Revisiting Turkey’s Role in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War

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After Erdogan boasted in July that Turkey could invade Israel—“just like we entered Karabakh”, Baku responded quietly, with state-affiliated media quoting a senior Defense Ministry official denying any “involvement of foreign servicemen” in the 2020 war. But all accounts point to Turkey’s heavy involvement in the 44-day war.

It marked Ankara’s first substantial, albeit largely covert, intervention in the three-decade-long conflict. While many analysts have explored its geopolitical dimensions, this piece focuses on the military aspect of Turkey’s intervention. While the full extent of Turkey’s role remains unclear, the available evidence paints a clearer picture of Ankara’s substantial support for Baku’s war effort.

To the best of our knowledge, Turkey’s involvement included the recruitment and transfer of Syrian mercenaries, the deployment and likely limited use of its F-16 fighter jets, the provision and operation of armed Bayraktar TB2 drones, advisory support and intelligence sharing, and even command at the highest level.

The Path to War

During the brief flareup of tensions on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in mid-July 2020—the most serious escalation in years—Turkey expressed strong support for Baku with Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar warning that Armenia “will be left under the trouble they started” and will “certainly pay for what they have done.”

Shortly thereafter, Turkey and Azerbaijan announced large-scale joint exercises to run from July 29 to August 10, however, these were later extended.[1] Additional ground and air force exercises were held in Nakhichevan from September 5 to 7, involving more than 5,000 personnel and a vast amount of equipment.

Meanwhile, the first reports of Syrian mercenaries being recruited by Turkey for deployment in Azerbaijan began circulating in mid-to-late July, becoming increasingly more frequent in the weeks leading up to the Azerbaijani offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh on September 27. This is covered in the lengthy chronicle published last year.

A wartime report revealed that Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan surged six-fold in the first nine months of 2020, reaching $123 million, with the total for the eleven months rising to $256 million.

Advisory and Operational Support

During the war, Pashinyan claimed that “150 high-ranking Turkish officers” were “directing military operations” on behalf of Azerbaijan, with “several thousand” Turkish special forces personnel deployed on the battlefield. In contrast, Aliyev claimed that “not a single person from Turkey participates in this war,” adding: “Turkish equipment yes, Turkish forces no.” He spoke of Ankara’s “diplomatic” and “moral support.”

But observers quickly recognized the “overt” and “evident” support from Ankara. Military analyst Rob Lee, who closely monitored the war, argued that the Turkish support was the variable explaining Azerbaijan’s greater success in the fall of 2020 than in July 2020 and April 2016. He suggested that it likely encompassed intelligence gathering and sharing, assistance with targeting (including planning & coordinating fire), and command and control functions, where Turkish advisors and liaisons played a key role—with Azerbaijanis doing the fighting. Even more than a year after the war ended, Lee noted that the full extent of the Turkish involvement remained unknown.

Turkish advisory and operational support has been widely acknowledged. While war correspondent Simon Ostrovsky said Turkey’s experienced advisors “directed Baku’s war machine,” Edward J. Erickson, a retired U.S. Army officer sympathetic to Turkey, opined that “it is very likely that the Azerbaijani general staff received advice in real time from the Turks.” A 2022 article in the reputable journal International Security pointed to Turkey’s “extensive” support from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to the “provision of drones, electronic warfare units, aircraft for target acquisition, long-range artillery, skilled Turkish troops that operated these platforms.”

In the 2021 book Storm in the Caucasus, Russian analysts Konstantin Makienko and Ruslan Pukhov described Turkey’s “direct military intervention” as the first by an “external military power in the post-Soviet space.” Makienko suggested that Turkey’s involvement was “very significant, even decisive” and that there is “strong reason to believe that Turkish advisors were present in combat formations at the battalion level and higher, and in some cases even at the company level.”

A victory parade was held in Baku on December 10, one month after the war ended, with Erdogan standing next to Aliyev as Turkish soldiers and officers marched and Turkey’s national anthem played. A year after the war ended, Erdogan’s Vice President Fuat Oktay, told parliament in no uncertain terms that Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT) had conducted “significant operations” in Nagorno-Karabakh, among other places. Oktay stated that Turkey had achieved “many successes”, including “ending the thirty-year occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh.”

The most detailed report on Turkish involvement emerged mid-war from the Russian daily Kommersant, which cited its “military-diplomatic sources”, understood to be the GRU, Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency. It asserted that the war was “planned and provoked by Turkey” with Ankara promising “comprehensive political-diplomatic, intelligence, and military-technical support.” Remarkably, it claimed that Turkey’s Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and Land Forces Commander Ümit Dündar were in Azerbaijan from September 28 to 30 to oversee the “general conduct of operations” on the front.

Kommersant reported that, following joint exercises in July and August, a total of 600 Turkish military personnel remained in Azerbaijan to coordinate the “planning and execution” of the offensive. This contingent included 200 troops in a battalion tactical group, 50 instructors in Nakhchivan, 90 advisors in Baku, 120 air and technical personnel at the Gabala airbase, 20 drone operators at the Dallyar airfield, 50 instructors at the Yevlakh airfield, 50 instructors in the 4th Army Corps (based near Baku), and 20 personnel at the navy base and the military academy in Baku. This Turkish contingent had in its possession 18 infantry fighting vehicles, a multiple rocket launcher, ten vehicles, and up to 34 pieces of aviation equipment (including six planes, eight helicopters, and up to 20 drones) to conduct military reconnaissance against Armenian forces.

Bahtiyar Ersay

Immediately after the war, another Russian newspaper, Vzglyad, reported that around 200 Turkish military advisors were based in Azerbaijan and were involved in organizational and staff tasks. It identified Major General Bahtiyar Ersay, Chief of Operations of the Turkish Land Forces, as the “military leader of the entire operation in Karabakh,” while Lieutenant General Şeref Ongay, Commander of the Third Army based in Erzincan, was involved in the planning of the offensive. 

Ersay reportedly took over as Azerbaijani military’s chief of the general staff Najmaddin Sadikov was sidelined. In a late October 2020 meeting at the Azerbaijani Operations Command Center, Ersay was one of the three officers reporting to Aliyev. In late August 2021, Ersay was appointed commander of the Azerbaijan Task Force Command under Turkey’s General Staff, which he continues to hold. A little over year later, in December 2022, Ersay was revealed to have been appointed as advisor to Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister Hasanov. At the time, Turan, an independent outlet, wrote that his “special role in the planning of military operations” of the 2020 war is no secret.

F-16 Fighter Jets

Turkey first deployed F-16 fighter jets to Azerbaijan for the joint exercises in late July 2020 with at least five seen at the Ganja Airport. Two weeks before the war, three F-16s flew over Ganja to celebrate the 102nd anniversary of the “liberation of Baku” by Ottoman forces. As the jets remained there after the exercises, Yerevan raised the issue with the CSTO and 12 NATO partners. Armenian officials later reported that Turkey rotated the planes, along with their crews and technical staff on September 23, which further raised alarm bells in Yerevan.[2] Armenian intelligence intercepted communication between F-16 pilots on September 25 discussing their involvement in “something important on Sunday”, i.e. September 27—the first day of the war.

Officials in Armenia and Artsakh insisted that F-16s were used from the first hours of the Azerbaijan offensive. On September 29, Armenia’s Defense Ministry claimed that an Armenian Su-25, attempting to repel the combined Azerbaijani and Turkish attacks against Armenia, was shot down by a Turkish F-16 in Armenian airspace, resulting in the pilot’s death.[3] Azerbaijan and Turkey dismissed the claim. Aliyev called it fake news, claiming that the Su-25 hit a mountain because the pilot was inexperienced.

Erdogan’s senior adviser İbrahim Kalın insisted that Turkey does not have any F-16s operating in the region, while Aliyev adviser Hikmet Hajiev denied the presence of F-16s on Azerbaijani soil. But analysis of satellite imagery by the New York Times the same day revealed at least two F-16s stationed at Ganja Airport on October 3. Two days later, Aliyev had to admit their presence, but claimed that the F-16s were “on the ground” and “not flying” and “not in any way” participating in combat. Aliyev later justified their presence as “a sign of solidarity” from Turkey.

While the presence of F-16s in Ganja is not direct evidence of the Su-25 shootdown, questions arose as to why their deployment was kept secret. The American security analysis firm Stratfor suggested that it demonstrated Turkey’s “direct military involvement” beyond its provision of mercenaries and hardware.

Throughout the war, Armenia’s Defense Ministry consistently reported that Turkish Air Force F-16s played an active combat role, particularly in providing cover for Azerbaijan’s Soviet-era Su-25 jets and armed Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, as well as directly engaging in airstrikes. The Armenian MoD further claimed that joint operations were coordinated from a Turkish E7-T remote command center flying over eastern Turkish airspace.[4] On October 15, Garik Movsesyan, Deputy Commander of Armenia’s Air Defense Forces, insisted that Armenia has extensive evidence of F-16 use in combat, including coordinating Azerbaijan’s Air Force operations, providing support during strikes, and offering operational cover. But the combat engagement of F-16s was not confirmed independently.

The F-16s were later relocated farther away from the frontline to the Gabala airbase, where satellite images taken on October 19 showed six F-16s. Analysis by Razm.info suggested that the F-16s were subsequently moved ever farther, to Lankaran in southern Azerbaijan.[5] In an October 26 address, Aliyev said that “everyone knows” that the “five or six” F-16s are “on the ground” in Azerbaijan and that “Turkish brothers” left them in Azerbaijan for “moral support.” At the same time, he warned, “if we are attacked from outside, they will see those F-16s.”

Turkish analyst Kerim Has suggested that the jets saw “limited and partial” use, but argued that their mere physical presence in Azerbaijan pressured Yerevan psychologically and “played a role in determining the outcome of the war” (Storm in the Caucasus, p. 103). A year after the war ended, Rob Lee wrote that “Turkey deployed F-16 fighters to defend Azerbaijani airspace during the war” without passing judgment on their combat use. Armenia’s wartime Defense Minister Tonoyan told the parliamentary select committee probing the war in 2023 that Armenian forces could have shot down the F-16s, but Russia had asked Armenia not to “provoke” the situation. Moscow did not respond to this.

Bayraktar TB2 Drones

The deployment of armed Bayraktar TB2 drones was perhaps the most discussed, though not necessarily the most important, aspect of Turkey’s support. These drones, numbering around a dozen,[6] were apparently responsible for a substantial portion of Armenian equipment and personnel loss.[7] Emil Sanamyan of the USC Institute of Armenian Studies, noted that judging by video materials and eyewitness accounts, “Turkish aerial attacks accounted for the majority” of the Armenian manpower losses. The attention Bayraktar drones received was fueled by the numerous videos of strikes on Armenian targets, as Armenian forces struggled to effectively counter them.[8]

There is broad agreement among observers, including Rob Lee and Ruslan Pukhov, that the drones were operated by Turkish crews. This conclusion is based on the brief period between Azerbaijan’s acquisition of the drones and the war’s outbreak, which did not allow sufficient time to properly train Azerbaijani personnel.[9] Edward J. Erickson suggested that Azerbaijan may have hired Bayraktar company’s civilian pilots and experts to lead its drone effort. A 2022 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded that “available evidence suggests it is likely that the TB2s used in the 2020 war were owned by Azerbaijan but operated by Turkish airmen and crews.” Lee also noted that a Turkish MoD-affiliated account named Clash Report posted a video of a TB2 strike before it was shared by Azerbaijan’s MoD, suggesting Turkish control or coordination of the TB2s.

It was also Yerevan’s position that Turks operated the drones. Armenia’s MoD claimed that a Turkish UAV command center was located across Hadrut. Additionally, the Kommersant report from mid-October suggested that 20 Turkish drone operators were stationed at the Dallyar airfield, which Armenia reportedly attempted to target with a missile strike on October 2.[10]

A post-war report by the Russian newspaper Vzglyad suggested that Turkish Air Force Major General Göksel Kahya oversaw the deployment of TB2s during the war. Kahya was spotted in meetings of Turkish and Azerbaijani officials in Baku as early as August 2020 and during the war. Earlier, in 2019, Kahya had reportedly been involved in coordination of TB2 drones deployed in Libya.

International Acknowledgement

International actors generally acknowledged Turkey’s involvement in addition to the numerous statements regarding the deployment of Syrian mercenaries, which will not be repeated here. Russia’s foreign intelligence chief Sergey Naryshkin, stated on October 6 that “for the first time, Turkey has openly and unequivocally sided with Azerbaijan,” but did not provide any details aside from the mercenaries.

U.S. State Secretary Mike Pompeo stated in mid-October that Turkey has begun to “reinforce” Azerbaijan and has “provided resources” to Baku. Trump’s National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien mentioned Turkish “technical assistance and advisory support” to Azerbaijan in a speech on October 30. In a campaign statement, former Vice President Joe Biden, Trump’s opponent in the presidential race, said Turkey has provided arms to Azerbaijan.

France’s Foreign Minister Jean-Yvez Le Drian told the French parliament on October 7 that “the new aspect [of the conflict] is that there is military involvement by Turkey.” In December 2020, EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell wrote that Turkey’s support “has resulted in a major victory for Azerbaijan.” On the other hand, when asked about Turkey’s role in the conflict, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg responded that the alliance is “not part of the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh” and that Turkey is a “valued ally”, a message he had conveyed to Armenian President Armen Sarkissian.

Footnotes:

[1] On August 11, Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister Hasanov and Foreign Minister Bayramov were in Turkey to meet with Erdogan, while Turkey’s Defense Minister Akar and Chief of the General Staff Yaşar Güler arrived in Azerbaijan with a large delegation the next day. They observed the “final episode of the first stage of the exercises” on August 13.
[2] Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan told the parliamentary select committee probing the war that immediately before the war as many as four F-16s were in air for up to eight hours daily, approaching as close as 25 km to the line of contact, activating air defense systems in Artsakh.
[3] Anton Lavrov, a contributor to the 2021 book Storm in the Caucasus, suggested that the Armenian Su-25 “most likely … crashed into a mountainside while flying at extremely low altitudes” (p. 49).
[4] Armenia’s MoD released a short video reportedly showing the flight path of an F-16, a Su-25 just east of the line of contact and an E-7T airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) in Turkish airspace, north of Lake Van and east of Erzurum.
[5] Razm.info argues that the transfer to Lankaran occurred after October 22 when Armenia reportedly launched missile attacks on Gabala. The move is suggested by a map found on a patch of the Turkish Air Force’s 151st Squadron, which marks three locations in Azerbaijan: Ganja, Gabala, and Lankaran. There is definitive proof, via satellite imagery, of the F-16s’ presence at the first two locations and the inclusion of Lankaran on the patch strongly suggests that the aircraft were deployed there as well. The patch features the squadron’s symbol, a vulture, with the label “Karabakh is Azerbaijan”, and a map with three locations marked. It appears to have been first posted on Instagram by Omer Erkmen, the graphic designer who created it. His post included two photos of F-16 pilots holding the patch in their cabins. Additionally, another photo circulating online shows someone holding the patch, with a somewhat blurry Lankaran Airport in the background as identified by Razm.info.
[6] The SIPRI database indicates a dozen, which was also estimated by Rob Lee. Le Monde reported just six, while Jane’s World Air Forces, quoted by Edward J. Erickson, reported as high as thirty-six TB2s in Azerbaijan.
[7] Based on Oryx’s visual evidence analysis, which has been questioned, TB2 drones were responsible for destroying 93% of the Armenian towed and self-propelled artillery pieces (148 out of 159), 85% of the Grad multiple rocket launchers (56 out of 66), and 58% of the tanks (85 out of 146).
[8] Armenia claimed on October 20, 2020 that around ten TB2 had been downed in Nagorno-Karabakh, while Leonid Nersisyan and Mark Cazalet, in Storm in the Caucasus (2021, p. 68), quoted a source in the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army’s air defense, that seven TB2s were shot down. Visual evidence of only three was provided (Oct. 20, Oct. 22, and Nov. 8). Rob Lee questioned the authenticity of the last, which he argued may be the wreckage of the first downed TB2. Lee suggested that “other TB2 could have crashed in Azerbaijani territory, which likely would not have been published on social media.”
[9] In June 2020, Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister Hasanov announced that Baku will purchase Turkish combat drones. But there was no official confirmation before the war that it had acquired TB2s. The likelihood that the drones were operated by Turkish personnel is further indicated by the timing: only in early February 2021, months after the war ended, did 77 Azerbaijani air force personnel complete their four-month TB2 operator training in Turkey.
[10] Analysis by Razm.info showed that this Soviet-era airbase, not far from Ganja, was “completely reconstructed, modernized, and technically equipped” during the summer of 2020. TB2s were later spotted at the Kurdamir airbase in central Azerbaijan in a satellite image from October 10, and at Yevlakh airport no later than October 22.

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