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On October 12, 2024, EU ambassador to Armenia Vassilis Maragos announced that member states have greenlighted Armenia’s prospective participation in the EU’s peace missions along with a €10 million funding allocation for the initiative.
Armenia’s possible participation in EU-led civilian and military crisis-management operations was originally outlined in Article 7 of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), signed between the EU and Armenia in 2017 and entering into force in 2021. The EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell mentioned it in February 2024 as part of increasingly closer foreign and security ties between Yerevan and Brussels, which have come to encompass the EU’s civilian observer mission in Armenia (EUMA) deployed along the border with Azerbaijan and non-lethal security assistance provided through the European Peace Facility (EPF).
When the EU approved €10 million for Armenia in July under the EPF for a fully-fledged deployable tent camp for a battalion-sized unit, it emphasized the aim of enhancing the “interoperability of Armenia’s Armed Forces in preparation for possible future participation in international military missions and operations, including those deployed by the EU.”
While Armenia’s participation is anticipated, no further details have been made available so far. Currently, the EU oversees 24 missions and operations that includes 3,500 military and 1,300 civilian personnel around the world, including in neighboring Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Palestinian territories, and almost a dozen in Africa.
Armenia’s prospective contribution of civilian or military personnel to such missions would build on two decades of experience in peacekeeping and other international efforts, offering a timely opportunity to reflect on this legacy and its broader implications.
The Origins and Development of Armenian Peacekeeping
Armenia formally joined UN peacekeeping operations on July 12, 2001 with a memorandum signed in New York. An Armenian peacekeeping battalion was formed with financial and technical assistance from Greece. A year later, a dozen Armenian soldiers from the battalion took part in NATO exercises in Georgia for the first time. By mid-2005, it consisted of about 200 troops. The battalion was formally reorganized into a brigade in September 2007, but it took several years for the initial skeletal framework of the brigade to take full shape.
Armenian peacekeepers have served under the command of Greece (in Kosovo), Poland (in Iraq), Germany (in Afghanistan), Italy (in Lebanon), and the United States (in Kosovo). In recognition of this collaboration, the flags of these five countries were carried by Armenian peacekeepers during the Independence Day parade in Yerevan’s Republic Square in September 2016. By that time, the total number of Armenian soldiers who had served in peacekeeping missions abroad stood at 3,220. Armenia’s Ministry of Defense refused to provide an updated figure at the request of EVN Report. Through two decades of missions abroad, two Armenians are known to have been wounded, one in Iraq in 2006 and another in Syria in 2019. No fatalities have been reported.
The brigade has received significant assistance from the U.S. and other Western countries. Their main training center in Zar, near the city of Abovyan, was renovated with U.S. support and reopened in 2017, allowing for NATO standard drills to be held in Armenia. It was further improved, again with U.S. support, in 2022. It hosted joint exercises in September 2023 and July 2024.
The peacekeeping brigade has been viewed as part of Armenia’s attempts to build closer ties with NATO while it remained a close ally of Russia through the 2000s and 2010s. In a 2015 profile on Armenia’s peacekeeping role, analyst Richard Giragosian noted that Armenia “uses its peacekeeping commitments and activities to help offset its over-dependence on Russia as its primary security partner.”
A 2009 U.S. diplomatic cable by chargé d’affaires Joseph Pennington, described the peacekeeping brigade as “the leading edge of Western defense reform in Armenia,” noting that the unit is “comprised of fairly well-trained contract soldiers, organized and trained toward a NATO model.” Likewise, Giragosian suggested that the Western “command and mentoring of Armenian peacekeepers have bolstered the impact of defense reform by supplementing and deepening military education and professional development.” Armenian peacekeepers have also benefited from Western financial assistance, namely direct funding for payroll costs.
Since 2004, Armenia has deployed military personnel, primarily from its peacekeeping brigade, to six countries and regions. The first three missions—in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan—were part of NATO or NATO-led operations. The fourth, in Lebanon, is under a UN peacekeeping mandate, while the two most recent, in Syria and Kazakhstan, are linked directly or indirectly to Russia and its CSTO military alliance. This makes Armenia perhaps the only country, along with Kazakhstan,[1] that has contributed to both Western (NATO), Russian (CSTO), and UN missions.
Kosovo (since 2004)
Kosovo was the first and is the longest-running area of deployment of Armenian peacekeepers. Except for the brief absence in 2012, Armenian troops have served there for more than 20 years now. First deployed under the command of the Greek unit in 2004, they serve as part of the NATO mission known as Kosovo Force (KFOR), which was first deployed in 1999.
Armenia first announced its intention to send peacekeepers to Kosovo in May 2003. It was formalized by the signing of an Armenian-Greek memorandum in September, and endorsed by parliament in December 2003. The Armenian platoon, consisting of 33 soldiers led by a junior officer, began their deployment in mid-February 2004 as part of the Greek battalion serving in the U.S. sector of Kosovo covering the southeastern part of the region. In early 2008, Yerevan announced its plans to double the size of its peacekeepers there, which was approved by parliament in May and 70 troops were deployed in June 2008, but their number was decreased in 2009 due to an overall reduction in NATO forces there.
A 2009 U.S. diplomatic cable noted that KFOR provides Armenia with “positive political credit in the West, and valuable military experience operating with NATO forces in a moderate threat environment.”
Armenian troops temporarily withdrew in February 2012 as Greece downsized its participation there because of its financial crisis. While initially in talks with Hungary, Armenian peacekeepers eventually returned under U.S. command in July 2012. The Armenian platoon of 35 deployed at Camp Bondsteel is “responsible for carrying out patrol service, ensuring the security of checkpoints, dealing with mass disturbances, managing crowds and escorting convoys.” The Armenian troops serve at the Southern Command Post of the Multinational Battle Group-East (MNBG-E) “to ensure a safe and secure environment, and freedom of movement.”
During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Armenia temporarily reduced its mission from 40 to two. As of October 2024, 57 Armenian peacekeepers are stationed in Kosovo.
Iraq (2005–2008)
The second location of deployment of Armenian peacekeepers was Iraq, invaded and occupied by U.S. and allied forces since March 2003. Armenian officials first revealed Yerevan’s intention to send personnel to Iraq in August 2003, but discussions on the practical modalities of the deployment continued until the following year. The move was publicly criticized by top generals, junior coalition partner Dashnaktsutyun, disapproved by Iraqi Armenians, and faced public opposition. Nevertheless, Armenia’s parliament endorsed it in late December 2004.
The deployment of 46 non-combat Armenian personnel began in mid-January 2005. It consisted of a transportation platoon of 30 military truck drivers, an engineering team of 10 demining experts, a medical team of three doctors, and three officers.
They served under the Polish-led multinational division with their primary deployment site being Camp Delta, near Al Kut, south of Baghdad. The first platoon provided 20 armored trucks and drivers for convoy missions within the Polish zone and from Camp Delta to Kuwait. The deminers performed road reconnaissance, storage and destruction of explosive materials, and road clearance of unexploded ordnance. They also served with the Salvadoran Battalion as part of the Camp Delta Quick Reaction Force. The doctors worked in the Polish field hospital at Camp Echo in Ad Diwaniyah and provided medical assistance to the local Iraqis in Diwaniyah and Kut.
The Armenian mission carried out more than 60 convoys, removed more than 9,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance and cleared more than 130,000 square miles of terrain. The doctors performed more than 300 surgeries and provided ambulatory healthcare to over 450 military personnel and 700 civilians.
In mid-2007, the U.S. requested Armenia to consider increasing its contribution by taking over from Georgian troops responsibility for “middle ring” UN security in Baghdad. Armenia’s then-Defense Minister Serzh Sargsyan countered that Armenia “could not afford to send so many combat troops” because of the risks associated with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and argued that the peacekeeping battalion was “not yet sufficiently advanced” and he “would not put inexperienced troops into such a situation, for which they were unprepared.”
One Armenian soldier was seriously injured in November 2006 resulting in a leg amputation. He was the only casualty of the Armenian mission in Iraq. A total of 342 to 380 Armenian personnel served in Iraq in eight rotations until the mission was withdrawn in early October 2008. President Bush thanked Armenia for the mission.
Afghanistan (2010–2021)
Armenia considered sending a mission to Afghanistan as early as 2007 and 2008, although initially it concerned only sappers/deminers and medics. Armenia and Germany agreed on the deployment by July 2009 and the details were regulated by an agreement with NATO in October 2009, which received parliament approval in December 2009. The Russian-led CSTO did not object to the move.
The Armenian contingent of 40 troops first traveled to Germany in December 2009 for pre-deployment training. The unit served under German command in Regional Command North of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the Kunduz province. Their primary mission was to ensure the security of the Kunduz Airport alongside the Germans. The Armenian unit arrived at the place of deployment in mid-February 2010. A small chapel was built by and for the Armenian troops in Kunduz in July 2010. By December 2010, Yerevan announced its plans to double the size of the mission. At the time, it was increased by five, to reach 45 personnel, including five instructors to train the Afghan army.
In May 2011, parliament approved further increasing its size by two infantry platoons to reach up to 130 troops, thus tripling the Armenian mission. A group of 81 Armenian troops arrived in Mazar-i-Sharif in June 2011, bringing the total to 126. They included riflemen, rifleman-drivers, sappers, and rifleman-medics. Like in Kunduz, they were tasked with guarding the Mazar-i-Sharif Airport being stationed at nearby Camp Marmal.
In May 2014, Armenia and Germany signed an agreement to redeploy an Armenian unit of 56 personnel from Camp Mike Spann in Mazar-i-Sharif to Camp Qasaba in Kabul, the Afghan capital. The ISAF mission was completed in December 2014 and succeeded with Resolute Support Mission, to which Armenia continued to contribute. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia reduced its mission size from 121 to 58. Armenian peacekeepers left Afghanistan in early March 2021 prior to the Taliban’s offensive that led to the capture of Kabul in August 2021.
Lebanon (since 2014)
Armenia first considered joining the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2006, following the Israel-Hezbollah war, but chose to opt out. Six years later, in February 2012, Armenia posted a military observer there as part of the UNIFIL and began talks with Italy in October 2012. During this discussion phase, Armenia’s Defense Ministry spokesperson spoke of two platoons, up to 60 personnel. Eventually, Armenia and Italy signed an agreement in June 2014, which was unanimously ratified by Armenia’s parliament in October. Armenia committed to providing 30 soldiers and two staff officers, each to serve in battalion and brigade headquarters.
The actual deployment came in November 2014. The platoon of 32 serves under Italian command. Armenia’s then-Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan told the first group before their departure that Lebanon is “neither Kosovo nor Afghanistan. Lebanon is [part of] the Middle East, which lies within the sphere of Armenia’s external security interests.” He also mentioned Lebanon’s significant Armenian community born out of the genocide of 1915.
In 2016 Italy asked Armenia to triple the size of its mission to 100 troops, which was discussed, but never implemented. As of November 1, 2024, a total of 33 Armenians serve within UNIFIL, including 32 peacekeepers and one observer. As of November 2022, three of the 32 peacekeepers were women.
Mali (2015–2019)
Besides its observer at the UN mission in Lebanon since 2012, Armenia also posted a serviceman in a similar position in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2015. The sole staff officer remained there “for several years” until at least 2019. The date of withdrawal is not indicated in open sources, but was completed no later than 2022 and the UN mission withdrew entirely by late 2023.
Syria (2019–2024)
A group of 83 Armenian demining and medical specialists from the Defense Ministry were deployed to Syria in February 2019. The deminers operate under the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE), a state agency set up in 2011 with U.S. support.
The idea of deploying CSTO peacekeepers to Syria was floated in Russia as early as 2012, but discussions intensified in 2016 with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov mentioning specifically the possibility of sending Armenian deminers. Armenia’s then-Defense Minister Vigen Sargsyan said in a May 2017 interview that Yerevan and Moscow were exploring the possibility. Armenia’s Defense Ministry told media months later that Yerevan is ready, in principle, to send a demining team to Syria as part of a multinational “coalition” that could be formed by Russia, saying the countries have held “preliminary discussions”.
Yerevan conditioned its involvement with the Syrian government’s consent, and observance of all international legal procedures. In November 2017, Russia’s deputy defense minister said in an interview that Yerevan has “already confirmed” its readiness to send “engineering units”.
Shortly after his rise to power, Nikol Pashinyan stated in a rally in August 2018 that Yerevan and Moscow will announce a joint “humanitarian project” that will be “an unprecedented instrument of partnership and vivid evidence that we are going to consistently upgrade our relations.” He announced Yerevan’s decision to send a humanitarian contingent in September, after a meeting with Putin in Moscow. He stressed that it is entirely humanitarian, does not contain any military element, and aims to support the Armenian community of Aleppo.
Armenia’s then-Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan said in an interview that while most specialists are military personnel, it is not a combat unit as they will be involved exclusively in humanitarian work outside of war zones, specifically Aleppo. He said the group will coordinate its work with Russia and the Syrian government. Deputy Minister Gabriel Balayan further clarified that the group will be “exclusively subordinated” to Yerevan, while not ruling out cooperation with Russia “in certain aspects”.
The group of 83 Armenian personnel were transported to Syria on February 8, 2019 on Russian planes. When they met in Moscow the same day, Russia’s Defense Minister Shoigu told Tonoyan that Armenia was “the first to respond to our call to assist the Syrian people,” calling it “a significant contribution to restoring normal life in Syria.”
Yerevan’s agreement to deploy personnel in Syria came amid charges against Pashinyan of pro-Western sympathies and an anti-Russian foreign policy. It was seen as an attempt by Pashinyan to dispel those suspicions and “demonstrate loyalty” to Moscow. Armenia’s Security Council chief Armen Grigoryan, who had criticized the idea in 2017, insisted that there are no issues in Armenian-Russian relations “that we would need to resolve by sending a military contingent to Syria.” During a speech in parliament on December 4, 2024, Pashinyan admitted that the move was designed to demonstrate to Moscow what it means to be an ally: “This is how we see being allies and the attitude toward fulfilling contractual obligations.”
The move was welcomed by the Russian ambassador Sergey Kopirkin, who said Moscow “highly value[s]” the decision, which “once again reaffirms the special allied nature of our relations.” But it was met mostly with disapproval inside and outside Armenia. Domestically, the decision was criticized by former officials and pro-Western politicians and activists.
Washington saw Armenia’s commitment as going against its efforts to isolate the Assad government internationally. The State Department said while it recognizes the desire of other nations to respond to the humanitarian situation in Syria, it does not “support any engagement with Syrian military forces, whether that engagement is to provide assistance to civilians or is military in nature.” It also expressed its disapproval of “any cooperation between Armenia and Russia for this mission” as “Russia has partnered with the Assad regime to slaughter civilians and trigger a humanitarian catastrophe.” Yerevan said it took note of the statement and reiterated that it is a “purely relief mission.”
After the deployment, Armenia’s Defense Minister Tonoyan appeared to hint that Armenia may at some point “participate in military operations,” which Pashinyan strongly refuted the next day. “We have no such plans,” he told parliament.
Armenian authorities repeatedly defended the decision. Pashinyan told parliament that their deployment is justified “for considerations of our sovereignty and also for our historical mission.” He said Armenian doctors and deminers are “repaying that historical debt to the people of Syria” for their help during the Armenian Genocide of 1915. He conceded that the move carries risks, but also strengthens Armenia’s sovereignty and international standing, and is “morally, humanly, and politically the right thing to do.” When he met with the personnel of the first rotation in July 2019, Pashinyan also pointed to the security of Aleppo Armenians and Aleppo’s Armenian cultural heritage.
A month after deployment, one Armenian deminer was seriously wounded near Aleppo, resulting in a foot amputation.
By June 2021, Armenian deminers had cleared more than 450,000 square meters (sq/m), while medics had provided assistance to 33,000 local residents. The Armenian mission and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in Syria agreed to cooperate in October 2021, with Armenian deminers being tasked with clearing around two million sq/m of unexploded ordnance and transferring the cleared areas to local authorities. By December 2022, two million sq/m were cleared using surface methods and more than 1.4 million sq/m of agricultural land were cleared using subsurface methods.
The Armenian mission did not suffer any casualties during the February 2023 earthquake in Turkey and Syria. Armenian specialists joined efforts to mitigate the aftermath of the earthquake in Aleppo by assessing buildings in critical condition.
On November 29, 2024, as Islamist rebels quickly advanced into Aleppo, Armenia’s Defense Ministry announced that the Armenian humanitarian mission was withdrawn and flown back to Armenia, with its operations “temporarily” suspended. Within less than two weeks, the Assad government collapsed and Damascus, the capital, fell to opposition control. It remains unlikely that the Armenian mission will return to Syria and this almost certainly means permanent withdrawal.
Kazakhstan (2022)
In January 2022, Armenia deployed peacekeepers to Kazakhstan as part of a mission of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Widespread social unrest after New Year’s turned violent and its government asked for CSTO assistance on January 5 as Armenia’s Pashinyan chaired the CSTO Collective Security Council. A decision was made the next day to deploy CSTO peacekeepers for a limited period aimed at “stabilizing and resolving the situation” there. It represented the CSTO’s first military deployment in support of an ally.
One hundred Armenian personnel were deployed on January 7. They were transferred by Russian aircrafts and included female peacekeepers. Armenian personnel were responsible for guarding the Aksay bread factory, Almaty’s main bread supplier, and the Druzhba water utility pumping station, also in Almaty, to prevent its possible poisoning. As the situation stabilized, they returned to Armenia a week later, on January 14.
Similar to the deployment in Syria, Pashinyan’s decision to send Armenian troops to Kazakhstan faced widespread criticism. A coalition of pro-Western NGOs condemned it as “short-sighted and irresponsible.” With its proactive approach, Yerevan tried, in Pashinyan’s words, to strengthen the CSTO’s “crisis response mechanisms.” Security Council chief Armen Grigoryan further defended the move, similarly emphasizing Armenia’s interest in ensuring the CSTO’s effective functioning. However, the organization’s lukewarm response and perceived inaction after Azerbaijan’s September 2022 attack on Armenia ultimately led Yerevan to freeze its membership.
Footnote:
[1] Kazakhstan’s involvement includes a Russian-led operation in Tajikistan in 1993, participation in the UN mission in Lebanon, and contributions to U.S.-led operations in Iraq.
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