Why Aliyev Agreed to the American Proposal: Azerbaijan and the Washington Accords

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While the Washington Accords have been hailed as a diplomatic success story in an otherwise fractured region, and as the international community has collectively voiced support for the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the usual caveat of Russia and Armenia’s pro-Russia opposition, the discourse in Armenia has revolved around three general trends. First, for those who have sought peace and collective de-escalation of tensions, the Accords were a welcome development, yet one that seemed too good to be true, considering Baku’s propensity for conflict-persistence and stochastic belligerence. Second, a healthy portion of society found the contours of the Accords to be positive and potentially beneficial for Armenia, yet skepticism toward its success, fused with a general sense of incomplete information as to what the Accords constitute, defined their conceptualization of developments. And third, a categorical opposition to the Accords as some form of a backdoor deal designed to dismantle Armenia’s sovereignty and ensnare the country into becoming a geopolitical battleground for Western interests.

Trends in the Armenian Discourse on the Accords

The first trend defines the position of the Government’s supporters, who qualify absence of conflict as an iteration of tenable peace and prioritize the normalization process as being crucial to Armenia’s long-term economic, security and geopolitical viability. This portion of society views peace as a process and not a one-off agreement, and based on that postulate, deems the Washington Accords as being a crucial cornerstone of Armenia’s new security architecture and Yerevan’s active engagement in the international system as well as its integration into the Transatlantic system. 

The second trend defines the robust chunk of society comprised of the so-called “undecideds,” whose support for the Government is fluid, where the logic of the lesser-of-the-two-evils characterizes their approach to political developments, and who fuse healthy skepticism with a certain intrinsic hope for a positive outcome. This portion of society struggles to sufficiently comprehend the complexities of the Accords due to lack of adequate information, being caught between the overt positive messaging of the Government and the doom-and-gloom vitriols of the pro-Russia opposition. While selectively apathetic, with a general aversion to the polarized discourse in the country’s political space, this group nonetheless consistently gives the Government the benefit of the doubt, utilizing the lesser-of-the-two-evils logic as the most tenable framework when gauging political outcomes. In this context, this grouping, beyond their legitimate grievances and lingering concerns, view the Velvet Government preferable to the previous regime, the West/U.S. preferable to Russia, and peace and normalization preferable to managed conflict and persistent instability. This section of Armenian society remains the most rational and level-headed, yet at the same time, the least informed, in relative terms.    

The third trend of thinking is propagated by a relatively marginal chunk of the political space occupied by Armenia’s illiberal opposition, whose pro-Russia, anti-West, and generally conspiratorial thinking, informs the discourse on the Accords. This grouping, composed of leaders and selective supporters of the previous regimes, consider the Washington Accords as antithetical to Armenia’s interests, as they further consolidate Russia’s regional marginalization, while further detaching Armenia from Russia’s orbit. More to the point, while the base of supporters for this faction remains mercurial, it relies more on its well-established media outlets, Diaspora connections, and expansive funding to advance counter-narratives.  

In the totality of the three broad trends that are shaping the discourse in Armenia on the Washington Accords, one thematic question, however, appears to consistently cut across all three trends, which, in essence, has become the proverbial elephant in the room: Why did Ilham Aliyev agree to sign the Accords? Substantively, regardless of the diverging, uncertain, or antagonistic positions of either of these groupings, the question at hand remains a crucial one that all want an answer to, yet none have been able to cogently develop. Thus, this month’s security report will empirically address the following question: Why did Aliyev, whose aversion to peace, penchant for conflict-persistence and aggression, and an immense power capacity in relative terms, agree to a normalization process that diminishes his position of maximalist power-posturing?

Understanding Why Aliyev Signed

Three explanatory frameworks, observed and culled from the U.S.-led negotiation process, provide precise answers: first, the paradigm shift in U.S. negotiation strategy; second, the change in the incentive structure used by Washington; and third, Aliyev’s strategic endeavor of establishing relations with the Trump White House.

The Trump Administration’s negotiation strategy with Azerbaijan in making the Washington Accords a reality was an extraordinary shift from the methods used by the Biden Administration, and in this context, Baku’s toolkit of obstructing or prolonging such processes proved to be operationally untenable. The Blinken State Department’s method of engagement with Baku was defined by “positive reinforcement,” where Washington would persuade, nudge, or offer incentives that would “positively” encourage Baku to comply with U.S. proposals. It was a model of heavy carrots with almost no sticks, with sticks only being reserved if Azerbaijan violated America’s red lines, which, in essence, was one: the invasion of Armenia. Beyond that, the use of punitive measures by the U.S. to cajole Aliyev into agreeing to a normalization process, or to altering his belligerent behavior, was absent. 

As such, from Baku’s lens, as long as they were able to frolic around America’s red lines, they could engage in performative or bad-faith negotiations, and thus prolong and exhaust the negotiation process. This is why Aliyev consistently came up with artificial obstacles, unconstructive demands, and untenable preconditions: all of these were designed to disrupt the negotiation process, yet offer him flexibility in utilizing coercive and kinetic diplomacy against Armenia. The Trump Administration’s approach was the opposite: they viewed escalation as a constructive tool of negotiation, and as such, whereas the Biden Administration had an aversion to escalation, the Trump team found it as efficacious. Thus, the use of sticks was prioritized over carrots, where a set of conditions and deadlines were placed in front of the given party, and if America’s demands were not met, a set of consequences were clearly communicated. Within this negotiation strategy, Aliyev’s toolkit of performative or bad-faith negotiating hit a wall: there was only so much dancing he could do before being called out on it.     

What were the consequences that the U.S. communicated to Aliyev if he did not agree to the Accords? These were two fold. First, Baku was informed that agreeing to the Accords was not simply about Armenia, but rather, American strategic interests, and as such, not only could Aliyev no longer scapegoat Armenia in refusing to agree, but to the point, not agreeing would be detrimental to American interests. In this context, the U.S. changed the negotiation paradigm: it was not simply about Azerbaijan and Armenia, but rather, it was between the U.S. and Azerbaijan. Within this new model of engagement, Aliyev had to decide whether he was ready to harm American interests and deal with the consequences, or agree to the U.S. proposal. Quite interestingly, by de-Armenianizing the negotiation model within this specific area, the U.S. was able to make the negotiation process bilateral (U.S. and Azerbaijan), and not multilateral, taking away from Aliyev the ability to scapegoat Armenia as a mechanism of prolonging or obstructing the process. Second, the U.S. communicated to Aliyev that rejecting the proposal would mean Washington enhancing and deepening relations with Yerevan, while leaving Baku entirely out of the process. Specifically, the U.S. would proceed with the infrastructure and the economic development model bilaterally with Armenia, thus marginalizing Azerbaijan, and to Aliyev’s horror, isolating him from regional developments. Simply put, the U.S. reconfigured Aliyev’s preference model: get left out of U.S.-led regional developments, or be integrated and involved.

The second explanatory framework is specific to the change in the incentive structure used by the U.S. As noted, the Biden Administration used a positive reinforcement model to incentivize change in behavior. The Trump Administration turned that approach on its head: Aliyev was free to not agree to the U.S. proposal, however, should he not, the U.S. would proceed in supporting, strengthening, and enhancing Armenia’s security and deterrence capabilities. In this domain, Aliyev was inversely incentivized to acquiesce to the U.S. proposal: either he agrees and receives the carrots offered by the U.S., or he disagrees and observes the U.S. help Armenia re-establish the regional balance of power. Substantively, the alteration in the incentive structure was a shock to Baku: either they agree to the Accords, or face a rupture of the power disparity that they had spent billions and decades in establishing. Considering the fact that Aliyev’s greatest geopolitical fear is Armenia closing the power gap, the stick that the U.S. was tacitly using was precisely this: either you come along, or we help Armenia close the power gap. 

Agreeing to the Accords, in this context, allowed Aliyev to exercise agency in the process, where his “constructive” participation would not only allow him to receive the carrots offered by the U.S., but also indirectly mitigate what could have been a lop-sided assistance and long-term support package to Armenia. From America’s perspective, by incentivizing Aliyev into being constructive, he was disincentivized from preferring an unconstructive approach, for within the domain of risk-loss analysis, Aliyev would stand to lose a lot more by refusing the American proposal when compared to what he can gain by agreeing.

The third explanatory factor centers on the extensive efforts the Aliyev regime undertook after Trump’s election to establish relations with the new Administration, only to consistently fall on deaf ears. With respect to utilizing political capital, Baku even petitioned Israel’s Prime Minister to use his office and close relations with Trump to open a window of opportunity, only to fail in this endeavor. Further, Azerbaijan hired four lobbying firms in DC from January 2025 to establish some form of access to the Trump White House, an endeavor which, again, failed to achieve its objectives. As such, between utilizing whatever political and diplomatic capital it had, while also expanding extensive financial resources in DC to buy access, Aliyev was at his wit’s end in trying to find some avenue into the Trump Administration. More to the point, considering the erosion in U.S.-Azerbaijan relations during the final year of the Biden Administration, Aliyev had hedged his bets on Trump’s election, and within this context, the entirety of Aliyev’s strategy of improving relations with the U.S. was hinged on establishing access with the new Administration. 

Put simply, gaining access to the White House was a strategic objective for Aliyev. After repeated failures of his regime to achieve it, the Washington Accords offered Aliyev an extraordinary opportunity. Thus, being at the White House, building a relationship with Trump, and signing the Accords at the Oval Office were less about Armenia or the normalization process, but from his broader strategic vision, more about re-establishing relations with the U.S. The third explanatory factor, to this end, offers an extra layer of clarification as to why Aliyev agreed to the Washington Accords: from his perspective, this was the opportunity to collect on the bet he had hedged on in seeking to improve relations with the U.S. Furthermore, Aliyev quickly understood that rejecting the U.S. proposal would exponentially diminish, even destroy, his chances of establishing any relationship with the Trump White House, and for this reason, it was a vital strategic opportunity that he could not pass up on. 

Conclusion

There should be no illusions as to why Aliyev agreed to sign the Washington Accords and acquiesce to the U.S.-proposed normalization process: not because he wants to establish peace, but rather, not to be marginalized and isolated from U.S. engagement in the region. If some iteration of peace is the price that Aliyev has to pay to gain favor with the U.S., it is still a net positive for him in the domain of gains, for the alternative placed Baku in an untenable position. 

When understood through this broader conceptual framework, it becomes quite clear that whether Aliyev wants peace or not is a secondary question. Rather, it is the implicit understanding that the contours of the region’s dynamics have changed with the entry of the U.S. as the dominant regional actor. As such, Aliyev agreeing to the Accords was an act of strategic adaptability, and not some newfound penchant for peace and stability. He understood the paradigm shift, and grasping the losses he would accrue if he stuck with his maximalist posturing, he demonstrated flexibility and compromise. That he continues to use the rhetoric that he does, or the extent to which he tries to goad Armenia into the logic of intractable conflict, do not change the facts on the ground: the dynamics on the use of force have been changed and Aliyev has acquiesced to this. Does this mean peace has been achieved? It depends on how we qualify the term.

In the scholarship on peace studies, there are two comprehensive theories of peace: negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace, in general, is defined as a state of affairs where there is absence of war and lack of internecine violence. Positive peace, on the other hand, is more expansive, where the very structures and cultures of violence between the societies are overcome, with a process of integration of the two societies entailing peace education, cooperation, and dispute resolution. 

When Armenia talks about peace, it is talking about negative peace, not positive peace, that is, peace on the ground and absence of war or violence. Armenia is not talking about positive peace because it understands that positive peace is a process and one that is too far away, if attainable at all. Thus, the change in the dynamics on the use of force, where Armenia went from the constant threat of being attacked to a state of affairs where use of violence is heavily mitigated, defines Armenia’s understanding of peace. 

For Aliyev, positive peace is not really an honest subject of conversation, while negative peace is a manageable concession he had to make to position himself in the domain of gains with respect to the U.S. presence in the region. When triangulating the entirety of the content at hand, it becomes quite evident why Aliyev signed the Washington Accords: he was sacrificing his maximalist posturing to adapt to the restructuring of the region’s power configuration. And if this sacrifice entails a state of negative peace with Armenia, he is willing to tolerate it considering the gains, from his perspective, he stands to accrue by engaging and improving relations with the United States.   

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