Despite their differences, Russia, the EU and the U.S. all came together days before the Azerbaijani attack on Artsakh to ensure aid could reach the besieged population. Why did Aliyev risk going against them? Or did he? Tatevik Hayrapetyan presents a thought-provoking analysis.

If concrete measures, such as direct intervention, imposing sanctions on Aliyev's family, and targeting Aliyev's reputation, are not taken, international actors involved in the mediation process will ultimately share responsibility for the events unfolding in Artsakh.

Without a clear recognition of the reality on the ground, especially Azerbaijan's obstructionist behavior, and without substantive enforcement instruments provided by international actors, a piece of paper cannot serve as a real peace deal, Tatevik Hayrapetyan writes.

Statements made by Ilham Aliyev over the past two years prove that Baku will never guarantee the rights and security of the people of Artsakh, since state sponsored hate propaganda has made Azerbaijan the number one threat to the survival of the Armenians of Artsakh.

Who is the most influential and determined mediator to prevent the possibility of another aggression against Artsakh or Armenia? The answer will define who can be the main guarantor of peace for the South Caucasus.

No analysis, no commentary, just facts: How Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev ideologically prepared Azerbaijani society for war not only against Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), but also Armenia-proper.

If the EU is honest in its commitment to make peace possible in the South Caucasus, then it needs to address Baku’s ongoing anti-Armenian rhetoric and policy of creating permanent tensions on the borders to pressure Armenia for further concessions.

Just days after Azerbaijan’s most recent military attack, local authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh instructed residents of the Armenian village of Aghavno to leave their homes by August 25, when it is scheduled to be handed over to Azerbaijani control.

Instead of making Yerevan step back every time there is a deadlock in the negotiation process, the mediators should instead develop the tools to pressure Baku. If they do not, another war in the South Caucasus is likely.

By meeting Azerbaijan’s demand for a €2 billion financial package to participate in “restoration and reconstruction”, the European Union is casting into doubt its sincerity in supporting democratic values in the South Caucasus.