One Battle After Another: What I Think About the Armenian Election

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The Morning After

As most residents of Yerevan know, June 7 was not only Election Day. It was also the final day of the wine festival on Saryan Street. Of course, I had to be there. My friend Joseph, a Jordanian-Armenian who repatriated in time immemorial, was playing high-energy techno just off Saryan, near Hayk café. Another friend, Liza, who moved to Armenia from Moscow in 2022, was playing heavy drum and bass in the yard of the Martiros Saryan house-museum. A stylish couple was dancing on the balcony of their apartment to soft Latino-house music. The street was full of people—Armenians, Russians, Indians, Europeans, Americans, Arabs; people of all races and creeds, vibing to Yerevan’s rhythms. This was new cosmopolitan Yerevan at its best.

I decided not to check the election results that night because I wanted to enjoy the party and forget about politics. Earlier that day, I had given several interviews, one to a French journalist, another to a Polish political analyst. Then, together with my mom, we went to vote. She wasn’t feeling well, but insisted on going. I voted for Civil Contract. 

I’m not as “pro-Pashinyan” as people tend to think. In fact, I’m a lot more leftist than Civil Contract. I don’t like the state of labor rights in our country or the way the government handles environmental issues, to give a few examples. Several months ago, some of my friends were trying to convince me to start a Green Party together and take part in the elections. Or maybe I was trying to convince them, I’m not entirely sure. In the end, we decided that in this election it was important to support Pashinyan and Civil Contract, most of all, because of the Kremlin’s interference.

So, at night, I tried to relax and stop thinking about politics for a while. Of course, it was impossible. When a drunken artist I know wanted to talk politics in the middle of Saryan, I literally ran away (they probably won’t remember it anyway). But then my Russian immigrant friends came up and started hugging me: according to the first results, Civil Contract was winning with almost 60% of the vote. They were extremely happy, but their friend, who had come from Moscow for a few days, was sad. She was going back soon. It seemed to me that most people around me were celebrating, though maybe some were trying to drown their sorrow in wine; I can’t tell. At least everyone seemed happy at Wine Days. 

When the music stopped at Saryan, we moved to another bar, then to a park, had some drinks on a bench, and then went to yet another bar. Sometime around 2 a.m., I went home because at 10 in the morning I had to talk to a Russian emigrant news program aptly named “Breakfast Show”. Yerevan summer at its best.

The morning was a little less pleasant. I woke up early because I like to meditate and do a little yoga. As I drank tea, I looked at the results. Civil Contract’s share of the vote had fallen to about 50% after the votes in the big cities, particularly Yerevan, were counted. It was still a confident victory, but not the one I had expected. I felt my celebratory mood had been premature. Yes, we won this time, but it was a close one.

There was another reason for me to feel anxious. It turned out that a friend of mine had to go to court because they were accused of an offence they didn’t commit. In general, Armenia’s law and order system is extremely imperfect, to say the least, and anyone who ends up in its hands is in serious trouble. That’s a topic for a different conversation; maybe one day I’ll write about that case. But it felt symbolic that I learned about my friend’s troubles this morning. Their troubles seemed to rhyme with those of our country. Why couldn’t the universe just let us relax and enjoy this moment a little longer?

Bittersweet Victory

Why do I have mixed feelings about the election results? I am obviously happy: the result is a clear victory for those who want to see Armenia decolonized. It showed that most Armenians want to decide their own future rather than leave it to Moscow. In fact, 50% is a remarkable result, especially given that Civil Contract didn’t just face local oligarchs, as it has before, but the full scale of Moscow’s election-interference machine. 

Moscow treated this election as a decisive battle. Putin’s right-hand man, Sergey Kiriyenko, who now oversees Russia’s election interference operations abroad, had a personal stake in the outcome. After setbacks in Moldova and Hungary, Armenia was his chance to redeem himself. It was also a far more permissive environment for Moscow to operate in than EU member Hungary or EU-aligned Moldova, given Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the CIS.

Millions of dollars were spent. Top PR specialists were sent to Armenia. Diplomatic and economic pressure was applied. Cyberattacks were organized. Disinformation was spread. And it was all in vain: the Kremlin’s plan did not succeed. We should give our country and our people some credit for that.

But there are plenty of reasons to be concerned. This was an important victory against Moscow’s meddling, but it was far from decisive. Pro-Russian forces may have hoped for a landslide, yet their showing was hardly insignificant. The fact that more than a third of voters backed Russian-supported oligarchic forces is troubling in itself, and nowhere is that more evident than in the unexpectedly strong performance of Samvel Karapetyan’s party. 

Whatever we think of Robert Kocharyan, he is a former president, and part of his coalition includes one of Armenia’s oldest parties, the ARF-Dashnaktsutyun. But it is alarming that a party created almost from scratch by a Russian-Armenian billionaire came in second with nearly 23%. I almost feel sympathy for our local billionaire, Gagik Tsarukyan, whose result was extremely modest by comparison.

There are two possible explanations for the relatively high numbers for Karapetyan and Kocharyan. And both spell trouble. One is Russian interference and vote-buying. Before the election, there was a lot of talk about an influx of dual citizens from Russia who were expected to vote for Karapetyan. There was also substantial reporting about the distribution of electoral bribes. Although Armenian law enforcement tried to stop the bribery, it is likely that far more cases went undetected than were prevented. It is impossible to assess how many people voted under the influence of these “technologies”. One possible hint is the nearly 10% rise in turnout this year compared with 2018 and 2021. Those were snap elections held amid post-revolution euphoria (2018) and a post-war crisis (2021), and the main contenders were more or less the same (Pashinyan vs. the pre-revolutionary elites), so it is unclear where this year’s 10% increase came from.

If this hypothesis is true, it would mean that Russia was able to influence the outcome of the Armenian election. It would also suggest that, had it spent much more money, the result could have been even more favorable to Moscow. In other words, Moscow’s mistake was not spending enough; next time, it could simply allocate larger budgets for election bribery and ensure stronger oversight so the money is not stolen. 

It would also mean that Armenian state bodies responsible for protecting our security and independence have been ineffective in responding to Russian electoral meddling, either due to a lack of professionalism or because the threat was too large. In either case, much work is needed to prevent this from happening again.

However, if we assume that “electoral tourism” and vote buying did not play a major role, the picture remains grim, perhaps even grimmer. It would mean that about one-third of Armenian voters are either unaware of the threat to sovereignty and democracy posed by Moscow, or simply do not care. Some may not know much about politics or be aware of geopolitical trends. For others, the trauma of war and the loss of part of our homeland may be so strong that they are easily swayed by emotion. Finally, some may actually prefer to live under an authoritarian regime that would turn Armenia into a vassal state of Russia. That is the scariest possibility.

What Happens Next?

Whatever the causes, we have ended up with a parliament in which a third is controlled by Putin. The Kremlin will have significant leverage over Armenian politics. By law, MPs have access to state secrets. Pro-Russian forces are likely to try to sabotage both the peace agenda and the foreign policy diversification agenda. New Kremlin-sponsored protest movements are highly likely, and we cannot rule out new coup d’etat attempts.

Still, we could try to find the silver lining. The relatively strong showing of pro-Russian forces will allow Putin to save face and claim a partial victory in Armenia, which could create space for de-escalation and dialogue. After all, the Kremlin can still claim that it has significant influence in Armenia. Perhaps passions will cool, and a new balance will emerge in Armenian-Russian relations.

However, given the close results of the election, it is likely that the Kremlin will continue its attempts to subdue Armenia.

Another worrying fact is that a large part of Armenian society will not be represented in the parliament at all. Voters who want Armenia to be a sovereign democratic country but have issues with Pashinyan will not have anyone to represent them. Civil Contract has no democratic opposition in parliament, which could negatively influence the lawmaking process. Most likely, we will see a continuation of the current situation, in which Pashinyan and Kocharyan supporters shout at each other, and when it is time to discuss specific laws, opposition MPs are often simply absent from the room. Worse, this dynamic will further alienate a large share of Armenian voters from the political system in general. These voters may either fall into apathy or become easy prey for populists and extremists.

In the coming five years we may see a rise in far-right populism in Armenia. It can center on either one of the pro-Russian parties in parliament or on some new ones. As world history shows, a country that has suffered a military defeat is especially vulnerable to a rise of the extreme right. So far, Armenia has endured the trauma of war without succumbing to fascism. But it’s worth remembering that, at some point in the 1920s, it seemed Weimar Germany had overcome the consequences of World War I and was moving forward. Then came the Great Depression, and then came the Nazis, who rose to power by harnessing German ressentiment and promising retribution. We remember what happened to Germany as a result. I truly hope this story does not repeat itself in Armenia, but we all need to work hard to prevent it.

First, this is directed at the winner, Civil Contract. Once celebrations are over, it will need to draw some hard lessons from this election. Pashinyan needs to learn to share responsibility with the rest of the team. I was a member of the My Step faction; I personally know many members of Civil Contract, and many of them are talented politicians. I also know the party has a strong culture of internal democracy—stronger, at least, than that of most other Armenian parties. Disagreements, debates, and sometimes quarrels were part of our routine when I was in My Step, and I am sure it is still the case within Civil Contract. But Civil Contract needs to open up a bit more and show citizens that differing opinions exist within the party, and that this is OK. Pashinyan also needs to move away from the toxic language he often uses when speaking about the opposition. In particular, he needs to be more careful and sensitive when addressing refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh. Civil Contract also needs to recognize that the state system remains inefficient and often repressive. Yes, there have been significant changes, but dealing with the state system is often a source of stress and disappointment, and people don’t differentiate between the political force, the government, and specific state institutions.

Then there are the small parties. Of course, they were at a disadvantage. It is hard to compete for voters’ attention when facing an incumbent prime minister, a former president, one of Russia’s richest people, and a guy who owns lions. Still, it is remarkable that none of the smaller parties managed to clear the 4% threshold, which, let’s be honest, is not a high bar by international standards. Leaders of these parties often complain about Pashinyan’s supposed “authoritarian streak,” yet behave like absolute monarchs within their own parties. Not to mention that they are often unable to negotiate coalitions with parties whose programs are extremely similar. Many of these people have been in politics for 10 years or more. Some would say it is too late for them to learn. As a believer in human progress, I think they can change and learn to put their egos aside to form viable political forces. But if they cannot, then new ones will emerge.

And then there are the rest of us, those who, in this election, were either voters or bystanders. If we want change, we have to do something to bring it about. Maybe it’s as simple as joining a party or donating to an NGO. But getting depressed over election results and arguing with strangers on Facebook isn’t enough.

I personally believe it’s time to build a left-wing political force. Others may see the need for different political projects. Some may choose not to join a party at all, and instead get involved in NGOs, trade unions, reading groups, or maybe even anarchist fight clubs (now that I think about it, I’d probably prefer that).

And if you don’t have the time or desire to do any of these things, you can simply donate to a cause you think is worth defending. But we all need to do something. Otherwise, in five years we’ll be disappointed, and we’ll have nobody to blame but ourselves.

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