A Year of Fragile Diplomacy: Armenia-Azerbaijan Talks and Turkey Relations in Review

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This year, Armenia and Azerbaijan shifted the focus of peace negotiations to a bilateral framework. Four years after the 2020 Artsakh War, the two sides remain unable to finalize a comprehensive peace agreement.

While there has been some progress on border delimitation and key elements of the agreement, Azerbaijan continues to employ intimidation tactics, with officials frequently issuing threats aimed at Yerevan.

In a recent interview with Russia’s RIA Novosti, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev escalated this rhetoric, condemning Armenia’s arms procurement as a direct threat to Azerbaijan. He warned that if such acquisitions persist, Azerbaijan’s future actions should not come as a surprise.

Border Delimitation 

In May, Armenia and Azerbaijan successfully delimited a 12-kilometer section of their mutual border in the Tavush-Gazakh region in the north. Following this delimitation, Armenia handed over four abandoned villages to Azerbaijan that had come under Armenia’s control in the early 1990s. Baku declared it reclaimed 6.5 sq/km of its territory. 

The process began on April 19, when the border commissions of Armenia and Azerbaijan reached a preliminary agreement during their eighth meeting on demarcating the northern part of the Armenia-Azerbaijan state border. By mid-May, both sides had signed a Protocol establishing the border’s delineation based on precise coordinates from on-site measurements. The parties agreed that this section will be considered delimited until the final demarcation and delimitation of the entire Armenia-Azerbaijan border is complete. 

Armenia’s Foreign Ministry clarified in a statement that the border demarcation protocol was based on a 1976 topographic map from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. This map underwent official verification in 1979 by the USSR’s authorized cartography and geodesy body, making it legally valid. These maps remained in use until the dissolution of the Soviet Union and were the last ones officially verified by USSR state authorities.

The agreement defined border sections between different settlement pairs: Baghanis (Armenia)—Baghanis Ayrum (Azerbaijan); Voskepar (Armenia)—Ashaghi Askipara (Azerbaijan); Kirants (Armenia)—Kheyrimli (Azerbaijan) and Berkaber (Armenia)—Ghizilhajili (Azerbaijan). These alignments conform to the inter-republican borders that existed when the Soviet Union dissolved. 

The village of Kirants in Armenia’s Tavush region was cut off from the rest of the country during the delimitation process. The road connecting the village to the regional center of Ijevan was handed over to Azerbaijan. In response, the Armenian government quickly repaired an alternative road linking Kirants to the village of Acharkut and the H-26 highway, while construction of a completely new road is underway.  

In addition, four structures (a house, a small shop, a garage and a shelter) were handed over to Azerbaijan as well as 50 plots of farmland. 

On May 24, Armenian and Azerbaijani border guards were deployed on the newly delimited northern border. In a statement, Armenia’s National Security Service announced that border guard troops are now responsible for safeguarding the delimited stretches of the state border. This includes 1.9 km in Berkaber and 4.9 km in Voskepar and Baghanis in Tavush. National Security Service border guards were deployed on the 5.8 km stretch of the border near Kirants on July 24.

During their April 19 meeting, the border commissions of Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to finalize the Regulations of the Joint Activities of the border commissions by July 1, though they completed this on August 30. Yerevan and Baku ratified the regulations on October 25, and it came into force on November 1 when the sides exchanged the ratified copies during the 10th border commissions session. 

The document on Joint Activities of the border commissions establishes the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991 as the fundamental basis for border delimitation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This basis may be adjusted if future peace and interstate relations agreements between the two republics stipulate different arrangements. 

Article 2 specifies that the Commissions will utilize all relevant cartographic materials, normative legal documents, and other legally substantiated records necessary for the delimitation process.

According to Article 5, the Commissions will conduct delimitation in agreed-upon sections of the border. For each section, they will draft a detailed description of the border line, which will remain provisional until the entire delimitation process is completed. Once comprehensive work is finalized, the Commissions will prepare a Protocol-Description of the full state border line, accompanied by supporting documentation. 

Neither the Armenian nor Azerbaijani sides have officially confirmed when the demarcation process will resume. Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, who chairs the Armenian border commission, noted in December that while no date for the next meeting has been set, he expects it to happen soon. He explained that during discussions on approving the regulations for the joint activities of the border delimitation commissions, both sides had agreed to meet once the regulations came into effect.

The start of the delimitation process sparked protests in Armenia, beginning in the border villages of Tavush and led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan. These demonstrations later moved to Yerevan, where Galstanyan and his supporters staged civil disobedience actions for several months, demanding Prime Minister Pashinyan’s resignation. However, these protests did not impede the demarcation process or the work of the border commissions and eventually fizzled out.

The Peace Agreement

Both Yerevan and Baku have repeatedly announced significant progress on the peace agreement, with only two unresolved articles remaining out of 17. The sides are currently working on the 11th draft of the peace treaty.

Two key points remain unresolved in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement draft:

1. The mutual withdrawal of international legal claims against each other.  
2. The removal of the European Monitoring Mission from the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

In interviews on December 18 and 19, leaders from both countries outlined their positions on these outstanding issues.

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev addressed the stalled negotiations, arguing that Armenia’s rearmament undermines the peace process. He defended the mutual withdrawal of international claims as fair, pointing to Azerbaijan’s estimate of over $150 billion in damages allegedly caused by Armenia during “30 years of occupation in Karabakh.” He also reiterated Azerbaijan’s position that the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMA) serves as a surveillance tool for the EU and NATO.

Aliyev, not for the first time, put forth additional preconditions, demanding that Armenia amend its constitution and formally dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group. He asserted that addressing these issues would remove all obstacles to a peace agreement. He also warned that Armenia’s “ongoing arms race” undermines peace efforts, cautioning that such actions could lead to disastrous consequences for Yerevan.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addressed Aliyev’s demands concerning constitutional amendments and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, while reiterating Armenia’s stance on unresolved treaty articles. He revealed that over a month ago, Yerevan had submitted proposals to Azerbaijan regarding the two outstanding issues but had yet to receive a response. The proposals suggested limiting the non-deployment of third-party forces to the delimited sections of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Pashinyan emphasized that this approach could lower the risk of escalation and eventually render external forces unnecessary after the full delimitation of the border.

Regarding mutual withdrawal of claims, Pashinyan agreed this should accompany the peace treaty but emphasized the importance of resolving disputes—not merely removing them from judicial platforms. He reiterated Armenia’s commitment to addressing humanitarian issues and finding solutions.

Pashinyan refuted Azerbaijan’s assertions about territorial claims in Armenia’s Constitution. He explained that the Constitutional Court had ruled that references to the Declaration of Independence in the preamble do not constitute territorial claims. While noting that Azerbaijan’s constitution contains similar territorial references from 1919, Pashinyan indicated that Armenia would not demand changes to Azerbaijan’s constitution, as this could delay the peace process. He emphasized that once ratified, the peace treaty’s provisions on territorial integrity and legal supremacy would supersede any constitutional concerns.

Regarding the OSCE Minsk Group, Pashinyan acknowledged its diminished role while calling on Azerbaijan to adopt a non-aggressive stance—particularly in light of its “Western Azerbaijan” rhetoric, to avoid threatening Armenia’s territorial sovereignty.

COP29: A Missed Opportunity to Sign the Peace Treaty

This year, Azerbaijan hosted COP29, the annual UN climate summit. In the lead-up to the conference, speculation grew over whether Armenia and Azerbaijan would sign the peace treaty before or during the event. 

Azerbaijan was able to host the conference after Armenia withdrew its own candidacy for hosting COP29 and after both countries agreed to a prisoner exchange in December 2023 as a goodwill gesture. 

In July, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan announced that the peace treaty draft was nearly complete and proposed signing it within a month. This announcement raised expectations that the document might be signed during COP29.

However, Armenia, although invited, did not attend the summit because Azerbaijan continued to keep Armenian hostages. Yerevan indicated it would have joined the summit if an agreement had been reached on repatriating Armenian POWs and detainees, but this did not happen.

Opening of Regional Communications 

The opening of regional communications remains one of the most disputed issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While both sides have discussed this matter since January 2021, they agreed this year to remove it from the peace treaty and address it in separate negotiations. 

In January 2021, a trilateral working group was formed to address regional communications, co-chaired by the deputy prime ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. The group continued its work until July 2023. On November 1, the deputy prime ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan held their first discussion about opening transport communications without Russian participation. 

In a December 18 interview, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia had presented a new proposal to Azerbaijan regarding regional communications. 

“In our assessment, we have found a solution for reopening the railway communication that both Armenia and Azerbaijan can fully accept. We have submitted this proposal to Azerbaijan in writing and are awaiting their positive response. Once received, it will be necessary to promptly sign an agreement and proceed with the railway construction,” Pashinyan said. 

The disagreements over unblocking regional communications—which Azerbaijan has framed as the opening of the “Zangezur Corridor”—stem from different interpretations of Article 9 of the November 9 trilateral statement, which ended the 2020 Artsakh War. 

This article requires Armenia to provide safe transport between Azerbaijan’s western regions and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, ensuring unhindered movement of people, vehicles, and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of Russia’s Federal Security Service would be tasked with overseeing these transport links. 

Despite accusations from Russia and Azerbaijan that Armenia is not fulfilling its obligation to open regional communications and providing a connection between mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhichevan, Pashinyan has repeatedly stated Armenia’s readiness to grant passage. Yerevan has also introduced its “Crossroads of Peace” concept for unblocking communications in the South Caucasus. 

During a session of the CIS in Moscow on October 8, Pashinyan stated, “the Republic of Armenia is fully prepared to ensure the safety of the movement of goods, vehicles, and people through its territory. This is our desire, our obligation, and we guarantee it.” 

He further emphasized, “All claims that Armenia has agreed to let third countries ensure the safety of communications on its sovereign territory, or that this is provided for in any document, are false. Ensuring safety within its territory is the sovereign obligation of any country—this is our responsibility, and we will guarantee it.”

However, Azerbaijan insists that Armenia grant a “Zangezur Corridor,” providing unrestricted access to its exclave over Armenian territory. 

In an interview on January 10, 2024, Aliyev explicitly demanded that Baku be allowed to transport cargo, citizens, and vehicles from mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan through southern Armenia without inspection or customs checks. He also reaffirmed his support for Russian oversight of this route. 

Meanwhile, Russia—Armenia’s traditional ally—is also pushing to open a route linking Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan under its control. In September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov strongly criticized Armenia for refusing to open regional communications. He accused Armenia of “sabotaging” the agreement Pashinyan signed regarding the unblocking of communications through the Syunik region. Lavrov noted that the three deputy prime ministers had agreed that countries would maintain full sovereignty and jurisdiction over routes passing through their territory. He specified that the route would pass through Armenia’s sovereign territory under the control of the Russian FSB Border Service. 

Pashinyan and other Armenian officials maintain that Armenia has no obligation to grant the so-called Zangezur corridor, since Azerbaijan and Russia have violated all provisions of the November 9 trilateral statement. 

Addressing the varying interpretations of Article 9 of the trilateral statement by Baku and Moscow, Pashinyan remarked that Azerbaijan frequently portrays the article as focusing solely on establishing a direct link between mainland Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan exclave. The prime minister emphasized that this was a misinterpretation. He pointed out that the Azerbaijan-Nakhichevan connection represents just one part of Article 9, which broadly addresses the reopening of transport and economic routes across the entire region. Pashinyan maintained it would be “illogical and impossible” to consider one aspect in isolation from the others.

Addressing Russia’s role in ensuring the security of the road, Pashinyan said: “There is no mention anywhere in the November 9 trilateral statement that the sovereign jurisdiction of the Republic of Armenia will be limited in any way; that any other country will establish definitive control over even a square centimeter of the territory of the Republic of Armenia. There is no such thing at all, and there cannot be.” 

Pashinyan emphasized that Armenia bears responsibility for securing transport routes between Azerbaijan’s western regions and Nakhichevan, and posed a pointed question: “How can Armenia guarantee the safety of the road if a third country is in charge of security?” He underscored that the November 9, 2020, trilateral statement explicitly designates Armenia—not any third party—as the guarantor of the road’s security.

The Prime Minister addressed Russia’s role, noting that Putin’s decree of November 10, 2020—issued one day after the trilateral statement—provided further details. Pashinyan suggested the decree implied Russian representatives would monitor Armenia’s compliance with the agreement.

Two days after Pashinyan’s remarks, MFA spokesperson Ani Badalyan clarified that Article 9 of the trilateral statement does not specify the physical presence of the Russian Federal Security Service’s Border Guard units.

All Quiet on the Turkish Front

In 2024, Armenian-Turkish talks failed to produce significant results—a decline from the momentum gained in 2022.

In March, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Special Envoy for Armenia-Turkish talks Ruben Rubinyan attended the annual Antalya diplomatic forum—Armenia’s second consecutive year of participation—though no substantial talks took place. 

The special envoys met in late July for their fifth round of talks at the Margara-Alijan border crossing. During this meeting, Ruben Rubinyan and Turkish envoy Serdar Kilic agreed to evaluate technical requirements for the Gyumri-Kars railroad border gate and to streamline visa procedures for holders of diplomatic and official passports.

The parties reconfirmed previous agreements and emphasized their commitment to continuing the normalization process without preconditions. At their last talks on July 1, 2022, they agreed to allow third-country citizens to cross the Armenia-Turkey border and to arrange air cargo transfers––both of which remain unimplemented. In November 2022, they met to discuss the technical aspects of these agreements. Yet none of the agreements has materialized. The Armenian side has renovated the checkpoint and road in Margara, but the border remains closed to third-party citizens and diplomatic passport holders. 

Rubinyan and Kilic met again in early November to assess the technical requirements for operating the Akhuryan-Akyaka railway border crossing in Armenia’s Shirak region. 

In January, Ararat Mirzoyan reported progress on restoring the historic bridge of Ani. He emphasized that only Turkey’s political will prevents the border’s opening. 

In July, Pashinyan and Erdogan held their annual phone call ahead of religious holidays in Armenia and Turkey. The leaders later met on the sidelines of the UNGA summit in September at the Turkish House in New York—a building that serves as the headquarters for Turkish diplomatic missions and cultural institutions. 

According to a press release from Pashinyan’s office, the leaders discussed existing agreements within the normalization process. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to moving forward without preconditions and stressed the importance of bringing new momentum to their relationship. 

Prime Minister Pashinyan presented an overview of Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative during the meeting and presented Erdogan with a map of the initiative. Erdogan gifted Pashinyan his book “A Fair World.”

Erdogan’s office stated that Turkey “supports the establishment of lasting peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the establishment of a robust friendship between the two countries.”

Turkish officials have consistently emphasized that Turkey’s reconciliation with Armenia is linked to Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, noting that Turkey consults with Azerbaijan regarding its talks with Armenia. 

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