Silencing Peace: Aliyev Maintains Ban on Discourse in Azerbaijan

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In recent speeches, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has once again started employing inflammatory language, calling Armenians the “treacherous enemy,” “bloodthirsty enemy”, “Armenian vandals,” “Armenian savages”, and that “Armenians have shown their barbarism”. While such rhetoric is not new for Aliyev, who has for decades used hate speech against Armenians, what stands out now is his full return to warlike propaganda after a brief period of restraint, fueling aggression, and animosity and promoting war.

Aliyev’s disinterest in fostering genuine peace in the South Caucasus has been apparent from the outset. His actions, such as the ten-month blockade that forcibly displaced Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, make his intentions clear. Despite this, many—including figures within Armenia’s own decision-making circles—naively believed his hostility was confined to Nagorno-Karabakh. Time has proven this assumption wrong, as Aliyev continues to demonstrate and openly affirm his broader ambitions with increasing clarity.

On September 20, 2024, during a meeting in occupied Stepanakert, Aliyev made a candid statement: “During the occupation, visitors from various capitals repeatedly claimed there was no military solution to this […] conflict. You may recall the thesis: ‘There is no military solution; it must be solved peacefully.’ […] In other words, what did they want us to come to accept? They wanted us to concede defeat. They wanted our people to come to terms with that defeat.

“Another claim was that it was necessary to start cooperating with Armenia. Various seminars were held through non-governmental organizations. Certain people in our society sold themselves to foreign circles, attended those trainings, mingled with Armenians, made deals, and organized joint meetings with them. What contacts could we have with the bloodthirsty enemy who committed the Khojaly genocide and razed all our cities and villages in the Karabakh region to the ground? But the goal of those who wanted to perpetuate this occupation was that the future generation, the young generation, should no longer want war, that we should make peace with Armenia, and thus the occupation would remain in place. We, the people of Azerbaijan, shattered all these plans, we overturned them.” 

Aliyev puts forward two key positions. First, he reaffirms his disinterest in a peaceful resolution based on mutual concessions, famously stating in 2023 that “war was a life mission,” effectively dismissing non-military solutions. Second, he has shut down any discussions of reconciliation and peace, rendering the possibility of a peaceful settlement unreachable.

In this context, in a speech at the beginning of this year, Aliyev explicitly explained his rejection of solutions based on mutual concession: 

“Of course, we all wanted to restore our territorial integrity as soon as possible. However, from a historical point of view, 30 years is not such a long time. During this period, many proposals were put forward during the negotiations, and some might wonder why Azerbaijan was not accepting them. After all, based on these proposals, several districts would have been returned to Azerbaijan without any war, the former displaced persons would have returned to their homes, and at the same time, the situation would have been normalized. Why doesn’t Azerbaijan agree? Of course, the negotiations had their own strategy and tactics. We conducted them in a manner that minimized external pressure while achieving our goals. But for me, the main point was that this is a historical issue and national issue, and it would be wrong to seek seemingly favorable gains. We must solve the issue in a fundamental way,  once and for all. We must fully restore our territorial integrity and sovereignty.”

The Azerbaijani President rejected proposals that would have peacefully returned several districts to Azerbaijan. This raises a logical question: Why? The answer seems clear––Aliyev did not want a peaceful settlement. Instead, he sought a scenario in which Armenians could no longer live in Nagorno-Karabakh. This explains why Azerbaijani authorities have banned discussions about peace within their society, opting instead to promote an image of Armenians filled with hatred and animosity.

Unsurprisingly, in the same speech, Aliyev reiterates that he has closed all avenues for peace or reconciliation talks among Azerbaijanis, particularly young people.

“Under various pretexts – cooperation with Armenia, creation of contacts through various NGOs to prepare people and societies for peace – the aim was for the young generation growing up in Azerbaijan to grow up in a different spirit. But our goal was for the growing generation to be patriotic, never accept this injustice, and if we are not lucky enough to restore this historical justice, future generations should do it,” said Aliyev in his speech. 

These two positions reinforce each other. On one hand, Aliyev rejects peace through diplomacy, favoring war to achieve his aims and eliminate any Armenian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. On the other hand, within his authoritarian regime, he suppresses any dialogue between Azerbaijani and Armenian societies, stifling alternative viewpoints or reconciliation efforts. This troubling dynamic continues even after Aliyev has achieved his goals in Nagorno-Karabakh.

After nearly four years of peace talks marked by unilateral concessions from Armenian authorities—including recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and recent concessions in Tavush to facilitate a “peace deal”—Azerbaijan is now imposing preconditions that rule out signing any agreement soon. Simultaneously, activists who have advocated for potential Armenian-Azerbaijani reconciliation face imprisonment. 

A recent wave of arrests in Azerbaijan exemplifies this trend. On August 21, researcher and activist Bahruz Samadov was arrested and charged with high treason for his critical articles on Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh policy and his connections with Armenian activists. 

Amnesty International reports that this echoes the July arrest of Talysh minority advocate Igbal Abilov, also charged with high treason. Both remain in custody. Samadov is primarily accused of his ties to Armenian NGOs and membership in the “No War” movement. Azerbaijani state media claim that “Bahruz Samadov, a member of the subversive group known as ‘No War’, has been in contact with representatives of the Special Service Bodies of the Republic of Armenia and citizens of that country who cooperated with them since 2020, during the period of the Patriotic War.”

The No War movement, launched by Azerbaijani activists in July 2023, is particularly noteworthy as it preceded another wave of aggression and the forced displacement of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. In response, members of parliament started a campaign against these activists. MP Elman Mammadov from the ruling party expressed strong views, stating,  “The anti-war campaign is an action against Azerbaijani statehood and security. This should be investigated at the state level; their identities should be determined, and very serious measures should be taken within the framework of Azerbaijani laws.” 

Another legislator, from Aliyev’s ruling party, Aydin Mirzazadeh, noted that every society has groups opposing national interests and financed from abroad, including Azerbaijan. He labeled the “no war” advocates as one such group, accusing them of supporting Armenian interests during the occupation both openly and covertly. 

This campaign served as yet another indicator of Aliyev’s reluctance to pursue peace with Armenians. Furthermore, the Azerbaijani state swiftly silences the few voices advocating for potential reconciliation.

Following Samadov’s arrest, the Azerbaijani government apprehended two other peace advocates—Samad Shikhi and Javid Agha—as they attempted to leave the country. Both Shikhi and Agha were quickly released, claiming they were brought in to testify against Samadov. Agha later revealed that he had been issued an indefinite travel ban.

The “embargo” on peace discourse is clearly accompanied by anti-Western propaganda led by Aliyev himself. The West—specifically France and the U.S.—has become a target for blame and, most importantly, would be held accountable for Azerbaijan’s potential further aggressive actions against Armenia.

On September 23, during the first session of the seventh term of Azerbaijan’s Milli Majlis, Aliyev openly accused the West of “turning Armenia against Azerbaijan.” He noted: “Western countries are sending weapons and ammunition to Armenia. In some cases, it is open, as in the French-Armenian military cooperation, while in others it is concealed. However, we now need to be informed about everything. We know who sends what to Armenia and when, which military cargo planes land at Armenian airports, and what military products are transported on those planes. In other words, the plans of some Western countries to turn Armenia against us are obvious. Of course, they do not care about the Armenian people. The Armenian people are just a tool in their hands—a tool for keeping Azerbaijan under constant pressure, using the territory of Armenia to create sources of threat for Azerbaijan and Armenia’s other neighbors, and thus, securing their own interests.”

He also mentioned that, “America is currently providing them with 250 million dollars, which they will use for their internal purposes, while a portion of that money will be allocated to purchase weapons to harm us. Who bears this responsibility, and who will be accountable in the future? Those providing this money, including the so-called ‘European Peace Facility’, demonstrate a remarkable level of hypocrisy. The fund is intended for weapons, yet they label it as a Peace Facility.”

Aliyev is constructing a false image of the West, claiming they are supplying weapons to Armenia against Azerbaijan. In reality, Western partners are pushing for a “peace treaty” and advocating for further negotiations aimed at achieving regional stability. 

The key misstep of some Western partners lies in their ineffective approach to dealing with dictators. They often assume that diplomacy, avoiding conflict, and fostering constructive dialogue will lead to positive outcomes. In reality, the opposite is often true: dictators are usually clear about their intentions, signaling aggression through propaganda before acting. Regrettably, Western partners sometimes overlook these warning signs, likely due to a misunderstanding of how authoritarian regimes function.

A recent study authored by Eduard Abrahamyan and myself draws parallels between the narratives of Putin and Aliyev regarding Ukraine and Armenia. The work, “A Comparative Analysis of Autocratic Regimes in Azerbaijan and Russia,” reveals striking similarities in their rhetoric. Both leaders employ fabricated histories, deny the existence of other states—specifically Ukraine and Armenia—and spread anti-Western propaganda. 

While the international community has taken a clear stance against Putin’s actions, it remains silent about Aliyev, who exhibits equally dangerous intentions through his actions and propaganda. Aliyev ordered the creation of the concept of “Western Azerbaijan” and publicly placed it on the political agenda in December 2022 to perpetuate conflict with Armenia and its people—a strategy crucial for the sustainability of his dictatorship.

Western partners have not adequately addressed this issue, despite its clear parallels to Putin and Ukraine. However, appropriate responses and preventive measures could avert another war and prevent human suffering in the South Caucasus. 

It’s worth noting the early October visit to Baku by Sergei Naryshkin, Director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). During his trip, Naryshkin met with a range of Azerbaijani domestic security and intelligence officials, as well as President Aliyev. According to an SVR statement, the discussions focused on “cooperation between the Russian Security Service and Azerbaijan’s special services across various areas of intelligence activities.”

Interestingly, the Azerbaijani side largely downplayed Naryshkin’s visit; even the meeting with Aliyev was not publicized on the official website of Azerbaijan’s President.

The Russian side was notably transparent about the discussions, revealing that both parties prioritized short-term objectives for bilateral relations and underscored the “special place” of joint efforts to counter activities by “Western special services aimed at disrupting the internal political stability of our states.” This highlights the deepening cooperation between Baku and Moscow, particularly in their shared narrative of “demonizing” the West within the South Caucasus.

It’s important to note Aliyev’s contradictory stance: he blames the West for “weaponizing Armenia against Azerbaijan,” while simultaneously accusing them of promoting peace in Azerbaijan through “various seminars and NGOs.” Although he doesn’t explicitly name the West, the implication is clear. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s propaganda machine openly states that “the West’s comprehensive defense of those arrested in Azerbaijan only serves to spotlight them and clarify the facts about their treason.”

This presents a paradox: how can the West, which funds peace and reconciliation projects at the societal level, simultaneously contribute to the possibility of another regional war? This is nonsensical. The West seeks stability for economic benefits, while Aliyev aims to perpetuate war and animosity, which are key to maintaining his dictatorship. Consequently, the Azerbaijani state opposes Western influence through various means. This enables Aliyev to avoid signing a “peace treaty” and hinder diplomatic efforts for peace, while also suppressing discourse on peace and reconciliation within Azerbaijan. This situation closely mirrors the dynamics we’ve observed in Nagorno-Karabakh over the past three decades. However, this time, developments may occur more swiftly. Urgent preventive measures are essential, and Western partners have a variety of untapped tools at their disposal to address this issue, which would serve both their reputations and interests in the South Caucasus.

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