What Happened to Nagorno-Karabakh and Why It Matters

Listen to the article. 

Since writing for EVN Report, Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) has become a central focus. Even when I am not directly writing about Artsakh, it seems to weave its way into almost every article. Reflecting on the events after September 2023, a critical review of what happened to Artsakh under international law has taken shape. While I have discussed the ethnic cleansing in Artsakh from the international criminal law perspective, the core question about the status of Artsakh itself remains unanswered.

September 2024 marks one year since Azerbaijan’s “anti-terrorist operation” dismantled the de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh, sparking an ethnic cleansing and a humanitarian crisis. This decisive military action solidified Azerbaijan’s control over the region. Azerbaijan’s swift defeat of Nagorno-Karabakh set a concerning precedent in international law. 

This raises a crucial question: what happened in and to Nagorno-Karabakh from the international law perspective, and why does this matter? I examine the application of debellatio to the context of Nagorno-Karabakh—a non-recognized state with a significant level of self-governance and control over its territory. 

Historical Background

The roots of the conflict can be traced back to the early 20th century when the region, populated predominantly by ethnic Armenians, was incorporated into Soviet Azerbaijan by the Soviet Union. Despite its Armenian majority, Nagorno-Karabakh remained an autonomous region within Azerbaijan during the Soviet era.

As the Soviet Union began to collapse in the late 1980s, the long-standing ethnic tensions in the region escalated into open conflict, fueled by growing secessionist aspirations across the USSR. In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh sought to secede from Azerbaijan and unite with Armenia. Azerbaijan sought to suppress the movement. This eventually escalated into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

By the end of the war in 1994, Armenian forces had gained control over Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding districts. A ceasefire was reached in 1994, known as the Bishkek Protocol. No country, including Armenia, recognized the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict remained unresolved, with occasional flare-ups of violence over the subsequent years, including a major escalation in April 2016.

The war reignited in September 2020, leading to significant Azerbaijani advances. The hostilities ended with a Russia-brokered ceasefire on November 9, 2020, which resulted in Armenia’s withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to the region. In December 2022, Azerbaijan began blocking the Lachin corridor and refused to comply with the ICJ’s orders to lift the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched an “anti-terrorist operation” in Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to the swift defeat of the local Armenian forces and the dissolution of the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh government. 

A Way to End Armed Conflicts 

The doctrine of debellatio has been applied to the total subjugation of a sovereign state. It occurs when a state’s armed forces are utterly defeated, and its government collapses to the point where it can no longer exercise any meaningful control or resistance. It requires the absence of a government-in-exile advocating for the defeated state’s cause and the lack of co-belligerents fighting on its behalf. For instance, in the case of Kuwait in 1990, debellatio did not occur because the Kuwaiti government went into exile and coalition forces intervened to reverse the Iraqi occupation. A historical example of debellatio is the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945, where the Allied forces occupied the entire territory, dissolved the government, and imposed new governance structures. 

However, the concept of debellatio has been applied in the context of non-international armed conflicts as well. Under this view, the complete military defeat or demobilization of a non-state actor, or any other form of dissolution ends the non-international armed conflict (para. 489). At any rate, this remains a relatively underdeveloped area of international law, especially in the context of non-recognized states like Nagorno-Karabakh.

Nagorno-Karabakh’s De Facto Statehood

For nearly three decades, Nagorno-Karabakh existed as more than just a rebellious region or an armed insurgency. Following the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994 and the subsequent Bishkek ceasefire, the region developed many of the attributes typically associated with sovereign states. These included a functioning government with a President, a legislative body in the form of a National Assembly, a legal and judicial system, a defense force, and well-functioning economic structures. In many ways, Nagorno-Karabakh was a quasi-state entity that, while not recognized internationally, demonstrated significant self-governance and territorial control.

This semi-autonomous existence set Nagorno-Karabakh apart from typical non-state actors in other non-international armed conflicts. The region maintained a distinct identity—culturally, ethnically, politically, and administratively, although heavily dependent on Armenia. 

However, Nagorno-Karabakh’s status began to unravel in the aftermath of the 2020 war, when Azerbaijan gained control of significant territories that had been under Armenian control. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a decisive military operation and dismantled the remaining structures of Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto authorities. This led to the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. 

This raises the question: What are the implications of debellatio where the defeated entity is not just an armed group, but a de facto state? The argument hinges on the idea that Nagorno-Karabakh’s defeat was not merely the suppression of an insurgency but the total destruction of a political entity with state-like features.

De facto or unrecognized states commonly describe secessionist entities that control territory, provide governance, enjoy a certain degree of popular support, persist over time, and seek widespread recognition of their proclaimed sovereignty. Nagorno-Karabakh is a prime example of such an entity. Millions of people live in such regions, often suffering from a lack of international cooperation, and subjected to economic isolation, and limited access to humanitarian aid, among other challenges. Nevertheless, the organizational structure and social cohesion within these entities set them apart from typical armed groups as understood under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Therefore, the discussion of the debellatio-type effect on these entities, using Nagorno-Karabakh as an example, represents a distinct and important area of consideration.

While international law and relations remain state-centric, it is crucial to acknowledge that the global societal structure is far from homogeneous encompassing a variety of entities and communities that exist beyond the framework of traditional nation-states (p. 59). As such, while the debellatio of a recognized state is a shocking event that draws significant international attention, the effects of debellatio on de facto states should not be overlooked.

Non-International Armed Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh?

Azerbaijan labeled its operation an “anti-terrorism” campaign, seemingly portraying it as a law enforcement action rather than an armed conflict. This aligns with Azerbaijan’s stance of treating the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh as a domestic issue, which would mean that IHL does not apply. However, this perspective does not accurately reflect the realities on the ground.

This raises the question of whether the “anti-terrorist” operation should be viewed as part of the international armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or whether it should be considered a non-international armed conflict between Azerbaijan and the Defense Army of Nagorno-Karabakh. Understanding this distinction is crucial, as it determines how the conflict is legally classified, and which legal frameworks apply. 

To place this in context, it is necessary to revisit the history of the international armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, which began in the early 1990s. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions emphasizes the factual realities of armed conflict, regardless of any formal declaration of war, even when a state does not officially recognize it. This also includes partial or total occupation of a state’s territory as a form of armed conflict. Despite significant lulls in fighting since the 1994 Bishkek ceasefire, the issue of Armenia’s purported occupation of Azerbaijani territory is crucial for assessing the ratione temporis of the international armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Yet, the application of IHL to Nagorno-Karabakh persisted even after the cessation of hostilities, because the region was considered occupied under international law.

According to Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, a territory is considered occupied when it is placed under the authority of a hostile army, and this occupation extends only to areas where such authority can be effectively established and exercised. 

The international community has largely viewed the disputed territory as occupied Azerbaijani land. Given the premise of Armenia’s effective control, which is a sine qua non requirement for occupation (para. 136), and Nagorno-Karabakh’s dependence on Armenia in various aspects, including financial, political, and military support (para. 186), I argue that Armenia’s alleged occupation, at any rate, began to come to its end after the 2020 war.

The international armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia included the 44-day war in 2020, culminating in the November 9 tripartite ceasefire agreement. Under this agreement, a Russian peacekeeping contingent was deployed, coinciding with the withdrawal of Armenian armed forces. As a result, the Aghdam, Kelbajar and Lachin regions and other territories were returned to Azerbaijan. 

An article entitled, “The Evolving Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: An International Law Perspective, Part II” argues that this did not conclude the international armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. According to this view, Armenia continued to exercise overall control over Nagorno-Karabakh until September 2023, meaning that the occupation and, consequently, the international armed conflict, persisted. I disagree. 

First, while the 1907 Hague Regulations referred to armistices as temporary suspensions of hostilities, modern ceasefire agreements have evolved through State practice. Today, ceasefires are often part of a broader attempt to settle conflicts permanently. Though they may not resolve all issues, such as territorial sovereignty, ceasefires impose an obligation on all parties to refrain from renewing hostilities. As a result, they preclude the use of force under the self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter within the context of that specific conflict.

Second, Armenia’s withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh had significant strategic and political consequences. Its battlefield defeat, coupled with the recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, including Nagorno-Karabakh—despite opposition from the region’s authorities—marked a decisive change in Armenia’s control over the region. This was further demonstrated during the September 2023 assault when Armenia’s Prime Minister refused to intervene militarily, highlighting Armenia’s inability and unwillingness to maintain any authority. Although the ICJ has recently stipulated that an occupying power may still have obligations under the law of occupation even after withdrawal if it continues to exercise authority (paras 92-93), the situation on the ground, in light of Armenia’s actions, ended its occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Therefore, even assuming arguendo that the international armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia survived the November 9 agreement, it no longer concerned Nagorno-Karabakh. Although a significant portion of Nagorno-Karabakh remained outside of Azerbaijan’s control, Armenia eventually lost effective and even overall control over these territories—whether due to military defeat or strategic decisions. Consequently, Azerbaijan’s September assault falls within the context of the non-international armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Legal Implications of Applying Debellatio to Nagorno-Karabakh

The Tripartite Statement prevented Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and any other actor, from unilaterally changing the situation. This left Azerbaijan’s victory hanging in the balance. Therefore, amid Russia’s disinterested “peacekeeping” and the timid international response to the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan seized the moment and launched an assault to secure a swift debellatio-type victory over the remnants of resistance in the blockaded region. As a result, Azerbaijan secured complete freedom of action, not burdened by obligations such as post-conflict reconciliation, or internal self-determination for Armenians within Azerbaijan.

In contrast, conflicts that end with a peace settlement typically involve negotiations where both sides agree on terms that impose limitations on future actions. Had the non-international armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh concluded through a well-negotiated settlement, with compromises from both sides, the potential for renewed hostilities would have been significantly reduced.

Instead, Azerbaijan opted for a shortcut to achieve its goal of subjugating the territory. This precedent can have far-reaching consequences, particularly concerning future conflicts involving de facto state entities. It may pave the way for a shift where military power, rather than international law and diplomacy, becomes the primary tool for resolving conflicts involving non-state entities, with profound implications for vulnerable populations.

For regions with similar quasi-state entities, such as Palestine, Taiwan, or Western Sahara, the precedent set by Nagorno-Karabakh could have dangerous consequences. States facing similar challenges might be more inclined to pursue total military victories, knowing that the international community might accept debellatio fait accompli.

Conclusion

The debellatio-type defeat of Nagorno-Karabakh allowed Azerbaijan to sidestep the complex arrangements and obligations that would have come with a peaceful settlement. By securing a total military victory, Azerbaijan reshaped the region’s political landscape without the constraints of post-conflict negotiations or addressing the rights and future of the Armenian population within its borders.

The direct consequence of Nagorno-Karabakh’s defeat was the forced displacement of over 100,000 Armenians, effectively erasing a centuries-old community from the region, and this speaks volumes about the humanitarian cost of such an approach. Accepting this outcome undermines the foundation of justice, accountability, and human rights. Allowing such actions to stand unchallenged sends a dangerous message, threatening to erode the core principles of international law. The lessons from Nagorno-Karabakh must catalyze stronger efforts in conflict resolution—efforts that prioritize these fundamental values and ensure they are upheld, not disregarded, in the face of such violations.

Azerbaijan’s actions in Nagorno-Karabakh have violated nearly every aspect of international law, and this cannot be ignored. I can only continue to shed light on these injustices. I will keep writing about accountability, human rights, and the rule of law that must not be abandoned in the face of such violations, no matter how idealistic it may seem.

Editor’s Note: An earlier version of this article appeared on the Lieber Institute’s Articles of War.

Also see
selections from

Opinion

Politics