Iran War, Escalation and Armenia: Managing Ambiguity and Risk

Listen to the AI generated audio article. 

The Iran War has not only consumed much of the attention and information space in the region, it has also produced a reverberation effect across much of the world. However, the residuals of the conflict, and the type of effect it has, remain quite different for regional actors when compared to the global community. For the latter, the impact is primarily economic, since the conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have increased oil prices, thus pinching many pocketbooks throughout the world. For the region, however, and specifically for the South Caucasus, the implications are primarily security-driven. The economic fallout is secondary to the detrimental consequences that the war poses on the security systems across the Gulf, the wider Middle East and the South Caucasus itself. In this context, the systemic factors that are defining the Iran War, and the effect that it is having on regional security complexes, is the underlying and primary factor of concern for Armenia.  

The strategic approach of the United States and Israel in this war is generally defined by the doctrine of “escalate to de-escalate”: the principle of deliberately increasing the intensification of the conflict through the use of limited force to compel Iran to acquiesce, ultimately producing a de-escalatory outcome. The overarching strategic approach relies on three general assumptions: 1) the inability of Iran to manage or endure escalation; 2) the increased costs of escalation incentivizing Iran to acquiesce; and 3) the increased escalatory capacity of the U.S. making resilience on behalf of Iran unsustainable. Thus, the model assumes that increased level of intensification of force creates a lose-lose risk structure for the adversary, as increased escalation either produces the adversary’s destruction, or its complete neutralization as a functioning regime. As such, the adversary is compelled to de-escalate and prefer a more manageable outcome. 

In the case of Iran, the escalate to de-escalate model has faced four unanticipated outcomes. First, Iran actually prefers escalation, since it forces the U.S. to invest more in the conflict, thus drawing the U.S. into a protracted conflict, or the so-called “forever wars” that are so toxic in American domestic politics. Second, escalation through aerial bombardment has its limits, so if the U.S. seeks further escalation, it must consider ground troops, which is a preferred outcome for Iran’s asymmetrical capabilities. Third, Iran prefers a war of attrition, and escalation enhances the attritional propensity of the war, thus negating the “de-escalation” postulate of the doctrine. And fourth, regardless of the fact whether Iran can withstand the actual level of escalation that the U.S. and Israel are capable of, the regime operates off of the logic that “it has nothing more to lose.” Within the confines of these factors, the “escalate to de-escalate” model faces the risk of falling into the “escalation trap.” In essence, this is what Tehran seeks, and this is what Washington is trying to avoid. To entrap the U.S., Iran has opted for its own policy of “horizontal escalation.” 

Before diving deeper into the intertwining nature of both approaches, a question first arises: how should Armenia position itself in this highly-volatile and highly-sensitive situation? Whether the United States ends operations in the next four weeks, or whether this becomes a revolving process of U.S. and Israeli militaries bombing strategic targets in Iran intermittently or of their time and choosing, it does not change the underlying nature of the problem for Armenia: war on its border involving two states with whom it has strong relations. 

Armenia’s policy, as it stands and likely going forward, is defined by strategic ambiguity: the tactical act of being deliberately ambiguous with respect to specific decision-making processes, operations, or policy positions. It is a mechanism of directly avoiding conflict, not being drawn into a quagmire, and allowing a state to manage a crisis situation without being forced to choose sides between warring powers. The scope of strategic ambiguity differs by scale. For large or middle powers it can be used to cultivate uncertainty, thus keeping their enemies or allies guessing. For small states, its scope is more confined, as it is used primarily as a tool of risk-aversion, and is mostly a tactical act, as opposed to a grand strategy. Within the doctrine of strategic ambiguity, Armenia will manage the conflict down south through a policy position more specifically known as “situational ambiguity.”

The fundamental objective of Armenia’s approach remains two-fold: first, to avoid entanglement, and second, to avoid defection from partner states. Thus, not to be drawn into the conflict or be pulled into having to choose sides remains the primary postulate in entanglement-avoidance. Second, to make certain that neither of the partners defects from the partnership, that is, making certain that relations are not harmed due to Armenia not meeting the presumed expectations of that partner. Strategic ambiguity allows for the management of such expectations with partners, as it relies on situational configurations, while not touching the wide range of factors that define the bilateral relationship. In this context, whether the situation evolves into the escalation trap and protracted war, or continued horizontal escalation and intermittent U.S.-Israeli operations, Armenia will manage and de-risk developments through strategic ambiguity.

The extent to which the United States is slipping into the escalation trap, or whether it is engaging in escalation management is yet to be seen, but in either case, Iran’s utilization of horizontal escalation is precisely designed to ensnare the U.S. into the escalation trap. The framework of an escalation trap basically traces the relationship between tactical success and strategic failure, and how presumed escalation can remedy the strategic failure at hand. Thus, a given conflict begins with the limited use of force, primarily aerial bombardment, to compel an adversary to acquiesce or conform. While the military operations prove successful in their implementation, the strategic goal of getting the adversary to conform is not. This creates a dilemma: should the strategic goals be altered, or relying on the success of the initial military operations, opt for escalation and increased use of force? Namely, what happens when military success does not produce the intended political success? 

This remains the question that is confounding both Washington and Tel Aviv: if regime change and destruction of Iran’s nuclear program were the underlying strategic goals, what happens if they are not achieved, regardless of the tactical success of military operations? Much of Iran’s military infrastructure, ruling elite, command-and-control capabilities, and a wider regional capacity for power-projection have either been exponentially weakened or in large part depleted. But has this produced the desired strategic goals, and if not, what is the next course of action: to further escalate or change strategy? 

In essence, how should decision-makers proceed when battlefield success fails to produce political results? The answer to this question will determine whether the U.S. falls into the escalation trap, or whether it opts to change its strategic goals and thus manage escalation. 

Due to the power asymmetry in the conflict, Iran has opted to initiate a so-called “mosaic” model of decentralized resistance, where command-and-control capacities are dispersed in order to limit American-Israeli “decapitation” capabilities. Thus, while Iranian military leaders can still be targeted and eliminated, Iran’s overarching war leadership cannot be easily decapitated. This asymmetrical resiliency approach makes implementation of horizontal escalation commensurate with Iran’s capabilities, as it seeks to expand the theater of conflict while operating in survival mode. Substantively, horizontal escalation entails expanding the geographic arena of the conflict toward economic and infrastructure targets in countries that are not directly part of the confrontation, thus increasing the overall costs of the war. The targeting of Gulf states, for example, as well as exploiting political cleavages in Iraq and Lebanon, while leveling high costs on global oil markets, are all designed to reproduce a destabilization effect and spread the costs of instability horizontally and across numerous domains. By potentially harming the infrastructure of the global economy, horizontal escalation is forcing the hand of the attacking parties: do they keep escalating to damage Iran’s own escalatory capabilities, or do they alter strategic goals to find a tenable solution that avoids an escalation trap?   

For Armenia, escalation in either iteration produces a high-risk, lose-lose outcome. Continued U.S.-Israeli escalation risks can destabilize Armenia’s entire southern border while generating complex challenges that Yerevan is ill-equipped to manage. At the same time, horizontal escalation by Iran equally complicates Armenia’s propensity for risk-absorption, as continued fallout between Iran and the Gulf states, for example, adds another layer of difficulty for Armenia, considering recent growth in economic and political relations with several such states. 

In the confluence of the escalation game, Armenia will proceed through the situational-appraisal model: each escalatory framework requiring situational ambiguity. This entails closely managing bilateral relationships while keeping them mutually exclusive and ambiguously detached. In practical terms, the logic is as follows: Armenia’s relevance to the United States is rooted in interests that are not contingent on Iran, which creates an incentive for Washington  to insulate Armenia from high-risk outcomes. Conversely, Armenia’s importance to Iran is not defined by Yerevan’s relationship with the U.S., reducing the likelihood that Tehran’s horizontal escalation would target Armenia.

Statecraft & Governance