Aliyev’s Fabricated Narratives: Unveiling the Agenda

Part II

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In recent weeks, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has escalated his rhetoric to unprecedented levels. He has long crafted narratives as a strategic weapon, deploying them for multiple objectives: obstructing the peace agreement with Armenia, advancing foreign policy and military strategies, pursuing broader geopolitical goals, and reinforcing his domestic agenda. In recent years, Aliyev’s language has grown increasingly combative, targeting not only Armenia but also major Western powers he perceives as sympathetic to Yerevan. Through interviews and public statements, Aliyev has laid out preconditions, demands, accusations, fabricated claims and threats, all aimed at manipulating perceptions and positioning Azerbaijan as a dominant regional player.

A January 7, 2025 interview to local journalists and an earlier televised interview with Dmitry Kiselev, a Kremlin propagandist (sanctioned by the EU and the United States) on December 18, 2024, provided Aliyev platforms to advance his aggressive messaging. In response, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan issued reserved and cautious rebuttals, offering Yerevan’s perspective on the peace process and its defense policies in an interview on January 8. The following day, he urged Baku to mutually abandon escalatory narratives and sign a peace treaty, accompanied by a number of proposals towards that end. 

This article delves into the content of Aliyev’s last two interviews, exploring their underlying motives, implications for Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, and the broader geopolitical context of the South Caucasus and global order. 

By juxtaposing Aliyev’s rhetoric with Pashinyan’s responses and wider Armenian perspectives, it examines the clash of narratives shaping the region’s volatile future. 

Attempt to Stigmatize Armenia as a “Fascist State” and “Regional Threat”

In his latest interview, Aliyev escalated his cognitive warfare against Armenia, trying to portray Armenia as a persistent “regional threat” and a state fundamentally shaped by fascist ideology. He claimed that “the independent Armenian state is actually a fascist state because this country has been led by proponents of fascist ideology for nearly 30 years.” 

Aliyev pointed to recently surfaced information in the media, specifically referencing a speech by Armenia’s first president as purported evidence that Armenia had no intention of “relinquishing even a single centimeter” of what Azerbaijan claims as its rightful territory.

He further alleged that the policies pursued during the 30-year occupation of Azerbaijani territories were not only caused by Armenia but were supported by a broader coalition of Islamophobic, “Azerbaijano-phobic,” and xenophobic forces worldwide. According to Aliyev, these policies reflected a collaborative effort among foreign powers and ideological allies.

While acknowledging attempts by Armenia’s current leadership to reposition itself as peaceful, Aliyev dismissed these efforts as insincere, pointing to their past rhetoric and policies as evidence. The Azerbaijani leader stressed that this threat has not dissipated, as Armenia continues to harbor what he called a fascist ideology within its current leadership, government and opposition. He asserted that Azerbaijan is “a neighbor with such a fascist state, and the threat of fascism is not going away. Either the Armenian leadership will destroy it, or we will. We have no other choice.”

Pashinyan’s Response

In his January 8 statement, Pashinyan suggested that Baku may be attempting to create “legitimacy” for further escalation in the region. He noted that aggressive statements are made with the expectation that Yerevan would respond aggressively, allowing Baku to escalate further. He emphasized that such actions are often paired with the dissemination of false claims about ceasefire violations by Armenian Armed Forces, which serves to develop a “justification” for a new escalation. However, Pashinyan reiterated Armenia’s commitment to the strategy of peace, stating that Armenia will not follow this path of escalation. He reaffirmed that Armenia will remain dedicated to consistently implementing the peace agenda and will continue to apply the language of dialogue, not aggression.

Addressing the accusation of “fascism,” he expressed the view that it seeks to provoke Armenia into responding by calling Azerbaijan a fascist state. However, he highlighted another approach, where Armenia recognizes that such a perception exists in Azerbaijan and attempts to understand the reasons behind it. Pashinyan further pointed out that similar perceptions about Azerbaijan also exist within Armenia. He emphasized that these mutual perceptions have contributed to years of conflict. He underscored that the strategy for peace involves recognizing these perceptions and engaging in a dialogue to address them, both for Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Analysis

By framing the issue as a mutual challenge rather than attributing blame to one side, Pashinyan positioned Armenia as committed to de-escalation and reconciliation, even in the face of provocative narratives from Baku. While this approach aimed at de-escalation, it also carried the risk of implying false parity between the two sides—a perspective that is criticized by the Armenian public, which harbors deep resentment over the wars and massacres initiated by Baku since 1988, as well as the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.

The Azerbaijani propaganda machine has long sought to stigmatize the Armenian nation and delegitimize Armenia by portraying it as a “fascist state” in the eyes of the international community. This narrative intensified in August 2023, coinciding with the escalation of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh from partial to total, leading to starvation among the population and on the eve of the final military offensive there. 

As part of a campaign combining historical revisionism of the conflict and Armenophobia promoted at the highest levels, Azerbaijani propaganda began labeling Armenians as Nazis. The outlet “Azerbaijani Times” published an article with a provocative headline, “Hitler is More Humanist Than Any Armenian Leader” referring to Armenian PM Pashinyan’s statements. Another Azerbaijani media outlet echoed this narrative. Following protests from Jewish organizations condemning the inappropriate use of the term “humanist” in reference to Hitler, the headline was revised to “All Armenian Leaders Are as Evil as Hitler.” This campaign served multiple purposes: deflecting blame for the humanitarian crisis caused by the blockade, legitimizing both past and impending military actions, and ensuring Azerbaijan’s impunity for the conflict and the looming ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Aliyev’s characterization of Armenia as a “fascist state” mirrors Vladimir Putin’s narrative of Ukraine as a “Nazi state,” a narrative frequently accompanied by threats of military force and justification for aggression. This parallel highlights a broader pattern of authoritarian leaders leveraging incendiary and unfounded labels to vilify opponents, rally domestic support, and legitimize their geopolitical ambitions. Like Putin’s rhetoric against Ukraine, Aliyev’s accusations serve to frame his country as a victim confronting a supposedly existential threat, while setting the stage for potential military or political escalations. Senior Azerbaijani officials and ambassadors have compared Armenia with Nazi Germany and Iraq, thus trying to justify Azerbaijan’s demand of disarming or at least limiting Armenia’s right to restore its defense sector, which is otherwise the sovereign right of every state envisaged in the UN Charter. 

In conjunction with Azerbaijan’s preconditions to withdraw lawsuits from international courts and dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, Aliyev is actively working to reshape and ultimately reverse the narrative surrounding the conflict. This strategy, aimed at establishing narrative dominance, serves a dual purpose: ensuring Azerbaijan’s impunity for its actions while simultaneously undermining Armenia’s ability to advocate for its interests on the international stage.

As Prime Minister Pashinyan has pointed out, many Armenians perceive Azerbaijan as a fascist state, citing its violent response to the peaceful movement by Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians for self-determination. This perception is reinforced by Azerbaijan’s history of initiating massacres, waging the First Nagorno-Karabakh War and subsequent wars, conducting military offensives, imposing blockades, ultimately carrying out the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh, and pursuing expansionist objectives toward Armenia.

Azerbaijan’s efforts to portray Armenia as a regional threat lack substance, as Armenia neither has the intent nor the capacity to pose such a risk. Historically, Armenia has not been a threat to Azerbaijan or the broader region. In a recent interview, Prime Minister Pashinyan reaffirmed this stance, stating, “Armenia has no intention, goals or plans to attack or engage in any provocative actions against Azerbaijan […]If Azerbaijan also doesn’t have intentions to attack Armenia, then the likelihood of escalation in the region is zero.”

Finally, beyond geopolitical ambitions, Azerbaijan’s strategy reflects a manifestation of cognitive warfare aimed at undermining the self-perception and identity of Armenians. By attempting to weaken their sense of self and collective narrative, Azerbaijan seeks to erode Armenian resolve, driving them toward cognitive capitulation, weakening their resolve to resist aggression and defend their rights.

The Peace Process and Claims to Armenia 

Aliyev claimed progress on 15 of the 17 articles in the draft peace treaty, highlighting two unresolved issues—the non-deployment of third-country forces along the border and withdrawal of lawsuits in international courts. Citing their last meeting in Kazan, Aliyev suggested that Armenia could eventually concede on these points. 

In his second interview, Aliyev also accused Armenia of “continuous provocations and unwillingness to implement peace agreements” and keeping tensions high, claiming that Azerbaijan is “committed to peace under the right conditions.” Later in the interview, Aliyev acknowledges that in December 2024 Azerbaijan rejected a proposal from the U.S. State Department to meet with Armenia’s Prime Minister under American facilitation. He justifies this decision by citing his perceived bias of U.S. and EU mediation efforts, asserting that Azerbaijan will only accept negotiations in a bilateral format.

While many believed Azerbaijan had only two official preconditions directly tied to articles in the draft agreement, Aliyev, in his second interview, escalated the rhetoric by introducing additional supplementary preconditions for concluding a peace agreement with Armenia. Expanding on his demands, he insisted that these conditions were neither extraordinary nor unreasonable, asserting that they should be fully accepted without compromise.

Aliyev expressed hope that Azerbaijan’s conditions regarding the peace treaty would be accepted “because there are no extraordinary issues in these conditions.” He emphasized that the abolition of the Minsk Group and constitutional amendments are non-negotiable prerequisites, adding, “If Armenia does not need a peace treaty, we do not need it either. We can live and conduct our own policy without signing it.” Underscoring Azerbaijan’s seriousness, he warned, “If we say something, then we are already taking this issue very seriously.” 

Finally, Aliyev demanded an immediate halt to Armenia’s armament, the termination of existing arms contracts, and the return of any weapons already delivered, emphasizing that this was also a condition for achieving peace. He also revived other demands that he had previously addressed either less assertively or with greater caution.

Pashinyan’s Response

Before Aliyev’s second interview, Pashinyan confirmed that 15 out of the 17 articles of the peace agreement had been agreed upon. He also mentioned that Yerevan had submitted proposals on the remaining two articles to Azerbaijan over a month ago, but had yet to receive a response. Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia is constructively engaged in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations and reaffirmed Armenia’s commitment to a strategy of peace. 

He suggested “the establishment of normal relations that would ensure, among others, the security of Azerbaijan’s western and Armenia’s eastern borders.” 

The following day, he also published proposals of the Armenian side to Azerbaijan for establishing lasting stability and peace in the region. He emphasized the need for both sides to mutually abandon escalatory narratives, creating an environment conducive to constructive dialogue. He underscored the urgency of signing a peace treaty, noting that 90% of the text has already been finalized, signaling that a historic agreement is within reach. 

Analysis

Despite statements by the Armenian government suggesting that a peace agreement is near completion, and Azerbaijan’s mixed messages—occasionally claiming to pursue peace while simultaneously issuing threats—skepticism remains widespread among the Armenian public and policy analysts. Many believe Azerbaijan is fabricating an endless list of preconditions to delay signing the agreement, while waiting for a favorable opportunity to launch new offensives or even a full-scale war against Armenia to fulfill its expansionist ambitions.

There is also a prevailing perception among Armenians that, due to the significant power imbalance, Armenia is increasingly making unilateral concessions in an effort to finalize a peace agreement. However, few in Armenia believe that, even with such concessions, Azerbaijan will ultimately sign the agreement. Aliyev’s recent statements in his interview only serve to deepen this skepticism.

Demanding the Withdrawal of Lawsuits in International Courts

On the matter of lawsuits, Aliyev insisted on their withdrawal, as well as on the exclusion of the reintroduction of legal disputes as a source of bilateral tension, urging both sides to abandon such practices altogether.

Pashinyan’s Response

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his team have signaled conditional openness to withdrawing lawsuits from international courts, emphasizing that such a step should follow the conclusion of a peace agreement, not serve as a precondition.

In his December 19, 2024 interview, Pashinyan hinted at the possibility of mutually withdrawing legal claims, framing it as part of a broader effort toward regional stability and peace. He underscored that this step would require mutuality and a conducive political environment to foster trust and dialogue.

On January 8, 2025, Pashinyan reiterated Armenia’s readiness to consider withdrawing lawsuits, provided it aligns with progress on other key elements of the peace agenda. He emphasized that Armenia’s legal cases are based on documented violations and rights abuses, implying that their withdrawal would depend on reciprocal actions by Azerbaijan to address these core issues.

A day later, Pashinyan incorporated the mutual withdrawal of lawsuits into Armenia’s formal proposal for lasting regional stability. He presented this as a potential confidence-building measure, contingent on tangible de-escalation efforts, adherence to international agreements, and Azerbaijan abandoning fabricated claims, such as the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative. Pashinyan also stressed the importance of resolving humanitarian issues as a foundational step toward fostering dialogue and trust between the two nations.

Analysis

By urging the withdrawal of lawsuits, particularly the case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Azerbaijan is evading justice and seeking to ensure its impunity for the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh. Another objective is to reshape the narrative of the conflict, aiming for a cognitive capitulation of Armenia.

While justice is widely recognized as crucial for reconciliation and sustainable peace, Azerbaijan advocates the opposite, calling for the abandonment of justice altogether. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan currently have ongoing lawsuits in the ICJ and European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), but potentially, there could be cases also in the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which Armenia became a member in 2024. 

Armenia holds an advantage in its ICJ lawsuit, as Azerbaijan’s mirroring lawsuit was significantly reduced by the ICJ order of November 12, 2024. While Azerbaijan has raised additional legal claims against Armenia, these lack a strong legal foundation and are unlikely to succeed.  

Although Armenia has not even pursued the issue of the return of Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh since their displacement, Baku claims that Armenia’s lawsuit implies a territorial claim. Azerbaijan demands the withdrawal of this lawsuit to evade accountability for its actions leading to the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and reshape the narrative surrounding the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. 

Even if interstate lawsuits can be negotiated, Armenia cannot prevent Nagorno-Karabakh refugees or civil society organizations in Armenia or the Diaspora from pursuing justice through the ECHR or ICC. Most policy experts and civil society in Armenia, including those who are considered pro-governmental and pro-peace, are strongly opposed to the withdrawal of lawsuits from the ICJ. 

The Armenian leadership’s goodwill to withdraw international lawsuits somehow resembles Timor-Leste’s decision to prioritize reconciliation over justice following the atrocities of the Indonesian occupation and the attainment of independence. The establishment of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) in 2001, tasked with documenting human rights violations committed between April 1974 and October 1999 and facilitating community reconciliation for less serious offenses. By focusing on truth-telling and communal harmony, the leadership aimed to maintain stability and foster peaceful relations with Indonesia, deliberately moving forward without extensive prosecutions. 

However, the dynamics between Azerbaijan and Armenia is very different from those between Indonesia and Timor-Leste after the latter became independent. The withdrawal of lawsuits could result in Armenia’s ultimate defeat in both lawfare and cognitive warfare waged by Azerbaijan, with potentially serious consequences. While such a move might secure Azerbaijan’s reputational security by such a move, Armenia risks losing its own.

Bid to Delegitimize the EUMA and Demand for Its Withdrawal

Regarding the non-deployment of third-country forces, which is the second article in the draft peace treaty not agreed upon by Armenia, Aliyev strongly criticized the European Union Monitoring Mission in Armenia (EUMA). He described it as a “direct threat” to Azerbaijan’s security and accused it of functioning as a NATO outpost under the guise of observation. He pointed to the inclusion of a Canadian observer in the mission as evidence of this transformation. According to Aliyev, the extension and expansion of the mission undermines trust rather than fostering cooperation. He emphasized that these actions, carried out without Azerbaijan’s consent, represented a breach of earlier agreements and reflected poorly on the EU’s credibility.

He ridiculed what he called “shameful demonstrations” by the mission’s observers, mocking their use of military style gear and behavior he deemed theatrical. Aliyev sarcastically remarked that Azerbaijan refrained from showing them how quickly they might retreat if tensions escalated and admitted to feeling tempted to do so. He dismissed the observers’ actions as unnecessary provocations, noting that Azerbaijan had explicitly demanded an end to their “binocular shows,” which appeared to have ceased following his complaints.

Aliyev also highlighted an incident involving the Polish president, who used binoculars to observe Azerbaijan with EUMA observers on the Armenia-Azerbaijan state border. He viewed this act as a symbolic insult and questioned how Azerbaijan was expected to respond to such treatment. He framed these developments as part of a broader issue of mistrust and challenged the EU’s intentions in deploying the EUMA, suggesting it had become a tool of external interference in the region rather than a neutral force.

Pashinyan’s Response

On the issue of the non-deployment of third-country forces, Pashinyan said that Yerevan has proposed that this provision should cover the already-delimited sections of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, where the risk of escalation is low and even “minimal”. He reiterated his proposal to establish a joint mechanism for investigating ceasefire violations, emphasizing that it is still awaiting a response from Azerbaijan.

Analysis

Aliyev’s claim, made in an interview with Russian state TV, that the EUMA is a NATO proxy based solely on the participation of one Canadian civilian observer (originally Ukrainian) is absurd. Contributions from non-EU partner countries to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions are a standard practice.

This Azerbaijani allegation mirrors Russian rhetoric regarding NATO in the context of the war in Ukraine, despite the fact that Armenia has never sought NATO membership. In contrast, it is Azerbaijan that maintains a strategic military alliance with NATO member Turkey. Armenia’s decision to host the EUMA reflects a focus on soft deterrence against security threats from Azerbaijan and improving human security perceptions in the border regions, rather than any geopolitical alignment.

On January 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Armenian forces of allegedly opening fire on Azerbaijani positions. The Armenian MoD quickly denied these claims, dismissing them as disinformation aimed at justifying potential escalations. The EUMA reported observing “no unusual movements” in the southern Syunik region during this time, effectively refuting the escalation claims and supporting the Armenian MoD’s statement. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan suggested that such accusations are part of Baku’s strategy to legitimize regional tensions.

This incident underscores the vital role of the EUMA in countering disinformation. Without its presence, Azerbaijan could potentially justify military offensives against Armenia, accusing Armenia of provocation. 

The Armenian government’s strategic yet risky proposal to link the EUMA’s withdrawal with the delimitation process seems designed to pressure Azerbaijan into engaging in delimitation and de-occupying Armenia’s border areas. To date, only about 12 km of the over 1,000 km border has been delimited. However, there is no assurance that escalation risks are absent in already delimited sections of the border. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s lack of response to Armenia’s proposal for a joint mechanism to investigate ceasefire violations is concerning. In the absence of both the EUMA and a bilateral mechanism, Azerbaijan may claim provocations by Armenia and launch a military offensive. For this reason, Armenian civil society and most experts—except those linked to previous Armenian administrations and considered pro-Russian—strongly oppose the EUMA’s withdrawal.

Finally, by demanding EUMA’s withdrawal, Azerbaijan continues to undermine the rules-based global governance system. After not allowing an international peacekeeping and even humanitarian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh under the pretext of preserving its sovereignty, it is now trying to achieve the withdrawal of a civilian observation mission from Armenia’s sovereign territory. Even Russia has not tried to impose it on Georgia on the other side of the Georgian-Abkhazian administrative border.

Demanding Amendments to Armenia’s Constitution 

Aliyev accused Armenia of harboring territorial claims against Azerbaijan through its constitutional references to its Declaration of Independence. He argued that these references undermine the peace process and demanded that Armenia amend its constitution to remove such provisions. According to Aliyev, achieving a peace treaty depends on Armenia’s full recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, including the Karabakh region.

He expressed frustration over Armenia’s reluctance to engage constructively in negotiations, stating that their behavior continues to hinder progress toward peace. Aliyev warned that delays in signing a peace treaty would result in increasingly unfavorable terms for Armenia, emphasizing Azerbaijan’s readiness to move forward only if Armenia abandons its territorial claims and adheres to international norms.

Pashinyan’s Response

Pashinyan refuted Azerbaijan’s claims about Armenia’s Constitution containing territorial demands. He explained that Armenia’s Constitutional Court has clarified that references to the Declaration of Independence in the Constitution relate exclusively to articles incorporated into the Constitution. He noted that the Constitution does not mention Nagorno-Karabakh directly or indirectly. He argued that if Armenia had considered Karabakh as part of Armenia, Karabakh would have participated in Armenia’s 1995 Constitutional Referendum and the presidential and parliamentary elections in Armenia, and it would be impossible to recognize Karabakh Armenians as refugees in Armenia.

Pashinyan also pointed out that the Constitution of Azerbaijan contains territorial demands against Armenia. Its preamble contains a reference to the 1991 Constitutional Act, which refers to the 1918 Declaration of Independence of the First Republic of Azerbaijan. In November 1919, the Republic of Azerbaijan presented to the Entente its administrative map, according to which, 60% of the territory of the Republic of Armenia was part of Azerbaijan. However, Armenia has not raised the issue of changing Azerbaijan’s Constitution to prevent a deadlock in the peace process. Furthermore, the agreed-upon sections of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty stipulate that the parties recognize each other’s territorial integrity, do not have territorial demands against each other and are committed to refraining from making such claims in the future.

According to Armenia’s Constitution, in the event of a conflict between the provisions of ratified international and domestic law, international law prevails. Therefore, once the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty is ratified by both parliaments, it will take precedence over both Armenian and Azerbaijani domestic legislation. The peace treaty will “practically dispel the concerns of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, including in relation to the constitutions.”

Analysis

Aliyev’s insistence on amending Armenia’s Constitution is a tactic to avoid signing the peace agreement. The Armenian Constitution cannot be amended without a referendum, which is planned in 2027 as part of a larger constitutional reform package. Pushing for a separate referendum to expedite changes to the Preamble could result in an unpredictable outcome, given Armenia’s current political climate, which is heavily influenced by the forced displacement of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and the challenges associated with their integration. Baku may be seeking a negative result from such a referendum as a pretext for launching a new military offensive against Armenia.

By questioning Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence, Azerbaijan is targeting Armenia’s sovereignty. Unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia, Armenia has declared itself the successor of Soviet Armenia and not the First Republic of Armenia (1918-1920). The League of Nations refused to recognize the First Republic of Azerbaijan and rejected its application in 1920 because it presented maps claiming 60% of contemporary Armenia’s territory. Azerbaijan may also have an objective to use the inconsistencies in the constitutions of both countries in its systematic policy of historical revisionism. 

Border Delimitation and Demarcation

Aliyev referred to the importance of the delimitation and demarcation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, framing it as an essential step toward stability in the region. He acknowledged progress in recent efforts, citing the return of four villages in the Gazakh district by Armenia as a significant achievement. This success, according to Aliyev, was a result of a “monologue rather than a dialogue” with Armenia due to Azerbaijan’s firm and strategic approach, as Armenia only acted under external pressure and clear Azerbaijani demands. 

Aliyev called for a comprehensive methodology for resolving border issues, incorporating factors such as security, communications, settlements, infrastructure, interconnectedness of communities, historical context, and environmental considerations. He dismissed the notion of treating the conditional border as an immutable “dogma,” arguing instead for a thorough clarification process based on these multiple dimensions.

Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan had shared its proposed methodology for delimitation with Armenia and received preliminary verbal feedback indicating no significant objections. He expressed cautious optimism for future meetings of the Armenian and Azerbaijani delimitation commissions.

Aliyev reiterated his position that any obstacles hindering the delimitation process based on “internationally recognized principles” should be removed, urging Armenia to demonstrate sincerity and commitment to addressing this issue. He framed the peaceful resolution of border disputes as a vital step toward stability in the region, and stated that Armenia has shown “reluctance in engaging in the delimitation process,” and that Azerbaijan is “concerned about their intentions.”

Pashinyan’s Response

Pashinyan underlined that in spite of the domestic criticism, Yerevan doesn’t even intend to return more than 200 square kilometers of Armenia’s sovereign territory occupied by Azerbaijan through military means, aiming to achieve it through institutionalized delimitation, and peaceful and constructive negotiations. He expressed hope that the national delimitation commissions of the two countries will meet soon to discuss which section of the border the delimitation should continue. On January 9, he urged continuing the delimitation process based on the experience of the delimitation carried out in the Berkaber-Voskepar section and the regulation on the joint activity of the two countries’ delimitation commissions.

Analysis

At first glance, Aliyev’s statements on delimitation appear constructive; however, their messaging casts doubt on the sincerity of his intentions. After reclaiming the last area legally belonging to Azerbaijan based on Soviet-era maps and legislation—and with the Armenian expectation that Azerbaijan should return approximately 250 square kilometers of Armenian border territories occupied in 2021-2022 through the delimitation process—Aliyev has once again referred to the border between the two countries as “conditional.” 

He has also attempted to introduce new criteria for delimitation and demarcation. While these criteria may appear reasonable in theory and align with the principles outlined in the OSCE Manual on Delimitation and Demarcation, the significant power asymmetry between the two nations raises concerns. Azerbaijan may resort to political or military coercion to avoid de-occupying Armenian territories or to pursue further expansionist objectives. 

Additionally, Aliyev’s narrative doesn’t give any credit to Armenia for its peaceful handover of villages bordering the Tavush region, instead attributing this outcome to Azerbaijani pressure and claiming it occurred outside the official delimitation process. This framing appears designed to undermine Armenia’s position and may also aim to fuel discontent among Armenia’s conservative opposition. This opposition, which emerged through a movement in June 2024 and is suspected of indirect ties to Moscow, has criticized Pashinyan for returning these villages, arguing that such actions fall outside the framework of legitimate delimitation efforts.

Finally, while Armenia has expressed a strong interest in advancing the delimitation process throughout 2024, Azerbaijan has accused Armenia of obstructing it. In reality, it is Azerbaijan that continues to impede progress, undermining trust and casting further doubt on its commitment to genuine negotiations.

Dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group

Aliyev emphasized the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group as a pre-condition for any peace agreement, interpreting Armenia’s hesitation to support this move as a sign of lingering revanchism. 

He argued that the Minsk Group had consistently shown bias, claiming that its three co-chairs had aligned themselves with Armenia during the period of negotiations. Reflecting on his interaction with the Minsk Group framework since 2004, Aliyev noted that countless meetings with the co-chairs had made it clear that regaining Azerbaijan’s territories or restoring its territorial integrity through dialogue under their mediation was unrealistic. This, he suggested, rendered the Minsk Group an ineffective mechanism for resolving the conflict.

Pashinyan’s Response

In December, Pashinyan expressed a constructive stance on dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group, arguing that if there is no conflict, there is no need for a conflict resolution format. However, he emphasized that Azerbaijan should refrain from promoting territorial claims and pursuing an aggressive policy towards Armenia, such as through the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative. On January 9, Pashinyan formalized his support for dissolving the Minsk Group, including it as one of his proposals in the context of the peace agreement.

Analysis

Armenian experts are divided when it comes to the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. Some are not opposed to its formal dissolution, considering that it has failed its mediation mission, and is long dysfunctional due to geopolitical divisions. There is also a belief that it has been instrumentalized by Russia to advance its geopolitical agenda. Other experts argue that the dissolution will legitimize Azerbaijan’s use of force and “military solution” for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and believe it may also serve as a precedent for other conflicts. 

The dissolution of the Minsk Group will be another step toward erasing the history of the conflict, invalidating its documents and proposals for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict under consideration at different times, and thus, transforming the narrative of the conflict in favor of Azerbaijan. Along with the demand of withdrawing lawsuits, this will be a defeat in the lawfare and cognitive warfare.

“Western Azerbaijan” Narrative and Demand to Settle Azerbaijanis in Armenia Under “Secure Conditions”

Aliyev asserted that 300,000 Azerbaijanis were deported from Armenia during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Additionally, Aliyev suggests that the number is even higher due to their descendants. He is demanding their return and reintegration into what he described as their “historical lands,” while criticizing the Armenian leadership for not addressing these demands.

He suggested it would be appropriate for Armenia’s Prime Minister to meet with representatives of the “Western Azerbaijan Community”, adding that they were even willing to travel to Yerevan to discuss the issue. Aliyev emphasized that this matter would remain on the agenda until Azerbaijanis could settle in “Western Azerbaijan”, including “West Zangezur”, under “secure conditions”. By “Western Azerbaijan,” Aliyev refers to the Republic of Armenia, and by “West Zangezur,” he alludes to Armenia’s Syunik region. 

Pashinyan and Mirzoyan’s Responses

PM Pashinyan described Azerbaijan’s “Western Azerbaijan” narrative as a fabricated claim aimed at undermining the peace process, emphasizing that this narrative lacks historical and legal grounding, stating that “Western Azerbaijan means the Western regions of Azerbaijan […] Therefore, the return of the people is the internal matter of Azerbaijan.” In his January 9, 2024, post on social media, Pashinyan clarified that “Western Azerbaijan” refers specifically to regions within Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders, such as Qazax, Tovuz, Aghstafa, Gadabay, Dashkasan, Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubadli, and Zangelan. He stated that if Baku insists on looking for “Western Azerbaijan” elsewhere, it could consider Nakhchivan as part of it. 

He warned that the use of this term serves as an attempt to question Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while also providing a pretext for future escalations or aggression against Armenia. Pashinyan further underscored that Azerbaijan must abandon this narrative, which seeks to question the territorial integrity of Armenia.

On the matter of the return of refugees, Pashinyan pointed out that when Azerbaijan uses the term “Western Azerbaijan refugees,” it attempts to close off any meaningful dialogue on the issue. He stressed that the discussion on refugees should not be framed within territorial claims and that Azerbaijan must first abandon this narrative for discussions to move forward. Furthermore, Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia is committed to addressing the mutual return of refugees in the context of a broader peace process, and after the signing of the peace treaty, a joint professional commission could be established to handle these matters.

In his annual press conference on January 8, 2025, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan addressed the circumstances surrounding the departure of the Azerbaijani minority from Armenia. He stated that during the collapse of the Soviet Union, the majority of Azerbaijanis left Armenia in a “civilized manner”. Specifically, 100 Azerbaijani families were able to sell their apartments, over 12,000 exchanged their apartments with Armenians living in Azerbaijan, and over 160,000 individuals received compensation from the Armenian government. Mirzoyan emphasized that these actions were part of a broader process of population movement during that period. 

Regarding the issue of the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia, Mirzoyan stated that there is no such issue on Armenia’s agenda. He characterized the narrative of “Western Azerbaijan” as a direct territorial demand against Armenia.

Analysis 

Since January 2024, Aliyev has made territorial claims on Armenia, including the capital, Yerevan. In addition, after years of asserting that “Karabakh is Azerbaijan,” Baku has introduced an irredentist claim that “Armenia is Western Azerbaijan,” promoted by an NGO called “Western Azerbaijan.” This narrative is supported by a “Concept of Return” to Armenia, developed following Azerbaijan’s military victory in the 2020 Karabakh war. The Azerbaijani propaganda machine is actively advancing this narrative, attempting to draw a parallel between the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia and the return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians after their exodus. However, this comparison has been rejected as untenable by the EU, as highlighted in the farewell interview of Toivo Klaar, the former Special Representative for the Caucasus.

Initially, some believed that Azerbaijan was crafting a counter-narrative to avoid discussions on the return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. However, Baku has recently started framing this issue as a separate claim. While some Azerbaijani propagandists advocate for the mutual return of Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijanis to Armenia, others reject the return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians altogether, while still promoting the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia. To justify this claim, Azerbaijan’s propaganda machine denies the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, falsely portraying it as a voluntary exodus, while simultaneously alleging that Armenia has conducted ethnic cleansing of its Azerbaijani minority.

Aliyev’s claims about the deportation of Azerbaijanis and his demands for their reintegration distort historical facts. The inflated figure of 300,000 deported Azerbaijanis stands in stark contrast to verified census data, which records only 160,800. Furthermore, there have been no massacres or violent events in Armenia that forced the Azerbaijani minority to leave; this displacement is largely considered a consequence of the population exchange triggered by the conflict. In his 2019 book Armenia and Azerbaijan: Anatomy of a Rivalry, Laurence Broers addresses the claim of an alleged “Kapan massacre” by Armenian forces. He notes that this narrative was promoted by Azerbaijani public figure Arif Yunusov and popularized by Thomas de Waal. Broers points out that independent journalists have debunked this claim, dismissing it as a “propaganda myth.”

The Azerbaijani claim also ignores the forced deportation and displacement of Armenians from Azerbaijan, including from Sumgait, Baku, Kirovabad (now Ganja) and Lower Karabakh due to pogroms and forced deportation in 1988-1993, and earlier from Nakhichevan due to marginalization, totaling 463,000 to 487,000 Armenians. Only from Baku 250,000 Armenians were deported after the 1990 massacre. None of them have received any compensation from Azerbaijan, although they have left behind property and wealth.

Armenia has never raised the issue of the return of displaced Azerbaijanis, and it is unlikely that they would want to return, given Azerbaijan’s long-standing policy of Armenophobia and their integration into Armenia and other countries. The current Armenian authorities are not even addressing the issue of the return of approximately 140,000 displaced Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh, despite significant domestic criticism. One of the main reasons for this is the lack of confidence in the feasibility of their return with adequate security guarantees and respect for their rights. When Baku categorically rejected the presence of international peacekeeping and humanitarian forces to protect Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians prior to their displacement, it remains highly unlikely that it will now accept such measures. Additionally, Armenians have no trust in any security or human rights guarantees that Baku may offer.

In this context, Aliyev’s demand for the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia as a “human rights issue” is grotesque, and his suggestion that this return should be “under security conditions” is concerning. It implies that he has long-term plans to impose what he has denied for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Moreover, his reference to settling Azerbaijanis in “Zangezur”—meaning Syunik—is particularly troubling. Unlike Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, Azerbaijanis have never lived as a collective community in a single area of Armenia, but have been spread across different regions. This is precisely the area where Aliyev is seeking an extraterritorial corridor to connect Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhichevan.

Armenian authorities have rejected Azerbaijan’s “Western Azerbaijan” narrative as containing an explicit territorial claim and undermining Armenia’s sovereignty. The French ambassador to Armenia reminded in his tweet that “Western Azerbaijan” is a region in Iran. 

Reactivating the Demand for a “Zangezur Corridor”

Aliyev emphasized the “Zangezur Corridor” as a project of national importance for Azerbaijan, framing it as more than just a transportation route but as a vital link between Azerbaijan and Turkey. He asserted that Armenia “should not act as a geographical barrier” between the two countries, and declared that the “Zangezur Corridor must and will be opened,” urging Armenia to recognize this sooner rather than later. Aliyev questioned why Azerbaijan should rely on indirect routes to access its integral region, Nakhichevan, insisting that a direct connection was necessary and did not violate Armenia’s sovereignty.

Aliyev further stressed that Armenia “must fulfill its obligations” as outlined in the 2020 November Statement, claiming the provisions were “clear and unequivocal.” He pointed to Azerbaijan’s patience, noting that it had waited over four years for the issue to be resolved through negotiations. However, he raised the question of how much longer Azerbaijan should wait and why it should continue to do so. He warned Armenia to consider the consequences of further delays, emphasizing that Azerbaijan ultimately holds the final say on the matter.

In this context, Aliyev reminded that Azerbaijan is the leading military power in the South Caucasus. He underscored the significance of military power in today’s world, cautioning that this reality should not be overlooked.

Pashinyan’s Response

In response to Aliyev’s demand for a “Zangezur corridor”, Pashinyan spoke about the opening of communications in the region. He emphasized Armenia’s commitment to the “Crossroads of Peace” project, which includes the opening of all transport connections in the region. This project envisions the opening of transportation links that will also connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan. 

He mentioned a specific proposal to Azerbaijan regarding the opening of the Yeraskh-Sadarak-Ordubad-Meghri-Zangelan railway, describing it as a concrete solution to opening communications. He stated that Armenia was waiting for Azerbaijan’s positive response to proceed with the agreement and the construction of their sections of the railway.

Analysis

Azerbaijan had toned down its demand for an extraterritorial “Zangezur corridor” through Armenia since mid-2024. Azerbaijani authorities and experts had indicated that they would instead connect with Nakhchivan through a corridor built via Iran, suggesting that Armenia would suffer as its communications would remain blocked.

The recent reactivation of this demand may be driven by several factors. One potential reason could be the Azerbaijani airplane crash, allegedly caused by a Russian missile, followed by telephone conversations between Presidents Putin and Aliyev. Given Russia’s strategic interest in this corridor under the control of the Russian Federal Security Service according to the November 2020 trilateral declaration—a document that has lost its validity for the Armenian side due to its violations by Azerbaijan and Russia—Russia and Azerbaijan may have jointly decided to refresh this demand, intending to pressure Armenia to concede the corridor or to take it by force.

This shift in rhetoric also marks Azerbaijan’s use of language that reveals the Pan-Turkic nature of the idea behind the extraterritorial corridor, aligning with earlier Turkish statements. To openly characterize Armenia as a barrier between Azerbaijan and Turkey presents an expansionist and even fascist narrative, invoking comparisons to the creation of the Danzig corridor. Such rhetoric implies that Azerbaijan, potentially aligned with Russia and possibly Turkey, is contemplating the use of force to create this corridor—essentially amounting to the occupation of Armenia’s sovereign territory, including at least half of its Syunik region. Notably, Aliyev has also spoken about his intention to settle Azerbaijanis in this region.

While Turkey had recently moderated its stance on the corridor, since November, it has conducted new military exercises and held visits of senior military delegations with Azerbaijan. It is widely known that Iran strongly opposes such a corridor. Additionally, both the EU and the U.S. have expressed support for Armenia’s perspective on opening communications with respect of Armenia’s territorial integrity and the principle of reciprocity.

On Azerbaijan’s Actions in Nagorno-Karabakh 

Aliyev asserted that Nagorno-Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijan. He claimed that Karabakh has historically, culturally, and geographically belonged to Azerbaijan, dismissing Armenia’s claims as baseless. Aliyev emphasized that the Azerbaijani population has lived in Karabakh for centuries and has always been part of Azerbaijan.

Aliyev argued that the 2020 war definitively resolved the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, framing it as a “liberation operation” that restored historical justice and reclaimed rightful Azerbaijani lands. He emphasized that any assertion to the contrary disregards international law and territorial integrity. Aliyev urged Armenia to accept the war’s outcome and recognize Karabakh as Azerbaijani sovereign territory, asserting that the situation is irreversible.

He referred to the 2023 military offensive in Karabakh as an “anti-terror operation” and maintained that the war was a response to Armenia’s actions, with Azerbaijan having no choice but to defend its sovereignty. While expressing no desire for further conflict, he affirmed his readiness to protect Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity at all costs.

Pashinyan’s Response

In his January 2025 interviews, Prime Minister Pashinyan did not directly mention Nagorno-Karabakh but discussed humanitarian issues, implying the displaced Armenians and underlining the importance of addressing their needs and the fate of missing persons. He emphasized Armenia’s commitment to providing aid and pursuing peaceful solutions for the affected populations.

Analysis

Since October 2023, official Yerevan has avoided raising issues related to Nagorno-Karabakh, despite facing significant domestic criticism. This restraint follows Armenia’s recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan in May 2023, a decision that has also drawn widespread domestic disapproval. Nevertheless, Baku continues to falsely accuse Armenia of harboring territorial claims and failing to fully recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan further perpetuates misleading narratives to justify the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, employing hybrid strategies implemented between 2020 and 2023. These include framing the 2020 war as a “just war” and portraying its final military offensive as an “anti-terror operation.” Such lawfare tactics undermine the rules-based international order and violate several principles of the UN Charter, raising concerns about the erosion of established global norms.

Furthermore, Baku has been engaging in historical revisionism concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, claiming that Azerbaijanis were the indigenous population, while Armenians were not, thereby presenting Armenians not as indigenous people with rightful claims, but as occupiers and aggressors.

In this context, Aliyev seeks to achieve impunity for his actions in Nagorno-Karabakh by legitimizing their methods and outcome, and securing his own and his country’s reputation. At the same time, by accusing Armenia of continuous territorial claims over Nagorno-Karabakh, he reinforces his narratives of “Armenian revanchism” and uses them as a pretext for justifying a potential new military offensive against Armenia.

On Armenia’s “Militarization” and Azerbaijan’s Military Strategy

In his December interview, Aliyev criticized Armenia’s ongoing “arms race” and “militarization”. He referred to Armenia’s arms buildup as a “serious threat” and destabilizing factor for regional peace and security. Aliyev stated that Armenia’s actions “undermine the efforts for peace and security in the South Caucasus,” warning that such policies were creating an environment of “increased tension and conflict.” He warned that Armenia cannot compete with Azerbaijan’s military capabilities even with external support. Highlighting past military victories, he reiterated his warnings to Armenia, calling on its leadership to abandon what he described as a “dangerous path.” 

In his January interview, Aliyev further intensified his claims, criticizing international actors for supplying Armenia with weapons. He stated that such actions were “violating regional stability” and called for the cessation of this support to prevent further escalation. Moreover, Aliyev urged that weapons supplied to Armenia should be “returned” to ensure peace and avoid further destabilization. He reiterated that “foreign military support to Armenia” was exacerbating tensions and obstructing efforts to resolve conflicts in the region. Furthermore, he warned that international actors supplying weapons to Armenia would be responsible for the destabilization of the region. 

Aliyev highlighted Azerbaijan’s military superiority and its rapidly growing defense budget, announcing that the country’s military spending for 2025 would reach an unprecedented $5 billion. He underscored that this significant investment is vital for safeguarding national security and reinforcing Azerbaijan’s regional dominance.

He also dismissed the post-World War II global rules-based order, asserting that these principles have lost their relevance. According to Aliyev, military power now dictates international politics, and nations that adapted to this reality early have secured stronger and more stable positions on the global stage.

Pashinyan’s Response

Pashinyan reaffirmed that, under international norms, Armenia has the right to maintain and reform its armed forces and, more importantly, the obligation to protect its citizens from external threats. He emphasized that Armenia’s acquisition of armaments aligns with its defensive objectives, aimed at safeguarding territorial integrity and border security. Addressing the need for effective defense, he argued that solely relying on defensive weapons would be insufficient in the event of a land attack, making artillery and missiles indispensable.

Pashinyan stressed that Armenia’s defense systems do not pose a threat to Azerbaijan, as Yerevan has unequivocally recognized Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity within its Soviet-era borders. In return, he called on Baku to unambiguously recognize the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia.

Highlighting the disparity between the two countries’ defense capabilities, Pashinyan noted that Azerbaijan’s military budget is three times larger than Armenia’s and includes the acquisition of non-defensive weapons. He questioned whether Azerbaijan’s systematic threats and military build-up signal a revanchist policy. Moreover, he reminded that Armenia has proposed establishing a bilateral mechanism for mutual arms control, a suggestion to which Azerbaijan has yet to respond.

Analysis

Aliyev perceives Armenia’s diversification of its security partnerships and efforts to restore its defense sector as a direct challenge to Azerbaijan’s expansionist and militaristic objectives. Azerbaijan is not seeking an equitable and just peace with Armenia but rather aims for Armenia’s capitulation. At the core of this approach lie Azerbaijan’s territorial claims over Armenia and its hegemonic objectives in the region.

The recent developments in Armenia’s defense sector, particularly its attempts to reduce the military imbalance between the two countries, are seen as a threat by Azerbaijan. Despite Azerbaijan’s far superior economic resources, broader defense partnerships, larger military budget, and more frequent military exercises, it is concerned about Armenia’s growing deterrence capabilities. While Armenia’s defensive upgrades are unlikely to match Azerbaijan’s military strength, they would raise the cost of any potential Azerbaijani military action against Armenia.

Azerbaijan’s concern about Armenia’s growing defense capacity suggests that it harbors intentions for further military aggression. Aliyev’s rhetoric underscores Azerbaijan’s desire to prevent Armenia from being able to defend itself. Additionally, Azerbaijan seeks to isolate Armenia from international defense cooperation and prevent the country from receiving any external assistance. These attempts by Azerbaijan aim to monopolize the right to possess a functional military and effectively strip Armenia of its inherent right to self-defense. Aliyev’s further demand to return weapons to their suppliers and framing it as a precondition is a highly unprecedented move that challenges international norms. 

The disarmament demands made by senior Azerbaijani officials, such as Hikmet Hajiyev, contradict fundamental principles outlined in the UN Charter. In a December 12, 2024, interview, Hajiyev raised the idea of imposing limitations on Armenia’s military buildup policy. He drew parallels to international practices, noting that “the military buildup, plans, and army construction processes of occupying and aggressive states are subject to certain limitations,” referencing measures applied to Iraq after the Gulf War. He further asserted that the issue of accountability for countries supplying Armenia with offensive weapons should also be addressed. 

To justify these illegitimate demands, Aliyev has activated the narrative of Armenia being a “fascist state”—a term he has used in addition to labeling Armenia as an aggressor and occupier for years. However, it is Azerbaijan that has initiated all the wars related to Nagorno-Karabakh and launched military offensives against Armenia. Therefore, if any state should consider disarming, it should be Azerbaijan, not Armenia. Alternatively, both states should have comparable military capabilities, which, along with a peace agreement, could serve as a deterrent to future conflicts.

Azerbaijan’s actions extend beyond just military concerns; it also seeks to limit Armenia’s international support, particularly in the defense sector. By harassing and bullying Armenia’s international partners, Azerbaijan aims to undermine their reputation and credibility and deter them from assisting Armenia.

Part II of this article will address Azerbaijan’s narratives about international actors and warnings to Armenia’s partners.

Conclusion

In his recent interviews, President Ilham Aliyev has intensified his rhetoric against Armenia, amplifying fabricated narratives and imposing an array of preconditions to an unprecedented degree. This escalation appears to be influenced by evolving geopolitical dynamics, including developments in the Middle East, the upcoming transition of administration in the United States, and Azerbaijan’s coordinated efforts with Russia to undermine Armenia’s expanding partnerships with Western allies.

Aliyev’s actions are aimed at legitimizing territorial claims and expansionist objectives, restricting Armenia’s defense capabilities, and justifying further military aggression. By labeling Armenia as a “fascist state” and emphasizing the need for unilateral disarmament, Aliyev seeks to manipulate international perceptions, deny Armenia its sovereign right to self-defense, and monopolize the narrative surrounding regional security. Aliyev’s insistence on restricting Armenia’s defense sector and preventing its international partnerships is also about consolidating Azerbaijan’s regional hegemony. It also seems to be coordinated with Russia, aiming at preventing Western influence in the South Caucasus.

Azerbaijan’s narratives and claims also intend to ensure its reputational security and secure impunity for its military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh, including the ethnic cleansing of Armenians. Moreover, Azerbaijan is making clear attempts at the cognitive capitulation of Armenia, seeking to change the narrative of the conflict by undermining Armenia’s sense of identity and revisioning history. 

Armenia’s responses have remained de-escalatory, balanced and constructive, consistently prioritizing dialogue and a peaceful resolution to the ongoing challenges. While Armenia remains committed to peace and de-escalation, skepticism persists regarding Azerbaijan’s true intentions. As Azerbaijan continues to push for unilateral territorial and military concessions, the path to durable peace remains uncertain.

EVN Report wrapped up 2024 with inspiring and sobering columns and opinion pieces, including comprehensive overviews of the year’s key developments in security and diplomacy. True to form, we also explored cultural narratives that bridged the past and future while reflecting on realities on the ground. We ended the year with the launch of a new section that offers a view of life with a pinch of SALT.

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