Armenia’s Next Democratic Challenge: Building a Credible Opposition

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Democratic elections are often framed in terms of winners and losers. Yet a democracy’s long-term health may depend just as much on the quality of those who lose. Armenia’s recent elections have once again raised a broader democratic question: what role can political opposition play when it is fragmented, unpopular, or unable to seriously challenge those in power?

Public debate often dwells on the weakness of opposition actors, but far less attention is given to the broader democratic functions opposition serves. Drawing on research on democratic accountability and political competition, this article uses Armenia’s 2026 elections as a point of departure to examine why effective opposition remains essential for democratic governance, even when voters are dissatisfied with the alternatives available.

Since independence in 1991, the Armenian public experienced a very specific form of political opposition that persisted until 2017. Under the presidential system, parliament was largely dominated by a party supporting the incumbent president, while other parties and factions with seats generally followed the same political trajectory and were often politically or economically tied to the ruling force. The focus was less on building a healthy parliamentary system than on consolidating power. As a result, the “opposition”—political forces critical of the regime—remained outside parliament. Between election cycles, their main role was either to criticize the government and the president or, occasionally, to hold demonstrations in response to election results, most notably in 2008 following Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s presidential bid and in 2013 after Raffi Hovhannisian’s challenge to the incumbent authorities.

In the 2017 parliamentary elections, the Way Out Alliance, comprising Civil Contract, Bright Armenia, and the Hanrapetutyun Party, secured nine seats, marking the emergence of a new type of opposition in the National Assembly. While the 2018 snap parliamentary elections following the Velvet Revolution brought a diverse group of parties into parliament, the 2021 snap parliamentary elections resulted in Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party retaining a majority and bringing the Armenia Alliance and the I Have Honor Alliance into parliament, both representing previous regimes. The Armenian public then witnessed parliament sessions devolve into heated debates with shouting and personal offences, while the incumbent party could still make decisions unilaterally, partly due to the 2015 constitution. The 2026 election results threaten a similar outcome. 

What differed in this election cycle, however, was that several parties themselves highlighted the importance of opposition-building, including the Hanrapetutyun Party’s Aram Sargsyan, For the Republic Party’s Arman Babajanyan, and Meritocratic Party’s Gurgen Simonyan. The Armenian public has also gradually begun to understand and discuss the importance of an opposition capable of gaining public trust and serving as a constructive counterweight to the ruling party, both inside and outside parliament. This shift reflects a broader change in political expectations. Until recently, Armenians primarily judged those in power. They are now beginning to evaluate the quality of the opposition itself.

Armenia’s challenges with opposition-building also stem from broader structural factors. Like many countries in the wider post-Soviet region, Armenia has undergone a complex, multifaceted transition since the early 1990s. One major process that is still unfolding is state rebuilding, as countries have sought to restore whatever features of statehood they had before Sovietization while leaving the Soviet legacy behind. 

Unlike countries in the West, former Soviet republics and socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe did not have the luxury of moving gradually through different stages of political and institutional development. State-building, constitution-making and nation-building unfolded simultaneously, as newly independent countries sought to establish functioning political systems, redefine national identities and manage the demands of day-to-day governance. Understanding this context is essential to explaining the challenges of opposition-building across the wider region.

At the same time, the political consciousness of the Armenian public has evolved dramatically since the 1990s. It has been shaped by experiences ranging from the peaceful democratic mobilization of 2018 to profound national traumas such as the 44-Day War and the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Artsakh. As a result, Armenian society is increasingly prepared to engage with a question that received far less attention in the past: how to build a credible and effective political opposition.

It is also important to note that challenges in building a viable opposition are not limited to Armenia and other post-Soviet countries. In bipartisan systems, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, the opposition’s role is relatively straightforward. However, in many multiparty systems across the world, opposition parties have faced similar struggles. One widely recognized challenge to democratic consolidation in transitional contexts is the absence of effective opposition parties capable of countering the dominance of incumbent regimes. This is partly because both opposition parties and the publics they seek to represent often fail to understand their added value or the functions they can, and should, strive to implement. While each democratic system is unique, these functions can be adapted to meet specific political needs.

Parliamentary opposition has certain policy-making powers that can be divided into three main groups. The first includes functions related to bill introduction and agenda setting, which allow the opposition to influence which legal acts are brought for discussion and the direction the state takes. The second group falls under debate powers, including the ability to propose amendments to legislation and contribute to the formation of committees and their procedures. The influence of political opposition does not end with debate. Once a law reaches the adoption stage, its fate often depends on a wider set of institutions and actors with the power to approve, block, or challenge political decisions. As a result, the opposition’s ability to shape policy depends not only on its representation in parliament, but also on the broader institutional framework and the checks and balances available within the political system. This overview of the parliamentary opposition’s policy-making powers reminds voters that, going into elections, they should consider which political actors can exercise these functions constructively and effectively. However, the importance of parliamentary opposition extends beyond its formal influence on legislation. Its broader democratic value lies in its ability to scrutinize power, ensure accountability, represent alternative viewpoints, and contribute to public debate.

Parliamentary opposition is an essential component of democratic governance, not primarily because it can defeat governments or determine policy outcomes, but because it helps keep power accountable. A healthy democracy requires more than competitive elections; it also needs institutions and actors capable of scrutinizing those in power between elections. Opposition parties perform this function by questioning government decisions, exposing mistakes, demanding transparency, and ensuring that alternative perspectives remain part of public debate.

Importantly, the value of the opposition should not be measured solely by its ability to replace a government. The opposition also performs a representative function by giving voice to citizens whose interests, concerns, or political preferences are not reflected in the governing majority. In doing so, it sustains political pluralism and prevents democratic politics from being dominated by a single narrative or political force.

Parliamentary opposition also contributes to better decision-making. By challenging proposals, identifying weaknesses, and presenting alternative solutions, opposition parties can improve public policy even when they lack the votes to block legislation. In this sense, the opposition is not merely an obstacle to governance; it can be an important source of policy learning and institutional correction.

Moreover, opposition forces don’t always operate through confrontation. In many democratic systems, the opposition works with governing parties on issues of national importance, contribute to legislative deliberations, and help build broader political consensus. Effective opposition therefore balances criticism with responsibility, challenging governments when necessary while contributing constructively to democratic governance.

Ultimately, opposition safeguards against the concentration of power. Governments need the capacity to govern, but democracies also need mechanisms that keep governments open to scrutiny, criticism and alternative viewpoints. Without a credible opposition, democratic institutions risk becoming less responsive, less accountable, and less representative of the diversity of views within society.

Now that the results of Armenia’s 2026 elections have been finalized, the Armenian public and opposition parties, including those that did not win seats in the National Assembly, should consider a key question: How can opposition parties become viable alternatives under dominant-party rule? 

Opposition parties should begin educating the public on what constructive opposition can contribute to parliament, as well as on a broader vision of state- and democracy-building. This is not an easy task, but the process of opposition-building should begin now with the goal of making measurable progress before the next election cycle. 

As psychologists note, the first important step in tackling a problem is recognizing that it exists. The Armenian public and political parties have finally recognized that for democracy to function, building an opposition must also be a priority. With this realization, another level of state-building is unlocked.

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