European Peace Facility’s First Assistance Measure for Armenia

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On July 22, the Council of the European Union adopted the first assistance measure under the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the Armenian Armed Forces. This decision was made alongside the European Commission’s decision to launch a dialogue on visa liberalization to support Armenia in its long-term goal to achieve a visa-free regime with the EU. 

Both decisions were endorsed in the context of ongoing negotiations for the EU-Armenia new Partnership Agenda. Since October 2023, top Armenian officials, including the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament and the Foreign Minister, have cautiously implied EU membership aspirations of the Armenian people for the first time, generating a discourse about Armenia’s “pivoting” towards the West. While some analysts warn about the potential negative implications of such a move, Armenia hasn’t submitted a formal request for candidacy, causing dissatisfaction among the extra-parliamentary liberal opposition and civil society. The complexities of the perspectives of Armenia’s European integration will be addressed in the next article.

As with the deployment of the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA), perceptions about adopting the EPF measure have been diverse among the Armenian public. Unsurprisingly, they have also elicited nervous reactions from Baku and Moscow, escalating to the point of condemnation.

This article will analyze why the EU decided to provide assistance to Armenia from the EPF, the significance of the measure, and the various perceptions of this decision among various circles in Armenia, as well as hostile reactions by Azerbaijan and Russia.

More Than a Year to Approve Armenia’s Request

Armenia first applied for assistance under the EPF in June 2023 without much advance advocacy for its approval. The request was supported by France and advocated by Anders Rasmussen, former Secretary General of NATO. Armenia’s request caught the EU by surprise and without reaching its member states for consideration, was quickly rejected by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell. According to EU and Armenian officials interviewed under Chatham House rules, in his response Borell referred to the deployment of the EU Mission in Armenia, the EU’s role in facilitating the normalization of relations and the peace process, and its efforts aimed at de-escalation and confidence-building between Armenia and Azerbaijan as sufficient. While it was not a definitive rejection, he implied that the EU did not consider an EPF assistance to Armenia necessary at that time and expressed willingness to discuss support for security sector reform in Armenia.

The deployment of the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) became an effective soft deterrent for Armenia’s border security and prevented further military offensives and creeping annexation of border areas by Azerbaijan. The EUMA is widely appreciated in Armenia, with the exception of illiberal pro-Russian circles who occasionally spread false narratives about both the mission’s effectiveness and the EU’s agenda. The mission is strongly criticized by Azerbaijan and Russia, which tried to prevent its deployment, and spread explicit disinformation about it after its deployment as part of their hybrid war against Armenia. Azerbaijan and Russia claim that the EUMA does not contribute to peace and stability in the region but instead  creates “dividing lines and geopolitical competition.” The EU, the U.S. and France have also become targets of that hybrid war due to their support to Armenia’s security and sovereignty. 

While proving to be effective in stopping further Azerbaijani military advances on the territory of Armenia, the EU and the U.S., failed to stop Azerbaijan’s blockade and its 2023 military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. This led to the forced displacement of its entire Armenian population, constituting ethnic cleansing. They were largely pursuing soft mediation based on “liberal peace”, which was dismissed by Azerbaijan, who took advantage of its role as an energy supplier for the EU, the imbalance of power between Azerbaijan and Armenia, thus normalizing the use of force and challenging the international human-rights based liberal governance system.

Due to the lack of consensus among EU members, and obstructed by member states with close relations with Azerbaijan because they receive gas from it, the Council of the European Union did not condemn Azerbaijan’s conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. Joseph Borrell made a statement on behalf of the EU “condemning the military operation by Azerbaijan against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and deploring the casualties and loss of life caused by this escalation.” The EU did not consider punitive measures towards Azerbaijan, and retained Azerbaijan as an alternative energy supplier to Russia.

While there was a common assumption among most EU member states and institutions that Azerbaijan would stop its political and military coercion towards Armenia after its conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh and would sign a peace agreement, that did not happen. Baku began claiming that Armenians left Nagorno-Karabakh voluntarily, denying they were ethnically cleansed and exercised lawfare to justify its blockade and military aggression through the notion of restoration of its territorial integrity. At the same time, it continues to make expansionist claims and demands towards Armenia and sabotages the peace agreement by putting forth never-ending preconditions that undermine Armenia’s statehood, identity and territorial integrity. It also continues to aggressively arm itself with offensive military equipment and weaponry from Israel, Turkey, Serbia, Pakistan, as well as three EU member states — Italy, Bulgaria and Slovakia. It also continues to build military infrastructure, including dual-use airports along its borders with Armenia. 

In April 2024, Armenia decided to hand over the last areas under its control that were Azerbaijani under Soviet maps as goodwill and the first step for delimitation and demarcation. The decision triggered domestic turbulence led by the conservative opposition with alleged ties to the Kremlin. Some civil society members and experts also disagreed with the move due to the strategic location of the affected villages and the unilateral nature of such a concession. The likely agenda of external actors behind the conservative opposition movement and instrumentalizing security concerns of people was to provoke conditions for a new military offensive by Azerbaijan and a change of power in Armenia, leading to Russian intervention and increased military presence. However, the movement failed to mobilize a significant amount of people. Armenia also requested that Russia withdraw its border guards both from the demarcated section in Tavush and Zvartnots International Airport.  

However, Azerbaijan continued refusing to withdraw from more that 260 square kilometers of Armenia that it occupied through military offensives or creeping annexation in 2021-2023. Moreover, Russia and Azerbaijan have been increasingly aligning against Armenia, conducting joint hybrid war against it for the purpose of political and military coercion. Objectives of that hybrid war are to see Armenia diplomatically isolated, dependent on Russia for its security, and unable to defend itself against Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia have also been systematically intensifying their demand for an extraterritorial corridor through Armenia linking Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhichevan. 

It has become obvious that the huge discrepancy in the military balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia doesn’t contribute to peace. Instead, it emboldens Baku to continue threatening Armenia and obstructing the peace process and border delimitation. It aims to make Armenia capitulate to its never-ending demands, submit to its hegemony and lose its viability as a state. 

Armenia has been diversifying its foreign and security policy and pivoting towards the West since 2023. It suspended its membership in the CSTO in November 2022, and started purchasing armaments and military equipment from France and India. Russia has been intensifying its rhetoric against these moves, echoing Azerbaijan’s threats to use force against Armenia and allegedly instrumentalizing Armenia’s illiberal opposition to escalate protests against the authorities. Thus, Armenia’s security and defense are facing, on a regular basis, both conventional security and hybrid threats. 

This could explain why the EU eventually approved the provision of military assistance to Armenia. Restoration of Armenia’s defense capability and comparable power balance with Azerbaijan are necessary for peace and to strengthen Armenia’s sovereignty. France broke the taboo in late 2023, becoming the first EU member country to supply weapons and military technology to Armenia, which is formally still a CSTO member. The U.S. also began providing security assistance to Armenia through joint military exercises.

In this light, the issue of provision of non-lethal military assistance to Armenia became a regular agenda item for the EU in the aftermath of the conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan in 2023. However, Hungary had been blocking the consensus to approve the decision until July this year, because of its close relationship with Azerbaijan. It took months to overcome Hungary’s obstruction to the adoption of the measure on EPF assistance to Armenia. 

The Nature and Scope of EPF Assistance to Armenia

The approved EPF Assistance to Armenia’s Armed Forces provides for non-lethal support. Ten million euros will be allocated to enhance logistical capacities, improve protection of civilians in crises and emergencies, and accelerate the interoperability of Armenia’s Armed Forces. The adopted assistance measure will allow the provision of a fully-fledged deployable tent camp for a battalion-sized unit. It is to enable Armenia’s potential participation in EU-led missions and operations and contribute to the resilience of the country. 

Politically speaking, the EU underlines the increasing importance of security in EU-Armenia relations, the enhanced dialogue on foreign and security policy, shared values and the willingness to contribute to peace, stability and prosperity in Armenia and the South Caucasus.

EPF Assistance to Others

The EPF was established in 2021 to finance operations under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy to prevent conflicts and preserve peace. It has broadened the EU’s range of instruments to promote its security strategy globally, and to support EU military missions under its Common Security and defense Policy (CSDP). Originally, it was intended to enable third countries to combat terrorism and minimize migration in line with the EU’s strategic objectives. However, it expanded its scope to strengthen the military and defense capacities of third states and regional organizations in light of new security challenges in Sahel and in light of Russia’s war in Ukraine. It also became a solution to the legal obstacle of EU finance of military equipment from its budget. Thus it filled the gap between expectation and capacity in terms of technical support and military equipment. 

Within its first two years, the EPF provided military and security assistance to almost 20 countries in four regions–– the Eastern Partnership (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova), the Western Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Balkan Medical Task Forces), and the Middle East (Lebanon, Jordan) and Africa (African Union, Mozambique, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Benin, Ghana and Cameroon in the Gulf of Guinea and Somalia). The biggest beneficiaries of the EPF have been Ukraine and the African Union, for which the EPF has enabled several capacity-building projects.

In light of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the EPF expanded its scope of assistance. The EPF has committed to provide assistance worth a total of 11.1 billion euros to Ukraine. It has established a dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF) to deliver operational support to Ukraine, focusing on increased joint procurement from the European and Norwegian defense industries. Earlier, the EPF had committed to financing military medical units, including field hospitals, engineering, mobility and logistics units, and cyber support. Ukraine became the first country to which the EU agreed to provide military equipment with lethal force. The EU also assists the country with a military training mission to strengthen the capacities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including their ability to provide services to civilians in crises or emergency situations.  

While the decision of providing lethal equipment to Ukraine was first considered controversial and exceptional, on July 15, 2024, the EU decided to provide lethal equipment to Benin as well. Adding it to the non-lethal assistance released for Beninese Armed Forces earlier, the country is to receive up to 35 million euros in total, representing 27% of Benin’s defense budget. The support will include a multipurpose military aircraft, medical capacities and land medical evacuation capabilities, the creation of a national military academy for training pilots and aircraft mechanics, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance radar, command and control capacities, and training ammunition and small arms for operational purposes. Support for Benin is intended to combat violent extremism, which is an increasing threat to stability in its northern region, thus also contributing to peace and stability in the Gulf of Guinea. 

It is useful to compare the EPF assistance to Armenia with its measures for Moldova and Georgia, as countries comparable in terms of the nature and scope of their problems.

For the Moldovan Armed Forces, total EPF assistance measures are worth 88 million euros. They finance non-lethal equipment, supplies and services, and technical training. The approved equipment includes air surveillance, mobility and transportation, logistics, command and control, electronic warfare and cyber-defense equipment. The first measure for Moldova, adopted in 2021, was worth 7 million euros and aimed to build the capacities of the Military Medical Service and the Engineering Battalion to respond to crises or emergency situations. Subsequent measures with increased assistance have followed every year. The EU assistance to Moldova aims to address the challenges it faces due to Russia’s war against Ukraine and to strengthen the country’s resilience, security, and stability in the face of destabilizing activities by Russia. 

For the Georgian Defense Forces, a total of 62.75 million euros in assistance measures has been approved to finance non-lethal equipment, supplies and services, including technical training. The approved equipment includes engineering, command and control, medical, logistics and cyber-defense equipment. The EPF committed to help strengthen their capacities, including their ability to provide services to civilians in crises or emergency situations through the provision of non-lethal medical and engineering equipment and civilian-type mobility assets. The first EPF measure for Georgia, approved in 2021, allocated 12.75 million euros. However, in July 2024, the provision of the most recent measure, amounting to 30 million euros and approved in May 2024, was suspended due to Georgia’s decline in democracy and deterioration of its relations with the EU.

The EPF ensures adequate risk assessment and mitigating measures in compliance with international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and EU arms export laws. Assistance under the EPF can be suspended or terminated at any time by the Council in case of infringement and/or abuse. The EU has suspended EPF assistance not only to Georgia but also to Mali and Niger due to coups in those countries and its unwillingness to support the military regimes.

Reactions to the Adoption of the EPF Measure for Armenia

Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan called the decision to provide assistance to Armenia under EPF an important milestone. The liberal opposition, experts and civil society are also appreciative of this decision, some of them having advocated for it themselves. Some of them have increased unrealistic expectations of the EU after the adoption of this measure that needs to be managed.

Armenia’s Euro-sceptic circles point out that the amount of the approved assistance is not significant, and that the EU is leading Armenia to further deterioration of relations with Russia and increased insecurity without providing tangible security guarantees in exchange. Illiberal pro-Russian circles echo Russian rhetoric saying that the “EU is turning Armenia into a new Ukraine.” 

Maria Zakharova, Spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated that as the example of Ukraine shows, the EU has lost its peacemaking potential and adopted a course of militarization and confrontation, provoking bloodshed instead of peace, acting upon geopolitical calculations and serving the U.S. and NATO. 

Aykhan Hajizada, Spokesperson of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, has called the EU’s decision one-sided, biased and dangerous, serving to build up Armenia’s military, creating dividing lines and increasing tension in the region. He stated that Azerbaijan expects transparent information about the aid to be provided. He has warned the EU against militarization in the region, otherwise “the EU will share responsibility with Armenia for any possible destabilizing provocations.”

A number of EU member countries have made statements welcoming the EU’s decision to adopt the EPF assistance measure for Armenia. Among them are France, Greece, Cyprus, Netherlands, Belgium, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Czechia, at the level of their Foreign Ministers. European Parliament MPs from various member states such as Spain have also welcomed the decision and called for its increase.

Significance of the Measure

The realpolitik argument that the amount of 10 million euros of the first EPF assistance measure for Armenia is not significant, is valid from a purely technical point of view. However, the political significance and potential of approving assistance to Armenia through the EPF are significant.

1. The endorsement of the measure indicates that there is a consensus among EU member states and institutions about Armenia’s commitment to peace. It shows that the EU states have a general understanding of the defense, security, and hybrid threats that Armenia is facing. This measure proves their understanding that Armenia is willing to conclude peace with Azerbaijan; however, it needs to restore its defense system to counteract potential military offensives violating its territorial integrity. 
2. It also shows that they consider Armenia as sharing the EU’s values of democracy and human rights. They realize that even if Armenia is still formally Russia’s military ally and a CSTO member, it has effectively suspended its practical involvement with them. 
3. It is important to see that even if Azerbaijan’s partner countries in the EU can delay the approval of security assistance to Armenia, the consistent work of the Armenian diplomatic service eventually pays off and they eventually conform with the position of the majority of the EU members.
4. Even modest assistance to modernize Armenia’s defense system in line with Western standards matters. Recent years have shown the importance of upgrading logistics, military tents, and medical services for Armenia’s military personnel. Defense reform has various aspects, and modernization of non-lethal equipment and services is crucial. It is important to consider EPF assistance in the context of the weapons and equipment received from France and India, joint military exercises with the U.S., and defense cooperation with Greece and Cyprus.
5. Approval of a first EPF measure is difficult. As the example of other third countries shows, once approved in principle, the volume of assistance to Armenia may increase, given that it continues to follow its path towards peace and democracy without deviations and decline.
6. Most importantly, with the adoption of this measure, in combination with the EU Mission in Armenia, the political cost for Azerbaijan to launch another military offensive against Armenia increases further. Such a measure indicates that Armenia is not diplomatically isolated and enjoys a degree of support by the EU. 

Recommendations

Armenia should continue restoring and modernizing its defense system while negotiating a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. It should also seek to re-engage the EU in negotiations, especially with the upcoming U.S. elections. 

Armenia should intensify its institutional reforms and advance democracy. During negotiations for its new Partnership Agenda with the EU, it should formalize its aspirations for EU membership in October 2024.

Azerbaijan should stop placing pre-conditions before Armenia and obstructing the peace agreement and delimitation of borders with Armenia. It should also stop sidelining the EU from those processes. 

Azerbaijan should stop its rhetoric against support for Armenia by France, the U.S. and the EU for strengthening its security, defense and sovereignty. The UN Charter obliges each member state to be able to defend its borders and people. Instead, it should stop the aggressive arms race against Armenia and threats of the use of force and new military offensives. Armenia has no territorial claims and aggressive intentions in relation to Azerbaijan, and its resources and military capabilities are much smaller to constitute a threat for Azerbaijan.

The EU may also consider other forms of defense sector reform to Armenia, similar to the support provided to Moldova. Apart from equipment and weapons, Armenia needs defense advisory support to modernize its Armed Forces. France and the U.S. have committed to deploy defense advisers to Armenian defense institutions. Armenia can also benefit from the experiences of Finland, Estonia, Austria and other EU member countries with which it has commonalities in terms of the nature of the threats, size, or geographical relief.

The EU should partner with the U.S. to restore its mediation role in the peace process. If Azerbaijan continues to set preconditions before Armenia to obstruct the peace agreement and delimitation process, the EU should increase its assistance through the EPF. The liberal peace approach and soft mediation are not effective with autocratic Azerbaijan and only embolden it to exploit the power imbalance and normalize coercion, threats, or the use of force. If Azerbaijan launches another military offensive against Armenia and makes further military advances in its territory, it will further normalize the use of military force and exacerbate the problems related to Russia’s war in Ukraine, and threats against Moldova and Georgia. It will also complicate the EU’s energy cooperation with Azerbaijan. Only the recognition that Armenia can defend its borders will compel Azerbaijan to cease obstructing the peace agreement, and the delimitation process, and respect international governance.

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