How Armenia Diversified Its Security Landscape in 2024

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Armenia stepped up its efforts to diversify security and diplomatic partners this year, further distancing itself from Russia while enhancing cooperation with the West.

While Armenia has effectively boycotted the summits and exercises of the Moscow-led CSTO since early 2023, Pashinyan explicitly announced this February that Armenia has frozen its participation. In another break from Moscow, Yerevan officially joined the International Criminal Court (ICC) in February after having ratified the Rome Statute last October despite repeated warnings from Moscow. 

Yerevan additionally pushed for the gradual reduction of Russian presence in the country, including by securing the removal of Russian border guards from Yerevan’s Zvartnots international airport, along the border with Azerbaijan, and the sole checkpoint on the border with Iran. Additionally, Armenian border guards are set to join their Russian counterparts in patrolling the borders with Turkey and Iran, which was so far conducted by Russians alone—likely setting the stage for their eventual withdrawal.

Military Capacity

Armenia intensified its efforts to rebuild and strengthen its military capabilities in response to persistent Azerbaijani threats and bellicose rhetoric, even as peace talks continue. In a January speech, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan identified the “diversification of security relations” as Armenia’s only viable strategic option. He revealed that in recent years, Armenia has “signed contracts for the purchase of several billion dollars’ worth of weapons and ammunition.” In a later interview, he emphasized that Armenia’s arms acquisitions represent “no more than 15-20% of Azerbaijan’s in terms of cost and volume,” noting that they are primarily defensive in nature.

Defense Minister Suren Papikyan stated in February that Armenia has made significant progress in diversifying arms suppliers, describing the process as irreversible. 

According to Security Council chief Armen Grigoryan, Russia’s share of Armenia’s arms acquisitions has declined sharply, from 96% to less than 10% since 2021. Grigoryan also noted that Armenia now has “four to five major partners” supplying weapons. While he mentioned India and France by name, added that the other suppliers are “European, Western countries.”

France

France began deepening its involvement in Armenia’s security sector after the 2020 war, with defense ties expanding further since 2022 as Armenia’s frustration with Russia intensified.

The first major milestone of the burgeoning relationship was the signing of a defense deal on October 23, 2023 for the acquisition of three GM200 radars produced by Thales and binoculars and sensors from Safran. Armenia also signed a letter of intent with MBDA for Mistral short-range air defense systems. Apart from these, Armenia has also ordered a total of 50 Bastion armored vehicles from Arquus, 24 of which were delivered via Georgia in November 2023.

In February, Sébastien Lecornu arrived in Yerevan in what became the first-ever visit of the French Defense Minister to Armenia. Ahead of his visit, Lecornu emphasized France’s “responsibility to simply help Armenia ensure a posture of deterrence and defense” against Azerbaijan. On board his plane were French parliamentarians, former ministers, and representatives of French defense companies Arquus, MBDA, Nexter (KNDS), PGM, Safran, and Thales. His plane also carried tons of non-lethal equipment, namely night-vision goggles produced by Safran. The delivery of GM200 radars was expected soon after, while discussions regarding the Mistral missiles were still ongoing.

In Yerevan, the two countries’ defense ministers signed a contract for the sale of an undisclosed number of sniper rifles from PGM Précision. A second agreement focused on military education, enabling five Armenian cadets to study at Saint-Cyr military academy annually. Lecornu highlighted consultative and advisory support for the Armenian military, noting that a defense mission had been established at the French embassy the previous summer. During his visit, a contingent of 17 French troops began training some 30 Armenian soldiers from the special forces in an initial pilot program. Additional agreements regarding military education were reported in September.

During a press briefing, Lecornu revealed that the discussions include the potential sale of short-, medium-, and long-range surface-to-air defense systems, artillery, and counter-drone measures. He specifically mentioned the short-range VL Mica and the medium-range SAMP/T systems, both produced by MBDA.

Armenia’s most significant arms acquisition of the year was officially confirmed in mid-June. During his visit to Paris, Defense Minister Papikyan signed a military-technical cooperation agreement with KNDS. However, it was Lecornu who revealed Armenia’s procurement of the advanced Caesar self-propelled howitzers from KNDS. Shortly after, French media reported that Armenia would receive 36 Caesars within 15 months. The announcement sparked sharp reactions from both Baku and Moscow, while the EU defended Armenia’s “sovereign right to choose its security and defense partners.” The U.S. also weighed in, stating it had no concerns about the sale and affirming the right of every state to self-defense.

As part of his June visit to Paris, Papikyan also engaged with other defense industry representatives at the Eurosatory expo, which hosted Armenian companies for the first time. Armenia’s defense ministry reported that agreements were reached and contracts signed, no further details were disclosed.

That same day, a number of prominent French politicians and intellectuals, including the Mayor of Paris, urged President Macron to deploy a French military force to Armenia, “whose effective presence would aim to deter those who would consider attacking Armenia.” A month earlier, French Ambassador Decottignies had told RFE/RL that, unlike Mali, where France deployed troops for counter-terrorism operations, its approach with Armenia is rooted in “state-to-state cooperation,” with the goal of “contributing to the buildup” of Armenia’s armed forces.

France has also welcomed Armenia’s partnership with NATO and with India. It has also encouraged other countries to join its efforts to support Armenia in security matters. Greece has suggested multilateral defense cooperation with France and India, and according to a Greek media report, Athens is considering selling Soviet/Russian air defense systems as part of “cooperation with France” without elaborating Paris’s precise role in the matter. 

Franco-Armenian strategic defense consultations were held on December 10, where the sides “set higher benchmarks for advancing cooperation,” with emphasis on defense planning, military education and training, advisory support, and military-technical cooperation. A defense cooperation program for 2025 was signed, including several dozen activities across nearly all areas. A defense delegation led by Papikyan visited Paris on December 15 to meet with Presidential Military Adviser Fabien Mandon and Defense Minister Lecornu. The latter stated that Paris continues its efforts to support Armenia in its defense endeavors, namely advice and training and equipment, “particularly in the field of air defense.”

India

Arms procurement from India, central to Indo-Armenian ties, continued to advance. In late October, Indian media, citing “official sources”, reported that Armenia has emerged, along with France and the U.S., as one of the “top three customers for Indian military exports.” According to Indian media reports, Armenia has thus far acquired four Swathi counter-battery radars, four batteries (24 units) of Pinaka multiple rocket launchers, towed (ATAGS) and self-propelled (MArG) howitzers, an undeclared number of Akash air defense systems, and Zen counter-drone technology.

In March, Deputy Defense Minister Karen Brutyan visited India for meetings with senior officials. The following month, India announced its intention to post a military attaché in Armenia. In May, the first defence consultations were held in Yerevan to discuss military-technical cooperation, education and training, and knowledge transfer. A joint working group was set up on bilateral defense cooperation.

In July, small arms manufacturer SSS Defence was reported to have won a large export contract from a “friendly country” for the supply of sniper rifles, representing the first-ever Indian export of sniper rifles. Some observers suggested that the buyer is likely Armenia.

Other Indian equipment has apparently already been integrated into Armenia’s Armed Forces. In a special forces training in early June, a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) drone was seen, which is likely the Advanced Loitering System-50 (ALS-50) introduced by Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL). It has a range of more than 50 km and can carry warheads weighing up to 6 kg. Armenia had reportedly shown interest in it when Papikyan visited an Indian defense expo in October 2022. Additionally, during a joint exercise with the U.S. in mid-July, helmet-mounted Spartan-S thermal imaging sights made by Tonbo in Bengaluru, India were spotted.

In mid-September, Indian media reported that Yerevan and New Delhi are in talks—”still at a very initial stage”—regarding the possible procurement of Indian-produced Astra air-to-air missiles for its Su-30 fighter jets procured from Russia in 2019. Hindustan Times quoted Armenia’s Air Force chief Hovhannes Vardanyan who said, “We are looking at modernising our Su-30s with the help of [state-controlled] Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) as it has a lot of expertise in the field.”

Also a matter of negotiations, according to The Print, are the towed ATAGS howitzers. It reported in November that after their “successful induction and performance,” Yerevan is in talks with manufacturer Bharat Forge for a “larger order”.

Also in November, state-run Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) announced the commencement of export of the first battery of Akash air defense system to a “friendly country”, which Indian media unanimously identified as Armenia. These systems were reportedly ordered in December 2023. Most recently, on November 24, Indian media reported that the supply of Pinaka multiple rocket launchers to Armenia had started. On the same day, Armenia’s Defense Ministry asked media colleagues with a request to “verify and clarify” reports of arms acquisitions appearing in “foreign media outlets,” which “do not correspond to reality.”

United States

U.S. Ambassador Kristina Kvien told RFE/RL in April that the two countries have “very active and robust” discussions about security and defense, emphasizing that “significant expansion” has occurred in the past year. In a Helsinki Commission hearing in September, Chairman Rep. Joe Wilson spoke of “clear bipartisan support” to increasing economic and political assistance for Armenia to help “provide a bulwark against external threats.” Former U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Dan Baer, a witness at the hearing, called for exploring partnering with the EU and “other friends of Armenia to develop long-term comprehensive security and defense partnerships.”

In a first, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and Armenia’s Defense Ministry held annual staff talks in May to “discuss bilateral defense priorities, develop areas for further cooperation, and outline military engagements for the coming years.” The U.S. flew around 270 troops and equipment to Armenia in July for the second iteration of the Eagle Partner joint exercise. It was said to have a “much bigger scale and scope” than the first iteration held in September 2023.

The highlight of U.S.-Armenia relations this year was the capstone strategic dialogue meeting held in Yerevan in June chaired by Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Assistant Secretary of State James O’Brien. This was the third meeting, with the first having been held in May 2019 and the second in May 2022. The countries reviewed progress and agreed to upgrade the status of bilateral dialogue to strategic partnership. The U.S. has previously signed charters on strategic partnership with Georgia in 2009 and Ukraine in 2021.

Washington outlined three areas of support to Armenia: economy and energy, security/defense and law enforcement, and democratic institutional reforms. On security, the sides “acknowledged the important role of U.S. assistance to Armenia’s defense transformation […], which the U.S intends to continue to support through advisory programs, military-to-military contact activities, professional military education opportunities” and the long-standing State Partnership Program with Kansas. The sides committed to launching formal bilateral defense consultations to “regularize planning of defense cooperation objectives.”

In her April interview, Ambassador Kvien revealed that the U.S. will appoint a resident advisor who will collaborate with Armenia’s Defense Ministry to enhance capacity, focusing on internal reforms and peacekeeping. The U.S. embassy said in July that the civilian adviser will not be funded by the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense, but will instead be a part of the State Department’s Global Defense Reform Program (GDRP), which “seeks to improve security sector governance and institutional capacity of select U.S. partners.” It said that the adviser, who will begin this year, had already been selected and will engage regularly with the embassy and the Defense Ministry.

Armenia may be nearing a turning point in arms procurement from the U.S. Two RAND analysts argued in March that the U.S. could provide Armenia defensive hardware such as short-range air defense systems and counter-drone systems to complement the capabilities Armenia is receiving from France. They suggested that such supply should be conditional on Armenia providing verifiable assurances of compliance with end-use requirements to prevent unauthorized transfer of technology.

Zhirayr Amirkhanyan, an advisor to Armenia’s Chief of the General Staff, indicated in a June interview that currently the U.S. is willing to sell only non-lethal equipment to Armenia. However, given the deepening of bilateral relations, this stance could potentially evolve in the future.

The strengthening of ties is reflected in frequent high-level engagements. In June, Armenia’s Security Council chief Armen Grigoryan met with President Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to discuss U.S. support for enhancing Armenia’s defense and security capabilities and resilience.

Armenia’s Chief of the General Staff Edvard Asryan visited Washington in October, where he toured the largest land power expo in the U.S. and met with senior officials, including director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), commander of the U.S. Army’s Security Support Command, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and General Charles Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces. Brown “reaffirmed the importance of strengthening the defense relationship” and “expressed concern about Russia’s malign influence in the region and the need to counter these activities.” 

Following his return, Asryan told reporters that the two countries have extensive defense cooperation in “all fields”, including in military-technical areas. When pressed whether Armenia is procuring weapons from the U.S., he responded: “That’s not something to announce [publicly].”

This was followed by the visit of Defense Minister Papikyan to Washington for a meeting with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. The Pentagon described it as the “the first such meeting in two decades,” more precisely since October 2005 when Serzh Sargsyan met with Donald Rumsfeld. The Pentagon said they discussed “ongoing and future security cooperation efforts, such as military education and professionalization, institutional capacity-building, and training.” Austin  called Papikyan’s visit “historic” and was quoted as saying: “It is our first meeting, and we have a full agenda.” No specific details or agreements were disclosed, but the meeting itself appears to signal rapidly strengthening ties.

While Trump’s unpredictability poses some risks, security ties appear sufficiently institutionalized to mostly withstand potential disruptions. In a positive development, Pashinyan spoke with the president-elect on November 16, just ten days after the election, describing the conversation as “informative but also very positive.” On December 7, Pashinyan met Trump in person during the reopening of Notre-Dame in Paris, where he was also photographed with key Trump ally Elon Musk.

European Union

A key moment in the ties with the EU occurred on July 22, when the European Council adopted two major decisions.

The first allocated €10 million assistance to Armenia’s Armed Forces under the European Peace Facility (EPF) to enhance its logistical capacities. Specifically, the EU will provide a fully-fledged deployable tent camp for a battalion-sized unit, which will accelerate interoperability in case of possible future participation of the country in international military missions and operations, including those deployed by the EU.

In the second move, the European Council greenlighted the launch of visa liberalization dialogue with Armenia. Following the decisions, EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell remarked that they were “long awaited by Armenia” and will “strengthen our partnership with Armenia.” Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan called it “historic”, while Defense Minister Papikyan expressed hope that assistance via the EPF will “give a new charge to closer cooperation with our partner EU member countries in both bilateral and multilateral formats.”

Several member states, France, Greece and Cyprus, the Netherlands, Czechia, and the Baltic states (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia), issued separate statements welcoming the decisions. Azerbaijan said the EU’s decision to “send military aid to Armenia is an erroneous and dangerous step that serves to increase tension in the region.”

The EPF journey was not smooth. First proposed by ex-NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen in March 2023, Armenia’s request was initially rejected. France and the European Parliament pushed for it in October 2023, after the Azerbaijani takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed on November 13, 2023 to explore the possibility of providing non-lethal support to Armenia through the EPF. Hungary, an ally of Baku, initially blocked it, but later dropped its veto in exchange for EU financing of demining activities in Azerbaijan.

Another key event in Armenia-EU ties was the trilateral April 5 meeting in Brussels of Prime Minister Pashinyan, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a show of support for Armenia. It did not contain security elements, but the EU and the U.S. “reaffirm[ed] support for Armenia’s sovereignty, democracy, territorial integrity, and socio-economic resilience.”

Greece and Others

Armenia and Greece signed a military-technical cooperation agreement in December 2023, which entails, among other things, transfer of technology and knowledge for arms production, R&D and joint production, personnel training, and weapons maintenance. Armenia’s parliament ratified it in June. The two countries’ defense ministers met again in March of this year to discuss progress and identified new areas for cooperation. 

In late November, the Greek news outlet Enikos reported that Greece’s Defense Ministry is in “advanced stages of negotiations to transfer Russian-made weapon systems to Armenia.” The discussions reportedly involve Soviet/Russian-made air defense systems S-300, Tor, and Osa, which Athens plans to replace with newer, more sophisticated systems. The report claimed it was “not solely a Greek initiative but a result of cooperation with France.”

Armenian officials did not comment on the report. Russia’s MFA representative Maria Zakharova said Moscow has seen it and reminded Athens that it needs Moscow’s consent to re-export Russian-made armament to third countries. She added that Moscow has not yet received any such requests from Greece.

In addition to Greece, Armenia’s Defense Ministry announced military-technical cooperation agreements with five other countries this year, including Czechia, Slovakia, Italy, Bulgaria, and Germany. Such cooperation encompasses the sale of military equipment, technology transfer, research and development (R&D), and related areas. As these developments were detailed in my July 2024 article, they will not be revisited here.

Since then, Armenia signed defense cooperation programs for 2025 with Germany in October and with Italy in December. Armenia reported reaching “several agreements” with Czech officials and defense industry representatives on military-technical cooperation in October.

Defense Minister Papikyan and Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan separately visited South Korea in September. In Seoul, Papikyan discussed the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral relations with counterparts from Korea, Singapore, and Finland.

Iran

The extent and range of security and defense ties with Iran remains unknown. In a February interview, Pashinyan identified Iran, along with the EU, France, the U.S., and India as one of Armenia’s security partners, describing the security relationship with them as “already by and large a reality.” 

Papikyan visited Tehran in March, becoming the first Armenia’s Defense Minister to visit the southern neighbor since 2017. In a meeting with his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, Papikyan discussed the “present state of cooperation and prospects for future development” and the sides reached “several agreements of mutual interest”, according to the Armenian defense ministry. Ashtiani told reporters days later that Tehran is “expanding defense cooperation” with Armenia. No further details were reported. Papikyan also discussed military cooperation with Chief of General Staff Mohammad and met with Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi.

As highlighted by Papikyan’s visit, details of this relationship remain largely unknown. Among the partners listed by Pashinyan, Iran is the only one sharing a border with Armenia but is also the least democratic, further limiting transparency about the nature of relations. This lack of clarity fuels speculation by Baku and its lobbyists in the West, who consistently portray Armenia as part of a Russia-Iran axis.

A September 2024 IRI poll found that a majority of Armenians (53%) consider Iran to be Armenia’s most important security partner, surpassing France (47%), the U.S. (37%), and India (30%). This perception can be attributed to Tehran’s consistent opposition to Baku’s push for a “Zangezur Corridor.” When Moscow attempted to revive the proposal in August, Tehran’s strong reaction compelled Russia to withdraw it from the regional agenda—at least for now.

Some in Armenia seem to believe that Iran would intervene in the event of an Azerbaijani invasion of Syunik, especially if its connection to Armenia is seriously threatened. Meghri mayor Khachatur Andreasyan recently told the New York Times: “We know that if something happens, Iran will definitely be with us.” He added that in discussions with Iranian officials, “they all confirm that if, God forbid, someone attacks Syunik, we will fight alongside you.”

When questioned about the possibility of an Azerbaijani attack on Armenia, Iran’s ambassador, Mehdi Sobhani, confidently told RFE/RL in July that such an attack “will not happen.” When asked further about Tehran’s potential response, he emphasized Armenia’s sovereignty, stating that “any action by another state must have the consent of that country,” suggesting the possibility of intervention if requested by Yerevan.

While  Iran’s potential role in such a scenario remains highly speculative, Tehran has taken a notably measured stance to Armenia’s growing ties with the West. French ambassador Olivier Decottignies remarked in a March interview that, despite disagreements on many issues, Paris and Tehran share a commitment to Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. During a press briefing in February with his French counterpart, Papikyan emphasized Armenia’s right to cooperate with both France and Iran, noting that both partners respect each other’s collaboration with Yerevan. While Moscow has repeatedly accused the EU observer mission (EUMA) of “spying” on Iran, Tehran has not been as critical. While not enthusiastic about Western presence near its northern border, Iran likely sees value in the additional deterrent against Azerbaijan.

Unlike Azerbaijan and Russia, Iran offered only mild criticism of the April 5 Brussels meeting between Armenia, EU, and the United States. The Iranian MFA spokesperson said it “believes that the South Caucasus should not become an arena of geopolitical competition,” emphasizing the role of regional formats such as the 3+3 consultative mechanism. According to Armenian officials, Iran refused to join Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia in issuing a statement denouncing that meeting.

But ties with Iran are not without hurdles. Iran has reportedly obstructed the shipment of Indian weapons to Armenia at times. Indian military supplies, however, were delivered via Iran’s airspace in March 2024, while Pinaka multiple rocket launchers, acquired in September 2022, were reportedly delivered overland in July 2023.

Also see

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