One Year After the Washington Accords

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On August 8, 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Washington at the invitation of U.S. President Donald Trump, marking a turning point in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov initialled the Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations, which had been finalized five months earlier, while Pashinyan and Aliyev signed the Washington Declaration in the presence of Trump. The declaration reaffirmed their commitment to peace and set out a framework for regional connectivity through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

The first anniversary of the Washington Summit offers an opportunity to take stock of the progress achieved, the obstacles that remain, and the prospects for translating negotiated commitments into implementation.

From Bilateral Negotiations to Washington

By the end of 2024, the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process had become largely bilateral. Baku increasingly rejected international mediation, including formats facilitated by France, the EU, and the Biden administration. Several countries, including Germany, Kazakhstan and Georgia, hosted individual meetings, but these did not develop into sustained formats, and the hosts had limited leverage over the parties.

Azerbaijan insisted that the remaining issues be negotiated directly between the two countries, and Armenia eventually agreed. This shift enabled Azerbaijan to exploit its significant power asymmetry and apply coercive pressure more effectively. Advancing the bilateral process required Armenia to make further concessions, including accepting two provisions it had previously opposed. 

On March 13, 2025, Armenia announced that it had accepted the remaining Azerbaijani proposals, meaning the text of the 17-article peace agreement was fully agreed and negotiations were formally concluded. While Armenia proposed consultations on the date and venue for signing, Azerbaijan immediately raised additional conditions for signature, and the breakthrough was followed by renewed tension. Azerbaijani forces fired at civilian infrastructure in Armenia’s southern Syunik region while attributing responsibility to the Armenian side. The incidents intensified during the Israel–Iran war, when broader regional instability heightened concerns about the possibility of renewed Azerbaijani military escalation.

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration became increasingly engaged behind the scenes to prevent escalation and advance the peace process. This backstage diplomacy included Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s visit to Baku and direct engagement with Azerbaijani leadership. In May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the U.S. was “working to prevent” Azerbaijan from invading Armenia.

By the time of the August 8 summit, Armenia and Azerbaijan had already negotiated the peace agreement bilaterally. The Trump administration used U.S. political leverage with Baku to overcome the subsequent impasse, address the contentious connectivity issue, and bring Aliyev to Washington alongside Pashinyan.

Trump repeatedly presented the Armenia–Azerbaijan breakthrough as one of the conflicts resolved through his administration’s “peace through strength” approach. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy cited Armenia and Azerbaijan among the peace deals brokered by the Trump administration. Pashinyan and Aliyev also nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, explicitly citing his contribution to the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. This gave Washington a reputational, as well as geopolitical, stake in ensuring that the progress achieved at the summit endured. 

End of Military Escalation: Deterrence Against Coercion

The most significant development since Washington has been the transformation of the security environment. The risk of military escalation that characterized Armenia–Azerbaijan relations after the 2020 war has fallen to a very low level, and the border has remained stable. 

At the same time, both countries continue to modernize their militaries. Azerbaijan retains significant military superiority, with substantially higher expenditures, while Armenia carries a high military burden relative to its economy. Armenia’s modernization and reforms have improved its ability to deter military coercion.

Azerbaijan portrays the military conflict with Armenia as over and its continued buildup as a response to broader regional threats, particularly Russia and Iran. Yet it still periodically signals that force remains an option if Yerevan does not comply with its demands. For Armenia, deterrence remains necessary to prevent military asymmetry from translating into coercive leverage. 

Competing Narratives of Peace

This shift is increasingly reflected in the official discourse of both governments. Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders claim that peace has been established, even though no peace agreement has been signed.

Pashinyan and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan have repeatedly described peace as a new reality that must be protected and nurtured. Pashinyan has compared it to a child requiring constant care, and both Armenian and Azerbaijani officials emphasize that their states and societies are learning to live in peace after decades of conflict.

However, Baku presents Azerbaijan as the “author of the draft peace agreement.” Aliyev’s assistant Hikmet Hajiyev framed this triumphalist narrative after the Washington Summit: “President Ilham Aliyev won the war—now he wins the peace.” This discourse continues to be accompanied periodically by reminders of Armenia’s defeat, assertions about responsibility for the previous conflict and references to Azerbaijan’s military superiority. Nevertheless, both governments now have a political interest in presenting peace as an existing reality rather than merely a future objective. 

The Unsigned Peace Agreement and Azerbaijan’s Constitutional Precondition

Despite this new reality, the peace agreement itself remains unsigned. Azerbaijan continues to formally condition its signature on changes to Armenia’s Constitution, arguing that the reference in its preamble to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which contains a provision about Nagorno-Karabakh, constitutes a territorial claim against Azerbaijan. 

Armenia’s position is that its Constitution contains no territorial claims against Azerbaijan. In September 2024, Armenia’s Constitutional Court ruled that only those provisions of the Declaration of Independence that are directly expressed in the Constitution have constitutional force. The agreed peace agreement provides for mutual recognition of territorial integrity and states that neither party may invoke its domestic legislation to avoid its obligations under the agreement. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s own Constitution indirectly contains potential claims against Armenia: its preamble refers to the 1991 Constitutional Act, which invokes the 1918 Declaration of Independence with claims extending to parts of present-day Armenia. Baku rejects this interpretation, arguing that its constitutional framework contains no territorial claims against Armenia.

At the same time, the ruling party is advancing constitutional reform—plans that predate both the 2020 war and Azerbaijan’s subsequent demand. The opposition depicts the initiative as a response to Baku, citing repeated Azerbaijani statements linking the signing of the peace agreement to constitutional change. This framing risks eroding public support for the reform. The process has grown more complicated since the 2026 parliamentary elections: Civil Contract did not win a constitutional majority and would need broader parliamentary support to initiate constitutional change. Even if a referendum is held, adoption requires a high threshold, and continued pressure from Baku could further diminish its chances of success. 

This raises a broader question: why is Azerbaijan continuing to insist on constitutional change when the agreed peace agreement already provides for mutual recognition of territorial integrity? Is Baku genuinely concerned that a future Armenian government could revive the Nagorno-Karabakh issue? 

A more likely explanation is that the demand is part of Azerbaijan’s lawfare: securing constitutional change in Armenia could help legitimize Baku’s military actions as having resolved an Armenian territorial claim. It can also be viewed through the lens of cognitive warfare, reinforcing a sense of defeat among Armenian citizens, including those displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh, and reshaping their historical narrative of the conflict.

Moreover, this constitutional precondition may itself jeopardize the continuation of the peace process. Baku knows that constitutional change in Armenia faces significant legal and political obstacles. By making it a condition for signing, Baku creates a potential off-ramp from the peace process. If a referendum cannot be held or fails, Azerbaijan can refuse to sign the agreement and blame Armenia for the deadlock. More strategically, this would allow Baku to avoid making peace irreversible and preserve the option of renewed coercion or military escalation should the geopolitical environment become more favorable in the future.

Lack of Progress on De-occupation Through Border Delimitation

There has been little tangible progress on border delimitation since the Washington Summit. The only section delimited and demarcated so far covers approximately 12 kilometers of the nearly 1,000-kilometer Armenia–Azerbaijan border. The process concerned four former Azerbaijani exclave villages and resulted in Armenia transferring control of the relevant territories to Azerbaijan in 2024. While this established an important precedent for resolving border issues through negotiation and on the basis of the Alma-Ata Declaration, there has been no subsequent progress on delimitation.

Approximately 241 square kilometers of Armenian territory, around 0.8% of the country’s internationally recognized territory of 29,743 square kilometers, remain under Azerbaijani occupation following the incursions of 2021 and 2022. Pashinyan has stated that Armenia intends to restore its territorial integrity through the delimitation process, not through military force. This leaves a significant asymmetry: the only completed section of delimitation addressed territories sought by Azerbaijan, while sections involving Azerbaijani occupation of Armenian territory remain unresolved. More complex questions, including the future treatment of enclaves, will also need to be addressed later in the process.

The lack of vocal statements by the Armenian leadership on de-occupation in the last two years has been raising questions domestically. Recent statements by Pashinyan and Mirzoyan, suggest an effort to depoliticize and de-escalate these issues, treating de-occupation, delimitation and enclaves as technical questions to be resolved through the delimitation process rather than as sources of political confrontation.

Armenian Captives

One year after Washington, 19 Armenians remain in Azerbaijani custody, including former political leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh. The return of four Armenian captives during this period was an important confidence-building measure, but it did not address the broader legal and humanitarian issue.

Their continued detention is particularly troubling because Azerbaijan insisted that the peace agreement require both parties to withdraw interstate claims from international judicial bodies. Armenian detainees continue to face criminal proceedings in Azerbaijan’s judiciary, which lacks independence and credible guarantees of impartiality and due process, and no meaningful international monitoring of their trials has been allowed.

More broadly, the ongoing prosecution of Armenian captives raises questions about lawfare in addressing the legacy of the conflict. No transitional justice mechanism has been established to address violations committed by both sides over decades of conflict. Instead, Azerbaijan is prosecuting representatives of conquered Nagorno-Karabakh in its domestic courts. This creates a highly asymmetric approach to accountability, rather than a mutually agreed framework for dealing with the conflict’s legacy.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Beyond the Political Question—Rights and Historical Memory

Three years after the displacement of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, much of Armenian society has accepted that the Nagorno-Karabakh cause, including the prospect of return, is closed. The Armenian government has removed the issue from its foreign policy agenda and views attempts to revive it as potentially detrimental not only to the peace process with Azerbaijan, but also to Armenia’s security and sovereignty.

The challenge is that this approach extends beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh cause itself. On the human rights dimension, the authorities also tend to discourage public discussion of the displaced Armenians’ rights, including property rights, violations committed against them, and the destruction or alteration of Armenian cultural and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh. On the historical memory dimension, there is also reluctance to address the Armenian experience of the conflict and displacement, preserve historical memory, and challenge Azerbaijan’s efforts to reshape the narrative of the conflict. In both cases, the concern appears to be that keeping these issues prominent could complicate normalization with Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan actively promotes its interpretation of the conflict’s history and causes through official discourse, and education, public and cultural diplomacy. The post-conflict period has therefore also become a struggle over how the conflict will be remembered and understood. Azerbaijan is pursuing this narrative assertively, while Armenia has largely refrained from developing or defending its own account. This creates a growing asymmetry in the contest over narratives.

The “Western Azerbaijan” Narrative: Toned Down, But Not Abandoned

Another important change has been the decline—relative yet uneven—in the intensity of Azerbaijan’s “Western Azerbaijan” narrative. This framing portrays the territory of present-day Armenia as the historical homeland of Azerbaijanis and promotes their “return”. The rhetoric has been less prominent than before the peace agreement was initialled, but it has not disappeared.

Instead, the narrative appears to be activated and deactivated depending on the political context. Azerbaijani state institutions and state-affiliated organizations continue to institutionalize and promote it through conferences, academic programs, publications and public diplomacy. In June 2026, Baku State University and the “Western Azerbaijan Community” organized an international conference entitled “Return to Western Azerbaijan as a New Stage of the National Idea,” followed later that month by a state-backed “Return to Western Azerbaijan” Congress-Festival in Nakhchivan.

Even when presented in the language of historical justice, human rights and peaceful return, the systematic use of “Western Azerbaijan” to describe the territory of the Republic of Armenia carries an implicit challenge to Armenian sovereignty. Its selective activation also allows it to function as an instrument of narrative and political pressure without necessarily disrupting the broader diplomatic process.

From the “Zangezur Corridor” to TRIPP

One of the most consequential achievements of the Washington Summit was a breakthrough on connectivity between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenia. For several years, Azerbaijan had promoted what it called the “Zangezur corridor,” a formulation Armenia rejected because of its implications for Armenian sovereignty and jurisdiction over Syunik. The issue became a major source of tension and was at times accompanied by explicit or implicit threats of force.

The Washington Declaration and the subsequent TRIPP Framework changed the approach to connectivity. Under TRIPP, Armenia retains full sovereignty, territorial integrity and jurisdiction over the route, as well as ownership of its territory and infrastructure, while Azerbaijan receives uninterrupted connectivity with Nakhchivan. The route is envisaged as operating through a commercial mechanism with U.S. involvement, rather than through an extraterritorial corridor or foreign security control. This transformed one of the most contentious issues of the post-2020 period into an agreed arrangement broadly compatible with Armenia’s longstanding principles for opening regional communications.

Implementation, however, faces challenges. Armenia’s railway network is under concession to the Russian-owned South Caucasus Railway, complicating the construction, rehabilitation, and operation of the railway infrastructure required for TRIPP. The U.S.–Iran conflict adds a geopolitical complication to a project involving significant American participation immediately adjacent to Iran.

Aliyev’s August 11 interview also demonstrated that Baku still periodically refers to TRIPP as the “Zangezur Corridor.” Although this terminology has caused considerable dissatisfaction in Armenia, it now appears to function mainly as a face-saving device for the Azerbaijani domestic audience, allowing the leadership to maintain continuity with earlier rhetoric after having accepted an arrangement that preserves Armenia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction.

TRIPP should therefore be assessed as a major political breakthrough whose practical implementation remains at an early stage. Washington largely resolved the dispute over the principles governing connectivity; the task now is to ensure implementation through the necessary infrastructure and the required legal, commercial, and operational arrangements, while developing connectivity in ways that also advance Armenia’s regional access and economic interests. 

Economic Cooperation: Interdependence or Asymmetric Dependence?

Economic interaction has emerged as one of the most visible changes in Armenia–Azerbaijan relations, yet it remains limited, asymmetric, and subject to considerable uncertainty. 

Its first dimension is the transit of third-country goods to Armenia, which Azerbaijan began authorizing through its territory in October 2025. Publicly documented shipments have consisted of Russian and Kazakh goods—initially wheat and fertilizer, and later a somewhat broader range of commodities. It remains unclear whether Armenian goods are transiting Azerbaijan in the opposite direction and, if not, whether Armenia has sought such transit.

The second dimension is direct bilateral trade, which is notably one-sided. Armenia began importing Azerbaijani gasoline and diesel in December 2025; by mid-April, imports had reached 9,337 tons, worth $7.2 million, and volumes have since continued to grow. However, no Armenian-origin goods have yet been documented as entering Azerbaijan. Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan said that the two governments had exchanged lists of products for potential trade, including a list presented by Armenia, but after several months there is still no indication that this has resulted in Azerbaijani market access for Armenian products. 

Armenian officials have presented economic interdependence as an important guarantee for sustainable peace. Yet the emerging pattern remains largely one-sided. The key question is whether this asymmetry is transitional and bilateral trade will develop in both directions, or whether it will become a durable feature of the relationship, creating Armenian dependence and giving Baku additional economic leverage. The one-sided nature of trade, transit and prospective energy relations raises a broader concern that this could evolve into Azerbaijani economic hegemony over Armenia, rather than the reciprocal interdependence expected to support sustainable peace.

Recent statements by Armenian officials suggest that the currently one-sided trade may soon become more balanced. Pashinyan and Mirzoyan have indicated that Armenian exports to Azerbaijan are expected to begin shortly, with the government encouraging Armenian businesses to engage in bilateral trade. This could mark an initial shift from one-sided economic cooperation towards greater interdependence.

Energy Security and the Risk of New Dependence

Energy is a particularly sensitive dimension of the emerging relationship. Armenia is diversifying its energy sources and international partnerships to reduce its dependence on Russia. Yet even partial dependence on Azerbaijani fuel or electricity would be problematic unless it were matched by reciprocal Azerbaijani dependence on Armenia, especially given the existing asymmetry in bilateral trade.

Aliyev’s August 11 statements suggest that this asymmetry could extend into the energy sector. He presented TRIPP not merely as a road and railway connection, but as a potential infrastructure corridor carrying fiber-optic cables, electricity transmission lines. and eventually oil and gas pipelines. This is consistent with Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan’s vision of TRIPP as including “railways, electricity grids, internet cables, maybe in future oil, gas pipelines.” However, Aliyev also argued that Armenia could benefit from this infrastructure, claiming that its nuclear power plant is outdated and will eventually close, potentially leaving the country facing an energy crisis that Azerbaijani electricity could help address.

This argument is difficult to separate from Azerbaijan’s long-standing advocacy for closing Armenia’s nuclear power plant, a demand dating back to the 1990s and periodically reactivated, including throughout the post-2020 period. Armenia, however, plans to operate the existing unit until 2036 while preparing its replacement and considering several international options for new nuclear capacity. Armenia–U.S. cooperation on small modular reactors is already progressing, while a new nuclear power plant also remains an option. Decisions about whether Armenia retains nuclear power, and what form its future nuclear capacity takes, are sovereign Armenian choices; attempts by Azerbaijan to influence them would constitute interference in Armenia’s decision-making.

Nuclear energy also provides Armenia with a comparative advantage that could contribute to a more balanced economic relationship. Rather than Armenia becoming dependent on Azerbaijani electricity, its capacity for the peaceful use of nuclear energy could position it as an electricity supplier to Azerbaijan, creating genuine interdependence in the energy sector.

Armenia–Türkiye Normalization: Progress, But Still Conditional

Improved Armenia–Azerbaijan relations have created more favorable conditions for Armenia–Türkiye normalization. Contacts between Yerevan and Ankara have continued, and practical steps have moved forward. However, normalization remains incomplete.

Türkiye continues to link normalization with Armenia to the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement. Ankara has refrained from fully opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations pending progress toward a signed agreement. Armenia–Türkiye normalization therefore remains effectively conditional on the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process.

Civil Society Exchanges and the Limits of Peacebuilding

The post-Washington period has seen an increase in Track 1.5 dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mutual visits and contacts among experts and civil society representatives have strengthened previously limited channels of communication.

These exchanges should nevertheless be viewed in the context of the environment for independent civil society in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani activists, journalists and intellectuals who long engaged in dialogue with Armenians and advocated reconciliation have either been imprisoned or left the country to avoid prosecution. Experts participating from Azerbaijan tend to be linked to or aligned with the government rather than independent civil society. This also affects the Armenian side, as the pool of participants willing to take part in such exchanges, or acceptable to Azerbaijan, limits the diversity of Armenian experts involved.

The distinction between genuine peacebuilding and managed dialogue is important. Sustainable societal reconciliation requires space for independent voices willing to challenge official narratives and address difficult aspects of the conflict.

Conclusion

One year after the Washington Summit, Armenia–Azerbaijan relations have undergone a fundamental positive transformation, but the emerging peace remains incomplete and marked by significant asymmetries. The cycle of military escalation has ended, the risk of renewed confrontation is very low, and hostile rhetoric has substantially declined. The connectivity dispute that once carried a serious risk of escalation has been substantially addressed through the TRIPP Framework, giving the United States a direct stake in its implementation and, more broadly, in making the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace sustainable.

Major issues nevertheless remain unresolved. The peace agreement is still unsigned, and Azerbaijan’s constitutional precondition risks creating a new deadlock. There has been no progress on restoring Armenia’s territorial integrity through delimitation, while Armenian captives remain in Azerbaijan. The prospect of return to Nagorno-Karabakh is no longer on the political agenda, but human rights violations, the loss and destruction of cultural heritage, and the contest over historical narratives continue to cause trauma, particularly among displaced Armenians. While Armenia has removed Nagorno-Karabakh from its foreign policy agenda and discourages discussion even of its human rights and historical dimensions, Azerbaijan continues to institutionalize and periodically activate the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative. This creates a growing asymmetry in how the two countries address the legacy of the conflict and construct their historical narratives, leaving Armenia exposed to continued cognitive warfare even as the military threat has receded.

Other asymmetries are also emerging. Economic interaction has begun, but trade, transit and prospective energy relations remain largely one-sided, raising questions about dependence rather than reciprocal interdependence. Societal peacebuilding also remains constrained, with independent Azerbaijani peacebuilders imprisoned or forced to leave the country. Both countries continue military modernization. For Armenia, maintaining credible deterrence remains necessary given the continuing military imbalance and Baku’s periodic use of coercive rhetoric.

The emerging peace is therefore neither a liberal peace grounded in human rights and reconciliation nor one that has neutralized the considerable power asymmetry between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is primarily a transactional peace, built on converging interests, deterrence, connectivity, economic incentives, and external political leverage. The Washington approach has sought to make peace more advantageous, and renewed confrontation more costly, for both sides.

So far, this model has been effective in stabilizing interstate relations. Its durability will depend on whether these transactional arrangements develop stronger legal, institutional, and societal foundations, and whether economic connectivity evolves into reciprocal interdependence rather than reinforcing existing asymmetries. The next stage will therefore be measured not simply by the absence of military confrontation, but by Azerbaijan dropping its constitutional precondition and the peace agreement being signed, the restoration of Armenia’s territorial integrity, the resolution of humanitarian issues, reciprocal connectivity and economic relations, and the development of mechanisms capable of sustaining peace beyond the political circumstances and external leverage that made the Washington breakthrough possible.

While the immediate military threat has receded, hybrid threats and narrative warfare remain significant security challenges.

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