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The art of revolting has always been a poetic phenomenon for the Armenian soul and not an act of brutality coated in philosophical sophistication and grand ideational postulates. Armenians have revolted because they have had no other alternatives. It has always been a practical response to oppression and not some pseudo-metaphysical adoration of lofty ideals.
Armenians are conditioned to revolt, precisely because they have been conditioned to be subjugated. And so we have developed a political culture driven by extant negation. But these acts of revolting have always been a response to external impositions, to the subjugation of Armenians as peripheral objects reduced to the interests of imperial ethos. The art of revolting, for the political Armenian, was always an act of negating the external…against that non-Armenian Other seeking to establish peonage.
But what of revolting against one’s own? Not against an external actor, or against the oppression of empires, or the injustices of foreign powers, but rather, revolting against the oppression imposed by those Armenians entrusted to exercise sovereignty. This was a new form of revolting—it was a velveteen act that sought to destroy the chains of repression without engaging in the act of destructing, an intrinsic part of all revolutions. This was a revolution without an Other, it was a revolution against acts not peoples, it was a revolution of self-negation because it was a rare historical act of self-correction. The Armenian people peacefully rose and demanded the peaceful abdication of sovereignty from an oppressive leadership. The Velvet Revolution was practical and poetic, but it was neither grand nor ideationally sophisticated. It was a collective act of sovereignty by a people against the unilateral abuse of power. But what now? After half a decade, a war lost, a people ethnically cleansed, yet a society forging ahead…what now?
To borrow from Meleau-Ponty, “revolutions are true as movements and false as regimes.”[1] Indeed, revolutions are negative responses to the intolerable state of political or economic conditions, and as such, revolutions function only negatively. Revolting is an act of negation. Revolutions draw their power and strength from a denial of the existing conditions, but the most important question comes after the dust has settled: can post-revolutionary governments establish a positive form of life without relying on the principle of negation, which was the very oxygen that made the revolution happen? In basic comparative terms, the Soviet or even the French revolutions both turned totalitarian for primarily clinging to the ethos of negation: without something to negate, the revolution becomes a cause unto itself and thus turns absolute. “The very nature of revolution,” for this reason, “is to believe itself absolute and not to be absolute precisely because it believes itself to be so.”[2] Did the post-Velvet system fall into the trap of clinging to some utopian image of paradise, or did it seek the practical—a conflicting process of multiplicity and plurality seeking democratic self-deliberation, even if it was a confusing and chaotic one? In essence, what distinguishes the Velvet Revolution, as an act of negative revolt, was that it was not based, developed or structured on some theory of action, it was untheorizable. It was a spontaneous act of negation, but not of the Other, or of the foreigner, or the external oppressor, but rather, one that sought an open future and not a closed utopia. The Velvet was pragmatic, not ideational.
In the five years since, the Velvet has consolidated, there is no going back. But that is not the same as presuming that clinging to negation will translate into quality governance and a stronger society. Negation is for revolting, not governing. Thus, the Velvet being “true as movement” cannot become “false as regime.” Armenia has gone through two cycles of free and fair democratic elections, with a third one nearing in 2026. The 2018 elections consolidated the pragmatic values of the Velvet. The 2021 elections consolidated the politics of negation inherent to the Velvet. The 2026 elections cannot do either. The politics of negation, that of negating the previous regime, the nakhkinner*, can no longer be the mantle of electoral prowess going forward, while relying on the dividends of the Revolution can only become an act of “believing itself to be absolute.” The Velvet won, this is unequivocal. But now that the dust has settled, the dust of war, discord, and social fracture, the legacy of the Velvet is at stake: the Velvet did what it was supposed to do, but has Armenia done what it is supposed to do since?
2026 will no longer be about the Velvet, the nakhkinner, or the politics of negation. If it is made as such, the soul of the Revolution will soon turn against itself, for unless the commitment to concrete progress, development, and growth are demonstrated, the ontology of the Revolution will lose its credibility. Armenia is not what it was in 2018, 2022, or 2023. It is more wealthier, socially complex, diplomatically vigorous, culturally strong, and collectively resilient. Is it where it needs to be? Not even close. Has it leaped forward amidst an impossible security and geopolitical environment. It most definitely has. But two important matters still absorb the collective consciousness of Armenian society: fragility and uncertainty.
For the sake of the Velvet, and not in spite of it, 2026 can only be about addressing Armenia’s problems and advancing its solutions, it cannot be about negation of the past, but rather, what the Velvet promised: embracing an open future. The more we mitigate uncertainty, the less fragile our collective sense of being. The Velvet will be eight years old in 2026…a new generation, having reached adulthood after the Revolution, wait to continue the mantle, but on their terms.
*Nakhkinner refers to the representatives of the previous regimes in Armenia prior to the 2018 Velvet Revolution.
Footnotes
[1] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Adventures of the Dialectic. Evanston: Northwest University Press. 1973, pg. 207
[2] Ibid. pg. 222
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Armenian diplomacy has been nothing short of failure since 2018, Armenia under Pashinyan failed to protect the one thing that so many Armenians fought for; Artsakh. The social fabric of Armenia is deteriorating before everyone’s eyes (everyone who is willing to see it), and there’s an increased factionalism fueled by incessant disinformation and corroding propaganda, especially on the part of the Pashinyan regime. The foundations of the Republic itself have been questioned. This piece hastily glosses over all the negative consequences of the populist government which came to power after the Velvet Revolution, which truly wasn’t about brining anything new but simply rejecting the old (in this sense at least the article has some merit to it). Armenia is more vulnerable then ever, and it is a big disservice to paper over all the massive challenges imposed on the Republic in great part due to the upsurge of populism and not ideational politics.
From what I see, Pashinyan’s diplomacy is churning out fairly well, if you believe Armenia’s destiny is a sovereign state. Our relationship with France, India, and Iran have never been better. Armenia has been diversifying its relations with European and Arab states. We have bought weapons from Greece, Czechia, and Slovakia, and re-established relations with Hungary, who would be our biggest enemy in the EU if this were to happen. We established relations with Saudi Arabia and signed investment deals with the UAE. There is nothing wrong with diversification.
But you will say, who will defend Armenia? Not the CSTO! In 2020, the CSTO declined to protect Armenia, despite their sovereign territory invaded and bombed, because the “border was not deliminated”. As Pashinyan rightly states, “if this organization does not recognize our borders, it does not exist”. Do you forget that it is our legal allies, Russia and Belarus, who have supported Azerbaijan’s extraterritorial Zangezur Corridor plan?
You will say, but he forsook Artsakh. Unfortunately, yes this is true. And his Western flirtations gave ammunition to Russia to turn its back on us. But Artsakh was always pro-Russian. Artsakh was hardly pro-Pashinyan either. So, this can’t explain everything. In some counterfactual when Sargsyan keeps power, are you convinced Russia would intervene? And if Russia intervened, are you convinced they would negotiate Artsakh’s legal recognition? I show you Abkhazia! Who relies fully on Russia, despite having access to international markets through the coast AND a friendly relationship with fellow Muslims in Turkey, in principle.
Armenia sold its soul to Russia since the beginning. It sold its energy, its land, its capital, and its best students to Russia in 1991. The Ter-Petrossian government, born from the Miatsum movement, failed to negotiate a peace agreement with Baku, and in 30 years, no meaningful progress was made in the OSCE or bilaterally over Artsakh. When Pashinyan’s government took over, the writing was already on the wall for Artsakh, who allowed itself to decay in military power relative to Baku, unfortunately.
Our small country can only survive in a bloc. The CSTO refused to defend us, so we had to re-examine our security system. And we did. Russia will always be a partner for Armenia. Pashinyan went to the BRICS conference in Kazan after all. Russia is not hostile by definition against the EU, with whom it had many trade deals prior to 2014 and 2022, so long as we don’t flirt with NATO (which will never happen because of Turkey).
We are arguably in a more promising position than in 2018, even if more dangerous and uncertain. But the security of the CSTO was shattered in 2020. I repeat, it is not certain Russia would support Armenia in 2020 if Sargsyan were still in power.
Unfortunately, I do not share your optimism. Armenia is increasingly drifting into the Turkish orbit. The West has no real interest in Armenia, and the West’s presence in the region is through Turkey: Syria’s fate should be a lesson for us. This does not mean that we should handover the country to Russia, but considering the fact that Russia is geographically closer, improving our relations with Russia (impossible under the Pashinyan regime) is imperative. The next existential crisis is on its way and all Pashinyan does is fool the public with his fake narratives that only mar the reality. If this continues I am afraid Armenia will follow in Artsakh‘s footsteps (God forbid).
As for Artsakh, it was Armenia‘s and Armenia had to walk an uncomfortable path to keep it Armenian, that‘s what politics is. Instead Pashinyan jettisoned it as if it was some foreign element. Unfortunately our national as well as state interests were completely disregarded, just like they are being disregarded now.