EU-Armenia Relations at a Crossroads: Between Normative Values and Pragmatism

Listen to the article. 

Armenia has recently demonstrated a strategic interest in deepening its relationship with the European Union, viewing it as a crucial partner for democratic consolidation, security diversification, and economic development. This drive has been shaped by shifting geopolitical dynamics and growing disillusionment with traditional security alliances, particularly Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In response, the EU has progressively stepped up its engagement—most notably by deploying a civilian monitoring mission (EUMA), after Russia failed to fulfill its security commitments and the CSTO remained inactive during Azerbaijan’s military offensives. The EU later approved non-lethal security assistance to Armenia through the European Peace Facility (EPF), marking a breakthrough in defense cooperation with a partner still formally aligned with the CSTO.

In 2024, negotiations began on a new EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda to replace the 2018 Partnership Priorities under the CEPA framework. While Armenia has not formally applied for EU membership, two developments have laid the groundwork for Armenia’s EU membership aspirations: Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s 2023 address to the European Parliament and the National Assembly’s 2024 bill. The EU’s launch of a visa liberalization dialogue has further signaled a shift toward a more strategic partnership.

The South Caucasus is a region of strategic importance for the EU, and Armenia has emerged as a key partner in this complex neighborhood. As the only country in the region currently pursuing democratic reform while facing external security threats, hybrid pressure, and structural economic dependencies, Armenia presents both a challenge and an opportunity for EU foreign policy. EU engagement with Armenia must navigate the delicate balance between promoting democratic values and addressing urgent geopolitical realities, especially amid regional instability and conflict. The EU’s energy and economic partnerships with Azerbaijan—particularly in gas and connectivity—limit its political and security support for Armenia. The suspension of Georgia’s EU candidacy and the downgrading of EU–Georgia relations further shape the broader regional context of EU–Armenia cooperation. Moreover, growing Euro-Atlantic divisions—particularly between the EU and the U.S.—threaten to undermine the coherence of collective Western support for Armenia.

This article addresses two core questions: To what extent does the European Union balance its normative commitments—democracy, human rights and the rule of law—with its geopolitical and energy interests in its policy toward Armenia? How should Armenia’s evolving foreign policy be interpreted through the lens of small state behavior—does it reflect a pivot, hedging or multi-alignment strategy in response to shifting regional power dynamics?

Historical Background of Armenia-EU Partnership 

Since gaining independence, Armenia has pursued a foreign policy aimed at balancing relations between Russia and the West. Under its first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan,  structural constraints and geopolitical pressures complicated attempts at strategic equilibrium. His successor, Robert Kocharyan, formally adopted a  “complementarity” doctrine, but Armenia’s dependency on Russia deepened into strategic bandwagoning during his presidency. Though President Serzh Sargsyan rebranded this approach as a “multi-vector policy,” it remained focused on hedging against Russia and ultimately returned to bandwagoning.

A pivotal moment came in the early 2010s when Armenia intended to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union. After five years of negotiations, President Sargsyan abruptly reversed course in September 2013, announcing Armenia’s decision to join the Russia-led Customs Union during a joint press conference with President Putin in Moscow. This move derailed the Association Agreement, as EU frameworks were incompatible with Russian-led regional structures. The decision was made without parliamentary debate, referendum, or consultation with Armenia’s National Security Council. The policy U-turn was publicly justified as a security-driven necessity to prevent renewed war over Nagorno-Karabakh. This strategic alignment with Russia was not the result of a coherent long-term vision but rather a constrained choice, shaped by systemic pressure and Armenia’s growing sense of insecurity following the 2008 war in Georgia and the stalemate in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In 2017, Armenia redefined its relationship with the EU by signing the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), a downgraded alternative that excluded security and free trade provisions. Nonetheless, it established a foundation for institutional and normative cooperation.

EU Mediation Efforts and Failure in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

After the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the EU stepped in to fill the mediation void left by the OSCE Minsk Group. The Minsk Group had lost effectiveness due to Azerbaijan’s rejection of its legitimacy, Russia’s strained relations with the U.S. and France, and Russia’s diminished credibility as Armenia’s security partner. From 2021 onward, the EU facilitated multiple high-level negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including summits mediated by European Council President Charles Michel, which gained momentum in 2022 and 2023.

The EU prioritized territorial integrity for both Azerbaijan and Armenia as a cornerstone of its diplomatic approach—addressing both the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Azerbaijan’s occupation of Armenia’s border areas—particularly given Russia’s war in Ukraine. This normative stance aligned with Armenia’s unambiguous recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity during EU-facilitated talks at the 2022 Prague summit, later reaffirmed in Brussels in 2023. 

Despite the EU’s genuine commitment to peace, its efforts failed to prevent Azerbaijan’s coercive actions and to protect the security and rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. While engaging with the EU platform, Azerbaijan rejected any international presence and denied self-governance rights for its Armenian population. It simultaneously imposed a blockade, increasingly restricted humanitarian access, and ultimately launched a military offensive in September 2023. Although the EU had warned against the unacceptability of ethnic cleansing, its reliance on soft diplomacy and reluctance to confront Baku limited its capacity to deter the mass forced displacement of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. 

The EU Council refrained from issuing a condemnation statement, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borell, issued a statement on EU’s behalf. The EU did not impose restricting measures in relation to its energy and communications deals with Azerbaijan. It was influenced by the lack of consensus among states that were dependent on gas and oil from Azerbaijan and had other common interests with the country. 

This outcome exposed the structural limitations of the liberal peacebuilding model that prioritizes dialogue and incentives over deterrence and enforcement. The EU’s failure to apply effective pressure highlighted the fragility of its normative approach when confronted with hard power, setting a dangerous precedent that territorial conquest and ethnic cleansing can go unpunished—one with potential implications for other conflict zones such as Gaza and Kosovo.

The EU’s Support for Armenia’s Sovereignty: EUMA as a Soft Security Deterrent

The European Union has adopted a more assertive and responsive policy in the South Caucasus by deploying the EUMA––a move that marked a significant shift in regional engagement. The EU formalized this decision in January 2023 under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework. This followed a temporary observation mission that operated from October to December 2022, staffed by personnel from the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia. The EUMA’s establishment stands as one of the fastest deployments in CSDP history.

EUMA’s deployment came after Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive against Armenia in September 2022. The attack resulted in over 200 casualties within two days and led to Azerbaijan’s occupation of border territories in three Armenian regions. The offensive included the shelling of civilian infrastructure in Jermuk and documented war crimes—including the extrajudicial killing and mutilation of Armenian soldiers, including servicewomen.

Despite Armenia’s membership in the CSTO and its bilateral alliance with Russia, neither the CSTO nor Moscow acknowledged the breach of Armenia’s territorial integrity or offered meaningful support. After an extraordinary session of the CSTO Collective Security Council in mid-September 2022, the organization dispatched a fact-finding mission led by Colonel General Anatoly Sidorov and developed proposals on de-escalation. However, this belated move was widely viewed as an attempt to forestall EU involvement. Yerevan rejected the offer and instead welcomed the EU’s civilian mission, signaling a strategic shift away from dependence on Russian-led security structures.

EUMA’s mandate includes contributing to stability in Armenia’s border areas, supporting the delimitation and demarcation process, and promoting confidence-building between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although the mission was designed to be present on both sides of the border, Azerbaijan has consistently rejected any international presence on its territory, citing sovereignty arguments––a common stance among authoritarian regimes seeking to avoid oversight. Despite these objections, Baku had no decision-making authority over EUMA’s deployment, as the mission was invited and hosted solely on Armenian sovereign territory under the CSDP framework.

While EUMA lacks enforcement powers, it has effectively patrolled border areas, monitoring ceasefire violations, and providing credible reporting that counters Azerbaijani disinformation campaigns. The mission’s visible presence has served as a soft deterrent against escalations. Significantly, the only major post-deployment escalation occurred in March 2024 in the village of Nerkin Hand—an area then under Russian oversight rather than EUMA—which highlights the mission’s stabilizing influence. EUMA has strengthened human security by engaging with local communities and has gained widespread popular support. It has also kept international attention focused on the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, reinforcing the EU’s broader geopolitical engagement.

The EU’s civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA) has not only contributed to Armenia’s border stability and human security, but has also served a broader preventive function—helping to deter the outbreak of a new regional conflict that would further burden the EU amid ongoing crises in Ukraine, the Balkans and the Middle East. By maintaining a stabilizing presence on the ground, the mission has supported the EU’s interest in preserving regional calm and avoiding disruptions that could jeopardize its energy cooperation with Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijani and Russian Information Warfare Against EUMA

After its deployment, EUMA became the target of a coordinated disinformation campaign by Azerbaijan and Russia. Both Baku and Moscow frame the mission as Western interference, questioning its legitimacy and neutrality. 

Azerbaijani officials, state-affiliated experts, and media portrayed the civilian, unarmed EU mission as an instrument of “espionage,” “reconnaissance,” and “undercover” NATO operations. Azerbaijani officials and diplomats claimed that EUMA was serving as a cover for Armenia’s “preparations for war,” thus undermining regional stability. In a further show of resistance to multilateral oversight, Azerbaijani border services surveilled EUMA patrols—an unprecedented contestation to international monitoring mechanisms.

Russian officials echoed these claims by describing the mission as provocative, destabilizing, and unauthorized, citing Azerbaijan’s objections—despite the mission operating exclusively on Armenian territory and requiring no consent from Baku. Russia has explicitly stated that the mission conflicts with its strategic interests in the South Caucasus. 

These narratives are part of a broader cognitive warfare strategy aimed at undermining EU involvement and deterring Armenia’s deepening EU ties, while Russian narratives specifically seek to erode public confidence in the EU’s role in Armenia. 

As part of the draft peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, since 2024, Baku has demanded the withdrawal of EUMA, citing an article requiring both parties to refrain from hosting third-country forces along the border. Azerbaijan has falsely framed the CSDP civilian observation mission as a force, reflecting its intent for further potential escalation or creeping annexation in Armenia’s border areas. In November 2024, Armenia suggested the withdrawal of EUMA from the delimited sections of the border, but Azerbaijan continued to insist on its removal from the entire border. In March 2025, Armenia accepted Azerbaijan’s terms in the peace agreement article in order to break the negotiation deadlock. 

This announcement triggered significant anxiety among the Armenian public. In response, Armenian authorities suggested they could work with the EU after signing the peace agreement to establish mutually acceptable terms for the mission’s continuation––likely implying a revised mandate rather than a full withdrawal. However, Azerbaijan then backtracked from its commitment to conclude the peace agreement and added new preconditions for signing. Azerbaijan also began spreading disinformation about alleged Armenian ceasefire violations while firing at civilian infrastructure in border villages of Armenia’s strategic Syunik region. EUMA responded by increasing night patrols, countering disinformation, and confirming damage to civilian infrastructure.

Currently, EUMA stands as a symbol of EU commitment to Armenia’s sovereignty and security. Without Azerbaijan’s opposition, EUMA could serve as an effective security guarantee and fulfill its confidence-building role after the conclusion of the peace treaty.

Significance of European Peace Facility Assistance to Armenia

In January 2024, the European Union adopted its first-ever assistance measure for Armenia under the EPF, marking a notable advancement in EU–Armenia security cooperation (Council of the EU, 2024). The €10 million non-lethal aid package aims to enhance Armenia’s defense capabilities through ground surveillance equipment, mobility assets, medical evacuation resources and engineering tools.

This decision, though modest in scale, represented a political breakthrough after nearly eighteen months of internal EU deliberations. Hungary initially opposed the initiative due to its close ties with Azerbaijan. Notably, this marked the first time the EU approved an EPF measure for a partner still formally within the CSTO framework, indicating growing strategic trust toward Armenia. Subsequent efforts to approve a second EPF assistance package have been blocked, again reportedly by Hungary acting in alignment with Azerbaijani interests. The EPF assistance, explicitly framed as a defensive measure, aligns with Armenia’s broader defense reform goals and its strategic shift toward more diverse, transparent, and democratically accountable security partnerships. The EU has emphasized that the support is not aimed against any third party.

Yerevan welcomed the first EPF measure as a meaningful step toward rebuilding Armenia’s defense sector following successive Azerbaijani military offensives. The measure served as a symbolic confirmation of the EU’s commitment to backing its political support with practical tools to enhance Armenia’s sovereignty and resilience amid a fragile regional security landscape.

The measure has faced aggressive disinformation campaigns from both Baku and Moscow. In January 2025, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev made false claims about EU involvement, stating: “Weapons are being sent [to Armenia] under the guise of non-lethal equipment… this is just the beginning.” These accusations continue despite clear evidence that Armenia’s EPF assistance explicitly excludes lethal components. The EPF has only provided lethal aid in exceptional cases—specifically Ukraine and Benin.

Russian officials have amplified Azerbaijan’s claims, framing the assistance as a destabilizing force meant to disrupt regional balance. These narratives form part of a broader cognitive warfare strategy aimed at three objectives: preventing Armenia from rebuilding its defense capabilities, limiting its security partnership options, and restricting further EU involvement in South Caucasus stability efforts.

The EU-U.S. Cooperation Platform to Advance Support for Armenia 

Since early 2024, Armenia has received broader Western support through a structured cooperation platform with the EU and U.S. This followed the high-level trilateral meeting, including one between Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and EU High Representative Josep Borrell on April 5, 2024. The platform advances the EU’s and U.S.’ strategic goal of supporting Armenia’s democratic resilience, economic diversification, and defense reform amid regional security challenges. Key initiatives include enhanced energy and transport cooperation, digital modernization, border resilience, and deeper integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. As part of this effort,the EU launched a €270 million Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia (2024–2027), comprising €200 million in grants and €70 million in loans and financial instruments to support democratic reforms, economic development, and security. 

Following the April meeting, controversial speculations surfaced within Armenia. Pro-Russian opposition forces criticized the government’s pivot toward the West, arguing that it would provoke regional powers and destabilize Armenia’s position in an already fragile geopolitical environment—especially given what they called a modest financial package. Meanwhile, radical pro-Western opposition groups spread baseless conspiracy theories, claiming that the EU and U.S. had offered Armenia much larger assistance and a fast-track to EU membership, which they said Prime Minister Pashinyan had declined—despite the absence of any supporting evidence.

Azerbaijan responded to this cooperation with an intensified disinformation campaign, framing the trilateral support as a geopolitical plot against its interests. Still before the meeting its media speculated that the meeting was going to be focused on security guarantees to Armenia. President Ilham Aliyev and state-aligned media outlets portrayed the platform as evidence of Armenia’s Western-backed militarization and part of a broader anti-Azerbaijani agenda. Following earlier claims about the EU Monitoring Mission and EPF assistance, Azerbaijan’s messaging has tried to undermine EU and U.S. engagement by portraying it as foreign interference. These narratives, spread through official statements and government-affiliated media, show a coordinated effort to block Armenia’s Western partnerships using geopolitical and anti-colonial rhetoric.

Armenia’s Aspirations for Deeper Integration and New Partnership Agenda 

Armenia has expressed a strong political will to deepen its ties with the EU, alongside enhanced security cooperation. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan clearly demonstrated this intent in his address to the European Parliament on October 17, 2023, emphasizing Armenia’s commitment to strengthening its partnership with the EU “as much as the European Union considers it possible.” Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan echoed this sentiment during the Eastern Partnership Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on December 11, 2023, stating that the Armenian people have European aspirations and are committed to closer EU relations to the extent the EU deems possible.

On October 27, 2023, the European Council invited the High Representative and European Commission to present options for strengthening EU–Armenia relations across all dimensions. Subsequently, on March 12, 2024, the European Parliament adopted a resolution to strengthen EU–Armenia relations, calling on the European Commission and EU Member States to develop a roadmap for elevated ties. The resolution acknowledged Armenia’s progress in implementing CEPA and proposed using experiences from Association Agreements with other Eastern Partnership countries as a foundation for deeper integration—including sectoral integration with the EU single market. It also underlined the importance of achieving a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Negotiations for a new EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda commenced in June 2024 to replace the 2018 Partnership Priorities and build upon CEPA. According to Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of March 2025, the parties had completed approximately 15 rounds of negotiations, demonstrating their mutual commitment to deeper cooperation. The agenda covers six thematic areas: democracy and governance; freedom, mobility and security; foreign and security policy; economic and sectoral cooperation; trade and trade-related issues; and people-to-people contacts. Its goals include strengthening legal and democratic institutions, enhancing cooperation on migration and organized crime, promoting regional normalization, improving connectivity and energy security, harmonizing trade regulations with EU standards, and strengthening academic, cultural and youth exchanges.

The EU has emerged as Armenia’s primary partner in advancing democratic reforms, strengthening the rule of law, protecting human rights, deepening sectoral cooperation, modernizing the economy, and building national resilience. With USAID gradually reducing its direct operational presence in Armenia, the EU’s role has grown even more significant as the leading international supporter of Armenia’s institutional transformation and democratic development.

The EU-Armenia Visa Liberalization Dialogue, which formally began in September 2024, represents a key component of this agenda. The dialogue advances alongside reforms in migration governance, border security, and data protection. Initially, the visa liberalization process with the EU was delayed and Armenia expressed dissatisfaction with the slow pace. However, significant progress has been made recently, marked by the launch of the operational phase of the EU-Armenia Visa Liberalisation Dialogue in December 2024 and the arrival of an EU expert mission to Armenia in February 2025. Beyond symbolic importance in strengthening people-to-people connections, visa liberalization carries strategic significance by embedding Armenia within the European political and normative framework—a vital element of the EU’s geopolitical balancing in the South Caucasus.

Between Aspiration and Feasibility: Armenia’s Path Toward EU Membership

Although Armenia has not formally applied for EU membership, significant political and institutional steps show a growing alignment with the EU accession pathway. Yet, this trajectory remains tentative, reflecting both internal caution and external uncertainty.

In early 2024, Armenia’s pro-EU opposition and civil society groups launched a grassroots initiative for a nationwide referendum—called the “Euro-vote”—to measure public support for potential EU accession. This campaign generated debate about the country’s geopolitical orientation and gathered over 50,000 signatures, meeting the constitutional threshold to present a draft law to the National Assembly. The initiative demonstrated both growing public support for European integration and a broader societal shift. This trend—particularly evident since 2020—has compelled the government to respond more assertively, even as formal EU membership remains a distant prospect.

In response to the grassroots initiative, the Armenian government translated broad societal support into formal legislative action. On January 9, 2025, the government approved the draft law titled “On the Launch of the Process of the Republic of Armenia’s Accession to the European Union”. The National Assembly adopted it in its second and final reading, on March 26, 2025, with 64 votes in favor and 7 against. President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed it into law on April 4, 2025, formalizing Armenia’s intent to pursue EU membership while maintaining timeline flexibility. While the law does not trigger a formal application, analysts widely interpreted it as a structural commitment to Armenia’s European trajectory, balancing ambition with strategic caution. Deputy Foreign Minister Paruyr Hovhannisyan later clarified that the bill served as a symbolic gesture reflecting Armenia’s aspirations rather than an official membership bid.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry issued an official warning, stating that the adoption of the EU membership bill was a “deliberately unfriendly act,” that could severely damage bilateral relations. Moscow characterized the move as part of a broader geopolitical shift threatening its traditional influence in the South Caucasus, warning that Armenia’s continued pursuit of EU integration would face repercussions.

More than a month after the law’s adoption, no follow-up steps have been publicly announced, leaving its implementation form and timeline unclear. While some view a formal EU membership application as politically risky or premature, others argue it is long overdue and necessary to demonstrate strategic clarity. Dissatisfaction is growing among Armenia’s pro-European political and public figures, who see the lack of concrete action as a missed opportunity to consolidate momentum. Whether Armenia will submit an application before the 2026 elections, or at all, remains a matter of domestic debate. An early move could signal determination but might also intensify Russia’s hybrid pressure. The extent to which EU alignment is structurally embedded in Armenia’s evolving foreign policy doctrine therefore remains uncertain.

Structural Economic Dependency on the Eurasian Economic Union

Although Armenia has reduced its security dependence on Russia and the CSTO, it remains structurally tied to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), through trade, labor migration, and energy. This dependency limits Armenia’s ability to fully align with EU economic standards. The deep level of economic integration means that any sudden withdrawal or suspension from the EAEU would risk severe economic disruption.

Russia has issued warnings to Armenia, stating that it cannot pursue EU integration while remaining a member of EAEU, and that Moscow may resort to legal measures if Armenia takes steps that violate EAEU regulations. Russian officials stressed that although Armenia has not formally declared its intention to leave the EAEU, any move toward alignment with EU structures could trigger legal consequences, given the perceived incompatibility between EU and EAEU mandates. This development highlights the mounting tensions between Armenia’s aspirations for deeper ties with the EU and its obligations under Russian-led regional frameworks.

Analysts agree that Armenia’s economic dependency on Russia extends beyond energy and remittances to encompass a complex, multi-layered structure of long-term investments, institutional integration through the EAEU, and military-industrial cooperation. Russia’s control over key sectors—including gas distribution through Gazprom Armenia and critical transit routes—creates significant barriers to economic diversification. Armenia’s economic reorientation toward the EU requires gradual and strategic management. 

While fully decoupling from Russia remains neither feasible nor desirable in the short term, targeted EU support could reduce structural vulnerabilities and pave the way toward deeper alignment with the EU single market. The EU could advance this process by offering tariff-free access for Armenian products, assisting with the harmonization of technical standards, and supporting sectors with export potential. Capacity-building programs focused on customs, product certification, licensing, and integrated border management would help Armenian producers meet EU market requirements. EU technical assistance could reduce Armenia’s reliance on Russian infrastructure, energy routes, and financial systems. While these steps would not eliminate EAEU dependency immediately, they would gradually enhance Armenia’s economic resilience. Armenia’s long-term economic sovereignty depends on strategic diversification and sustained EU engagement. 

The country’s dual positioning within both EU and EAEU frameworks will become increasingly untenable, making a gradual and strategic realignment essential for long-term integration.

Overcoming Dependency Through Connectivity: The EU’s Strategic Role

To support Armenia’s economic realignment, the EU must address both physical and geopolitical barriers that limit Armenia’s access to broader markets. The EU, being primarily a common market, requires physical connectivity––something Armenia currently lacks. This limitation stems from its closed border with Turkey, exclusion from regional projects involving Azerbaijan, and the complex nature of EU-Georgia and EU-Turkey relations. Connectivity is not merely a technical challenge, but a strategic issue that determines Armenia’s ability to benefit from EU market integration and economic diversification. 

Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative—designed to reopen regional transportation and communication links based on sovereignty, reciprocity, and jurisdiction—presents a constructive vision for infrastructure development and regional stabilization. Its implementation could transform Armenia from a geopolitical dead end into a crucial conduit between Europe and Asia. At the EU–Central Asia Connectivity Summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasized this potential, describing the reopening of Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan as a “game changer” that could bring Europe and Central Asia “closer together like never before”.

However, this vision faces opposition from Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev, who has accused the EU of “colonialism” and “meddling” in regional affairs, asserting that relations between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Armenia are not the EU’s concern. These statements indicate that Baku is not genuinely seeking inclusive regional connectivity, but instead aims to control or impede transport arrangements to maintain Armenia’s isolation. 

The EU can strengthen Armenia’s position by advocating for inclusive, rules-based access to infrastructure corridors and linking economic support to meaningful connectivity. Supporting Armenia’s integration into regional transport networks—alongside domestic infrastructure modernization and regulatory alignment—would help counter coercive dependencies. This approach would also solidify the EU’s role as a stabilizing actor in the South Caucasus while advancing its own connectivity agenda.

Public Perceptions of the EU and Russia’s Hybrid Campaign 

Public opinion in Armenia toward the EU is broadly favorable, reflecting appreciation for both its normative appeal and potential for deeper political and material support. According to the International Republican Institute’s March 2024 survey, 61% of Armenians view the EU favorably, making it one of the most trusted international actors—surpassing Russia and matching sentiment toward France and the U.S. The EU is widely recognized for its contributions to Armenia’s democratic reforms, civil society development, capacity-building, and security stabilization through the EUMA.

The EU continues to enjoy generally favorable perceptions in Armenia, though segments of the population have grown disillusioned with its normative power. As analyzed earlier in this paper, many Armenians resent the EU’s soft response to the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh and its failure to impose meaningful restrictions or political consequences on Baku. This inaction is widely perceived as enabling Azerbaijan to legitimize its territorial gains through military force and use coercive tactics to obstruct the peace process—undermining the EU’s credibility as a normative actor.

Russia has intensified its hybrid campaigns to undermine EU influence and discredit Armenia’s pro-European path. Pro-Russian Armenian opposition figures and their affiliated media promote narratives that portray the EU as a threat to Armenia’s identity, sovereignty and traditional values. These efforts tap into nationalist sentiment and security anxieties, especially as the country’s 2026 parliamentary elections approach. Russia is likely to escalate its information warfare in the lead-up to the vote—using local allies, pushing anti-Western narratives, and attempting to break down public support for European integration. These coordinated disinformation campaigns mirror tactics used in Georgia, Moldova and Romania, threatening to polarize Armenia’s political discourse while hijacking support for a pro-European foreign policy. For Armenia, these risks are especially serious given its domestic political divisions after the forced displacement of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, uncertainty about the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement and the normalization process with Turkey, the pervasive influence of Russian media, and Moscow’s instrumentalization of Armenia’s illiberal opposition.

The EU’s public image is marked by contrast: its strong normative values are widely admired, yet its practical political decisions often raise skepticism. This dual perception presents both risks and opportunities. The growing gap between what people expect and what the EU delivers could damage its credibility and reduce support for Armenia’s European trajectory. However, if the EU develops more engaged, responsive, and locally grounded policies, it could strengthen democratic resilience and long-term alignment.

Georgia’s Democratic Decline and Euro-Atlantic Divisions: Impact on Armenia’s EU Aspirations

Recent developments in Georgia and the United States have shaped Armenia’s strategic thinking about its European trajectory. Georgia’s worsening ties with the EU—marked by democratic backsliding, Russian-backed interference, and the suspension of its EU candidacy—serve as a warning sign. These developments have led Armenian policymakers to weigh the risks of pursuing closer EU ties without strong institutional support. Georgia’s case shows how weakening democracy, compounded by geopolitical pressures and Russian meddling, can derail even well-established EU partnerships. This situation underscores how vulnerable transitional democracies in the region are to coordinated efforts that shake public confidence in pro-European paths and block democratic reforms. The contrast between the EU’s stated values and its limited ability to enforce them has raised doubts about whether the Union can effectively protect its democratic partners.

Growing divisions within the Euro-Atlantic space—driven by the emergence of a more transactional U.S. foreign policy under President Donald Trump and a weakening of transatlantic solidarity—have fractured the coherence of Western engagement. As the EU struggles to maintain internal consensus on long-term support for Ukraine, preserve NATO unity, and advance its strategic autonomy, coordinated action with the U.S. on Armenian issues has become less likely. Unlike the joint EU-U.S. platform launched in April 2024 to support Armenia, current dynamics suggest that such unified support may not be sustained. In this context of fragmented Western priorities, Armenia’s alignment with the West is becoming more difficult to sustain—and the relevance of its European aspirations increasingly uncertain.

This fragility is compounded by Armenia’s vulnerability to coercive tactics from both Azerbaijan and Russia, whose alignment and assertiveness further obstruct its European path. At the same time, the global retreat of liberal norms—intensified by the U.S. deprioritization of democracy and human rights—has weakened collective international resolve to uphold the very values the EU seeks to project. Within the EU itself, conflicting national interests and divergent value systems hamper unified action, undermining its normative influence and strategic credibility in the South Caucasus.

Mutual Acceptance of Realpolitik: A Challenge in EU–Armenia Relations

Armenia’s path toward EU accession faces significant structural and geopolitical challenges, raising questions about its feasibility in the near future. The EU’s reaction to Armenia’s parliamentary bill on membership aspirations has been perceived as low-profile and lacking enthusiasm. This disillusionment deepened when European Commission President Kaja Kallas visited Azerbaijan while postponing her scheduled trip to Armenia—a visit that coincided with the 110th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. The decision drew criticism from both the Armenian public and European Parliament members, who questioned the EU’s position on Azerbaijan’s ongoing cross-border violence and unlawful detentions. These actions have amplified concerns that the EU’s strategic and energy partnerships with Baku may take precedence over its normative commitments to democracy, human rights and conflict prevention.

Armenia is navigating a delicate recalibration of its foreign policy. PM Pashinyan has articulated a vision of a “balanced and balancing” approach, signaling not a Westward pivot but rather a diversified, multi-vector strategy. His symbolic participation in Moscow’s Victory Day celebrations—after a two-year absence—was widely seen as a pragmatic balancing act in a region marked by unpredictable pressures and competing powers, though it drew criticism from Armenia’s liberal pro-European circles. Nevertheless, in April 2025, Armenia voted in favor of a EU–sponsored UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—a notable shift from its previous abstentions on similar measures. 

Armenia’s Strategic Realignment: Pivot, Equidistance, Hedging or Multi-Alignment?

During this period, Armenian and international analysts contributed policy articles and opinion pieces to national and international media, engaging in a broad debate over the direction of Armenia’s foreign policy. Some analysts have questioned the genuineness of Armenia’s perceived pivot to the West, arguing that the country has not made a definitive break from its traditional alignments and remains constrained by deep-rooted dependencies, particularly on Russia and the CSTO. Others, focused on the risks associated with such a shift, warning that even a genuine reorientation could lead to geopolitical overexposure while offering limited returns. They caution that Armenia’s move might replicate what they view as the strategic miscalculations of Ukraine and Georgia. In contrast, proponents viewed the shift as long overdue and called on the EU to accompany Armenia’s strategic reorientation with meaningful and sustained support. 

More pragmatic assessments acknowledged Armenia’s pro-Western orientation while highlighting the limits of Western security guarantees, advocating instead for a balanced, multi-alignment strategy suited to Armenia’s constrained geopolitical position. Another perspective argued that Armenia’s emerging foreign policy is increasingly shaped by a cautious multi-vector approach—seeking to balance relations with the EU, U.S., Russia, and regional actors to enhance its sovereignty and geopolitical flexibility. This strategy reflects a long-term effort to reduce overreliance on any single power and navigate a volatile regional environment through diversified partnerships.

More nuanced assessments have emerged in Armenian policy discourse. One perspective argues that Armenia is not pursuing a definitive pivot, but rather a policy of equidistance—a deliberate strategy to maintain flexibility by reducing overreliance on any single actor while preserving balanced engagement across competing spheres of influence. Another framework conceptualizes Armenia’s foreign policy evolution as a three-stage process: initially pivoting to the West, then diversifying external partnerships, and ultimately hedging against regional uncertainty. This perspective underscores how Armenia manages a complex environment in which Western support, while meaningful, remains limited—and where strategic ambiguity can function as a stabilizing mechanism. 

As a contribution to the evolving debate, this article proposes a new analytical perspective: Armenia’s current foreign policy can be interpreted as a cautious, context-specific adaptation of Finland’s Cold War strategy. It aims to neutralize the Russian threat by gradually reducing dependence, reinforcing sovereignty, diversifying economic partnerships, while pragmatically aspiring to EU membership. Yet, unlike Finland, Armenia faces a more volatile and fragmented geopolitical landscape—characterized by continued threats from Azerbaijan potentially supported by Turkey, the absence of European neighbors, and the influence of competing regional powers. Whereas “Finlandization” implied neutrality at the cost of limited autonomy, Armenia appears to be pursuing multi-alignment as a more assertive and pluralistic form of strategic flexibility. 

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations: Aligning Aspirations with Strategic Realities

Armenia’s push toward European integration has unfolded in a constrained environment marked by regional insecurity, poor connectivity, economic dependencies, and persistent Russian influence. Scholars argue that while the EU has demonstrated stronger political engagement, the lack of a credible membership path limits its transformative potential. The EU’s effectiveness hinges on tailoring its approach to Armenia’s vulnerabilities while maintaining long-term strategic engagement.

Although enthusiasm for EU accession remains strong among Armenia’s pro-European liberal circles, the broader public remains skeptical due to regional instability, perceived EU indecisiveness, and unclear political incentives. Conservative Euro-sceptic and pro-Russian actors dismiss membership aspirations as misguided or unrealistic. However, Armenia’s reform-oriented policy and civil society communities increasingly view the accession process not just as a geopolitical choice, but as a framework for strengthening sovereignty, security, governance, accountability, and democratic norms. Civic engagement and informed debate create a more realistic understanding of the EU accession process. 

Yet significant obstacles remain. The EU’s enlargement fatigue, internal divisions, and evolving transatlantic tensions—reflected in its emphasis on strategic autonomy—limit its ability to offer Armenia a clear political horizon, while Armenia’s lack of direct geographical connection to the Union, the suspension of Georgia’s candidate status, and the absence of tangible progress in Armenia–Turkey normalization leave it without a viable route for geographical access to Europe. On the other hand, Armenia faces vulnerability to both external and internal pressures: Azerbaijan seeks to obstruct the conclusion of a peace agreement by employing coercive tactics—including the threat or use of force, hostile rhetoric, and unacceptable preconditions—to constrain Armenia’s sovereignty. In parallel, Russia employs economic leverage, energy dependency and its supporters in Armenia to dissuade European integration. The convergence of Azerbaijani and Russian narratives and tactics reflects a coordinated hybrid effort to deter the advancement of the Armenia-EU partnership. These external threats are further compounded by domestic political polarization, which erodes internal cohesion and undermines national resilience against geopolitical manipulation.

To prevent disillusionment and consolidate progress toward a closer partnership, the following approach is recommended:

I. Policy Recommendations for the EU: Bridging Commitments with Credibility

Reaffirm Armenia’s EU Aspiration with Practical and Political Support

1. Acknowledge the Importance of the Accession Path
   Even without formal candidacy status, the EU should recognize the strategic value of Armenia’s European orientation by providing clearer benchmarks, stronger political engagement, and support for democratic and institutional reforms.
2. Deepen Sectoral Cooperation to Support Economic and Energy Diversification
   The EU should strengthen support for Armenia’s efforts to diversify away from Russian economic and energy dependence through enhanced trade relationships, energy security measures, infrastructure improvements, and alignment with EU regulatory standards.
3. Strengthen Institutional and Democratic Resilience
   EU assistance should continue robust institutional support for governance, justice sector reform, and the protection of human rights—ensuring that Armenia’s democratic development remains sustainable and resistant to both internal and external destabilization.

Reinforce EU Credibility Through a Firm Geopolitical Posture

4. Reject False Equivalence in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Context
   The EU must abandon its policy of false equivalence in addressing the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict by acknowledging Armenia’s commitment to peace and recognizing Azerbaijan’s continued obstruction of the process. It should reject Azerbaijan’s efforts at cognitive warfare and attempts to delegitimize EU support for Armenia.
5. Apply Conditionality to Azerbaijan
   The EU should explicitly link future energy and connectivity agreements with Baku to three conditions: ending coercive diplomacy, removing preconditions on Armenia, and signing a balanced and equitable peace agreement.
6. Support Inclusive Regional Connectivity Through Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace Initiative
   The EU should support Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace initiative by promoting inclusive, rules-based regional transport frameworks. This includes exerting political and diplomatic pressure to prevent Azerbaijan’s demands for an extraterritorial corridor, resolve its obstruction of cross-border communications, and secure Armenia’s place in broader connectivity strategies such as the Global Gateway and the Middle Corridor. 
7. Expand Defense Support to Armenia via the EPF
   The EU must maintain and expand defense assistance through the European Peace Facility (EPF). Should Hungary or another member country block these efforts based on its close relations with Azerbaijan, the EU should implement the “consensus-minus-one” formula, as used in the Ukraine context.
8. Sustain the Long-Term Presence of EUMA
   Brussels and Yerevan should negotiate a durable mandate for the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA). This would ensure its continued contribution to confidence-building, human security, and defense sector reform after the peace agreement’s conclusion. The EU must also address Azerbaijan’s opposition to international civil presence in the region as contradicting international law and order.
9. Introduce Deterrence Measures
   The EU should make clear that any renewed military action by Azerbaijan against Armenia will trigger targeted restrictive measures. This clear message would serve as a deterrent and help prevent future escalation along with its political and economic costs.

These measures would strengthen Armenia’s sovereignty and democratic development while enhancing the EU’s credibility and relevance in the South Caucasus—helping build a more resilient, rules-based regional order.

II. Policy Recommendations for Armenia: Advancing a Credible and Sustainable EU Partnership

1. Pursue Democratic Reforms Pragmatically
   Armenia must continue advancing institutional reforms, good governance, and the rule of law—not just to satisfy EU requirements, but to build internal resilience and consistency of its democratic path. The EU accession process requires a strategic, long-term approach—balanced between realistic expectations and unwavering commitment.
2. Distance From Russia and Exit the CSTO
   Armenia should continue to distance itself from Russia by reducing its political and security dependence on it while working toward formal withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
3. Diversify Economic and Energy Ties
   Armenia must intensify efforts to reduce its structural dependence on the Russian market and the Eurasian Economic Union. Priority should be given to expanding trade partnerships, improving tariff and licensing frameworks, developing infrastructure projects, and diversifying energy sources. Aligning regulatory standards with the EU will be crucial for strengthening Armenia’s long-term economic sovereignty.
4. Maintain Consistency in Foreign Policy Messaging
   Armenia’s foreign policy messaging must align with its strategic direction. Mixed signals or symbolic backtracking risk undermining EU trust and domestic confidence. Maintaining a clear, sustained commitment to the European path is essential for credibility. A coherent foreign policy stance would also help prevent another scenario like that of the 2013 reversal under external pressure.
5. Balance Engagement Without Overexposure
   While enhancing EU ties, Armenia must balance relations with other actors through multi-alignment, thereby avoiding geopolitical vulnerability while preserving flexibility in a volatile region.

This balanced approach will enable Armenia to build a pragmatic, resilient, and forward-looking partnership with the EU, anchored in democratic transformation and gradual integration while successfully navigating a complex and competitive regional landscape.

Politics

See the section 

EVN Security Report

See the section 

[Beyond Borders]

See the section 

Also see

Month on View