Why Azerbaijan Still Shapes Armenia-Turkey Normalization

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Azerbaijan continues to hold significant leverage over the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations. That influence was underscored recently when Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Turkey said the Turkish-Armenian border would open only after Armenia met Baku’s demand to amend its constitution. The remark prompted criticism and debate within Turkey, but it also reflected Azerbaijan’s persisting influence over the normalization process.

That influence is rooted in decades of Turkish policy. Since 1993, when Armenian forces made significant territorial advances during the First Nagorno-Karabakh war, Turkey has largely aligned its Armenia policy with Azerbaijan’s position. It unilaterally closed the border that year and has, ever since, linked normalization with Armenia to progress in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

Yet reducing Armenia-Turkey relations to Azerbaijan alone would oversimplify the issue. Even without Baku’s influence, the relationship would remain shaped by the legacy of the Armenian Genocide, geopolitical considerations, Turkey’s domestic politics and broader questions of regional security. 

Symbolic Steps Take Center Stage 

Against this backdrop, Ankara appears to be carefully calibrating the normalization process; doing enough to keep talks alive and maintain diplomatic engagement, but avoiding the final steps that would place normalization on a more durable footing.

Armenia, for its part, has sought to normalize relations with Turkey since gaining independence in 1991. First President Levon Ter-Petrosyan pursued diplomatic relations without preconditions, but those efforts failed as Turkey tied relations with Armenia to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

The countries again came close to normalizing relations in 2009, when they signed the Zurich Protocols, which laid out a roadmap for diplomatic relations and the opening of the border. The process soon stalled. Although agreements were negotiated without preconditions, Turkey quickly linked ratification to progress in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, insisting that Armenian forces withdraw from the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh before the protocols could move forward. Armenia argued that Ankara had violated both the letter and the spirit of the agreements.

In response, Armenia suspended the ratification process in 2010 and formally withdrew the protocols from parliament in 2015. Three years later, shortly before leaving office, President Serzh Sargsyan declared the protocols null and void, accusing Turkey of using them as a delaying tactic. Addressing the UN General Assembly in 2017, he warned that Turkey could not “indefinitely hold these documents hostage and ratify them only when it finds it convenient.”

The collapse of the Zurich Protocols reinforced a pattern that continues to shape Armenia-Turkey relations today: Ankara has repeatedly tied normalization to developments in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, even when bilateral agreements were framed as unconditional. 

Armenia and Turkey resumed normalization talks in late 2021, following Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. The process was formalized with the appointment of special envoys—Ruben Rubinyan for Armenia and Serdar Kılıç for Turkey—who have since held a series of meetings, alongside regular contacts between senior officials and the two countries’ leaders.

With the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict effectively removed from the bilateral agenda after Armenia’s defeat in the war and the dissolution of Artsakh, this latest round of normalization has become the most substantive to date. Compared with previous attempts, the process has produced some largely technical progress. The sides have established the legal framework for direct bilateral trade, launched joint work on restoring the historic Ani Bridge, advanced technical discussions on reopening the Gyumri-Kars railway and expanded contacts between business communities.

Yet the most politically significant agreements remain unimplemented. Despite repeated commitments, the land border has not reopened even for third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders, the railway remains closed, and no timeline has been announced for either project. Much of the progress has therefore been symbolic or preparatory rather than transformative.

Frustration in Turkey Against Azerbaijan?

Although Azerbaijan has long exercised considerable influence over Turkey’s Armenia policy, criticism of that dynamic has rarely surfaced publicly in Turkey.

That changed after Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Turkey, Rashad Mammadov declared that the Armenia-Turkey border would open only after Armenia amended its constitution and signed a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. By publicly laying out the conditions and timeline for Turkey’s border policy, Mammadov appeared to weigh in on an issue considered Ankara’s sovereign decision.

The remarks prompted an unusually public reaction from some Turkish analysts and former diplomats. Gönül Tol of the Middle East Institute said Turkish diplomats had privately complained that Azerbaijan increasingly sought to dictate terms to Ankara, adding that Mammadov’s comments took that tendency “to a new level.” Retired ambassador Mehmet Fatih Ceylan likewise criticized the statement, arguing that decisions on Turkey’s relations with Armenia belong to Ankara alone. 

Yet the criticism remained largely confined to policy and diplomatic circles.

“The Turkish public does not know about Armenia,” says Turkish political scientist Cengiz Aktar. On the contrary, Aktar argues that, given the state of the Turkish economy, “if the average Turkish citizen knew that Azerbaijan is giving the country cash, they would applaud that.”

Historian Gerard Libaridian similarly notes that the issue has never become the subject of sustained public debate in Turkey.

“There is no indication that Turks have any designs on Armenia. They are surprised by what we think they are,” says Libaridian, arguing that Armenians tend to overestimate their importance to Turkey.

Without domestic political pressure, dissatisfaction among former diplomats and analysts is unlikely to alter government policy.

More importantly, Ankara has repeatedly demonstrated that maintaining strategic alignment with Baku remains a higher priority than advancing normalization with Armenia. Whatever frustration may exist within parts of Turkey’s foreign policy establishment has not translated into a shift in official policy. 

Why Does Azerbaijan Continue to Shape Turkey’s Armenia Policy?

Both Libaridian and Aktar believe that Azerbaijan’s influence over Turkey’s approach to Armenia stems from the same factor: economics. 

Azerbaijan is Turkey’s largest foreign direct investor, with more than $19 billion invested largely through the state-owned energy company SOCAR. These investments, along with Azerbaijan’s role as an energy supplier, have deepened the strategic partnership between the two countries.

Libaridian argues that this economic relationship has altered the balance between Ankara and Baku.

“In the initial phases, it was mostly courtesy and sentiment,” he explains. “Ankara had the upper hand, and it was more of an emotional, ethnic relationship. But in the last few years, Baku has gained the upper hand, not so much for political reasons as for financial ones.”

He points in particular to the period preceding Turkey’s recent elections, when the country faced severe inflation and pressure on its currency: “Even before the last election in Turkey, we knew the economy was very shaky, and Turkey needed a significant amount of foreign currency to support its economy. A good part of that came from Baku.”

Cengiz Aktar argues that as Turkey’s economy has deteriorated, the Erdoğan government has become increasingly reliant on Azerbaijani financial support. That dependence, he says, leaves Ankara with little incentive to pursue policies that could jeopardize its relationship with Baku.

Aktar also contends that there is little domestic political cost to maintaining that approach. “Maybe people living near the border will benefit from opening the border, but it will not affect people living further away,” he argues.

Normalization with Armenia attracts little public attention in Turkey, and most voters are far more concerned with inflation and the cost of living than with relations with either Armenia or Azerbaijan. If closer ties with Baku help stabilize the economy, Aktar says, that is likely to carry far greater political weight than opening the border with Armenia.

The decision to normalize relations ultimately rests with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Yet the combination of economic dependence, strategic cooperation, and limited domestic pressure has made it politically easier for Ankara to continue aligning its Armenia policy with Azerbaijan’s priorities than to move ahead independently.

Beyond Azerbaijan: Turkey’s Domestic Constraints

While Azerbaijan’s influence has become a defining feature of Turkey’s Armenia policy, it is not the only factor shaping the pace of normalization. Turkey’s domestic political landscape and decision-making structure have also limited Ankara’s willingness to take the final steps toward normalization.

For much of the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey was governed by fragile coalition governments. According to Libaridian, these administrations focused primarily on preserving their political alliances and electoral prospects, leaving little room for controversial foreign policy initiatives such as opening the border with Armenia. Rather than pursuing ambitious diplomatic breakthroughs, coalition governments largely sought to maintain the status quo.

The transition to an executive presidency under Erdoğan fundamentally changed how foreign policy is made. Decision-making became increasingly centralized, with the presidency assuming greater control over strategic issues and the Foreign Ministry playing a less influential role than in previous decades. In theory, this concentration of power should have made bold diplomatic decisions easier.

Yet neither Libaridian nor Aktar believe this has translated into greater momentum for normalization. Although Erdoğan has the authority to move forward, both argue that Armenia does not rank highly enough among Turkey’s strategic priorities to justify spending valuable political capital.

That calculation is reinforced by domestic politics. According to Aktar, as long as inflation, unemployment, and economic hardship remain voters’ overriding concerns, maintaining close ties with Azerbaijan carries far greater political and economic value than pursuing a normalization process that generates little domestic interest.

For Libaridian, this helps explain why technical progress has not translated into political decisions. Turkey has the institutional capacity to normalize relations with Armenia, but little incentive to challenge the status quo.

Conclusion 

Five years into the latest normalization process, Armenia and Turkey have established mechanisms for dialogue, expanded technical cooperation, and advanced projects that would have been difficult to imagine a decade ago. Yet the political decisions that would fundamentally transform the relationship—opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations—remain elusive.

Whether those steps depend primarily on developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, Turkey’s domestic politics or broader geopolitical shifts remains contested. Although the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has largely been resolved militarily, Azerbaijan continues to exercise decisive influence over the normalization process. As long as Ankara weighs its relations with Armenia against its strategic and economic partnership with Baku, the pace of normalization will likely continue to be shaped by factors extending well beyond the Armenia-Turkey border.

For Libaridian, this reality also defines Armenia’s challenge. If Yerevan cannot determine the pace of normalization in Ankara, it should focus instead on what it can control: reducing regional threats through diplomacy, strengthening its own institutions and economy, and remaining prepared for normalization whenever the political conditions emerge. Waiting for Turkey, or for Azerbaijan, to change course, he argues, risks leaving Armenia trapped by the very dynamics it seeks to overcome. 

Politics