EVN Security Report: November 2023

Regional dynamics in November demonstrated acute developments that are on track to produce unanticipated realignments, both altering Armenia’s security environment and enhancing its security and foreign policy diversification. With the Western pivot serving as the fulcrum of these developments, Armenia observed an unprecedented deepening of relations with the United States and Europe, while, at the same time, an unexpected deterioration in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations took place. While the former is hinged on the dividends accrued from the Western pivot, it is the latter that may potentially trigger expansive shifts in the region’s power configurations. The growing Russo-Azerbaijani axis, the West’s feigning of surprise at Azerbaijan’s cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Baku’s loss of credibility in Western capitals, gave way to a restructuring of Azerbaijan’s relationship with the West: it went from one of transactionalism to rhetorical antagonism. The pending realignment in the region’s power constellation indicates a Russo-Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem on one hand and an Armenia-Europe-America coalition on the other with respect to the structuration of interests and preferences in the South Caucasus. Iran’s posture remains one of selective neutrality. Considering the Russo-Azerbaijani axis’ intrinsic antagonism towards the collective West, the axis’ endeavor of neutralizing Western support for Armenia, and Turkey’s supplemental support to the axis’ desire of maintaining the region’s authoritarian orbit against Western infringement, a robust restructuration of regional interests took place after the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Russo-Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem consolidated the proxy-ization of Azerbaijan as the region’s mini-hegemon, thus empowering it to engage in strategic narcissism and attack both the United States and Europe, thus deteriorating relations with the collective West. The outcome has been two-fold: the enhancement of Western support for Armenia’s political and security diversification and Baku’s castigation of the United States and the European Union, followed by the Aliyev regime’s aggressive suppression of civil society (which it qualifies as symbolic of Western interests in Azerbaijan).  

At a Senate Appropriations hearing, Secretary Blinken noted the necessity of funding to “enable us to tackle grave humanitarian needs created by autocrats and terrorists, as well as by conflict and natural disasters in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, Armenia and other places around the world.” Qualifying the humanitarian crisis in Armenia as being an extension of autocratic behavior by Azerbaijan triggered an aggressive response from Baku, accusing the U.S. of being “anti-Azerbaijani” and responsible for the Karabakh conflict. Similarly, when EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joseph Borell, called out Azerbaijan for its egregious behavior, Baku lashed out, accusing the EU of inciting “separatism in the territory of Azerbaijan” and for “insidious militarized” reasons. This elicited a rebuke from Europe, and a clear indication that the Aliyev regime’s threats and “madman strategy” approach would no longer work. Further displaying what it qualifies as anti-Azerbaijani bias, Baku-linked media released content arguing that the United States will be supporting Armenia’s energy diversification as an alternative to Russia, that American monetary and technological assistance will be provided to Yerevan, and more so, that Washington will support the training and development of Armenia’s security structures as incentives for Yerevan to cut its relations with Russia. 

The scope of Azerbaijan’s growing insecurity with respect to Armenia’s Western pivot reached its apogee when America’s Assistant Secretary of State, James O’Brien, in no unequivocal terms, displayed America’s profound frustration with Baku, while praising official Yerevan for its “commitment” in pivoting towards the “transatlantic community.” In the case of the former, the U.S. canceled high-level visits, condemned Baku’s behavior, refused to waive Section 907 that allowed military assistance to Azerbaijan, and noted that the relationship with the Aliyev regime had been downgraded. Leaning on the language of deterrence, O’Brien also stated that not only will the use of force against Armenia produce untenable outcomes for Baku, but that sanctions now remain on the table, and “We’ve told them that there’s no chance of business as usual as long as the peace agreement goes unconcluded.” In no uncertain terms, O’Brien made clear that it is the position of the United States that Azerbaijan is not only the aggressor but also the impediment to peace, and that this continued posturing by Azerbaijan will further erode relations with the U.S, and by extension, the European Union. 

Having been accustomed to bothesidism and a general tolerance for its egregious demeanor, Baku appeared to have been completely caught off guard by America’s response, which sent shockwaves throughout the Aliyev regime, eliciting vitriol against America. Baku labeled the U.S. position as “counterproductive, baseless, and unacceptable,” blaming the U.S. for having failed as a mediator, and more acutely, qualified the U.S. as a “non-regional” actor. At the most fundamental level, what Baku has assumed was a transactional relationship with the U.S. that can be leveraged to appease U.S. frustration, has now deteriorated to one of reciprocal, yet manageable animosity. 

Seeking to engage in diplomatic brinkmanship, an attribute common to authoritarian regimes that suffer from ontological insecurity, the Aliyev regime took concrete steps against both the U.S. and the European Union. In the case of the latter, it suspended several twinning projects on law enforcement, social security, healthcare and migration, while in the case of the former, not only did it personally attack Samantha Power, but also threatened to cancel USAID projects, while at the same time clamping down on civil society and independent journalists as “U.S. spies.”       

Co-Alignment and Geographic Bandwagoning: The Process of Diversification

The new dichotomy of the U.S.-Europe-Armenia coalition and the Russo-Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem has produced geopolitical pluralism in the South Caucasus. The intersecting geostrategic, geoeconomic, and geosecurity configurations have produced a new structuration in enhancing Armenia’s security: instead of the region being under the homogenous dominance of Moscow and leaving Armenia at the mercy of negligent Russia and belligerent Azerbaijan, Armenia finds itself with alternative prospects of developing its security architecture. Borrowing from the scholarship in neoclassical realism, the confluence of the region’s re-alignment of power interests and Armenia’s posturing within this complex environment can be qualified through two concepts: diversification and geographical bandwagoning.[1] Having been reduced to a Russian satellite by Armenia’s illiberal regimes from 1998 to 2018, Armenia had neither the capacity to geographically balance nor the toolkit to diversify: everything revolved around subservience to Russia’s dependency structure. 

The new geopolitical pluralism in the region ruptured this structuration, allowing Armenia to pursue diplomatic and security relations across various partners, without being reliant on a single external actor. This is the crucial distinction between “balancing” and “bandwagoning.” To borrow from the extant scholarship, “balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain.”[2] Through diversification and geographical bandwagoning, interest-driven policy orientation replaced systemic subservience, with the objective of securing strategic dividends. Contextually, Armenia’s new foreign and security diversification policy is not defined by a “either-or” principle, but rather, an “and-and” policy, where geostrategic posturing is defined by engaging a variety of partners to advance the national interest, as opposed to being bogged down or taking sides in the clash of interests between larger powers. The objective of diversification, to this end, and the geographical bandwagoning that has been brought about by the new geopolitical pluralism in the region, is to mitigate Armenia’s external security dilemma while securing tangible assistance from a diverse range of partners. 

Within this context, Armenia’s Western pivot is strategically directional and interest-driven, as opposed to ideational. Thus, Yerevan’s policy of diversification can be better qualified within the framework of co-alignment, where simultaneous formation of strategic partnerships recalibrate Armenia’s access to tangible assistance, enhancing the “and-and” approach, while also creating the environment in which Armenia may reap strategic dividends. The fear of the Russo-Azerbaijani axis has been the extent to which this co-alignment statecraft will produce strategic dividends for Yerevan, and threatened by Armenia’s “and-and” approach, Moscow and Baku have attempted to frame Armenia’s diversification as a case of “patron shopping,” where Armenia is not really diversifying anything, but rather, seeking a new master. The endeavor of hampering, either through Azerbaijan’s use of force or Russia’s weaponization of energy and trade, Armenia’s co-alignment model is to curtail Yerevan’s diversification strategy and thus allow the Russo-Turkey-Azerbaijani tandem to exercise monopoly on interest preferences in the region. 

The co-alignment model, which serves as the conceptual framework for the diversification policy, is operationalized through the concept of “issue-splitting.” In layman terms, co-alignment is the form of statecraft which allows a small state to diversify its “providers,” thereby preventing larger power(s) from establishing a structure of dependency. Co-alignment, in turn, rests on the mechanism of issue-splitting, which is the “segmentation of the relevant issue areas” for which tangible assistance is sought into “various constituent parts.” Through this approach, each issue/policy area, and segments of such areas, become the subjects of engagement with the wide range of actors that the small state is seeking tangible assistance from. Thus, various segments of security (as one policy area) can be engaged with a range of partners; segments of energy, segments of economy, segments of technological engagement, so on and so forth, all become subjects of diverse and distinct scopes of strategic engagements with diverse and distinct sets of partners. In this context, issue-splitting allows co-alignment to qualify and support the policy of diversification.    

Developments in November, which are the continuous outcomes of the broader diversification process, offer growing empirical evidence in support of Armenia’s utilization of issue-splitting. In the domain of security, for example, various segments in defense that Armenia needs tangible assistance in has been addressed by co-aligning with France, such as access to weapons systems and military training, while at the same time “other partners in the field of defense” along with the “Armenian government is actively pursuing the diversification of their partnership.” This is evident in the engagement of the United States in the segment of defense assistance that Armenia needs within the areas of “professionalization of Armed Forces, professional sergeant staff’s strengthening, modernization of the management system, peacekeeping, military medicine, military education, and combat readiness.” This is supplemented by access to tangible assistance in training of non-commissioned officers and military science. Diversification through co-alignment is also visible in Armenia’s growing engagement with Italy in the security sector as well as the development of the Strategic Dialogue with Great Britain. The segmentation of defense needs is further co-aligned with India, from whom Armenia continues to purchase both advanced weapons systems and ammunition. Armenia’s range of needs, from hard power capabilities to technical assistance and military science, are further co-aligned with the European Union, where it is currently assessing the scope of providing “non-lethal support to Armenia under the European Peace Facility.” A corollary to the diversification process is the enhancement of Armenia’s co-alignment with Georgia, upon which Armenia is reliant for its transportation and logistical needs. Contextually, whereas in the past there was complete absence of segmentation and diversification, with the entirety of all of these issue-areas being fundamentally contingent on Russia, through co-alignment and diversification, Armenia is able to engage with over 10 partners on the various segments of its security needs, as opposed to being unidimensionally reliant on a single unreliable actor. 

Extending issue-splitting to the policy areas of energy, economy, and diplomacy, the broader diversification process remains commensurate with what has been observed within the security sector. Armenia, for the first time, established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, allowing for potential diversification in the fields of economy and energy, not to mention diplomacy and political capital in the Muslim world. Its deepening relations with Germany, in the same light, improves Armenia’s access to tangible assistance in diplomacy and economics, while the implementation of the Strategic Dialogue with the UK also offers Armenia access to “trade and economic ties.” These developments are further supported by Armenia’s nascent foray into energy diversification, as issue-splitting in this sector has seen the establishment of growing relations with South Korea. At the broader multilateral level, Armenia has observed a general increase in its international political capital, as observed in the distinct attention that it was given in the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement, as well as the overarching positivity to Armenia’s proposed “Crossroads of Peace” project.   

Conclusion

After decades of structural inertia, systemic stasis, and an unhealthy reliance on Russia’s system of dependence, Armenia’s economy, energy, foreign policy, and security sectors not only suffered from chronic underdevelopment, but also contributed to the collective deterioration of Armenia’s capabilities and potential. The strongest country of the South Caucasus in the 1990s had become the weakest within two decades. Marginalized from regional and international projects, exempt from developing its security and military capabilities, and confined to the whims and interests of a singular regional overlord, Armenia had been reduced to a (dys)functional satellite. Nonetheless, as the statecraft of co-alignment has displayed, the policies of diversification through issue-splitting, the utilization of geographic bandwagoning, and interest-driven posturing within the region’s new geopolitical pluralism, have paved a new direction for Armenia. The failures of complementarity and multi-vectorism, as foreign and security policies of the last two decades, have served as painful lessons in what happens when a state abandons agency and selects dependency over strategic autonomy. Yet as the Western pivot takes root, and as Armenia strengthens and implements its policies of diversification, a new statecraft is emerging, where co-alignment is strengthening Armenia’s new doctrine of strategic engagement.    

 Footnotes: 

[1]  See Spero, Joshua P. 2003. “Paths to Peace for NATO’s partnership in Eurasia.” In Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance, edited by James Sperling, Sean Kay and S. Victor Papacosma. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Lo, Bobo. 2002. Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking. London: Palgrave Macmillan; and Mankoff, Jeffrey. 2011. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Rowman and Littlefield.
[2]  Schweller, Randall. 1994. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security 19, no. 1: 72–107. See also, Schweller, Randall. 2004. “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing.” International Security 29, no. 2: 159–201.

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