In Search of Bayraktar: From Myth to Margin in Modern Warfare

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On December 14, 2024, Ukraine launched a drone attack on the Russian city of Kazan, 1,000 kilometers from the frontline. At least one of the eight drones was identified as Ukraine’s Lyitiy model, a light, aircraft-like unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The drones temporarily shut down the airport, causing substantial property damage, though no casualties were reported. This was the first major drone operation in the Ukraine-Russia conflict in some time, bringing drones back into the spotlight and reigniting debates about their evolving role and strategic impact in modern warfare.

Just days later, on December 25, the downing of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 further shifted attention to the challenges of aerial combat against UAVs. The Embraer 190 aircraft, en route from Baku to Grozny, was reportedly misidentified as a hostile target by Russian air defenses near Grozny. A Russian Pantsir air defense system allegedly engaged the plane, leading to its crash and resulting in 38 fatalities out of 67 passengers and crew. This incident occurred amid active engagements between Russian forces and Ukrainian drones in the region. On high altitudes, systems like the Pantsir struggle to effectively distinguish civilian aircraft from UAVs like those used by Ukraine. Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems had also reportedly disrupted the plane’s communications shortly before the incident. Moreover, the effectiveness of such systems is often compromised during large-scale drone swarms and coordinated attacks, as demonstrated by Ukrainian tactics. 

A Myth in the Making

Drones rose to near-mythical status after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, with headlines hailing them as game-changers in modern conflict. I challenged this narrative, arguing that while UAVs like the Bayraktar TB-2 clearly mattered on the battlefield, their supposed dominance often overshadowed the role of broader tactics and combined arms. Now, in Ukraine, the TB-2’s reputation faces another test. Once championed for its battlefield prowess, it is increasingly meeting its match in Russia’s expanding EW arsenal. This shift invites a reassessment of its current effectiveness—how much of its once-touted advantage remains and what that says about the ever-shifting balance between cutting-edge technology and equally sophisticated countermeasures.

The Bayraktar TB-2 is a Turkish-made, medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) tactical drone equipped with precision-guided munitions and advanced imaging systems. It can carry laser-guided missiles, engage targets from a distance, and perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Compared to larger Western platforms like the U.S.-made MQ-9 Reaper, the TB-2 is smaller, carries fewer weapons, and operates at a shorter range. Its affordability and simpler logistics—requiring fewer specialized ground systems—make it accessible to militaries that can’t invest in heavier, pricier UAV fleets. However, what catapulted it into the global spotlight was its real-world performance, and the viral media coverage of its performance in Nagorno-Karabakh and early in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the TB-2 was showcased hitting high-profile targets such as anti-air systems and armored vehicles, fueling talk of a “drone revolution.” The hype reached new heights in early 2022 when clips emerged of the TB-2 striking Russian forces in Ukraine. Social media platforms were flooded with dramatic footage, while Ukrainians even composed songs celebrating the drone as a vital defense against aggression. Fast-forward to 2025, and it is time to ask: What happened to the “game changer”? Let’s see how and why the Bayraktar TB-2’s once-unquestioned star status has faced a reality check amidst hardened defenses.

The Standard-Bearer

“Bayraktar” means “flag-bearer” in Turkish—a fitting name for an unmanned aerial vehicle that has put Turkey’s defense industry into the international spotlight. It is produced by Baykar Makina, founded by members of the Bayraktar family. Early on, Baykar garnered attention by offering drones that balance affordability and effectiveness. Azerbaijan was one of the first high-profile buyers of the platform. Ukraine soon followed suit, purchasing the drones before and during its battles against Russia—footage of successful strikes helped elevate the Bayraktar TB-2 to near-celebrity status. Beyond these headline cases, countries like Qatar, Morocco, and even Poland (the first NATO member to do so) have acquired Bayraktar TB-2s, drawn by their lower cost, modular design, and relatively straightforward logistics.

One person at the heart of Baykar’s success is its CEO, Selçuk Bayraktar—a local celebrity in Turkey and a prime example of the country’s emerging Islamic elite. Not only does he serve as the company’s public face, delivering talks at universities and public forums, but he is also President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s son-in-law. This close political connection has proven pivotal in aligning Baykar’s drone production with Turkey’s broader foreign policy goals.

Baykar symbolizes Turkey’s push for a more independent defense industry—reducing reliance on foreign suppliers while showcasing national technical prowess. The anticipated arrival of the TB-3, an upgraded successor to the TB-2, underscores Turkey’s ambition to stay on the cutting edge. But the TB-2 is a valuable diplomatic asset beyond advanced engineering and financial success. By offering a capable yet more accessible drone to countries looking for alternatives outside the West, Russia, or China, Turkey is positioning itself as a key and alternative ally for smaller states. In this sense, each battlefield success of the TB-2 bolsters Turkey’s vision of cementing its place on the global stage.

Beyond its battlefield successes, Bayraktar is a prime example of high-level, professional “hype-building”. This isn’t to suggest its capabilities are exaggerated—the TB-2 is undoubtedly effective—but in how Turkey has consistently amplified its strengths, positioning it as a standout system in a competitive market. A proven record in real-world conflicts is essential for any weapon’s credibility and each engagement provides Baykar with valuable data to refine and enhance the drone against emerging countermeasures. This “combat-proven” status is a key selling point, reassuring potential buyers that their investments are battle-tested. Turkey has actively ensured the TB-2’s battlefield exposure—by joining or facilitating conflicts. This prompts analysts to ask, “Where’s Turkey’s next war?” and how the drone’s role could continue to evolve. 

Baykar targets nations that, for budget or regulatory reasons, can’t access—or are not permitted to acquire—more sophisticated Western drones. Yet the real “game-changer” here is not so much the drone itself; it never was. Rather, it is the tactical narrative crafted around it, magnified by social media and the global appetite for military spectacle. Turkey’s pragmatic creativity has demonstrated that weapons systems are not exempt from this kind of modern-day “brand-building.” In pursuing a more independent defense economy, Turkey has leveraged this strategy to great effect—showing that the power of perception can sometimes rival the power of the platform itself.

The grand campaign began in Nagorno-Karabakh, where videos showed relentless airstrikes taking out Armenian targets. With air defenses and EW nearly ineffective, the drones roamed the skies unchecked, dealing heavy losses and psychological blows to Armenian troops and civilians alike. At the same time, the real audience extended far beyond the battlefield. Professionally edited videos of these strikes appeared on Baku’s billboards and across social media all over the globe, turning drone warfare into a hot topic among bloggers, journalists, and military experts. 

In Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan employed an integrated strategy that combined EW, multiple drone platforms, and real-time intelligence. TB-2s benefited from a larger umbrella of coordinated assets, including decoy drones and spoofing operations, which helped neutralize or expose Armenian defenses. By the time TB-2 footage was released to the public, it seemed as though a single platform was responsible for Azerbaijan’s success, obscuring the deeper synergy of complementary systems working behind the scenes. A significant number of the “TB-2 strikes” circulating online were from kamikaze drones with more impressive explosive payloads. Additionally, many clips featured the same strike from multiple angles, magnifying the public perception of an unstoppable drone force. 

The strategic value of these platforms have already been discussed in some detail, but it is worth noting that media coverage was sometimes more precise than the actual hits on the ground. Then came Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Aiming for a lightning victory, Russian forces soon found themselves exposed to TB-2 strikes. Ukraine invested considerable funds and faith into the drone, which was a windfall for Turkey and Baykar. Once again, headlines proclaimed a new era of warfare. It seemed that the TB-2 narrative, first shaped in Nagorno-Karabakh, was reaffirmed against one of the world’s most formidable armies. But was this truly a testament to the drone’s unbeatable edge—or was the hype telling even a bigger story than reality?

Reality Check

Early in its invasion, Russia focused on speed and scale, attempting to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses with waves of attacks. There was a crucial lesson that Russia failed to learn from Nagorno-Karabakh. Without frontlines or methodical, step-by-step advances—complete with solid air defenses and reliable intelligence—Russia’s rushing columns became prime targets for the Bayraktar TB-2. Moving so quickly made it almost impossible to safeguard against small, low-flying drones. As a result, the TB-2 was able to slip behind Russian lines and strike with relative impunity, highlighting how outdated tactics can become liabilities in modern warfare. The Ukrainian chapter of the TB-2 hype was swift and spectacular.

Then, almost without warning, the once-flooded feeds of TB-2 strike footage practically dried up. Ukraine had been eager to ramp up local production of the Bayraktar just a short time ago, yet the enthusiasm gradually faded. What happened to the TB-2? The drone was always vulnerable—Armenia simply lacked the means to prove it in Nagorno-Karabakh. But when the Bayraktar TB-2 clashed with Russian forces in early 2022, the story changed.

Hastily advancing Russian columns offered prime targets, allowing Ukraine’s TB-2s to wreak havoc. Videos of stranded or destroyed Russian armor littered social media, showcasing one of the war’s earliest shocks. But unlike Armenia, Russia had the resources to adapt. As the frontlines solidified, Russian units dug in, deployed layered air defenses, ramped up their own drone capabilities, and improved their EW. Under these new conditions, the TB-2 lost much of its advantage. Today, the drone remains relevant but largely relegated to reconnaissance and artillery spotting. Once hyped as the ultimate “game-changer,” the TB-2 has now been pushed to the periphery by Russia’s evolving defensive arsenal.

Russia’s Countermeasures

Russia has demonstrated that combining advanced air defenses with EW can swiftly expose a drone’s true limitations. EW revolves around manipulating radio and electromagnetic signals to jam or spoof enemy systems, shield friendly equipment from interference, and detect hostile transmissions for counteraction. This high-tech toolkit has proven especially challenging for drones like the Bayraktar TB-2, forcing them to operate more cautiously. 

Among these, the Krasukha-4 stands out as a powerful platform capable of disabling surveillance and targeting radars from miles away, effectively blinding the drone’s ability to gather real-time intelligence or precisely locate targets. Equally concerning for TB-2 operators is the RB-341V (Leer-3) system, which combines Orlan-10 UAVs with sophisticated jammers and a command post housed on a KamAZ-5350 truck. By mimicking cell towers, Leer-3 can interrupt enemy mobile networks, intercept subscriber data, and even send out fake audio or video messages—adding a potent layer of psychological warfare to the battlefield.

Once these tools are deployed around key infrastructure or major troop concentrations, the TB-2’s once-lethal raids become dramatically riskier. Drone operators may suddenly lose contact with their drones, forcing them to abandon strikes or risk losing the aircraft altogether. In some cases, the drone might even be lured off course by misleading coordinates, steering it into hostile territory. Even if a TB-2 successfully evades initial jamming, every sortie risks revealing the drone’s flight path to advanced detection systems, narrowing the window for repeat attacks.

This integrated EW “shield” undercuts many advantages that once made the TB-2 so formidable. Russia’s military integrates EW across all branches—land, sea and air—treating it as a linchpin of modern operations rather than a mere add-on. Commanders see EW as pivotal for crippling an enemy’s ability to communicate, coordinate, and gather intelligence. One standout system is the “Moscow-1,” which surveys the electromagnetic environment and synchronizes various EW units. Meanwhile, “Murmansk-BN” specializes in jamming short-wave transmissions, allegedly capable of undermining NATO radar and communication networks on a massive scale. “Sapphire” is a cutting-edge system engineered to detect and suppress drones almost automatically. Weapons like the Harpoon-3 and Silok employ electromagnetic pulses to disrupt and sever a drone’s control links. 

Russia’s EW arsenal also includes technology aimed at smaller, fast-emerging threats. One such tool is Zerkaltse, reportedly tailored to disable FPV (first-person view) drones, which have become popular due to their low cost and ease of use. By targeting a drone’s communication links, Zerkaltse can disrupt its operator’s video feed or control signals, effectively blinding the pilot and forcing the UAV out of action. These systems illustrate why EW has become as decisive as traditional firepower, making the control of the electromagnetic spectrum a crucial front in modern combat.

Russian forces also target high-precision Western munitions that rely on GPS for accuracy. For example, Russia employs advanced jamming technologies against Excalibur rounds launched from the M142 HIMARS and the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), which can fire 12 GMLRS or Extended-Range (ER) GMLRS rockets, as well as ATACMS missiles. Additionally, Russia disrupts JDAM-ER bombs deployed from military aircraft, interfering with their GPS guidance systems. While these precision weapons remain highly effective under normal circumstances, they depend on stable satellite signals to hit their targets. That reliance offers a prime opening for Russia’s EW units, which can degrade GPS accuracy or block it outright.

The enduring lesson is clear: even the most “game-changing” system can be outmaneuvered once adversaries commit enough resources and ingenuity to counter it. Even if the Bayraktar TB-2 somehow slips past Russia’s electronic jammers, it still has to contend with a more brute-force obstacle:  Pantsir-S1 (commonly called “Pantsir”), a combined surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system. Specifically designed to defend against low-altitude aerial targets like drones, the Pantsir uses radar, electro-optical sensors, and rapid-fire cannons or short-range missiles to track and neutralize incoming UAVs.

However, the TB-2 has a noteworthy advantage in terms of cost and producibility. A TB-2 with its ground control elements is significantly cheaper than a Pantsir battery. Drones are also much faster to build, repair, and replace. If one or two TB-2s are lost, Ukraine (or another operator) can potentially replace them quickly, while each Pantsir unit is expensive and requires highly trained personnel to operate.

This imbalance forms the concept of “attrition warfare.” The Pantsir might be lethal when it comes to shooting down drones, but every interception demands resources—missiles, maintenance, and time. Meanwhile, TB-2 operators can deploy multiple drones simultaneously, forcing the Pantsir to reveal its position or expend ammunition. Moreover, operators can pair the TB-2 with decoy drones or use EW measures, making the Pantsir’s job even tougher and more resource-intensive.

Ultimately, the outcome depends on whether the attacking side can afford to lose and replace drones more easily than the defending side can maintain and rearm its high-value air defense systems. Thus, while the Pantsir system remains a potent counter to the Bayraktar TB-2, it is far from a guaranteed shield against an opponent prepared to exploit the attrition balance. Ultimately, Russia managed to neutralize the Bayraktar TB-2 by expertly blending sophisticated EW with powerful air defense systems like Pantsir, which by no means is the only tool in their arsenal. No single system can guarantee long-term dominance on the battlefield.

The EW Race

Russia and China are projected to nearly double their combined EW investment from $2.5 billion in 2024 to $5.1 billion by 2033. China’s recent military restructuring to focus on “intelligentized” warfare, combining electronic, space and cyber capabilities, shows how serious they are about dominating this space.

The United States is not sitting idle, though. To catch up with Russia and China, the United States poured a whopping $5 billion in EW capabilities in 2024. Moreover, recent projects like Lockheed Martin’s new helicopter-mounted EW system and the Army’s AI-powered jamming detector show America is racing to stay ahead. The message is clear: whoever masters EW will be more confident in tomorrow’s battlespace.

The Road to a Drone Legend and Back

Armenia’s series of strategic blunders—compounded by Russia’s decision not to step in—led to the dire outcome in Nagorno-Karabakh and thrust the Bayraktar TB-2 into the global spotlight. Azerbaijan exploited critical gaps in Armenian defenses, showcasing dramatic TB-2 footage that overshadowed the more intricate reality of combined-arms warfare. In doing so, they elevated the TB-2 to near-mythic status—setting the stage for its next major tests on battlefields where more sophisticated countermeasures awaited.

Russia failed to heed the obvious lessons from Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing itself to learn the hard way. But unlike Armenia, Russia proved resourceful enough to push the drone threat back effectively. This reinforces a crucial assessment: while drones like the TB-2 are decisive and far-reaching technologies, they are not revolutionary game-changers, nor are they invincible.  Russia demonstrated this clearly. Proper EW, combined with the right strategy and robust air defenses, has now relegated the TB-2 to the periphery of the battlefield, limiting its once-dominant role.

For Armenia, the lesson is stark and immediate—the race is not over, and it never will be. As drone technology continues to advance, so too will the countermeasures designed to neutralize them. Armenia must invest in both offensive and defensive capabilities. Drawing from my first-hand experience serving in EW units, I can attest to the critical importance of robust defensive systems. During my military service, deficiencies in EW capabilities often rendered systems nearly inoperable, highlighting the dire need for continuous investment and improvement.

In the wake of Azerbaijan’s recent military budget increase to an unprecedented $5 billion, Armenia has neither time nor room to lose. This surge underscores the necessity of swiftly enhancing both drone technologies and the sophisticated countermeasures required to protect against them. Additionally, Russia’s EW advancements did not happen overnight․ The sophistication of systems like Krasukha-4 and Leer-3 underscores that Russia has long possessed the tools to neutralize advanced drone threats effectively. Yet, when it came to aiding Armenia in countering the drone onslaught during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia chose inaction. Russia always could make a difference but opted not to. 

The interplay between offensive drone technology and defensive countermeasures underscores a fundamental truth in modern warfare: no single system can guarantee long-term dominance on the battlefield. Instead, it is the harmonious combination of diverse and complementary defenses that shifts the balance of power. Armenia must invest wisely in both drone advancements and the sophisticated countermeasures necessary to protect against them. Only through such balanced and strategic investments can Armenia hope to withstand contemporary conflicts and build a more resilient defense posture for the future, especially in light of Azerbaijan’s threats over Armenia’s efforts to strengthen its military.

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