The exercise involved over 4,000 personnel and 700 pieces of military equipment and marked the first major Turkic multilateral drill of its kind without Russian involvement. In 2025, Baku and Astana launched the “Caspian Breeze-2025” naval exercises near Aktau, focusing on maritime security, live-fire drills, and asymmetric threat response. Finally, Azerbaijani and Iranian naval forces conducted the AZIREX‑2024 under the theme “Cooperation for Peace and Friendship”, a joint maritime search‑and‑rescue exercise in the Iranian sector of the Caspian Sea. The two-day drill involved two Azerbaijani ships and over 100 personnel executing rescue, medical assistance, and vessel safety scenarios and illustrated Azerbaijan’s security collaboration with Iran.

Despite the restrictions imposed by Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, the United States has provided military assistance to Azerbaijan through annual presidential waivers since 2002. Between 2002 and 2020 alone, Azerbaijan received approximately $808 million in U.S. assistance, including around $164 million in security and military aid, until this practice was effectively halted by the Armenian Protection Act adopted after Azerbaijan’s military conquest and ethnic cleansing of Armenians in November 2023. 

Conclusion

The military imbalance between Armenia and Azerbaijan—paired with Armenia’s demonstrated commitment to peace and Azerbaijan’s continued reliance on military coercion—underscores the urgent need to support the transformation of Armenia’s defense sector. At the same time, it is vital to encourage Azerbaijan to engage constructively in a fair and enforceable peace agreement, including border delimitation and security guarantees for Armenia.

These diplomatic efforts should be reinforced by continued support for Armenia’s deterrence and defense capabilities, building on the armaments already procured from India and France. Reducing the military asymmetry between the two countries would limit Azerbaijan’s capacity to use its military superiority as leverage and instead foster the conditions necessary for a just and durable peace. The European Union should strengthen its support through the European Peace Facility, and EU member states supplying lethal military technologies to Azerbaijan should either reconsider such transfers or ensure equivalent support is made available to Armenia to avoid exacerbating the imbalance. Given its peacemaking agenda, the U.S. administration should also consider deepening its defense cooperation with Armenia, while refraining from renewing the Section 907 waiver for Azerbaijan.

If left unchecked, Azerbaijan’s posture could deepen instability in the South Caucasus, with broader consequences for global security and the rules-based order—particularly amid heightened global tensions such as the ongoing Israel–Iran confrontation. International partners—the United States, followed by the European Union and other key actors—must intensify their diplomatic engagement to secure and uphold a peace agreement free from preconditions or coercion.

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