Regional Peace Cannot Be Built by Ignoring Azerbaijan’s Rhetoric

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“De facto peace exists between Azerbaijan and Armenia.” These are the words of Azerbaijan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Jeyhun Bayramov, delivered at a joint press conference with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, following talks in Moscow on July 17. 

It reflects a broader shift in the tone of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations since the August 8 Washington summit, after which Baku significantly dialed back the war rhetoric that had characterized the relationship.[1]

Yet despite attempts to demonstrate peaceful intentions, Azerbaijan’s leadership continues to systematically promote the expansionist “Western Azerbaijan” narrative which portrays the territory of the Republic of Armenia as the historic homeland of Azerbaijanis and has increasingly been promoted through Azerbaijani state media, educational institutions and official discourse. This threat is being ignored by the Armenian government, misread by the Armenian opposition, and taken far too lightly by international partners.

One year into a process increasingly defined by the language of peace, what does the continued promotion of this narrative tell us about the prospects for lasting peace?

The precedent of Nagorno-Karabakh and the broader negotiation process around the conflict demonstrate two points: 

First, narrative warfare cannot be ignored or dismissed as insignificant, especially in today’s environment of disinformation and misinterpretation, where even the most absurd narratives can eventually enter public discussion. 

Second, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is known for a policy of dual messaging. He consistently presents a moderate image to international audiences while maintaining a much harsher line at home. Yet his actions are largely driven by domestic political considerations, hence the aggressive war and ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh, developments some international partners may have believed would not happen.

Now that the Armenian government has explicitly announced its intention to close the Nagorno-Karabakh chapter, Azerbaijan, in response, is explicitly promoting a highly dangerous expansionist narrative against Armenia as its “national idea.” 

Ongoing monitoring of Azerbaijani state media, especially the state-run “Azertag” news agency, shows a clear tendency to portray Armenia’s territory as “ancient Azerbaijani land,” a claim with no historical, geographical, or political basis. Let us first examine the statistics behind this dangerous propaganda campaign and then analyze its content and broader tendencies.

On November 3, 2025, three months after the August 8 summit and the DC-brokered peace process, Aliyev attended a conference marking the 80th anniversary of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences. In his speech, he explicitly assigned a task: “More research works, even small booklets should be prepared so that both Azerbaijani youth and the world community can know their history well and, at the same time, for our return to present-day Armenia to sound completely logical and fair.”

Aliyev is fully aware that this expansionist narrative cannot sound either “logical” or “fair.” He knows that it has no legal basis under international law.[2] He is also well aware that the term “Western Azerbaijan” has no historical precedent and has never appeared on any geographical map. It is a political term invented and promoted by his father, Heydar Aliyev, who used it in a public speech in December 1998, stating:

“The area now called Armenia—[what is] actually Western Azerbaijan, [including the] Iravan, Goycha, Zangibasar, and Zangezur districts—all these were the lands where Muslims and Azerbaijanis lived. Unfortunately, Muslims were expelled from these areas, and now there is not a single Muslim in those areas. This is the result of the policy of Armenian nationalism, Armenian extremism, and Armenian chauvinism. If we are discussing Islamic civilization in the Caucasus, we must tell the truth.”

Azerbaijan’s expansionist rhetoric is not new, but it gained momentum and became part of the political agenda after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.[3] In December 2022, Aliyev himself announced: “Armenia was never present in this region before. Present-day Armenia is our land.”

A year ago, an EVN Report article “Fairy Tales, Textbooks and Territorial Claims: Weaving the Myth of ‘Western Azerbaijan,’” examined how Azerbaijan’s education system was being used to promote the concept and the risks of raising a generation to believe that neighboring Armenia “belongs to them.”

This monitoring presented here focuses on Azerbaijan’s state-run news agency “Azertag,” following Aliyev’s November 2025 directive to promote the concept more actively. It examines the period following the U.S.-mediated breakthrough in Washington, when one might have expected the rhetoric to recede as Armenia and Azerbaijan moved toward a peace agreement. The figures below count Azerbaijani-language articles that invoke “Western Azerbaijan” in reference to Armenia.

In November, “Azertag” published 49 such articles[4]. The number fell to 42 in December and 32 in January, before rising to 38 in February, 24 in March, 31 in April, 29 in May and 80 in June.

The pattern suggests that “Western Azerbaijan” is not simply a political slogan but an increasingly systematic, state-backed narrative with long-term strategic implications for Armenia’s sovereignty and security environment.

The concern is not simply that Azerbaijani officials make territorial claims about Armenia. It is that the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative is being:

1. constructed as a historical claim;
2. institutionalized through universities and state institutions;
3. embedded in national identity;
4. promoted through diplomatic and international channels; and
5. framed as a question of human rights, when in reality, it is a clear form of territorial expansionism.

Taken together, these efforts suggest an attempt to establish a durable narrative in which Armenia is not viewed solely as a sovereign neighboring state, but also as territory associated with purportedly unresolved Azerbaijani claims.

The “Western Azerbaijan” concept should therefore not be dismissed as a political slogan or isolated rhetoric. It has become a state-backed ideological, educational and diplomatic project aimed at reshaping perceptions of history, legitimacy and sovereignty in the South Caucasus. That is difficult to reconcile with the stated goal of lasting peace.

Ignoring it today would mean repeating the mistake many made in dismissing years of Azerbaijani rhetoric about Nagorno-Karabakh as mere propaganda, until it was followed by military aggression and ethnic cleansing.

The “Western Azerbaijan” narrative is not confined to political speeches or state media. It is increasingly being given an institutional and academic framework and declared a “national idea”.

In June of this year, Baku State University and the Western Azerbaijan Community jointly organized an international conference titled “Return to Western Azerbaijan: As a New Stage of the National Idea.” According to Azertag, the conference examined the “scientific” basis of the concept, including the purported “right of return” of Azerbaijanis to what it calls “Western Azerbaijan.”

The choice of venue matters. Baku State University is one of Azerbaijan’s major educational institutions, and the conference brought the narrative into an academic setting, giving it the appearance of scholarly legitimacy while exposing students and the wider educational community to the idea that present-day Armenia constitutes “Western Azerbaijan”.

The same message was reinforced later that month in Nakhchivan, where the III Festival-Congress “Return to Western Azerbaijan” was held with the participation of the Nakhchivan presidential representation, the Ministry of Science and Education, Nakhchivan State University and the Western Azerbaijan Community. In speeches at the event, senior Azerbaijani officials described “Western Azerbaijan” as a national and educational priority and spoke of moving the concept from an idea toward “strategic action”.

This is significant because the narrative is no longer being promoted simply as political rhetoric. It is being incorporated into Azerbaijan’s educational, academic and state institutions, and presented as a legitimate national project.

For example: 

• Jeyhun Jalilov, the Azerbaijani president’s envoy in Nakhchivan, stated: “In light of the new realities, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev, identified the issue of Western Azerbaijan as one of the key directions of the national agenda.”
• The Minister of Science and Education of Azerbaijan, Emin Amrullayev, emphasized that “the topic of Western Azerbaijan has become one of the main topics in the educational and scientific spheres of the country.” The Minister further stressed that “the topic of Western Azerbaijan has moved from an idea to a stage of strategic action. As a result of the purposeful policy of the head of state, systematic organizational, educational, and research measures are being implemented regarding the return to Western Azerbaijan.”

• Deputy Speaker of the Milli Majlis Ziyafat Asgarov likewise declared that “the return of Western Azerbaijanis to their homeland is one of the important priority directions of the foreign policy of our country.”

These official statements, along with an active propaganda campaign in state media, clearly show Azerbaijan’s continued efforts to portray the internationally recognized territory of Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan.” They also confirm that this narrative has shifted from an ideological concept to a strategic state policy, a strong indicator that Azerbaijan is not pursuing genuine reconciliation. Instead, it is institutionalizing a baseless but systematic, state-sponsored expansionist narrative that is fundamentally incompatible with lasting peace.

Unfortunately, this serious threat is still not being addressed properly. The Armenian government has chosen either to ignore it or, even worse, to draw false parallels between Azerbaijan’s fabricated “right of return” to so-called “Western Azerbaijan” and the internationally recognized right of return of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.[5] Government representatives have even criticized the opposition for reminding the public of the right of return of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The two claims are fundamentally different. When Ilham Aliyev began referring to Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan” and promoting the invented concept of a “right of return,” Armenians were still living in their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh. The two issues were never connected. 

More importantly, equating a fabricated, state-sponsored expansionist narrative with a well-established principle of international law only normalizes Azerbaijan’s claims against Armenia instead of exposing their true nature. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s efforts to close the Nagorno-Karabakh chapter of Armenia’s foreign policy have also created a political dilemma: if the government defines the conflict as resolved and insists that Armenia and Azerbaijan are now at peace, how does it characterize Azerbaijan’s continuing claims about Armenia itself?

That question cannot be avoided by simply declaring the conflict is over. If anything, the emergence of the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative makes it more important for Armenia to articulate clearly what it is, why it matters, and how it differs from the rights of Armenians displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh.

The opposition has also failed to frame the issue correctly. Several of the main opposition parties, particularly “Strong Armenia,” which is now represented in parliament, actively used Azerbaijani terminology during the pre-election campaign by referring to the “settling of 300,000 Azerbaijanis” to criticize Pashinyan’s government. This claim played into Azerbaijani propaganda and threats about Azerbaijanis “returning” to Armenia. 

This is not simply a debate about Azerbaijanis who once lived in Soviet Armenia; according to the 1989 Soviet census, they numbered 84,860.[6] It is about a state-sponsored ideological project that challenges Armenia’s territorial integrity and historical legitimacy. Yet the issue has become caught up in Armenia’s domestic political rivalry, with both the government and parliamentary opposition failing to articulate a coherent response to its broader national security implications.

Armenia’s international partners have also yet to treat this issue with the seriousness it deserves. But the primary responsibility lies with Armenia to explain clearly what the “Western Azerbaijan” concept is, why it matters, and what its long-term implications could be for the country’s sovereignty and security.

Armenia still has diplomatic, political, legal, and informational tools with which to challenge Azerbaijan’s state-sponsored narrative. The objective should not be to amplify the rhetoric, but to contest it consistently and prevent it from becoming further embedded in international discourse, and ultimately, in political realities on the ground.

Armenia has paid a heavy price for ignoring openly declared intentions in the past. There is an opportunity to counter this policy through diplomacy, strategic communication, and consistent political messaging. This must become a central task for the Armenian government, political parties, academics, civil society and diaspora organizations to make clear what is at stake. 

A narrative doesn’t become a territorial claim overnight, but allowing it to take root without a response makes it harder to challenge later. The threat is clear and real, and it must be prevented in time. 

Footnotes: 

[1] Between March 16 and the end of April, 2025 Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense released 26 reports—16 in March and 10 in April.
[2] The legal avenues for the alleged “resettlement” of Azerbaijanis in Armenia are closed. Today, there is no international judicial or legal forum in which Azerbaijan can credibly pursue claims of an alleged Azerbaijani “right of return” to Armenia. This question is bound up with legal and temporal constraints that have already been addressed by the two most authoritative international judicial bodies. Their decisions define the relevant legal framework and timelines, leaving no basis for Azerbaijan’s claims. 

In its decision in Samadov v. Armenia (Application No. 36606/08, 26 January 2021), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) declared inadmissible the application of an Azerbaijani applicant who had lived in Karvachar. The Court noted that Armenia acceded to the European Convention on Human Rights in 2002, while the applicant filed the application only in 2008, without any justification for waiting more than 15 years after the alleged violation, and six years after Armenia’s accession to the Convention, to bring the claim. The Court found these delays excessive and concluded that the application had been lodged out of time.

This judgment is particularly significant because, in its interstate application against Armenia filed in 2021, Azerbaijan sought to raise claims relating to the property rights of Azerbaijanis who left Armenia and Artsakh in the early 1990s. The Samadov judgment strongly suggests that such claims would likewise be considered inadmissible due to the excessive lapse of time.

Even more importantly, in its Judgment of 12 November 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that it lacked jurisdiction to examine Azerbaijan’s claims relating to the period between 1993 and 1996, including allegations concerning the purported deportation of Azerbaijanis. By excluding these historical claims from its jurisdiction, the ICJ further limited the legal avenues available to Azerbaijan in relation to events of that period.

Taken together, these two judgments demonstrate that there is currently no viable international legal avenue through which Azerbaijan or individual Azerbaijani claimants can pursue property-rights claims arising from the displacement of Azerbaijanis in the early 1990s. Any such attempt would face serious admissibility or jurisdictional obstacles in light of the established positions of the ECHR and the ICJ.
[3] At the meeting with the so-called “Western Azerbaijan Community” in December 2022, President Ilham Aliyev stated: “Now that the Karabakh conflict has been resolved, this is the issue on our agenda. Of course, it was premature to talk about it before the Karabakh conflict was resolved. But we should not waste any time now. A Concept of Return should be developed. Again, it should be a peaceful concept…”.
[4] 1.11.2025, 3.11.2025, 3.11.2025, 4.11.2025, 4.11.2025, 4.11.2025, 5.11.2025, 5.11.2025, 6.11.2025, 6.11.2025, 6.11.2025, 7.11.2025, 8.11.2025, 8.11.2025, 8.11.2025, 9.11.2025, 11.11.2025, 12.11.2025, 12.11.2025, 13.11.2025, 13.11.2025, 14.11.2025, 14.11.2025, 14.11.2025, 14.11.2025, 15.11.2025, 15.11.2025, 15.11.2025, 17.11.2025, 17.11.2025, 18.11.2025, 18.11.2025, 19.11.2025, 19.11.2025, 20.11.2025, 22.11.2025, 22.11.2025, 25.11.2025, 25.11.2025, 27.11.2025, 27.11.2025, 28.11.2025, 29.11.2025, 29.11.2025, 29.11.2025, 29.11.2025, 30.11.2025, 30.11.2025, 30.11.2025.
[5] In its November 17, 2023 judgment, the International Court of Justice recognized the right of return of NK Armenians and affirmed Azerbaijan’s obligation to ensure their prompt, safe, and voluntary return. This constitutes a valid international judicial act. The UN Human Rights Council has made a similar call and recognized this right internationally. PACE has also addressed this issue. The European Parliament has likewise recognized this right. International human rights NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, have also raised concerns regarding this issue.
[6] Population of individual nationalities in the territory of the Armenian SSR in 1979 and 1989 (Armenian SSR Census), 1989, p. 106.

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