Armenia, Azerbaijan and Constitutional Amendments: Lessons from the Prespa Agreement

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In March 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan finalized a draft peace treaty aimed at ending their decades-long conflict. However, the signing has been delayed as Azerbaijani officials, including President Ilham Aliyev, introduced additional conditions. Chief among them is a demand that Armenia remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence from the preamble of its Constitution, particularly those pertaining to Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku claims this is essential for securing full recognition of its territorial integrity.

More recently, on August 8, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted a trilateral summit with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. The three leaders signed a joint declaration paving the way for a comprehensive peace treaty. The document addressed several outstanding issues, but made no reference to changes in Armenia’s Constitution. Following the summit, President Aliyev publicly reaffirmed his demand that Armenia amend its Constitution.

In early July, Elchin Amirbayov, the Azerbaijani President’s Representative on Special Assignments, visited Greece—a longstanding friend of Armenia—to discuss bilateral relations. During his visit, he gave an interview to a Greek newspaper, in which he tried to justify Azerbaijan’s demands for constitutional revision in Armenia by drawing parallels to the 2018 Prespa Agreement between Greece and North Macedonia.

The Prespa Agreement, signed in June 2018, resolved a decades-long naming dispute between Greece and what was then officially known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). At the core of the agreement was a constitutional renaming of the country from “Republic of Macedonia” to “Republic of North Macedonia,” directly addressing Greek concerns over perceived irredentism associated with the term “Macedonia.” The deal also required amendments to constitutional articles and the Preamble, eliminating language viewed as problematic by Athens. Following parliamentary ratification, the government held a non-binding referendum in September 2018. Despite low turnout, the majority of participants supported the agreement. By January 2019, the parliament passed the required constitutional amendments with the necessary majority.

Despite surface similarities, the Armenia–Azerbaijan case is fundamentally different. Greece’s concerns were largely symbolic and identity-based, rooted in questions of historical narratives and national identity. The two states established diplomatic relations in 1995, and at no point did either threaten the other with war or occupy its territory. The Prespa Agreement resolved a symbolic dispute and was part of North Macedonia’s broader effort to integrate into NATO and the European Union. In contrast, Armenia and Azerbaijan have experienced violent conflict, territorial occupation, population displacement, and contested sovereignty. The stakes involve not just national symbols but control over land, security, and the consequences of war. The context is not symbolic—it is existential.

In terms of constitutional language, Greece objected to specific phrasing in North Macedonia’s Constitution which it considered irredentist or contrary to United Nations Security Council Resolution 817, which recommended the provisional reference “FYROM” upon the country’s admission to the UN. Armenia’s Constitution, by contrast, does not explicitly mention Nagorno-Karabakh but includes the 1990 Declaration of Independence in its Preamble. That declaration references a 1989 joint decision between the Armenian SSR Supreme Council and the Nagorno-Karabakh National Council on reunification; a symbolic gesture Azerbaijan finds problematic. Azerbaijan’s own constitutional framework also includes historical claims: its 1991 Declaration of Independence identifies the modern state as the successor to the 1918–1920 Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, which claimed territory overlapping with modern Armenia. This mutual embedding of historical narratives in constitutional texts complicates the process. Still, only Azerbaijan is demanding constitutional change from the other party.

On the legal front, the amendment procedures in the two countries differ significantly. In North Macedonia, constitutional changes were passed through the parliament, and while a referendum was held, it was not binding. Armenia’s Constitution, however, imposes stricter requirements. Article 202(1) mandates a referendum for any amendments to Chapters 1 through 3, which define the state’s foundational principles. Though the Preamble is not labelled a chapter, it can be regarded as functionally equivalent to Chapter 1 because it defines the state’s foundational principles.

To support this argument, the Armenian Constitutional Court, in its April 2021 Decision No. 1590, stated that the Preamble forms part of the Constitution’s immutable core due to its foundational character. This interpretation implies that even a referendum cannot alter it unless the Court itself revises its stance. Consequently, removing the reference to the 1990 Declaration would almost certainly require approval by the Court, a two-thirds majority in parliament, and a referendum. Any attempt to bypass this process risks violating Armenia’s constitutional framework.

Politically, the Armenian government has already made significant concessions. It has recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and reaffirmed its commitment to the 1991 Alma-Ata Protocols, which emphasize mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity among former Soviet republics. Armenia never formally recognized Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence, nor did it annex the region after the 1991–1994 war. Still, the symbolic connection to Nagorno-Karabakh remains in the Constitution’s Preamble and continues to fuel Azerbaijan’s objections.

While the Prespa Agreement may offer procedural lessons—such as the use of referenda to legitimize sensitive constitutional amendments—it cannot serve as a direct model for Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Athens–Skopje case involved diplomacy, symbolism and peaceful negotiation. In contrast, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict remains volatile, with mutual distrust, ongoing tensions and enduring grievances.

Constitutional amendments, particularly to a document’s preamble, must follow domestic legal procedures. For Armenia, this involves the Constitutional Court, the National Assembly, and the citizens of Armenia. Attempting to force such changes outside this framework and under foreign pressure would set a troubling precedent and will eventually weaken state institutions.

Some external actors may see constitutional amendments as confidence-building measures. Yet unilateral pressure on Armenia to rewrite its foundational legal document before a treaty is signed, and without reciprocal obligations, undermines both Armenian sovereignty and the integrity of the peace process. 

So what is the lesson the Prespa Agreement offers?

The Prespa Agreement demonstrated that constitutional change can foster reconciliation, but only when conditions are peaceful, voluntary and mutually beneficial. Greece and North Macedonia resolved a symbolic dispute without violence. Their talks were framed by Euro-Atlantic integration goals, and the agreement enjoyed international and parliamentary support, although large parts of public opinion in both countries were against the deal. Armenia and Azerbaijan, by contrast, face the legacy of war, displacement and insecurity. The constitutional stakes are higher, not merely about names and history, but about land, sovereignty, and, eventually, survival.

To demand unilateral constitutional revision in the absence of a signed treaty or clear mutual guarantees transforms legal reform into a coercive tool. That is neither sustainable diplomacy nor legitimate peacebuilding. Even in the case of the Prespa Agreement, constitutional changes occurred only after the signing of the deal and a political referendum. If Armenia is ever to consider constitutional change, especially to its Preamble, it must ensure the process reflects democratic and institutional consent, not foreign dictates.

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