[Beyond Borders]
This column explores the key issues shaping life in the South Caucasus, focusing on how the divergent paths of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan reflect the region’s complex histories, economic developments, and political shifts. While new generations in these countries grow more isolated from one another due to language barriers and conflicting national trajectories, the same is true for local policymakers, who are often more familiar with distant capitals than their immediate neighbors. Each nation seeks its own path, sometimes in conflict with others, while international actors often treat the region as a whole, reluctant to craft policies specific to individual states. Drawing on personal experience with the region’s revolutions, conflicts and transformations, Olesya brings you Beyond Borders—a column exploring how decisions made in one corner of the South Caucasus impact all who live there.
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Last Friday night many in Armenia and Azerbaijan stayed up late, drawn to the flicker of a live broadcast from Washington. It was a ritual heavy with hope and hesitation: the signing of agreements meant to turn the page on three decades of conflict.
For those in Yerevan or Baku, it was clear enough that these papers, signed in one of the world’s most powerful offices, were not an ending. Thirty years of enmity, two wars, tens of thousands dead and entire communities driven from their homes cannot be erased with a flourish of ink. The stains run deeper than parchment.
And yet, what unfolded was undeniably a moment, perhaps even a turning point. These two nations, born alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union and the conflict itself, now face a harder task than war: learning to live in peace. Their armies have mastered the arts of fortification and offense. But peace—real, lasting peace—is a discipline that may take as long to learn as this conflict once took to wage.
Short-term Calm
The signing marks a first step toward stability, however fragile. Along much of the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, the frontlines remain alarmingly close. Near the village of Khnatsakh, above Goris in Syunik region, opposing trenches lie so close to each other that soldiers can hear TikTok videos drifting from the other side. Skirmishes could erupt again. But for now, the aim is containment, keeping sparks from catching.
Militarily, Azerbaijan continues to hold the advantage. Its forward positions inside Armenian territory could inflict serious damage if fighting resumed. In this light, Washington’s agreements serve a practical function: removing a ready-made pretext for renewed escalation, at least for the moment.
This conditional calm matters in Armenia, where parliamentary elections loom in less than a year. If tensions ease, the country can finally turn inward, focusing on political debate without the constant threat of a new war. That space could nurture the trust needed for long-term domestic stability.
The U.S. Factor
Recent media polls with people in Yerevan and Meghri speaking in support of the announced deals suggest cautious optimism. But hope will not sustain itself. Implementation requires action, starting with selecting an international company to facilitate transit between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory.
During the ceremony, President Trump declared that his personal involvement and the White House venue were guarantees the agreements would hold. This should certainly be the case at least until his anticipated Nobel Peace Prize nomination later this year. Political self-interest might help in the short term. What’s less certain is whether Washington will fully and properly commit to managing even this single transit arrangement.
One concern is the uncertainty over who will now drive the Armenian-Azerbaijani file forward within the Trump team. While special envoy Stephen Witkoff was instrumental in bringing Azerbaijan to Washington, much of Armenia’s position was safeguarded by the leadership of the State Department, which pushed for measures like initiating the peace treaty—lifting a political “sword of Damocles” that had hung over Yerevan in talks on transportation routes. Who takes over the portfolio now will help determine whether the effort advances or stalls.
Even so, Washington’s involvement does not signal a return to long-term “curation” of the South Caucasus. U.S. interest in the region peaked during George W. Bush’s presidency, symbolized by his 2005 visit to Tbilisi, and has since waned. Since then, reluctance to take on new commitments or openly confront Russia has shaped policy for years. This same caution has driven U.S. mediation since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Moscow’s distraction from the South Caucasus, the collapse of its already fragile peacekeeping role, and the halt of weapon supplies to Armenia undermined the diplomatic efforts it had once maintained, raising fears of a full-scale Azerbaijani advance into Armenia. Trump may alter the tone, but without significant investment the fundamentals will remain unchanged.
Turkey’s Next Move
Perhaps the most significant follow-on could come from Turkey. Its normalization process with Armenia, restarted three years ago, produced agreements to open the border and begin direct trade. Until now these steps were held hostage to the Armenian-Azerbaijani track, which has just taken a fresh turn in Washington.
At present all Armenia-Turkey trade travels through third countries. This summer in my native Javakheti region of Georgia, bordering both nations, the constant rumble of trucks moving goods between them was impossible to miss—day and night, seven days a week. Direct routes could shift that flow onto Armenian-Turkish roads.
Technically everything is almost ready. In the past, Turkish diplomats admitted that the missing element was Azerbaijan’s assent. Initiation of the peace agreement has already triggered it. Several phone calls between Ankara, Baku and Yerevan have followed the Washington event.
For Armenia, opening the border would mean access to Turkish ports, expanded trade and reintegration into the region’s transit transport network after more than three decades of isolation. For Turkey, the benefits are tangible: reopening its only closed border, extending influence across the South Caucasus and injecting resources into its underdeveloped eastern provinces. In the past officials in Ankara, in their attempts to make Baku move, also noted that an open border would give Turkey more leverage over Armenia, which would be keenly aware that closure could be reinstated.
Europe’s Role
The European Union should not stand aside. Though sidelined when Armenia and Azerbaijan turned to direct talks after the 2023 collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh, Brussels remains the only Western actor with a multi-sector, structural presence in the region.
EU enlargement may be stalled, but investment in infrastructure and stability continues. In the near term, European funding could prove decisive in closing the forty-kilometer gap in southern Armenia’s railway—a stretch that may require tunneling and complex engineering. Such a project would give Brussels a seat at the table in implementing the agreements while anchoring stability for years to come. The EU should make a move, even if the main event took place not in Brussels but in Washington DC, which does not seem to favor relations with Europe very much nowadays.
