Beyond India and France: Armenia’s Quest to Diversify Defense

In the past year, especially since the major Azerbaijani incursion into Armenia in September 2022, the Armenian government has made diversification of the country’s security, including arms procurement, a priority. It was prompted by Russia’s refusal to assist by intervening to deter Azerbaijan and its unwillingness and/or inability to supply weapons to Armenia.

As the military threat from Azerbaijan persists, restoring and enhancing Armenia’s military capabilities following the devastating losses of the 2020 war has become vital for establishing a relative balance in the region. India and France have already emerged as the primary arms suppliers, but Armenian officials are actively seeking additional defense partners, primarily in the West, much to the ire of Russia that continues to maintain extensive economic leverage over Armenia.

European Union

The EU assumed a security role in the region after Azerbaijan’s September 2022 incursions, when it deployed, with Azerbaijani agreement, a civilian observer mission on the Armenian side of the border for two months. The mission (EUMA) was extended in February for a two-year period. It has an exclusively civilian staff of around 100, including unarmed observers from 23 member-states of the EU with Canada having pledged to contribute two observers.

During his visit to Armenia in March 2023, ex-NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen proposed initiating a security dialogue between Armenia and the EU. He highlighted the European Peace Facility (EPF) as a potential mechanism for supporting Armenia’s prospective purchase of Western armaments and military equipment.

The EPF was established in 2021 as an “off-budget funding mechanism for EU actions with military and defense implications.” It has been used by the EU to provide major assistance to Ukraine, but also a number of countries in Africa and the Middle East, and EU-aligned countries in its neighborhood: Moldova (€87 million), Georgia (€63 million), Bosnia (€20 million), North Macedonia (€9 million).

In July 2023, Armenia’s parliament speaker Alen Simonyan revealed that the EU had rejected Armenia’s request through the EPF, by citing its mediation efforts in talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as “conflict sensitivity”. He stressed that Armenia had only requested “technical assistance for raising [its] defensive capabilities.”

The EU’s willingness to aid Armenia in the security field evidently grew in the aftermath of Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh on September 19-20 and the forced displacement of the entire Armenian population and the looming threat of an Azerbaijani invasion of Armenia in the immediate aftermath. A European diplomat told Reuters that instead of sanctioning Azerbaijan, the EU may end up focusing on supporting Armenia economically and “possibly with military aid.”

In late September, as the exodus of Karabakh Armenians was underway, Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan met with Charles Fries, a senior EU diplomat, to discuss possible cooperation directions within the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Security expert and EVN Report contributor Nerses Kopalyan, noted then that it would “mostly entail transfer of knowledge, military sciences, technical expertise, and possible intelligence sharing” and would not include “hard power.”

France took it upon itself to lobby for greater support for Armenia from the EU. During her visit to Armenia on October 3, France’s Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna said that she had asked EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell to include Armenia in the beneficiaries of the EPF, which she said “faces the same type of threats and attempts at destabilization” as Moldova. A non-binding resolution, passed by the European Parliament two days later, called for the EU to “respond favorably to Armenia’s request for support” via the EPF, but conditioned it with Armenia’s reconsideration of its current military alliances, the Russian-led CSTO, where Armenia has effectively frozen its membership by arguing that it CSTO has not acted in Armenia’s interests.

The French-Armenian defense deal announced on October 23 acted as further impetus for the EU to be more open to provide security support to Armenia as it broke the long-standing taboo of any real discussions of Western weapons deliveries to Armenia.

A breakthrough came during the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting on November 13, where France again spearheaded European efforts to secure defense support for Armenia. French Foreign Minister Colonna stated before the meeting that “there should be support for Armenia” through the EPF. After the meeting, EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell announced that the EU will “explore possible support to Armenia” via the EPF, which the official readout of the meeting specified would be “non-lethal”.

Armenia’s Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan called the decision “very preliminary”, while an EU spokesperson told Armenpress that it is the “start of the process” and “there is no concrete proposal yet” about how the support via the EPF could look like, noting that in the case of Armenia “anything is possible.” He added that what the EU has said has “nothing to do with arming Armenia” and that it simply seeks to increase support for Armenia in “its ability to protect itself against any kind of threats.”

In late November, an EU delegation visited Armenia for extensive meetings in Yerevan with senior officials to explore ways to deepen ties. The European External Action Service said in a concluding statement that the sides confirmed their mutual interest to “further the dialogue and cooperation in the areas of security and defense.” It reiterated that the EU will “further explore non-lethal support to the Armenian military via the European Peace Facility.”

Analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) recently argued that besides delivering equipment via the EPF, the EU is best suited to provide assistance in reforming administration, logistics, military education, training, and operational and tactical planning and procedures, which is essential for effectively utilizing new equipment. On the diplomatic side, they argued that the EU should engage with Georgia to provide a transport corridor for equipment deliveries to Armenia and hold strategic consultations with India, Armenia’s newly-found hardware provider, to further support Armenia militarily.

Stefan Meister, analyst at the German Council on Foreign Relations, argued that security cooperation without security guarantees is a weak point as it will only alienate Armenia’s relations with Russia, without a real ability to leave Russia’s sphere of influence.

European States

Besides the far-reaching defense partnership with France, which goes beyond acquisition of armament, and the prospective EU-wide support via the EPF, Armenia is also seeking deeper cooperation with individual European states.

Following the announcement of the French-Armenian deal on October 23, reporter and analyst Tatul Hakobyan suggested that three European countries besides France will help Armenia restore its defensive capabilities, but did not name the countries. When pro-Western experts and politicians from Armenia got together in Brussels recently to call for closer ties with the EU, they adopted a declaration, which welcomed Armenia’s “already established military and security cooperation” with France, Germany, the Netherlands, Lithuania, and Czechia. Kopalyan, the security expert, told Azatutyun in a recent interview that Armenia is actively engaged in extensive discussions regarding security matters with the Netherlands and is aiming to foster closer ties with Germany.

In September, Secretary Council’s Grigoryan commended the Dutch ambassador’s “significant contribution to security cooperation” between the two countries. After the Azerbaijani takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Dutch parliament adopted a motion asking the government to call on other EU member states to positively respond on a possible Armenian request for military support. When German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock visited Armenia in early November, she stated that Germany can cooperate with Armenia in the security field to help Armenia defend itself. Weeks later Pashinyan met with the chief of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND).

Armenian-Czech defense cooperation dates to 2010, when the Czech and Armenian Defense Ministers signed an agreement establishing the groundwork for cooperation in military education and the defense industry. In 2019, Defense Ministers Davit Tonoyan and Lubomír Metnar signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation. In a meeting with Metnar, Pashinyan said the two countries were effectively cooperating in defense and have great development potential. The 2019 agreement was approved by the Armenian government only recently, in March 2023. It regulates the production and trade of defense items. The Armenian parliament passed it on September 12 and the president signed it on October 3.

Poland and Armenia have an underwhelming experience of joint military production. An agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed in 2013. In 2014 the Armenian government and the Polish company Lubawa S.A. set up a joint venture for the production of mostly protective gear for the Armenian military. When Poland’s Deputy Foreign Minister Bartosz Cichocki visited Armenia in 2017, he said Poland is ready to expand joint production, however just two years later, by 2019, Lubawa effectively ceased operations in Armenia after years of operating at a loss. Poland’s former ambassador to Armenia attributed it to a few orders from the Armenian military. There are now attempts to revamp security cooperation. In July newly appointed Polish ambassador Piotr Skwieciński met with Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan, while in August the ambassador and defense attaché of Poland discussed cooperation with Defense Minister Papikyan. In October Grigoryan discussed bilateral cooperation with Poland’s Deputy Foreign Minister Wojciech Gerwel.

Long-standing defense cooperation with Greece (and Cyprus) continues mostly in education and training, but there are signs of wider cooperation. In late August 2023 the Armenian government approved a draft bilateral agreement with Greece on military-technical cooperation, which calls for mutual research on and transfer of defense technology and setting up of joint ventures for the manufacture of equipment and ammunition, training of personnel and repair of hardware imported from third countries. In late October, the Armenian ambassador and the Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias and Security Council’s Grigoryan and Greece’s National Security Adviser Thanos Dokos separately discussed enhancing defense cooperation.

Even with the UK and Italy, traditionally close partners of Azerbaijan, there have been signs of growing cooperation in the security field.

In May 2023, when British Minister for Europe Leo Docherty visited Yerevan for meetings with Mirzoyan and Pashinyan, he tweeted: “We look forward to strengthening our relationship on security, defense and trade.” Recently, on November 14, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan visited London for the first strategic dialogue between the two countries. The joint statement mentioned defense cooperation as one of the key areas, which it said continues to expand with an increasing number of Armenian personnel receiving English language training, leadership courses, multinational peacekeeping, and mine-awareness packages. When Docherty returned to Armenia on November 20, he met with the Security Council’s Grigoryan to discuss the “possibilities of cooperation in the field of security.” On November 29, officials from both countries held strategic consultations on defense in London, where they discussed the prospects of bilateral cooperation and underscored readiness to implement already reached agreements.

Italy, which receives a significant amount of Azerbaijani oil, has recently emerged as a defense partner of Azerbaijan. In June the Italian defense manufacturer Leonardo announced the sale of C-27J Spartan aircraft to Azerbaijan, while in September la Repubblica reported that Italy and Azerbaijan have been in talks for a major arms deal, including trainer and transport aircraft, assault rifles, anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles, and midget submarines. Despite this, Italy’s Chief of the General Staff Giuseppe Cavo Dragone visited Armenia on November 9 to discuss defense cooperation with his Armenian counterpart Asryan and Defense Minister Papikyan. The Armenian Defense Ministry said in a statement that Papikyan and Dragone reached agreements “in a number of areas of bilateral interest.”

United States

The past year has also seen a significant intensification of Armenian-American defense ties. Kopalyan has argued that the U.S. is unlikely to “provide hard power”, but it can help Armenia with “extensive expertise and institutional support.” Bob Hamilton, a research professor in the U.S. Army War College and a former American defense attaché in the region, told RFE/RL in September that the U.S. does not “really have interests in Armenia that would justify a major military partnership.”

In May, Minister Papikyan discussed cooperation with officials from the DIA, Pentagon’s intelligence agency, but official meetings have usually centered mostly around education and training.

In June, Papikyan and Under Secretary of Defense Colin Kahl spoke to discuss the implementation of agreements reached during the former’s September 2022 visit to the U.S., chiefly cooperation in peacekeeping, military education and medicine. During his July visit to the U.S., the Security Council’s Grigoryan discussed defense education with senior officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper and Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines. In the same month, Armenia’s Chief of the General Staff Edvard Asryan discussed, in meetings in Washington, “upcoming programs, joint activities, the implementation of the concept of Mission Command and the professional NCOs system, opportunities for extending cooperation in the air force” with Christopher Grady, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Charles Brown, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force.

The most publicized event in the U.S.-Armenia defense cooperation was the joint exercise from September 11 to 20 titled “Eagle Partner 2023” that was held in Armenia. Armenia’s Defense Ministry said it was aimed at increasing interoperability and exchanging best practices in control and tactical communication. It involved around 175 Armenian and 85 U.S. (from the Kansas Army National Guard) personnel.

Following the Azerbaijani offensive and amid widespread fears of an Azerbaijani invasion of Armenia, some Congressmen called for security assistance to Armenia. Rep. Brad Sherman called on the U.S. to airlift weapons to Armenia, while former Senator and Governor Sam Brownback called on Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to visit Armenia immediately.

In early November, Chief of the General Staff Asryan visited the U․S․ European Command (EUCOM) Center in Germany. EUCOM Deputy Commander Steven Basham expressed the U.S.’s willingness to continue cooperation programs in the “professionalization of armed forces, professional sergeant staff’s strengthening, modernization of the management system, peacekeeping, military medicine, military education, combat readiness, training.” Asryan also visited the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels to observe training activities and the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Academy as “part of their aims to further develop the Armenian military’s NCO corps.” Basham called the visit a “milestone event as we deliberately and incrementally develop our defense relationship.” Asryan said Armenia is interested in learning about the best practices from the United States. “These discussions lay the foundation to plan and conduct future combined training with EUCOM,” he added.

During a November 15 hearing in the House of Representatives, Assistant Secretary of State James O’Brien suggested that there may be “additional items” the U.S. and EU can employ to bolster Armenia’s security. “France has just announced some significant contributions to Armenia’s security. Yes, we are looking at all the tools we have,” he said. At a November 27 press briefing, O’Brien said the U.S. welcomes “any package that is supportive of Armenia” and noted that “exactly how the EU chooses to get there will be its business” when asked about the possible EU support through the European Peace Facility (EPF). 

In a recent interview, Kopalyan asserted that U.S.-Armenia relations have not yet reached the point where arms trade is feasible, but argues that while previously the U.S. unofficially vetoed any arms deliveries to Armenia from its Western (NATO) allies, with Armenia’s pivot to the West it greenlit such shipments, most prominently from France. He suggests that U.S. intelligence sharing with Armenia is also limited to cases of real critical threat and has not (yet) been institutionalized.

Asia

Encouraged by the successful defense partnership with India, especially in arms procurement, Armenia has looked elsewhere in Asia for hardware.

Among them is the United Arab Emirates, the main arms exporter in the Arab world. In July Defense Minister Papikyan discussed defense cooperation with the newly appointed Emirati ambassador. In November Papikyan toured international defense industry pavilions at the Dubai Airshow. Along with Armenia’s High-Tech Industry Minister Robert Khachatryan, he met with the UAE’s Minister of State for Defense Mohammed Ahmed Al Bowardi to discuss the “current course and prospects of military-technical cooperation”.

Armenian analysts, such as Artsrun Hovhannisyan and Leonid Nersisyan, have proposed South Korea, the fastest-growing arms exporter globally, as a potential supplier of weapons for Armenia. The two countries had established diplomatic relations more than three decades ago, but only recently agreed to mutually open embassies in 2024 in a sign of growing ties. Armenia and Korea may cooperate in nuclear power as Armenia has looked to that country as one of the options for building a new nuclear power plant. Pashinyan and South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol spoke on the phone recently to discuss ties, but no details were provided. South Korea produces a range of hardware that Armenia can consider for procurement, with its artillery pieces being the most obvious choice. It has sold its famed K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzer to a range of countries, from India and Turkey to Estonia and Finland. Since Armenia has already reportedly acquired both truck-mounted (MArG) and towed (ATAGS) howitzers from India, it could instead seek other Korean armament.

Although Armenia has acquired Chinese equipment in the past, there have been no recent reports of arms procurement from China. In August, China’s military attaché in Armenia, told reporters that the two countries have “great potential” in military cooperation, including in peacekeeping, demining, education, reforms, and technologies.

Japan, which has long had a strict policy on arms exports but has eased it in the past decade, may also become a prospective partner. On October 28, Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Japan’s National Security Advisor Akiba Takeo discussed “bilateral cooperation in security and economy.”

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