To War or Not to War? Russia’s Coaxing and Aliyev’s Dilemma

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The Aliyev regime’s definitive militarized victory and ethnic cleansing of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic have been a boon to his political fortunes within Azerbaijan. Since this victory, authoritarianism in Azerbaijan has intensified, as predicted by the existing scholarship on ethnic conflicts and stubbornly ignored by opposition forces inside the country. Studies show that conflicts resolved through war and violence, as opposed to a negotiated settlement, often lead to a consolidation of authoritarian rule in the victorious state. 

The violent end of Nagorno-Karabakh also marked an end to the internationalized ethnic conflict with Armenia, which for years has been used for regime stability in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 2018, Armenians managed to transcend this false and forced narrative of democracy-or-security, while Azerbaijanis remain trapped in it, despite their government’s decisive victory. 

President Aliyev is sustaining this false narrative by positioning Armenia as the convenient scapegoat, fueling his fresh search for external enemies, despite the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since the fall of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Aliyev has been trying to instigate a new rivalry with Armenia – this time, a territorial conflict. This could begin with either a limited annexation of Armenian territory, or a broader invasion, which he will try to frame as a “border clash”. Precedents for such actions emerged with Turkey’s limited military interventions and annexations in Syria during the civil war there, and with Israel’s ongoing invasions into southern Lebanon in pursuit of Hezbollah. Russia’s invasion in Ukraine offers the template for the second, more aggressive scenario with territorial conquest as a possible outcome. Most recent studies on annexation and conquest suggest a rising trend in limited annexations, while norms against full conquest still continue to hold. 

The fall of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to fuel inter-state rivalry, despite Armenia’s persistent and increasingly vocal calls for peace with Azerbaijan. This rivalry can escalate to an Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia, or will settle into a “negative peace” defined by a no-contact and no-war standoff. The third scenario of regional integration, regional opening and institutionalized stability in the South Caucasus remains outside of President Aliyev’s remit of possible choices. His crackdown on peace activists and scholars, and suppression of civil society—the very actors which would normally drive the implementation of any peace agreement—is one of the indications that Aliyev’s rhetoric of cold peace is just hot air. Additional markers of Aliyev’s preferences for war or peace, or anything in between, is the fact that Azerbaijan’s land borders remain closed, and Baku keeps moving the target in peace negotiations, continuously generating new demands from Armenia. 

Much of the domestic discourse in Armenia and outside is dominated by geopolitical narratives, with many analysts convinced that an attack is imminent— likely after the COP 29 climate summit in Azerbaijan. This scenario, it is broadly assumed, is more likely if the Democrats lose the White House in November. Armenia’s deepening ties with the U.S. and its efforts to diversify its foreign policy and alliances have been significant, yet there is uncertainty about whether these shifts, alongside military reforms, provide sufficient deterrence for an impending war. The traditional U.S. support for the survival of small states around the world is increasingly insufficient, necessitating more diversified and multi-level security diplomacy by the Armenian state. 

External Geopolitics, Domestic “Crude” Politics of Oil, or a Mixture of Both? 

Indeed, the risks of war can be driven by external geopolitical calculations, involving Russia, Turkey and their close coordination with Azerbaijan. But this narrative obscures more than it reveals. It highlights the phenomenon of authoritarian alignment between the increasingly personalized autocracies in the Eurasian continent—a phenomenon Hal Brands described as “Fortress Eurasia”. In addition to the increased coordination by the autocrats in the Eurasian continent, the Russian invasion has also made the West rather coy to pressure smaller autocrats, like Ilham Aliyev—an effort to prevent the further entrenchment of small state autocrats in a rival big power camp. Indeed, smaller autocratic systems enjoy the benefits which the market of geopolitical competition and multiple power centers currently provide. Much like Belarus’ Lukashenko before the 2020 protests, Aliyev has been adept at playing the West against other global actors, though his resources to continue this strategy are unsustainable. 

The geopolitical lens through which many consider Aliyev’s potential decision-making, also miscalculates Aliyev’s negative agency, diluting the significance of domestic institutional drivers and incentives. Azerbaijan, under Ilham Aliyev’s long-standing rule, operates as a personalized petro-state, shaped by authoritarianism and hereditary power. What many analysts describe as Azerbaijan’s diversified foreign policy, is, in reality, an external geopolitical patronage system which Aliyev has weaved to sustain his regime amid declining oil revenues. External geopolitical calculations do matter, but the patronage system which they create inside Azerbaijan is crucial to understanding Aliyev’s decision-making trajectory and the international behavior of the Azerbaijani state.

The Dual Threats for Ilham Aliyev 

Domestic factors of regime durability are crucial for authoritarian strongmen when deciding on a warpath, and Aliyev is no exception. All political leaders—whether in authoritarian and democratic states—consider the political impact of starting a war on the durability of their regimes and governments. Even in entrenched autocracies, political survival of their regimes remains significant. Autocrats of all stripes always face the problem of dual threats; from above, through palace coups by rival elites, or from below, through mass protests or uprisings. They continuously balance keeping the elites content through an elaborate patronage system, with corruption as the primary instrument, while using blunt and soft tools to suppress the broader public. Meeting public demands through large social programs will require cutting defense spending, which can embolden elite challengers. On the other hand, cutting social spending will appease the elites but increase the risks of public protests. 

For large petro-states, like Russia, these dual threats may not necessarily pose a dilemma, as their budgets can accommodate both. However, in Azerbaijan, where oil revenues are rapidly declining and the economy remains heavily dependent on them, this dilemma is very real. This makes it challenging for Aliyev to manage the dual pressure facing autocrats—appeasing elites and suppressing the masses. The constant talk of war and heightened security environment which Aliyev maintains with his expansionist rhetoric, allows him to justify increasing military spending to his people. The increase in military expenditure not only fuels corruption, but bolsters Aliyev’s coercive power over society. Thus, the talk of war with Armenia justifies the military spending while legitimizing the growing corruption that it fuels, degrading the institutions of the Azerbaijani state in the process. 

Relying on one of the most comprehensive datasets available, Adrian Florea has shown that authoritarian regimes engaged in spatial rivalry with states become more vulnerable to coups. Such conflicts enhance the resources, organizational power, and coordination capacity of the military, which in turn empowers the armed forces, thereby increasing the risks of regime survival. Florea’s study shows that “the rivalry over territory is a robust predictor of coups against autocrats.” 

The warpath is risky for Aliyev at a time of societal repression. As evidenced by the waves of anti-government protests in the Middle East during the Arab Spring in 2011, Aliyev will ignore the public at his peril. As personalized autocracies eliminate all forms of civic groups, no matter how small, they heighten the likelihood of protests escalating into violence. Civic groups allow for peaceful management of protest activities and their absence makes unrest more volatile. And the likelihood of Aliyev using force is very high, as studies show that externally aggressive states are often willing to resort to violence at home. 

Weak Strongman 

As Azerbaijan’s authoritarianism has become increasingly personalized, opposition parties, media and the modicum of civil society, no matter how weak, have been steadily and consistently suppressed. According to the BTI Transformation Index, Azerbaijan’s indicators for Political and Social Integration in 2024 are hovering at 2.7, with “party system”, “interest groups” and “social capital” registering the lowest possible levels at 2, 2 and 3 respectively. Other countries with similar rankings on this indicator of personalized power are Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Venezuela. Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia and Uzbekistan have registered slightly higher levels on this indicator. 

This problem of “weak strongmen” with heightened personalized power results in the distortion and degradation of state institutions. In contrast to institutionalized authoritarian systems, such as military or single-party authoritarian states, Azerbaijan has become a personalized petro-state, which then shapes its behavior in international politics. For example, negotiations with such governments are less likely to produce an agreement, compared to single-party or military authoritarian states. The personalization of authoritarianism in Azerbaijan has also inhibited economic growth (due to closed borders, high corruption, oil dependence, distortion of trade routes in the South Caucasus) and weakened the bureaucracy. It is against this backdrop that Aliyev is drumming up domestic support for his militarized foreign policy, a position which the broader public may or may not support.  

In general, according to a study by Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson spanning 150 years, all political leaders who pursue a path to war expose themselves to  significant domestic political risk, threatening their regime’s survival. This risk is mitigated for authoritarian elites with long tenures in power. However, this risk increases when leaders face defeat or bear the high costs of war. These authors have also shown that democratic leaders are more likely to pursue wars with lower risk of defeat, while their authoritarian counterparts are more willing to take risks in the battlefield, pursuing conflicts with uncertain outcomes. Having denuded the institutions of the Azerbaijani state, navigating the economic costs of warfare will become particularly challenging. As of 2024, the BTI Transformation Index ranks Azerbaijan as “weak” in terms of its governance index, with its “consensus building” indicator at 3.6 out of 10, reflecting the fragile state of its political infrastructure. 

Considering the decline of oil revenues and the growing pressures on the social contract between Aliyev and his people—stability in exchange for loyalty—the warpath is quite risky for Aliyev’s political tenure. While Putin’s patronage could help offset this risk, Putin is already stretched thin, supporting other autocrats across the Middle East, Africa and Latin American. Backing Aliyev might be too costly, and even undesirable for Putin. It is reasonable to assume that Putin may prefer an unstable and domestically weak Aliyev regime, as it would enhance his own bargaining power relative to Baku, allowing Moscow to exert greater influence.

The risks of war for personalized autocracies like Aliyev’s are also high because wars can ignite internal protests and revolts. Unlike in 2020, an international war of aggression would place Aliyev on the wrong side of the very principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that he invoked when waging war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Such a war would be politically and economically costly for his regime. Even the threat of an oil embargo, can push the states that currently purchase oil from Azerbaijan, to look for alternatives. The Russian invasion in Ukraine, and the lightning speed by which Europe weaned itself from Russian gas is a dangerous precedent for Aliyev. 

Any such external shock, precipitated by war with Armenia, exposes Aliyev’s personalized autocratic system. At least one study by Frye, covering the period between 1946-2008, showed that even without the stress of war, personalized autocracies are already vulnerable to fall through “irregular means” such as coups, revolts and protests. Frye explains that 70% of rulers in personalized non-democracies lost office through irregular means, versus 47% for military dictatorships and just 19% for one-party regimes. In the words of political scientist Milan Svolik, “Autocrats who manage to die in their bed have made a notable achievement.” 

On Self-Sabotage and Taking the Bait From Russia

If Aliyev takes Putin’s bait and attacks Armenia, it would indeed pose a serious risk for Armenia’s statehood and survival. But this would also constitute pure self-sabotage for Aliyev, as such a war would be politically costly for Baku. Engaging in open aggression would isolate Azerbaijan from the global petro-industry and any territorial gains would go unrecognized by the international community—a lesson Russia is currently learning in Ukraine. With weakened domestic institutions and declining oil revenues, being dragged into Russia’s revisionist orbit is the last thing the Azerbaijani regime currently needs. Such an outcome will dilute the delicate geopolitical patronage system that Aliyev has cultivated around his regime as an external measure to accrue legitimacy at home. Aliyev has succeeded so far in playing the West against the rest, a key factor in his regime’s stability. Aliyev is no Lukashenko today, but will quickly become one should he take Putin’s bait and attack Armenia’s international borders. Such a move would reduce Aliyev’s ability to maneuver in international politics. 

If such an attack occurs, there is no guarantee that it will yield the decisive outcome seen in 2020. In fact, the likelihood of a “non-victory” for both sides is very high, judging by global patterns of armed conflict. The evolution of “non-victory” has become a clear outcome in numerous conflicts, in which military means are less effective in achieving political results than in previous decades. While Armenia will hardly be able to win a war of Azerbaijani aggression, the possibility of dragging Azerbaijan into a protracted and costly war is also significant. Such an outcome will increase the burden on Azerbaijani society, which is already showing signs of discontent over the growing budgetary demands of Aliyev’s policy of “Great Return” in Nagorno-Karabakh. Such an outcome could further strain Aliyev’s domestic support, complicating his political calculus.

Such an attack is also risky for Aliyev, especially when viewed in the context of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Many analysts in Armenia argue that the escalation of the war in the Middle East—particularly if Israel manages to drag reluctant Iran into war—could enhance Aliyev’s political fortunes in Western capitals. Some also argue that such an outcome will create a regional environment in which Aliyev might feel emboldened to make moves against Armenia’s south. However, the opposite scenario is equally plausible. Should Iran be directly entangled in a war with Israel, Azerbaijan could itself emerge as a target. 

The spillover of the war from the Middle East into the South Caucasus would elevate the power of external actors, as evidenced in the case of the wars in Syria and Yemen. Such regional instability poses significant risks for institutionally weak states like Azerbaijan. The influx of proxy actors, openings for hybrid warfare, and the flow of arms and funds into a declining petro-state could destabilize the regime in Baku. Such an outcome can also undermine the much-touted “transit routes” that Aliyev hopes will boost Azerbaijan’s geopolitical value as oil revenues dwindle. 

Turkey, too, would not benefit from the spill-over of the war in the Middle East into the South Caucasus. Its struggling economy is in desperate need of stability and comprehensive connectivity in trade and transit both with the Middle East as well as  Central Asia. Aliyev’s gamble might be a net-gain for Putin, but not for Erdogan.  

What Can Aliyev Gain From Regional Stability in the South Caucasus  

Ironically, since coming to power, Aliyev has benefitted from relative regional stability in the South Caucasus, enabling its oil and gas sector to flourish over the past two decades. While the Azerbaijani economy has become more primitive, experiencing significant de-industrialization, Aliyev’s regime stability has only strengthened. Regional stability offers Azerbaijan a way to overcome economic pressures of the post-oil period, which will require the expansion of its non-oil economy. Like any small, landlocked state, Azerbaijan’s economic needs are best served by open borders and regional trade. Stability and regional trade can offer Azerbaijan the soft landing it needs in its post-oil period, thereby giving Aliyev the best chance and opportunity for political survival.

Moreover, it is in deeply fractured regions, with a high degree of regional authoritarianism and state weakness, where external geopolitical involvement tends to be more prevalent. In such settings, autocratic leaders are more reliant on external patrons than those in more stable regions. The contrast between Yemen and Syria in the deeply fractured Middle East versus Venezuela in a regionally interconnected and stable Latin America is striking. While Syria’s Assad is heavily indebted to Putin for his political survival, Venezuela’s Maduro managed to survive on his own. Whereas Syria’s dictator had to survive a civil war to stay in power, Venezuela’s Maduro has coasted from one peaceful “election” to another. Put differently, regional stability is good for the political fortunes of personalized autocrats, while regional fracture—often worsened by interstate conflict—creates a high-risk environment for them. 

Taking Putin’s bait would be a costly miscalculation for Aliyev, especially at a time when Azerbaijan faces internal weaknesses and the Middle East is embroiled in an escalating proxy war. Instead, working towards institutionalizing regional stability and predictability in the South Caucasus is essential, though not sufficient, for a smooth transition for Azerbaijan’s post-oil economy and securing the stability of Aliyev’s regime.

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