Conditioning Peace on Constitutional Change: Impact on Armenia’s Sovereignty and Identity

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After Armenia and Azerbaijan announced agreement on a draft peace treaty, Azerbaijan escalated its demand that Armenia remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence from its Constitution’s Preamble, which mentions Nagorno-Karabakh. While framed as necessary for recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, this has become Baku’s primary precondition for signing the peace agreement. In reality, it serves to delay or derail the peace process, exacerbate Armenia’s internal vulnerabilities, undermine its national identity, and establish grounds for a potential Azerbaijani military offensive against Armenia.

This demand constitutes interference in Armenia’s domestic political affairs, undermining its democratic processes and independent governance. It demonstrates how Azerbaijan projects external pressure into Armenia’s domestic sphere to advance its objectives while compromising Armenia’s sovereignty and identity.

The implications of this demand can be analyzed through three dimensions: (1) strategic risks to the peace process and Armenia’s security; (2) threats to Armenia’s democratic governance; and (3) challenges to the collective identity of Armenians.

Armenia’s Constitution, Declaration of Independence and the Alma-Ata Declaration

Armenia’s Constitution establishes that the Republic of Armenia is the legal successor to Soviet Armenia, not to the First Republic of Armenia (1918–1920). This aligns with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, which established that the administrative borders of the former Soviet republics would become recognized interstate borders between the newly independent CIS member states.

Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence references the 1989 joint decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Council and the Artsakh National Council on the “Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh.” However, Armenia’s Constitution does not directly reference Nagorno-Karabakh or Artsakh. Instead, it refers to the Declaration of Independence in its Preamble, creating only an indirect, symbolic connection. 

Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has pointed out that if Armenia had considered Nagorno-Karabakh as part of its territory, the region’s population would have participated in Armenia’s 1995 constitutional referendum and subsequent elections. Moreover, its residents could not be recognized as refugees in Armenia. The Armenian Constitutional Court has confirmed that the reference to the Declaration of Independence does not contradict recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. It also does not pose a legal obstacle to ratifying a peace agreement, as any ratified treaty would prevail over domestic provisions under Article 6 of Armenia’s Constitution. The Speaker of Armenia’s National Assembly has suggested submitting both constitutions to the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission for review. Azerbaijan, however, has effectively ignored this proposal—unsurprising given its increasingly hostile approach toward human rights-related multilateral institutions. Pashinyan has also explained that after signing, the Constitutional Court will review the peace agreement. If found inconsistent with the Constitution, he will pursue constitutional amendments to secure peace and work to gain public support. If deemed constitutional, the agreement will proceed directly to Parliament for ratification.

Azerbaijan’s Interference in Armenia’s Constitutional Reform

Armenia’s constitutional reform process began for domestic governance reasons, entirely separate from Azerbaijani demands. After the 2018 Velvet Revolution, the new government prioritized democratic consolidation, institutional reforms, and improved governance. Discussions about constitutional revisions gained momentum in 2019–2020. Armenia’s Constitution, adopted in 1995 and amended in 2005 and 2015, contains inconsistencies, particularly regarding the balance of powers and judicial independence. 

Prime Minister Pashinyan argued that Armenia needed a new constitution as early as 2020. While acknowledging that frequent constitutional changes could destabilize the state system, he noted that many Armenian citizens did not see the existing system as truly theirs or connected to their will. Pashinyan maintained that a new Constitution was necessary to create a political system genuinely rooted in the free will of Armenia’s citizens.

In 2022, the government established a Constitutional Reform Council to propose amendments to the current constitution. In May 2024, the council’s mandate shifted to drafting a “new constitution” by the end of 2026, with a referendum planned for 2027. This shift appears to be conditioned by Azerbaijan’s demand for constitutional changes, specifically the removal of the preamble mentioning Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence.

Armenia’s legal framework requires the Preamble of the Constitution, which references the Declaration of Independence, can only be amended through a constitutional referendum. This makes any change subject to public approval rather than unilateral executive or legislative action. Azerbaijan has exploited this constitutional reform timeline by making these changes a precondition for peace, effectively delaying the peace agreement until at least mid-2026. Baku’s objective appears designed to impose additional demands on Armenia during this period while maintaining the option to launch a military offensive if the geopolitical conditions become favorable. 

Baku has repeatedly characterized Armenia’s reluctance to acquiesce to its demands as evidence of “revanchism,” justifying pressure tactics when Yerevan resists concessions. This strategy enables Azerbaijan to use potential referendum failure as leverage to avoid signing a peace agreement or to abandon the peace process altogether. Baku’s ultimate goal may be to exploit a failed constitutional referendum to justify military offensive against Armenia, framing it as a necessary response to Armenia’s supposed “unwillingness to make peace.”

Public Perceptions and Internal Risks

Public perceptions of constitutional reform have shifted as peace negotiations progressed. Initially designed to strengthen democratic institutions, many now view the reforms as submitting to Baku’s demands rather than addressing domestic needs. This has deepened societal scepticism, especially among the nearly 150,000 forcibly displaced Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, some of whom will acquire Armenian citizenship by the time of the referendum, as well as segments of the broader Armenian population who sympathize with their cause or resent perceived Azerbaijani pressure. These groups fear that constitutional changes could mean renouncing their cause and identity. Baku appears to be deliberately fostering this perception within Armenian society to generate confusion and polarization. Under Armenia’s Constitution, a successful referendum requires approval from at least 25% of all registered voters (approximately 650,000 citizens).  The widespread perception that these constitutional changes are being made under Azerbaijani pressure significantly raises the risk of referendum failure. 

Pashinyan and the ruling party emphasize that Armenia’s Constitution will not be amended under Azerbaijani pressure. However, Pashinyan has argued that the new constitution should not reference Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence. He maintains that while the Declaration served its historical purpose, the Constitution should address current priorities and move beyond outdated narratives. Pashinyan justifies this position by highlighting the need to “remove ambiguities that may be misinterpreted internationally” and to align the Constitution with the government’s “Real Armenia” ideology. This approach focuses on the country’s internationally recognized borders as the framework for its security and development strategy. 

Azerbaijan’s Constitution, Historical Revisionism and the “Western Azerbaijan” Narrative

From the Armenian perspective, Azerbaijan’s own legal and constitutional framework contains more explicit territorial claims against Armenia than Armenia’s does against Azerbaijan. 

Azerbaijan’s Declaration of Independence (1991) asserts legal continuity with the 1918–1920 Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) rather than with Soviet Azerbaijan. During its brief existence, the ADR presented maps to the League of Nations claiming 60% of present-day Armenia, including Yerevan, Syunik, Gegharkunik and Vayots Dzor. These territorial claims led the League to reject Azerbaijan’s membership in 1920. The Preamble of Azerbaijan’s Constitution explicitly references the 1991 Declaration of Independence, creating a legal basis that can be interpreted as claims on Armenian territory. 

These claims are not merely historical. Since December 2022, President Aliyev has escalated assertions that Yerevan, Lake Sevan and Syunik are “historic Azerbaijani lands.” This rhetoric aligns with Azerbaijan’s “Western Azerbaijan” narrative, promoted by the state-supported “Western Azerbaijan Community” organization. In 2022, this organization presented a “Concept of Return” that frames all of Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan” and outlines a phased “return” under Azerbaijani administration. 

Prime Minister Pashinyan has addressed this asymmetry by emphasizing that Armenia has never demanded Azerbaijan amend its Constitution or Declaration of Independence despite their problematic content. Armenia believes a peace treaty would supersede those provisions. Pashinyan stated: “If Azerbaijan truly seeks peace, it should not be demanding changes to Armenia’s Constitution while maintaining provisions in its own that contradict the principle of mutual recognition of territorial integrity.” 

At the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2025, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov dismissed concerns over Azerbaijan’s own constitution. He claimed that Armenia would have raised these concerns earlier if they were genuine, a response that revealed Baku’s unwillingness to engage constructively and its manipulation of Armenia’s goodwill. 

Azerbaijan undermines its stated commitment to peace by demanding constitutional changes from Armenia while refusing to address the territorial claims embedded in its own legal and constitutional frameworks. This approach reveals Azerbaijan’s strategic use of autocratic legalism to pressure Armenia while maintaining its own maximalist claims. Such tactics form part of Azerbaijan’s broader strategy of narrative warfare and lawfare, where it selectively uses legal frameworks to pursue territorial ambitions under a veneer of legitimacy while demanding unilateral concessions from Armenia.

Case Comparisons

Azerbaijani officials and analysts cite international and European precedents to justify their demand that Armenia amend its constitution as a condition for peace and normalization. They have claimed that Azerbaijan’s demand is “not unprecedented in international practice,” pointing to  “referendums on constitutional amendments in several European countries” that have resolved similar issues, ensured compliance with international agreements, and fostered peaceful bilateral relations. 

Post-WWII and Cold War Germany 

Some Azerbaijani ambassadors have invoked post-WWII Germany in their social media posts. An Azerbaijani author has referred to Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik as a model for reconciliation and normalization between adversaries. He argues that Brandt’s recognition of post-WWII borders and renunciation of territorial claims in the 1970 Moscow Treaty should inspire Armenia to eliminate constitutional references to Nagorno-Karabakh. 

After World War II, Germany adopted a new constitution––the Basic Law––replacing the Weimar Constitution and dismantling the authoritarian structures that enabled the Nazi regime. Drafted under Allied supervision, the Basic Law established federalism, separation of powers, and robust human rights protections. These measures prevented the re-emergence of totalitarianism, ensured democratic governance, and symbolized a clear break from the past. Germany’s post-war constitutional transformation was a consensual, internally driven process that safeguarded democracy and human rights in the aftermath of dictatorship.

Azerbaijan’s reference to post-WWII Germany creates a misleading parallel between Armenia’s support for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians’ self-determination aspirations and Nazi-era irredentism—a comparison designed to manipulate international opinion. This aligns with Baku’s broader attempts to portray Armenia as a fascist aggressor and occupier, fabricating narratives similar to those Putin uses to justify actions against Ukraine under the guise of “denazification.”

When invoking Ostpolitik, Azerbaijan ignores its own Cold War context of negotiated reconciliation, instead using it to legitimize its coercive demands and irredentist claims. By mischaracterizing Ostpolitik as a justification for unilateral constitutional concessions, Baku pressures Armenia in the peace process in ways that threaten Armenia’s sovereignty, governance, and identity.

The Belfast Agreement Analogy: A Misapplied Precedent 

James Sharp, former UK Ambassador to Azerbaijan, cited the 1998 Belfast Agreement (also called the Good Friday agreement) as a precedent for Armenia to amend its constitution. He argued that such amendments ensure compliance with international agreements and foster peaceful bilateral relations. Sharp suggested deferring constitutional changes until after a peace treaty, noting that Ireland’s referendum removed claims to Northern Ireland after the agreement was signed, which helped sustain negotiation momentum. 

However, Azerbaijan’s approach differs fundamentally. Its coercive demand for reform as a precondition contrasts sharply with the Belfast sequencing. The Belfast Agreement succeeded through mutual trust, reciprocal concessions, and U.S.-EU mediation—elements absent in Azerbaijan’s unilateral pressure tactics. This misapplied analogy merely serves to exploit military dominance to compel Armenia while ignoring critical differences in both process and goodwill.

The Cyprus Referendum: How Perceived External Pressure Can Stall Peace

Azerbaijan’s demand for Armenia to amend its constitution risks a failed referendum, similar to the 2004 Cyprus referendum on the Annan Plan. This UN-mediated plan proposed a federated United Cyprus Republic with constitutional changes. Despite 64.9% approval from Turkish Cypriots, 75.8% of Greek Cypriots rejected it due to perceived external pressure, distrust and insecurity.

While Azerbaijani authorities do not explicitly reference Cyprus, their alliance with Turkey and signals of intent to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus suggest awareness of this precedent. Baku may be deliberately seeking a similar referendum failure in Armenia to stall peace negotiations while shifting blame to Yerevan. The perception that Armenia is amending its constitution under Azerbaijani pressure—rather than through its own sovereign process—could spark widespread resistance. This would be especially true among displaced Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who, already traumatized by loss, may see the reforms as surrendering their identity. 

It mirrors how the failed Cyprus referendum allowed the Turkish side to entrench its control over Northern Cyprus. Azerbaijan’s demand differs significantly from Cyprus’s internationally mediated process, which balanced peace efforts with a referendum. Instead, Azerbaijan’s approach lacks reciprocity and trust, interferes in Armenia’s domestic affairs, and exploits its military superiority. 

North Macedonia Under Euro-Atlantic Integration Pressure

North Macedonia offers a similar case, where the country faced pressure to make identity-related constitutional amendments from both Greece and Bulgaria. In 2018, under the Prespa Agreement with Greece, North Macedonia amended its Constitution, changing its official name and removing previous constitutional references. These changes resolved disputes that had blocked its NATO membership and EU accession path. These constitutional changes were framed domestically as a necessary compromise for Euro-Atlantic integration; they sparked deep societal debates about identity, sovereignty, and the price of geopolitical alignment. 

Subsequently, Bulgaria imposed additional conditions for North Macedonia’s EU accession, demanding recognition of the Bulgarian minority and changes to historical narratives and language definitions. Bulgaria linked these demands directly to the continuation of EU accession negotiations. North Macedonia accepted a French-mediated proposal in 2022 to begin constitutional amendments that would meet Bulgarian conditions. However, this process has triggered widespread protests and resistance. As of 2025, the required constitutional changes remain unfinalized, leaving the EU accession process stalled and societal divisions deepened.

North Macedonian’s experience illustrates how smaller states can be pressured into constitutional changes by external powers promising stability and membership in larger political and security communities. This case highlights the risks of societal fragmentation, identity crisis, and public disillusionment when concessions feel coerced or promised benefits fail to materialize. This comparison reveals the challenges that arise when constitutional reforms collide with external demands in asymmetrical power relationships, offering insights for Armenia as it considers similar changes during peace negotiations.

Cognitive Warfare and Lawfare Targeting Armenia’s Identity

Azerbaijan’s insistence on Armenian constitutional changes is part of its broader strategy of cognitive warfare and lawfare. This approach uses narrative manipulation and selective autocratic legalism to advance its geopolitical aims.

Through narrative warfare, Baku portrays Armenia as the primary obstacle to peace. It labels Yerevan’s defense of its sovereignty as “revanchism” while presenting itself as a constructive actor promoting regional stability. This tactic aims to shape international opinion, isolate Armenia diplomatically, and erode external support for its security concerns.

Simultaneously, lawfare involves the strategic use of legal arguments. Azerbaijan selectively demands Armenian constitutional amendments as a supposed prerequisite for peace while disregarding the revisionist implications embedded in its own legal framework. This creates an asymmetry in the negotiation dynamic, taking advantage of Armenia’s commitment to international law and democratic processes to extract unilateral concessions under the pretense of upholding legal norms.

The “Western Azerbaijan” narrative and the “Concept of Return” expand this strategy, by shifting the conflict from Nagorno-Karabakh to claims over Armenia’s internationally recognized territory. By embedding expansionist claims in its narrative and legal discourse, Baku normalizes maximalist positions while appearing to pursue peace.

These strategies also undermine Armenia’s collective identity and historical continuity. The forced displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and demands to remove symbolic references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence from the constitution create an identity crisis, desecuritization, and societal fragmentation within Armenia. This weakens democratic governance and effective foreign policy decision-making—vulnerabilities that external actors can exploit. 

In this context, narrative warfare and lawfare function as tools of Azerbaijan’s broader coercive diplomacy, pressuring Armenia to make unilateral concessions while maintaining the threat of renewed aggression if demands are not met. Recognizing and addressing these dynamics is essential for any meaningful international engagement aimed at a fair and lasting peace in the region.

Politics

EVN Security Report
June 2025

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