Assad’s Fall: A Wake-Up Call for Armenia to Carve Out a Place in the Region

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, after more than a decade of civil war, is a transformative moment for the Middle East. The innumerable storylines challenge the outsider’s ability to absorb new information. But our focus remains the story of Armenia.

On the face of it, the main challenge is the plight of ethnic Armenians in Syria. Bashar Assad was a dictator, but he was also widely seen as a protector of the country’s minorities. Approximately 80,000 Armenians lived there before the outbreak of civil war in 2011, over half have fled. As his regime collapsed in recent days, thousands more are endangered, fearing persecution at the hands of the victorious rebels, many of whom are Islamists with ties to Al Qaeda.   

But there are even bigger geopolitical questions on the table. The consequences will ripple outward, reshaping alliances, power dynamics, and, for some, national strategies. It applies as well for Armenia, a small country navigating a neighborhood dominated by regional heavyweights like Turkey, Russia and Iran.

The heart of the matter is this: Assad’s collapse serves as a crucial reminder—small states must think like small states. But within this limitation lies an opportunity for innovation and strategic clarity.

Small states often become pawns in the calculations of larger powers. This is an immutable truth of geopolitics. Armenia’s experience—caught between the competing interests of Turkey, Russia and Iran, dragged in their rivalry extending from Syria, Libya, the larger Middle East, the East Mediterranean, the Black Sea, all the way  to the South Caucasus, and already damaged heavily—demonstrates this clearly. Its reliance on Russia as a security guarantor has created vulnerabilities, especially as Moscow’s influence weakens under the strain of its misadventures in Ukraine. A post-Assad Syria with Iran’s growing isolation, a weakened Russia and a stronger Turkish presence could embolden Ankara’s assertiveness, not only in the Middle East but also in the South Caucasus, where its geopolitical ambitions intersect with Armenia’s precarious security. The evolving new reality presents significant risks and challenges, but also opportunities for Yerevan. The current configuration of regional power rivalries may lead to rearrangements tomorrow, but the inherent vulnerabilities of a small state remain constant.

The lesson is that small countries cannot afford delusions of grandeur or assume they can wield influence disproportionate to their size and capabilities. Instead, they must think pragmatically about how to survive, sustain a space to maneuver and thrive as small actors in a world dominated by great powers. 

Several countries provide an instructive example. By becoming hubs for regional services and mediation of regional rivalries, they found a niche that brings disproportionate value. Similarly, Armenia must focus on what it can do exceptionally well—whether in technology, cultural diplomacy, banking or trade. Thinking small does not mean thinking weak; it means leveraging unique strengths to carve out a place in the world.

Another key strategy for small states is maintaining equidistance from competing regional powers. For Armenia, this would mean balancing relations with Turkey, Iran and Russia without becoming overly reliant on any single one. The persistent existential risks to its sovereignty, physical security and outright survival urge recalibration in Armenia’s foreign policy. These risks stem from the regional power competition and recurrent shifts in the regional balance of power, often occurring at the expense of a small state, including by way of its partition or absorption. Our own stressful history is a useful guide.

Regional equidistance and a commensurate foreign policy recalibration do not require abandoning principles or values. As a democracy, Armenia already distinguishes itself in the region, offering a stark contrast to its more authoritarian neighbors. However, in geopolitics, values must be coupled with pragmatism.

The fall of Assad underscores the volatility of relying on alliances with larger, ideologically and geopolitically aligned powers. For Armenia, this is a cautionary tale about the risks of tying its fortunes too closely to a single power—in this case, Russia.

Turkey’s strengthened position following Assad’s fall highlights the urgency of recalibrating Armenia’s foreign policy. While historical grievances, particularly the Armenian Genocide, cast a long shadow over Armenian-Turkish relations, these issues should not preclude practical engagement. A stable relationship with Turkey, grounded in mutual interests, could provide Armenia with new strategic opportunities, including  for trade, connectivity, and regional integration. 

The dispute over Turkey’s non-recognition of the 1915 Ottoman genocide of the Armenians remains, but it need not be a dispute between the states. This does not mean forgetting history but rather elevating it to a higher plane. The genocide is a fact, but should not remain a constant impediment to state-to-state relations. Armenia must learn to navigate its complex neighborhood with agility, maintaining open lines of communication with all its neighbors while avoiding entanglement in their rivalries.

For Armenia, thinking small also means thinking strategically. The country has an opportunity to position itself as a bridge between competing powers. Its historical connections to the Persian world, its deep and extensive ties to Europe and to Russia, as much as its geographic proximity to Turkey make it uniquely suited to serve as a mediator and facilitator in the region.

Armenia is compelled to consistently elevate its capacities, entrench democratic and effective state and national institutions, reliable legal frameworks and independent courts, favorable trade, economic and taxation regimes, bolster quality education, enhance its physical infrastructure, support and promote its growing IT and banking sectors to become a hub for regional innovation, attracting investment from both East and West. Similarly, it could position itself as a neutral platform for dialogue between Turkey, Iran, and other regional actors. By focusing on areas where it can bring unique value, Armenia can punch above its weight without overextending itself.

None of this will be possible without internal cohesion and stability. For Armenia to succeed as a small state in a complex region, it must address its domestic challenges and political polarization. A strong, democratic Armenia is better equipped to navigate external pressures and seize opportunities.

Moreover, a cohesive society can better withstand the pressures of great-power politics. In the wake of Assad’s fall, the Middle East is likely to become even more volatile, with new power struggles emerging. Armenia must be prepared to adapt to this changing landscape, and that too requires a foundation of internal resilience.

Assad’s collapse, like the fall of other seemingly entrenched regimes, underscores the impermanence of power. For Armenia, this is both a cautionary tale and a source of hope. The lesson is clear: no regime, alliance, or geopolitical reality is permanent. Small states must adapt to survive. But they must also recognize that change creates opportunities for those who are prepared to seize them.

As Armenia looks to its future, it should draw inspiration from its history as a resilient and resourceful nation. By thinking big-while-being-small, focusing on unique strengths, and maintaining equidistance in its foreign policy, Armenia can chart a path that ensures its survival and prosperity in a turbulent world.

Also see