Of Republic, Order and Decay

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Wir ordnens. Es zerfällt.
Wir ordnens wieder und zerfallen selbst.

We impose order on it. It falls into decay.
We arrange it anew and crumble ourselves.
– Rainer Maria Rilke[1]

Introductory Remarks

This piece, consisting of two interconnected sections, offers a brief review of classical republican theory and Florentine political history to contextualize the challenges facing the Armenian Republic. As such, it does not intend to merely give commentary on current affairs, but to offer a way of recasting Armenian history without having to renounce what makes up our historical identity. 

Therefore, it will touch upon domestic issues and narratives expounded by both the government and the anti-government movement, led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan. The clash between two sides can be seen as a clash of two Armenias, to use an expression from the Prime Minister himself: the historical and the real Armenia. Both of these categories, however, depart from reality and do not offer solutions, as will be argued. The comparison between Armenia and the Florentine Republic of the late Renaissance will serve as both a warning and an illustration of the vulnerability of republics, seeking legitimacy and stability in the flux of history.  

Machiavelli’s Florence 

Republics are notoriously hard to maintain; such is the gist of classical republican theory as summarized by French philosopher Montesquieu in a telling passage from his Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline: 

What makes free states last a shorter time than others is that both the misfortunes and the successes they encounter almost always cause them to lose their freedom. In a state where the people are held in subjection, however, successes and misfortunes alike confirm their servitude. A wise republic should hazard nothing that exposes it to either good or bad fortune. The only good to which it should aspire is the perpetuation of its condition.[2]

The verdict of Montesquieu is succinct and clear: republics should tend to their self-preservation by not exposing themselves to fortune. Montesquieu’s reference to fortune (in Italian, fortuna), as well as his advice of caution to republics, are of Machiavellian, or rather Florentine, provenance. For Machiavelli, and by extension for Montesquieu, fortune signified the external threats that a republic can face. It was in Italy, after a long break, that the republican form of government was revived with all its attendant ramifications in political thought.[3] Nowhere in Italy, more than in Florence, did the republican theory find greater expounders and more daring visionaries. 

Interestingly, much of the highly original intellectual output was generated during the republic’s crisis years, after the end of Medici rule behind a republican façade. By 1494, the republic was in disarray, Medici rule had been overthrown and Italy, which was then a mosaic of different states, was invaded by Charles VIII of France. His invasion brought millenarian ideas to the Florentine Republic. Briefly, the Republic even experienced theocratic rule under the prophetic leader Savonarola, who designated Florence as the place on earth where the return to Grace would commence after the apocalypse. However, Savonarola soon fell out of favor with Pope Alexander VI and was excommunicated in 1497, after failing to obey the Pope’s summons. In 1498, the prophetic preacher met his end at the hands of civic and Church authorities. 

It is precisely at this juncture that Machiavelli takes the stage with his political philosophy and analysis of the causes of the republic’s failure and its possible regeneration. His idea was to show, through meticulous historical analysis, how republics deal with crises by mastering  fortuna, which was the agent of change and instability. Because a republic exists in time and cannot rid itself of the temporal ramifications of the secular order, it cannot escape the currents of change unleashed by fortuna.[4] Moreover, it is apparent that even the passage of time alone can have a decaying effect on the order established by the republic. In The Prince we read: “In quiet times [rulers] never [think] that things change.”[5] Thus, change is constant and so is the republic’s struggle to maintain order.    

Machiavelli posits that it is through virtú (from Latin virtus), an ability of an individual or society to act politically or militarily, that the republic can impose its will on fortuna and save itself from its snares. However, virtú is limited in quantity and always prone to decreasing. Once its source is sapped, there needs to be a return to the beginnings of the republic to regenerate it. In other words, Machiavelli proposes an innovatio of the republic. This innovatio, though reminiscent of the English “innovation”, does not only presuppose creating something new but rather signifies renewing the old order, a return to its original state.[6] By such means Machiavelli supposes the republic can recover its lost virtú and reestablish the order by weathering the storm of fortuna.   

While virtú is the means by which a republic can tame fortuna and establish command over it, the republic can never hope for such circumstances to continue indefinitely. Therefore, when virtú becomes scarce, a return to the beginnings is needed to counter the change. 

Each successive innovation is a restoration of the original state of affairs and first principles. Only in this way can a republic withstand the atrophic effects of time and change imposed by fortuna. Such is the lesson passed down to generations of political philosophers in Europe and beyond by Machiavelli. This lesson is articulated by Montesquieu’s aforementioned passage, albeit in a more condensed form. 

Machiavelli’s Florence never recovered from the severe blows of fortuna, and the republican order had to yield to the dynastic rule of the Medicis (1532). After a brief interregnum, the Medicis came back to power in Florence, this time not as covert but as apparent despots. 

Ubi Armenia[7]: Between the Historical and the Real

So, how does Armenia, in its current state of affairs, figure into this discussion? Direct comparisons would be both uniformed and rash, even though it seems tempting to compare Archbishop Galstanyan with Savonarola. Fortunately, Archbishop Galstanyan is not a figure of Savonarola’s caliber, and he does not command the prophetic rhetoric and tone of the latter. If we set aside the personalities involved, there are certain similarities between the circumstances of contemporary Armenia and the Italian republics from the 14th to early 16th centuries. 

Firstly, it is important to look at the South Caucasus in general to understand Armenia’s geopolitical situation. This region is home to newly independent states that were once part of the Soviet Union and, before that, the Russian Empire. If it weren’t for the short-lived republics formed in the process of the Russian Empire’s breakup, the transition from imperial to Soviet rule would have been almost seamless. 

Armenia and Georgia have been struggling for quite some time to rid themselves of Russian imperialism. This struggle involves overcoming their Soviet past, dealing with its complex legacy, and resisting Putin’s ambitions in the region. Both republics are in a constant fight to reassert themselves as autonomous regional actors and legitimize their sovereignty. In this sense, they are in a similar position vis-à-vis Russia as the burgeoning Italian republics were to the Empire. 

Bartolus’ famous dictum civitas sibi princeps (a city is an Empire unto itself) was devised to give legitimacy to the newly formed republics at a time when republican form of government had no other theoretical foundation.[8] As shown previously, the republic as a form of government was last practiced in Rome during classical antiquity, hence it needed to be contextualized and rethought in a post-imperial world. The South Caucasus is undergoing a similar process in a paradoxical post-imperial world order.[9]

After comparing the early modern Italian republics with those of the South Caucasus in rather general terms, it is time to examine the political discourses prevalent in Armenia. These discourses partly address the current crisis caused after the 2020 war. Both the government and anti-government forces, especially since the protests by the Tavush for Armenia movement, have presented differing and equally incorrect approaches to history and Armenian identity.   

Pashinyan’s discourse is perhaps the more well-known of the two. The Prime Minister hardly misses an opportunity to stress the dichotomy between historical and real Armenia. Recently, he stated that his love for real Armenia cannot be surpassed by anything else.[10] This discourse ties into his narrative about the possible peace treaty, which seems so close and yet so far away. 

On top of this, he also intends to introduce a new model of patriotism by substituting Mt. Ararat with Mt. Aragats or by renaming the history textbook from Հայոց (Armenian History) to Հայաստանի պատմություն (History of Armenia), as has been known for quite some time.[11] This onslaught against the historical Armenian identity is justified by his campaign for solidifying the Armenian state: Armenian people have been misled by foreign powers, our history has been written by empires, and needs to be remodeled to fit the state-centric view of the current government. 

Interestingly, Pashinyan is blind to the fact that the real Armenia is just as historical as historical Armenia and that the current republic is but a part of that greater whole. Few would disagree that by contrasting real and historical Armenia, Pashinyan, at least unwittingly, implies that the historical is a fake category, that history, in fact, is not real. This is a paradox inherent in Pashinyan’s discourse.[12] The only way to overcome this would be to accept the historicity of Armenia and not try to separate concepts that belong together. Instead of overcoming, we need to integrate our complex and multi-layered history into the life of the current republic.

On the other hand, we have the anti-government movement led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan. Although their discourse has constantly changed, some issues raised by the movement can be outlined succinctly. Archbishop Galstanyan’s movement is strongly against the government initiative of reshaping or remodeling Armenian identity. One participant of the movement expressed his ideas about their anti-government campaign, framing it as a fight against the government’s attempt to undermine the value system of Armenian identity, such as the idea of martyrdom for land.[13]

Moreover, an interesting theme has emerged. The opposition speaks of ավետյաց երկիր (promised land), and the Archbishop has claimed that the movement aims to achieve this promised land. This clearly evokes the lost territories, Artsakh above all else, implying that the movement envisages returning these territories or at least Armenians returning to these lands. Thus, temporal, secular issues are being handled with an eschatological approach. Both external and internal challenges faced by Armenia are understood in absolute terms, and the movement sees its victory as a final resolution to the crisis. Such an approach to the very tangible and imminent threats to Armenia, its statehood and ultimately its identity is as unconstructive as Pashinyan’s utopian peace treaty, which he believes will end the current crisis. Thus, both sides fail to accept reality and instead choose to deal with hypotheticals.[14] 

What Is to Be Done?

Letting go of the past can be dangerous. It is especially true in the case of republics, which are in a constant struggle to overcome the anthropic effects of change and need their past as a foundation to build upon. 

Pashinyan’s new patriotic program is doomed to failure because his innovatio does not take into account the complex history and identity of the republic he governs. Yet an innovatio is needed, because simply clinging to the idea of a promised land does not do us any favors. The idea of a promised land proposed by the anti-government movement aligns with the much older notion of sea-to-sea Armenia of Tigranes the Great. 

Hence, to overcome Tigranian imperialism, we should offer a similarly potent narrative that emphasizes Armenia’s historical identity instead of following Pashinyan’s approach. Unlike Florence, Armenia lacks a rich republican past, so we need to find new narratives in the country’s monarchic past, re-contextualized within a republican framework. Armenia’s current situation calls for a rehabilitation of King Artashes I, who can be considered a restorator orbis (restorer of the world) in Armenian history.[15] After all, Tigranes, who established the short-lived Armenian Empire, succeeded because Artashes had laid the groundwork for an empire. He initiated sweeping reforms by dividing and demarcating the land. Modern Armenia needs Artashesian reforms, not Tigranian imperialism. Since its independence, Armenia has needed the former, but belied by fortuna after the victorious war, and blinded by heightened sense of nationalism, chose to follow the latter.[16]

A republic should be chiefly concerned with its preservation and restore its order by returning to its beginnings. The Armenian Republic needs to come to terms with its own history and embrace it, not to find the glory days of a distant past, but to honor the arduous work of its founders. By choosing this path we can abandon the artificial division between historical and real Armenia. In other words, to reformulate a phrase of the Spanish author Salavador de Madariaga: Armenia needs to become one, with its many Armenias.[17] 

Concluding Remarks 

Armenia must innovate because the times and circumstances have changed drastically in and around the country. This innovation, as I aimed to show, should not come at the cost of relinquishing our past and symbols. Instead, we should integrate them even more into our social fabric and prevent faux nationalists from exploiting that past for their Quixotic initiatives. 

If Italy is the country born to revive things dead,[18] Armenia is the country that is destined to reinvent itself continuously without renouncing its past[19]. Khorenatsi wrote his history in Christian Armenia but did not shut the door on the country’s pre-Christian past. The Khachkar (Խաչքար), innovative as it is, is at least in part a restoration and reinterpretation of the old Vishapakar (Վիշապաքար) tradition, unique to Armenian Highlands, in the late antique Christian context.[20] The examples can go on ad infinitum. The current or any future Armenian government needs to find balance between the country’s historical past and its present because simply rejecting it is not the way forward. 

Footnotes: 

1. Die achte Elegie (The Eighth Elegy) from Duino Elegies. Translated into English by the author, the lines might slightly differ in meaning from the other English translations.
2. Chapter IX, Two Causes of Rome’s Ruin, p. 58. Italics added by the author. 
3. Felix Gilbert: History: Choice and Commitment, 1977, p. 94.
4. J.G.A. Pocock: The Machiavellian Moment, 1975, p. 84: “…republican theory faced the problem of explaining how a system of distributive justice, once defined as finite in space and time, could maintain its existence in a world where fortuna constantly presented threats which, because they were irrational, were always immediate rather than remote.” In general, the current article follows the same logic, which was outlined by Pocock in the above-cited book when treating Florentine political thought. 
5. The quote is taken from Benoît Godin: Innovation Contested, The Idea of Innovation over the Centuries, 2015, p. 58.
6. To be sure the meaning of innovatio in Machiavelli’s writings is complex and varied, while in The Prince innovatio is presented as the act by which the prince introduces new laws, in his later work, e.g. Discourses, Machiavelli uses innovatio in precisely the terms described above. The issue might be between the different forms of government, whereas a prince can innovate and introduce new laws, a republic is necessarily more conservative and innovates to restore the lost order. For more on this discussion see: Ibid., p. 66 
7. Where is Armenia?
8. Felix Gilbert: History: Choice and Commitment, p. 94.
9. Azerbaijan, the odd one out, being a dictatorship through and through does not have similar issues, since just like the despotic regimes in Italy of early modernity so does Aliyev’s Azerbaijan derive its legitimacy from its imperialist partners, Turkey and Russia. It is safe to say that after the victorious outcome of the 2020 Artsakh War, Aliyev has embarked on a journey of his own imperialist politics, albeit, this too, might be sanctioned by either Turkey or Russia. The recent events, which have transpired between France and Azerbaijan with regards to the unrests in New Caledonia are a tell-tale sign of the ambitions of Aliyev’s regime. 
10. Here’s a snippet of Pashinyan’s impassioned speech: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-8OoZGQXyuE
11. See Azatutyun’s article on this issue: ԿԳՄՍ նախարարությունն առաջարկում է «Հայոց պատմություն» առարկան վերանվանել «Հայաստանի պատմություն». 
12. See Civilnet’s interview with Ashot Voskanyan: Փաշինյանը, «Երկիր Նաիրին» ու պատմական Հայաստանը. զրույց Աշոտ Ոսկանյանի հետ.
13. 13. The Archbishop himself talks about the centrality of Ararat as a symbol of their movement. The reader can find copious evidence of the opposition’s discourse on the rather prolific YouTube channel of 168.am. 
14. The age old problem, i.e. Armenians’ inability to deal with the real, so well explained by Gaïdz Minassian in his What Is the Armenian People’s Relationship With “The Political”? rears its ugly head again.
15. Artashes has also earned the epithet Աշխարհակալ (Conqueror of the World) in historiography, but he is best remembered for his reforms.
16. On this see: Nerses Kopalyan, Why Armenia Lost and Why Azerbaijan Will Also Lose: The Trappings of Strategic Narcissism
17. De Madariaga’s phrase reads: “a Espanha é una com todas as suas Espanhas” (Spain is one with its many Spains), cited in: A. H. De Oliveira Marques: Breve História De Portugal, 2012, p. 12.
18. “…perchè questa provincia pare nata per risuscitare le cose morte”: Machiavelli, Dell’arte della Guerra, pp. 386-87. 
19. This is the crux of Gregory Areshian’s impeccable study of Armenian identity in his article: Historical Dynamics of the Endogenous Armenian, i.e. Hayots, Identity: Some General Observations, in: Reflections of Armenian Identity in History and Historiography, Los Angeles 2018, pp. 15-37.
20. Even though I have reached this conclusion on my own, the same idea has been expressed by Mikayel Badalyan, the former director of the Erebuni Museum. See his interview on Urartu and Etiuni, especially after the 30th minute.

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