Why Is the EU Deploying a Mission in Armenia and What to Expect?

Background

The European Union launched its civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA) on February 20, 2023, within its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The objective of the EUMA is to contribute to de-escalation and stability in Armenia’s border areas, as well as support the delimitation and demarcation process and confidence-building between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Mission will complement mediation efforts led by President of the European Council Charles Michel. The EUMA will patrol and report, which will strengthen the EU’s understanding of the situation on the ground. 

The EUMA will have an initial mandate of two years, and will consist of a total of 100 personnel, including 50 unarmed observers. Its headquarters will be established in Yeghegnadzor, and its field offices in Kapan, Goris, Jermuk, Martuni and Ijevan. Stefano Tomat, EEAS Managing Director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), will be the Mission’s Civilian Operation Commander and its Head will be Dr. Markus Ritter, head of the German Federal Police Headquarters in Stuttgart and former Head of Mission of EUAM Iraq.

The EUMA will follow the two-month EU Monitoring Capacity in Armenia (EUMCAP) which consisted of 40 observers drawn from the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia. This temporary arrangement was based on the statement adopted at the quadrilateral meeting between Armenia, Azerbaijan, France and the EU on October 6, 2022, in which Armenia and Azerbaijan confirmed their commitment to the UN Charter and the 1991 CIS Alma-Ata Declaration, through which both States recognized each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 

The EU is deploying the mission in Armenia upon the request of the Armenian Government. The EU attempted but could not obtain Azerbaijan’s authorization to deploy on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border while both Azerbaijan and Russia have objected to the deployment of the EUMA. The Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan has cautioned that the mission must consider “the legitimate interests of Azerbaijan” and “not be exploited for derailing the normalization process between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”

President Aliyev of Azerbaijan has called the EU’s intention to deploy the mission a “very unpleasant fact.” Foreign Minister of Russia Lavrov has stated that the deployment of a new mission “could only be counterproductive” in building trust since it would not have the approval of the Azerbaijani side. He has questioned the civilian nature of the mission warning that the 2,000-strong Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh and Russian border guards serving in Armenia “will react to the behavior of the EU observers taking into account the situation on the ground.” He also suggested that the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) had prepared a plan to deploy a peacekeeping operation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hinting that Armenia preferred an EU Mission.

Let’s examine the motivations of each stakeholder in the context of the deployment of this mission. 

Armenia v. Azerbaijan

Armenia is aiming to preserve its territorial integrity in light of Azerbaijan’s military offensives in May 2021, November 2021 and September 2022, as well as Azerbaijan’s creeping annexation that is advancing its positions in between military offensives. According to official Armenian sources, currently Azerbaijan occupies 150 square kilometers of Armenian territory. This number does not include areas that Armenia conceded under political-military coercion in 2021, hoping that Azerbaijan would stop its territorial claims and offensives. An example of this is Goris-Kapan road, which can be legitimately considered a disputed territory and be brought to the International Court of Justice. Moreover, while engaging in offensive operations, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense spread disinformation blaming Armenia for provoking them on a regular basis. Being far away, EU member countries did not know when to expect a new military escalation and did not know what position to adopt.

Azerbaijan has also been demanding an extra-territorial corridor through Armenia’s Syunik region to connect it with its exclave Nakhichevan through false justifications, and threatening that if Armenia doesn’t agree to it, that it would take it by military force. Finally, Azerbaijan has been making territorial claims on most of Armenia, including its biggest water basin Lake Sevan, its capital Yerevan, and even calling Armenia “Western Azerbaijan”. 

The Armed Forces of Armenia were not sufficiently modernized before the 2020 war, which resulted in their military defeat in defending the right of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to live in their homeland. In the aftermath of the war, the army faced extraordinary political and security challenges, which hindered the restoration of its defense capacity. The Armenian Armed Forces struggled to stop Azerbaijan’s military offensives, unable to balance immediate conventional threats and its need for long-term defense reform. Aliyev implied that the Armenian army is in poor shape and that Armenians should accept all Azerbaijani demands; otherwise, Azerbaijan would launch another war and destroy Armenia. He also stated that if Armenia tries to restore its Armed Forces, Azerbaijan would immediately launch a military offensive and destroy it. These threats violate fundamental principles of the UN Charter: Article 2(4) prohibiting the unilateral use of force, except for self-defense, and Article 51 on the individual and collective right of each country to self-defense. Moreover, each country has an obligation to protect its civilian population. 

Since the EUMCAP was deployed, Azerbaijani offensives against Armenia have significantly decreased, along with its allegations that Armenia is provoking it. The positions of the EU member states in relation to Azerbaijani-Armenian issues have also become clearer, and they have started expressing more supportive positions for Armenia. The EU Mission has significantly reduced Armenia’s anxiety about the possibility of new military offensives by Azerbaijan. Although the EUMA will not ensure Armenia’s defense, it will allow it the time and space to restore its defense capabilities.

Finally, the EUMA’s deployment will decrease Armenia’s security dependence on Russia and the CSTO, both of which have become more of a perceived threat than a security guarantor against Azerbaijan. Armenia’s alliance with Russia and membership to the CSTO cause a clash of values with its adopted system of democratic governance, stigmatizing Armenia in the eyes of the Euro-Atlantic community. While maneuvering between major actors of the region, including Russia, Azerbaijan has been trying to lable Armenia as a Russian proxy. The EUMA’s presence will make it difficult for Azerbaijan and its lobbyists to push that narrative further, especially given both Azerbaijan’s and Russia’s opposition to the mission.

Last but not least, the deployment of this mission can be considered a victory of Armenia’s progressive civil society and expert community, who have been urging the Armenian government to use international multilateral mechanisms, including the OSCE and EU monitoring missions for ensuring border security, and border delimitation and demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Some advocated for an EUMA domestically and internationally, and they are pleased to see the results of their public diplomacy efforts. 

Russia and the CSTO

Armenia relied on its military alliance with Russia and its CSTO membership for support in defending its territorial integrity until at least the first incursion of Azerbaijan into Armenia, which resulted in the occupation of Sev Lich (Black Lake) in May 2021. However, neither Russia nor the CSTO fulfilled their commitments, leaving Armenia alone in the face of military blackmail and aggression. 

Russian troops in Armenia did not prevent Azerbaijan’s military offensives and advances into Armenia in 2021-2022. Conservative Armenian experts attempted to explain this situation through Russia’s war in Ukraine, its distracted attention and stretched resources, as well as through the actions of Armenian authorities, which “angered” Russia. Some experts have suggested that Russia authorized Azerbaijan’s military offensives against Armenia, in order to pursue its geopolitical interests or to penalize Armenia for attempting to reduce its dependence on Russia. Most importantly, liberal circles in Armenia are convinced that it is in the common interest of Russia and Azerbaijan to make Armenia concede an extra-territorial corridor controlled by the Russia’s Federal Security Service that would not only link Azerbaijan with Turkey but would be also used by Russia to bypass western-imposed economic sanctions. 

There is also a belief among Armenia’s civil society and expert community that Russia discouraged the Armenian government in requesting a UNSC meeting about Azerbaijan’s military offensive in May and November 2021. Armenia’s urging of a UNSC meeting after the September 2022 military offensive was supported by France and not its formal ally Russia. The Permanent Representative of Russia failed to explicitly state at the meeting that Azerbaijan violated Armenia’s territorial integrity and presented it as a problem related to border delimitation and demarcation, which echoed the Azerbaijani narrative. Later on, Pashinyan even argued that “Russia’s military presence in Armenia not only does not guarantee Armenia’s security but, on the contrary, creates threats to Armenia’s security.” 

Another controversy is Russia’s role in the delimitation and demarcation of borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia has committed to facilitate that process since 2021, saying that the official stamped Soviet maps necessary for it are kept in the archives of the Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. However, after one and half years, there has not been any information about the provision of those maps to Armenia or Azerbaijan by Russia. 

At the CSTO summit in November 2022, Pashinyan pointed out that, “Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not stop Azerbaijan from resorting to aggressive actions,” and the CSTO has not been able “to make a decision regarding its response to Azerbaijan’s aggression against Armenia.” After multiple requests by Armenia between May 2021 and September 2022, the CSTO eventually sent a fact-finding mission to Armenia in September 2022 and offered technical assistance. However, it was too late and possibly aimed to hinder the EU Mission in Armenia –– the CSTO has lost its credibility in Armenia, and the possibility of an EU Mission was already being explored. 

The lack of Russian support for Armenia in light of Azerbaijan’s military aggression has been conditioned by the growing alliance between Russia and Azerbaijan, reflected in their Joint Declaration of February 22, 2022. The CSTO’s reluctance to support Armenia is also based on other CSTO members’ closer relations with Azerbaijan –– unsurprising given their common geopolitical interests and similarly autocratic governance systems while, in contrast, Armenia has committed itself to democracy.

The European Union

The EU’s prompt action in relation to the deployment of both temporary and long-term missions in Armenia is unprecedented. As leading European experts have noted, “no one imagined that this [Prague] meeting would lead to a new two-year civilian EU mission.” 

Why has the EU –– and not the OSCE or the UN –– decided to deploy a mission in Armenia? UN and OSCE Missions in Armenia would be impossible given Russia’s power to veto such a mission in the UN Security Council; both Russia and Azerbaijan would also oppose such a move in the OSCE. Even in the EU’s case, consensus was far from guaranteed as the EU and several member states had just signed energy deals with Azerbaijan, Baku opposed the mission, and Russia’s political and military presence in the area made that difficult. Moreover, Armenia had suspended diplomatic relations with Hungary until December 2022. 

Despite doubts, EU member states reached consensus on the deployment of the mission both in October 2022 and January 2023. In doing so, they also disclaimed skepticism among the Armenian public about EU interest in the region. Still, in mid-2022, even some progressive Armenian experts claimed that only Russia is interested in maintaining a presence in the conflict zone between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Let’s examine the reasons of the EU’s interest in deploying a mission in Armenia.

First of all, the EU realized the high possibility of a new large-scale war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. While the 2020 Artsakh War did not have immediate consequences for the EU, it became a precedent for the use of force by a bigger authoritarian country with higher military capabilities towards a smaller democratic country with lower military capabilities for settling disputes. As Freedom House suggested in its 2022 report, “Aliyev’s evident success in using military aggression to reinforce his rule may have contributed to Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.” The war in Ukraine became a threat not only to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty but also to the security of the EU and associated countries –– especially to Finland, the Baltic States and Moldova. Tackling the consequences of the war in Ukraine will become more difficult if a new war starts in the European neighborhood.

During and in the aftermath of the 2020 Artsakh War, the EU urged “both sides” to stop fighting, without identifying the aggressor. It had several reasons for this, such as an unwillingness to intervene in the OSCE Minsk Group’s mandate, its policy of parity between oil- and gas-rich but autocratic Azerbaijan and more democratic Armenia, as well as the success of Azerbaijani propaganda in advocating its narratives about the conflict for more than two and half decades amid failures of Armenian diplomacy. 

The EU’s approach was perceived as a false equivalence and caused frustration among Armenia’s progressive and liberal civil society about the EU’s lack of support. Given the schism between Armenia’s commitment to democratic values and the hereditary authoritarianism of Azerbaijan, Armenians with a pro-Western orientation expected support from the EU, given its declared commitment to human rights and democracy. It was criticized more harshly by conservative political forces in Armenia, feeding their conspiracy theories about the negative correlation between democracy and national security. 

More than a year after the ceasefire, the EU offered to mediate in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, creating an alternative to the Russian-facilitated track in place since January 2021. 

First, it volunteered its assistance in delimitation and demarcation. Armenia’s civil society and expert community believed that contemporary norms of human rights and human security should be considered during that process –– not just maps. They concluded that the OSCE and the EU could provide a more appropriate framework for delimitation than Russia.

The first meeting with the EU’s participation took place in December 2021 and was facilitated by President of France Emmanuel Macron and President of the EU Council Charles Michel. It was followed by trilateral meetings facilitated by the EU between spring 2022 and August 2022. They were not able to prevent the escalation of September 2022 and achieve a breakthrough in the process, with one of the reasons being the imbalance of power between Azerbaijan and Armenia during negotiations.

The Azerbaijani offensive of September 2022 showed how fragile the security of the region is. Shelling reached Armenia’s resort town of Jermuk, and war crimes were committed, such as the brutal extra-judicial execution of Armenian POWs and the mutilation and murder of female service members on the territory of Armenia. 

Geopolitical experts see the establishment of an EU mission as a competition between Russia and the EU for influence in the region. Some Western experts claim that Russia is trying to turn Armenia into an outpost, while some Armenian experts believe that “now is a good time [for the EU] to use this situation to strengthen its positions and weaken Russia’s positions in Armenia.” 

While those views may be valid, the EU is most likely pursuing a balance between its geopolitical interests and system of values. The September 2022 offensive followed the gas deal that the EU concluded with Azerbaijan on July 18. Azerbaijan has promised to double the supply of its gas to the EU through the expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor. The EU sees that cooperation as creating an alternative to Russian gas supplies and contributing significantly to Europe’s energy security, calling Azerbaijan a reliable partner. The EU was criticized for this deal not only by Armenian civil society and experts but also by international human rights watchdogs, who have noted that it is short-sighted to replace one autocratic country with another as an alternative energy source. Azerbaijan has also been weaponizing energy against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh since March 2022 through periodic suspensions of gas, and especially during its ongoing blockade of the Lachin Corridor. 

Meanwhile, some analysts have suggested that Azerbaijan doesn’t have the supplies of gas that it has committed or it doesn’t have the capacity to deliver them to Europe, and even if it does, it will still constitute an insignificant percentage of Europe’s energy needs. Experts have also pointed out two facts: First, critical infrastructure needed by Azerbaijan to extract and transport the gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe is co-owned by Lukoil — a Russian oil and gas company. Secondly, Azerbaijan has concluded a gas deal with the Russian Gazprom in November 2022 to import Russian gas in order to meet its obligations to Europe, which may indicate that it is partially “laundering” Russian gas to Europe. 

Azerbaijan is only one of Europe’s partners for the diversification of its energy sources, which prevents it from becoming excessively dependent on one country as it was the case in Europe. Although it may seem that Azerbaijan’s role as an alternative energy supplier affords it more leverage over Europe than Europe has over Azerbaijan, but that interdependence can still serve as a deterrent against subsequent military actions against Armenia. If Azerbaijan continues its military offensives, it will invite more condemnation and Europe will not be able to maintain a spirit of partnership with it. Even if the EU is becoming a geopolitical actor, it cannot give up on its core values of human rights and democracy. Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev most likely understands this and will most likely avoid actions that will bring high political and economic costs. 

Risks, Limitations and Challenges

It is important to manage expectations in relation to the EUMA mandate and capacities. Armenian society is highly polarized and while its liberal circles have exaggerated expectations, conservative groups tend to underestimate or be skeptical of the EUMA’s role in strengthening Armenia’s security, and some even see it as a potential destabilizing factor. 

While Azerbaijan will be cautious about inciting military aggression against Armenia in the presence of the EU monitors, and Russia will most likely avoid direct confrontation with countries, most of which are NATO allies, both may use other measures against Armenia. Azerbaijan has been keeping Nagorno-Karabakh under blockade since December 12, 2022, and has cut the supply of gas periodically through the blockade. On February 18, 2023, Russia cut its gas supply to Armenia, saying the pipe is clogged. It remains to be seen whether Russia is attempting to use Armenia’s energy dependency on Russia as a way to penalize Armenia for requesting the EU Mission.

Deployment of EU monitors in an area where Russia has had a significant military presence is perceived as risky by some. Provocations or incidents against the EU cannot be excluded. Conservative Armenian experts associated with the parliamentary opposition and the previous government, still echo Russian warnings about turning Armenia into yet another scene of geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that it is not the first example of such coexistence. The EUMM, another unarmed civilian monitoring mission of the EU, has been deployed across administrative boundary lines with Abkhazia and South Ossetia where Russian troops have been operating since 2008. Moreover, there have been Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) between the EUMM and the Russian presence in Georgia.

Although the EU and U.S. ambassadors to Armenia have demonstrated their support for Armenia’s territorial integrity through activities and visits to Syunik region, conservative experts argue that it is the West that is trying to open a corridor through Armenia to facilitate new links for global markets, referring to pro-Azerbaijani Western analysts advocating for it. It is not entirely clear how firm the EU’s views are on this issue, but it needs to understand that the corridor doesn’t open communications in the region but rather excludes Armenia from them and deepens its insecurity. Russia needs the corridor to bypass sanctions, Azerbaijan intends to further undermine Armenia’s territorial integrity and continue its annexation, and  Azerbaijan and Turkey have ambitions for a Pan-Turkic unity.

The most obvious gap not resolved through the EUMA is that it cannot contribute to the security and stability of Nagorno-Karabakh due to Azerbaijan’s categorical opposition to an international presence there as well as to the presence of the Russian peacekeepers. In previous articles, the possible coexistence of a Russian and EU peacekeeping mission has been explored. However, such collaboration is currently unrealistic given the polarization between the EU and Russia. 

The biggest uncertainty related to the role of the EUMA is the fate of the already occupied territories of Armenia by Azerbaijan. The EU should aim to facilitate integration of international norms of human rights and human security in the process of delimitation that should be followed by the demarcation of borders and the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from the occupied territories. 

Expected Outcomes and Conclusions

The deployment of the EU Mission is based on both the geopolitical interests and core values of the EU, and therefore combines liberalist and realpolitik motivations.

It is important to understand that the EUMA is envisaged to be a small civilian mission that is neither mandated, nor has the capacity to resist any military offensive. Instead, it is a soft security mission expected to be a deterrent to another potential Azerbaijani offensive through its political leverage and physical presence. It will also raise the awareness of EU member countries about the security situation and military provocations, ascertaining which party initiated them.

Apart from surveillance of the border security situation, the EU monitors should be sensitive to the human security concerns of the inhabitants of Armenian border towns and villages. The presence of the EU Mission in border regions of Armenia will make local people feel supported.

The EUMA should examine whether Azerbaijan has the energy resources and the infrastructure to deliver them to Europe to which it has committed, and continue balancing its geopolitical, economy and energy interests with its core values and principles of human rights and democracy. It may consider applying conditionality in its relationship with Azerbaijan, which would include a requirement to stop aggressive actions, including the collective punishment of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan should understand that its energy resources and the offer to deliver them to Europe do not entitle it to cross the red lines of Europe, violate the international order and use military force and coercion against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to achieve its goals.

Armenia should take advantage of the EU-facilitated negotiations, and the EU should mitigate Azerbaijan’s coercive political and military tactics to reduce the asymmetry of power in negotiations aimed at concluding a peace agreement. 

Armenia should understand that the EU Mission will not stay forever, and it should restore its security and defense sector to defend its territory and people. It cannot do it alone and needs the cooperation of partners, including that of the EU and its member states for that challenging task. The EU should understand that a peace agreement without the restoration of the military balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan will not be sustainable, as asymmetry between parties to any conflict will generate the potential for a new one. The restoration of the power balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the peace agreement between them are equally important for the EUMA’s exit strategy and sustainable peace and security in the region.

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