The Current Discourse
Recently, the discourse about the transformation of foreign and security policies of Armenia, a small state facing significant security challenges in a volatile geopolitical environment, has been intensifying. International officials, political figures and academics have been debating whether Armenia is in the process of “pivoting” or “changing its vector”. The question arises as to whether Armenia will turn away from Russia and adopt an explicitly pro-Western foreign and security policy, or if it is only diversifying its partners to reduce its dependence on Russia. Furthermore, there is uncertainty about whether the ongoing transformation is irreversible, or if Armenia is maneuvering between power centers.
In recent years, Armenia’s relationship with Russia and its membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have become increasingly strained and turbulent. The political forces, civil society and the wider public in Armenia have been engaged in a debate about whether:
– Armenia should withdraw from the CSTO and review its bilateral relationship with Russia while maintaining bilateral Armenian-Russian agreements and keeping the Russian military base in Armenia;
– Armenia should withdraw from the CSTO and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union;
– Armenia should finalize the end of its formal alliance with Russia, and demand the withdrawal of the Russian base from Armenia.
Armenia negotiated a draft Association Agreement with the EU from 2010 to 2013. However, Russia disrupted this agreement by coercing Yerevan to join the Russian-led Customs Union, now known as the Eurasian Economic Union. Despite Russia’s coercion and geopolitical blackmail, Armenia has taken the path of democracy since the Velvet Revolution in 2018. The country reaffirmed its commitment to democracy in the 2021 snap elections. Armenia doesn’t share the same system of values as Russia and the CSTO countries, nor does it have common geopolitical interests with them.[1]
Yerevan hasn’t received any support from Russia or the CSTO, despite Russia’s treaty obligations to provide such support, especially in light of Azerbaijan’s incursions and creeping annexation of sovereign Armenian territories since 2021. Instead, it was the European Union that deployed a monitoring mission in Armenia as a soft deterrent against Baku’s violation of Armenia’s territorial integrity.
Russia has increasingly aligned itself with Azerbaijan in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and CSTO member countries have closer relations with Azerbaijan than Armenia. Furthermore, Russia has failed its mediation and peacekeeping role in Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in the ethnic cleansing of Armenians in September 2023.
Therefore, the choices that Armenia must make are defined by the risks and benefits associated with those options. It is important to consider whether these choices will escalate the already significant security challenges for Armenia without providing significant political dividends, economic benefits, and most importantly, security guarantees. Alternatively, these choices could create tangible new opportunities and enable reliable security mechanisms.
The question at hand is not only the security vacuum resulting from Russia’s and the CSTO’s lack of support for Armenia’s territorial integrity in the face of Azerbaijan’s incursions. It is also about the increasing alignment between Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Finally, Russia is likely to intensify its hybrid warfare against Armenia, including attempts to disrupt the ongoing transformation in Armenia’s policies and democratic reforms through domestic political turbulence.
If Armenia decides to break away from Russia and exit the CSTO, the discussion focuses on whether this is the right decision considering the threats it is currently facing. If it is indeed the right decision, the next question is what is the right momentum and further, what are the potential consequences:
– Neutrality or nonalignment and if yes, how would Armenia mitigate significant threats to its security in a hostile geopolitical environment, without belonging to any alliance or a coalition?
– Pivoting toward the West and expressing aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration? How far can Armenia go with such aspirations? Will it seek close cooperation or membership?
– If membership is the goal, should Armenia aspire to become only an EU member or also a NATO member? Are these aspirations realistic and is the West interested in accommodating such aspirations given Armenia’s geographical location at the periphery of the European neighborhood? These assessments raise questions about the long-term process of complying with EU norms, the complexity of reaching a consensus within the EU, and Turkey’s power of veto in NATO.
– If Armenia does not pursue membership, can it continue to closely cooperate with other power centers such as India, which is relatively uncontroversial, or Iran, but is stigmatized by the West.
– How about Russia? Should Armenia adopt a confrontation style in its relations with Russia, or should it aim at de-escalation to avoid further antagonization? Even if Armenia aims to maintain neutral relations with Russia, will Russia accept it, considering that it has been mostly the Russian side using antagonistic language toward the Armenian side?
The theory and practice of international relations (IR) offer conceptual frameworks for deep-trend analysis of Armenia’s foreign and security policies since it regained independence in 1991. The frameworks also help evaluate the choices Armenia is currently facing to pursue its interests in a highly volatile and complex geopolitical environment. These concepts include pivoting, hedging, balance of power, bandwagoning, diversification, non-bloc and small states, neutrality, nonalignment, “finlandization” and equal distancing. Let’s unpack those terms.
Introduction to Terms
Pivoting refers to a comprehensive change in foreign and security policy, shifting from one center of power to another. The concept of “pivoting” was first used in 1904[2] but has evolved since. According to IR scholars, pivot states possess military, economic or ideational strategic assets that are coveted by great powers. They are caught in the middle of great powers’ spheres of interest and leverage their assets to have relations with multiple great powers to preserve their interests. “A change in a pivot state’s association has important repercussions for regional and global security.”[3] Georgia has been considered as a “pivot’ state, and Ukraine is a recent example of a “pivot” state.
Hedging is a relatively recent concept in IR, referring to a national security or alignment strategy, undertaken by one state toward another, featuring a mix of cooperative and confrontational elements. Scholars use it to explain “how the states tend to respond to rising powers that may challenge their security interests” or “when they forge protective ties with a friendly great power, how do they guard against the possibility of abandonment”.[4] Hedging helps countries maintain the balance of power in the region in order to reduce the risks when they have chosen the side incorrectly. It is primarily applied to middle powers or small states. It can be demonstrated by a state through either simultaneous cooperation with two great powers, resulting in a balance of power, or by adjusting its relationship with one great power based on its relationship with another. For instance, Turkey[5] can be considered to be hedging NATO, and Hungary is doing the same with the EU. Other scholars describe hedging as a middle position between the two straightforward strategies of balancing and “bandwagoning”, displaying mixed elements of selective engagement, limited resistance, and partial deference.
Those concepts suggest more modern and nuanced approaches for the current situation of Armenia than the IR realist theory about “balancing” developed during the Cold War and “bandwagoning” developed in the post-Cold War period. These theories struggle to explain how states position themselves in the current geopolitical environment.
According to the key concept of realism and neorealism the “balance of power”, states, primarily motivated by their desire for survival and security, will either internally develop and implement military capabilities and hard power mechanisms to constrain the most powerful and rising state that poses a potential threat,[6] or they will ally with other states to balance the threat and gain more leverage over a dominant or rising power.[7] Obviously, the first option applies to larger states with larger resources, or for a specific situation such as Israel’s, and the second – small and medium states that have become a member of NATO, initially established to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” in the post-World War II period. Later, the concept of soft balancing emerged to describe the use of economic and diplomatic tools to constrain the powerful state and resist its exertion of dominance.
Bandwagoning is the alternative to the balance of power for neutralizing threats.[8] Some scholars have referred to the “balance of interests” as an alternative model, establishing “bandwagoning for profit,” that is, joining a conflict (on the seemingly stronger side) solely in the hopes of eventually obtaining material rewards.[9] Bandwagoning in IR means entering an unequal alliance or partnership with a stronger, adversarial power, and conceding disproportionate gains to avoid being taken by force.[10] According to realism, states bandwagon when they find themselves in a weak position with no possibility of building a balancing coalition or their geography makes balancing difficult, i.e. due to being surrounded with adversaries. Part II of this article will analyze how Armenia failed its intended policy of “balancing” and ended up “bandwagoning” with Russia from the end of the 1990s and the last few years.
Policy experts often use the notion of diversification for Armenia’s foreign and security policies as means for a change, to describe earlier and current Armenian policies. In the first case it rather refers to its past attempts of “balance of power” that were otherwise named as “complementarity” and “multi-vector policy” and in the current context – to its hedging.
Other Armenian experts have suggested declaring Armenia a non-bloc state. This would mean nonalignment or neutrality for Armenia. These two concepts have similarities but are not the same. A neutral country is one that chooses not to take part in a war between other countries. In line with international law, such as the 1907 Hague Conventions, neutrality assumes not to allow any part of its territory to be used for military purposes by one side of the conflict. It doesn’t necessarily mean they cannot express political support for a side to the conflict. Some countries declare long-term or permanent neutrality that can be used both during armed conflicts and in peacetime relations with potential warring parties.[11]
Some scholars believe that neutrality or nonalignment, which were widely applied during the Cold War, have become difficult to maintain in the current geopolitical situation. Others argue that neutrality has outlived its original purpose of providing security and stability in Europe.”[12]
After the world wars of the previous century, several European small states –– Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, Malta, Sweden and Finland adopted neutrality as a strategic option. Small states can be defined as states having limited abilities to mobilize resources, which can be material, relational, or normative.[13] They lack power in terms of their capabilities as well as in terms of their relationship to others. This limits their ability to remain autonomous and influence others,[14] as well as limited power to prevent others from affecting its policy choices.[15] Small states try to compensate for their lack of influence by joining an alliance or a coalition[16] to counterbalance threats from more powerful actors.[17] Alignment provides small states with protection by a great power, but at the expense of their strategic autonomy[18] or within an international or regional organization.[19]
Finland’s case has been most comparable to Armenia’s. It has a direct border with Russia with which it has a history of conflict, including two conventional wars. In August 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union agreed that Finland belonged in the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. Finland fought against the Soviet Union twice during World War II but was defeated in both conflicts. In 1940, Finland collaborated with Germany in an effort to recover its territorial losses and evacuate Finns. However, it was defeated by Soviet Russia for the second time in 1944. As a result, Finland had to evacuate 400,000 Finns from Karelia and conceded 10% of its territory to Soviet Russia. In exchange, Finland prevented the sovietization of Finland. The independence of Finland was confirmed in the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948, after which Finland adopted the status of neutrality. Finland’s further policies throughout the Cold War were conciliatory not to antagonize the Soviet Union.
It received the name “finlandization”, which has been considered offensive in the Finnish foreign policy discourse. As its former Prime Minister Alexander Stubb explained in 2022, the term meant “allowing a foreign power to dictate the country’s domestic politics due to foreign policy concerns and ‘circumstances’, i.e threats.” In the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine, some analysts explored Ukraine’s potential “neutralization” or “finlandization” as a possible negotiated buffer to address Russian grievances linked to NATO expansion. However, Ukraine and most NATO Allies opposed this idea, stating that NATO membership is the only security guarantee for Ukraine. NATO Allies agreed to expedite Ukraine’s NATO membership. Finland, on the other hand, has made significant progress since the end of the Cold War. It has developed high standards and became a EU member in 1995. Finland also advanced its security cooperation within the NATO Partnership for Peace program, achieving a high level of interoperability and contribution, and becoming a NATO member through the fastest accession process.
While Finland and Sweden decided to become NATO members in light of Russia’s war in Ukraine, other neutral European states such as EU members Austria, Ireland and Malta, and non-EU Switzerland have remained neutral. However, the war in Ukraine made it difficult for them to preserve their neutral status.[20] The nature of Switzerland’s neutrality has shifted as it joined the EU’s sanctions against Russia.[21] Membership in the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) requires EU member states to align with the EU’s positions. Austria has faced criticism for its non-critical approach towards Russia in the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Austria is contributing to the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) but Ireland and Malta have found it incompatible with the principle of military non-alignment: Instead, Ireland is one of the largest contributors to the UN peacekeeping missions.
Despite historically tense relations with Russia due to the Russian role in conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as its close partnership with Ukraine, the incoming EU candidate Georgia has tried to maintain a relatively neutral policy towards Russia since the war in Ukraine. However, this stance has also drawn criticism.
Most countries in the Global South have been trying to maintain neutrality regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine. Many are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a forum consisting of 120 developing countries that are not formally aligned with or against any major power alliance. Some developing countries, especially those in Africa, have mixed feelings about the Russian-Ukrainian war. They are influenced by Russia’s growing influence and particularly by the Wagner Group in Africa.
Since 2019, Azerbaijan has held the presidency of NAM and has led the adoption of a statement against colonialism, neocolonialism and illegal territorial occupations. However, these efforts were not specifically directed against Russia, but rather aimed at France in alignment with Azerbaijan’s national interests and manipulating the anti-colonial sentiments of African countries that have been French colonies in the past.
Despite Azerbaijan’s close partnership with Ukraine, a Declaration was signed on February 22, 2022, formally elevating their partnership with the Russian Federation to the level of alliance and containing provisions related to security cooperation. Later in 2022, Azerbaijan signed a gas deal with Russian GazProm to fulfill its commitments of supplying gas to the EU. This deal involves partially laundering Russian gas to Europe for a higher price in its capacity as Europe’s alternative energy supplier to Russia.[22] It is worth noting that Azerbaijan claims its foreign policy is based on the principle of “equal distancing” from all major powers, avoiding alliances or confrontation with any one power against the others.[23]
This piece provides a broad, but not exhaustive range of concepts that may be relevant to Armenia’s past and current foreign and security policies. To determine the appropriate direction for Armenia, Part II of this article will analyze the history and dynamics of its foreign and security policies since regaining independence in 1991. Part III will evaluate the current threats and opportunities and offer conclusions and recommendations for future choices.
Footnotes:
[1] Sossi Tatikyan. The EU’s Role in Preventing a New Conflict and Ensuring Sustainable Peace Between Armenia and Azerbaijan. European Policy Review, Volume 6, Issue 1. (July 2023).
[2] H. J. Mackinder. The Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Journal, vol. 23, no. 4, (1904), pp. 421–37. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1775498. 2023.[3] Tim Sweijs, Willem Theo Oosterveld, Emily Knowles and Menno Schellekens. Why are pivot states so pivotal? The role of pivot states in regional and global security. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2014) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12620
[4] John D. Ciorciari and Jürgen Haacke. Hedging in international relations: an introduction. (September 2019). International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 19(3):367-374. DOI:10.1093/irap/lcz017
[5] P.V. Shlykov. The State of Strategic Hedging: Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Relations with Russia. Russia in Global Affairs, (2023) 21(3), pp. 134–158
[6] Kenneth N. Waltz. Realism and International Politics. New York: Routledge (2008), 137.
[7] Stephen Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, International Security, 9: 4 (1985): 4.
[8] Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, (1987), p. 17
[9] Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.International Security 19:1 (Summer, 1994), pp. 72-107.
[10] John J. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics, in Anarchy and the Struggle for Power. New York: Norton (2001).
[11] Leos Muller. Neutrality in World History. New York; Routledge, (2019). https://europarl.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/32EPA_INST/4n13r6/alma991001164773404886
[12] Thomas Fischer, et al. Introduction: Neutrality and Nonalignment in World Politics during the Cold War. Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 18, no. 4, (2016), pp. 4–11. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925637. Accessed 26 Nov. 2023.
[13] Jean-Marc Rickli. European Small States’ Military Policies after the Cold War: from Territorial to Niche Strategies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 21, number 3, (September 2008), pp. 307-325, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557570802253435.
[14] Laurent Goetschel. The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today’s Europe, in Small states inside and outside the European Union, edited by Laurent Goetschel. Dordrecth, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 13-31; Archer Clive, Bailes Alyson, and Wivel Anders (2014). Small States and International Security: (1998) Europe and Beyond. London: Routledge.
[15] Miriam Fendius Elman. . The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard, British Journal of Political Science, 25, Issue 2, (1995) pp. 171-217.
[16] Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner. Small States and Alliances. (2001) Heildelberg: Physica-Verlag.
[17] Harals Müller. Security Cooperation, in Handbook of International Relations, edited by Carlsnae, Walter, Risse, Thomas, and Simmons, Beth A. London: (2002) Sage, pp. 369-391.
[18] Hakan Wiberg. Security Problems of Small Nations, in Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse, and Olav Knudsen (eds.), Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe. London: Brassey’s, (1996) pp. 21-41.
[19] Robet O. Keohane Lisa Martin (1995). The Promise of an Institutional Theory, International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, (1995) pp. 39-51.
[20] Franco Algieri. Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU (in German). Wien: Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. (2010) p. 49.
[21] Thomas Greminger and Jean-Marc Rickli. Neutrality After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. The Example of Switzerland and Some Lessons for Ukraine. PRISM Vol. 10, No. 3. (7 September 2023). https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3511995/neutrality-after-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-the-example-of-switzerland-and/
[22] Sossi Tatikyan. The EU’s Role in Preventing a New Conflict and Ensuring Sustainable Peace Between Armenia and Azerbaijan. European Policy Review, Volume 6, Issue 1. (July 2023).
[23] Valiyev, Anar, and European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). “Azerbaijan:” Absorb and Conquer: An EU Approach to Russian and Chinese Integration in Eurasia, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016, pp. 29–36. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21670.7.
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