Armenia vs. Azerbaijan: Competing Narratives at the UN

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The 80th session of the UN General Assembly coincided with a painful date for Armenia: the fifth anniversary of the 2020 war, when Azerbaijan launched a 44-day military offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh. This war violated the UN Charter’s principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and prohibition on the use of force, while ignoring the global humanitarian ceasefire appeal declared during the Covid-19 pandemic. It was marked not only by conventional weaponry but also by the use of drones, cluster munitions and mercenaries, alongside hybrid warfare tactics such as psychological operations. 

The war did not end with the ceasefire but shifted into new forms: information warfare and lawfare aimed at delegitimizing Armenians’ aspirations for self-determination and their very presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. These tactics undermined international mediation and rejected international presence. The conflict then escalated into a blockade and gradual military conquest of the territory, leading to the forced displacement of its Armenian population and ongoing destruction of their cultural heritage. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan extended its military presence into sovereign Armenian territory, pursued military coercion, advanced expansionist claims, and imposed preconditions that obstructed the peace process.

Five years later, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addressed the international community from the UN General Assembly podium with markedly different tones. Their speeches came just weeks after the two leaders initialed the Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations and signed the Joint Washington Declaration on August 8, 2025, under U.S. President Donald Trump’s mediation. The document heralded a new phase in relations between the two countries, as it “aims to close the chapter of enmity and explicitly excludes any notion of revenge, presenting the peace process as irreversible.” This event marked the beginning of a new era of peace, with the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) as the centerpiece of regional communications.

Just six weeks later at the UN General Assembly, Aliyev’s speech returned to familiar themes of triumphalism, framing Armenia as “capitulated” and asserting that Azerbaijan had secured the “Zangezur corridor,”—its desired extraterritorial corridor through Armenia. In contrast, Pashinyan’s remarks demonstrated narrative constraint, refusing to engage in hostile rhetoric and instead emphasizing that the peace process must be based on reciprocity and sovereignty. This contrast between Aliyev’s narrative warfare and Pashinyan’s narrative restraint revealed not only divergent strategies but also fundamentally different visions of peace and regional connectivity.

Narrative Constraint Versus Narrative Warfare

The Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, like most protracted disputes, is nuanced and complex. Both societies have suffered displacement and loss, generating competing narratives. However, in his UNGA address, Aliyev disregarded this complexity. He characterized Armenia as the aggressor, dehumanized Armenians collectively, positioned Azerbaijan as the only victim of suffering and displacement, and presented its desired extraterritorial corridor as a necessary condition for peace. This approach reflects Baku’s long-standing pattern of weaponizing narratives to reinforce its version of events, deflect international scrutiny, and maintain pressure on Yerevan.

This serves multiple purposes for Aliyev. First, it seeks to legitimize Azerbaijan’s actions while delegitimizing Armenian and international criticism. Second, it sustains Armenophobia by using hostility toward Armenians to consolidate authority, indoctrinate new generations, and leave space for future claims and actions should the geopolitical environment become favorable. Third, it reinforces regime control domestically by rallying society against an external enemy and diverting attention from internal challenges. Fourth, it secures narrative dominance in both cognitive warfare and lawfare by shaping how the conflict’s outcome is understood internationally and reinforcing Azerbaijan’s unilateral interpretation of history. Fifth, Aliyev aims to provoke reactions from Armenia that can be used to shift blame and portray Armenians as obstructing peace. Finally, he seeks to position Azerbaijan as both a middle power and an aspiring regional hegemon.

Pashinyan avoided mirroring resentful language, even when Aliyev accused Armenia of “occupation” and “ethnic cleansing”––ironically, three years after occupying segments of Armenia’s border areas and two years after enforcing the mass displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. He addressed Aliyev’s framing of the 2020 ceasefire as “capitulation” and to the so-called “Zangezur corridor,” rejecting both as incompatible with a genuine peace process. Instead, he emphasized sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, the commitments in the Alma-Ata and Washington Declarations, and practical first steps toward peace. Through this narrative restraint, Pashinyan denied Aliyev the escalation he seemed to invite, underscoring Armenia’s commitment to peace, while also hinting that Aliyev’s rhetoric continues to contradict the spirit of the Washington Declaration.

“Capitulation” as a Narrative Trap

Aliyev’s repeated references to Armenia’s “capitulation” in 2020 aim to establish a victor–defeated asymmetry, making humiliation the foundation for the peace agreement and its arrangements. This framing contradicts reconciliation by maintaining a hegemonic, zero-sum logic rather than creating space for mutual trust and compromise.

Pashinyan confronted this directly, stating that Armenia stopped fighting in 2020 to save lives, not to surrender its sovereignty. By highlighting the discrepancy between Aliyev’s rhetoric and the actual wording and essence of signed documents, Pashinyan defused the rhetorical trap. He stressed that peace must be built on mutual consent, not forced submission.

The “Zangezur Corridor”: Extraterritoriality Versus Sovereign Connectivity

Connectivity marked the clearest divergence between the two speeches. At the UNGA, Aliyev stated that durable peace requires “unimpeded access” through what he termed the “Zangezur corridor.” Armenia has consistently rejected this terminology because it implies an extraterritorial passage through Armenia’s Syunik region to link Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhichevan––a framing Pashinyan emphasized is seen in Armenia as a territorial claim.

Pashinyan reminded the Assembly that the phrase “Zangezur corridor” appears in no signed or initialed document. He instead highlighted Armenia’s own proposals—the Crossroads of Peace and the U.S.-backed TRIPP project—which envision opening transport and communication links between Armenia and Azerbaijan for intra-state, bilateral and international transit. He reframed connectivity as cooperation exercised under each state’s jurisdiction and sovereignty, with border and customs controls serving as essential guarantees rather than concessions. He called it an infrastructure project that will include the opening of the existing railways, highways, with the prospect of developing pipelines, electricity transmission lines, and cables, underlining the importance of opening of the Armenia-Turkey border toward that end.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, Aliyev had mentioned solely the “Zangezur corridor.” At the UNGA, however, he adjusted his rhetoric. Without openly rejecting the U.S.-brokered TRIPP framework, agreed upon between the parties under U.S. auspices, he tried to merge it with his corridor narrative. Aliyev declared that TRIPP would ensure unimpeded access through the “Zangezur corridor,” portraying it as the mechanism for implementing TRIPP. In doing so, he sought to recast a U.S.-brokered initiative as support for Azerbaijan’s extraterritorial agenda. On both occasions, Pashinyan countered by reaffirming that connectivity can only proceed within a framework of sovereignty and mutual consent.

Claiming Peace as a Trophy of Force

Aliyev presented himself as the architect of the peace agreement, presenting the Washington Accords as his own achievement. Through this approach, he aimed to gain the upper hand over Armenia while simultaneously undermining both Armenia’s role in the process and Washington’s credibility as mediator. 

However, Aliyev’s rhetoric at the UN contradicted the spirit of these documents. He continues to obstruct the treaty’s signing by demanding Armenia amend its Constitution to remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which contains a provision about Nagorno-Karabakh. This constitutes foreign interference in Armenia’s domestic constitutional reform process—likely aimed at causing its failure, undermining Armenia’s sovereignty, and creating a pretext to abandon the peace process. 

Pashinyan reminded the Assembly that the Washington Declaration and the initialed text establish principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and renunciation of force. He emphasized that Armenia is pursuing constitutional reforms through a referendum as an exercise of sovereignty, while noting that additional demands only delay the signing of the treaty and erode trust in the process.

Narrative Gaps on Security and Humanitarian Issues

While Azerbaijan celebrates the restoration of its territorial integrity, segments of Armenia’s internationally recognized border areas remain under Azerbaijani occupation, creating ongoing human security concerns. In his speech, Pashinyan avoided addressing the occupation directly. Instead, he emphasized the importance of the 1991 Alma Ata Declaration defining former administrative borders of the Soviet Republics as their inter-state borders after independence, and the delimitation and demarcation process based on its already agreed regulations. 

The humanitarian dimensions of the conflict also reveal diverging priorities. Pashinyan did not address the plight of the refugees displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh two years ago. In his subsequent speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on September 30, he stated that he considered their return unrealistic and raising the issue risky for the peace process. Instead, he argued they should live in Armenia, become citizens, and enjoy the full rights of citizenship. For Armenians, this remains one of the most sensitive issues, as the right of return is firmly grounded in international law and reinforced by ICJ rulings related to Armenia’s case. Yet, with elections only a few months away, Pashinyan opted for an unpopular but pragmatic course—favoring stability and movement in the peace process over asserting claims that, while legally justified, could derail negotiations.

As for the 23 Armenian captives still held in Baku, Pashinyan referred to them only in broad terms, underlining the importance of “addressing the issue of persons deprived of their liberty as a result of the long-standing conflict.” His wording suggested that Yerevan is working behind the scenes for their release. Aliyev, by contrast, focused on landmines and missing persons from earlier phases of the conflict, characterizing them as lasting consequences and portraying Armenia as the culpable party.

Cultural heritage forms an additional dimension in this conflict. Aliyev mentioned mosques allegedly destroyed during earlier phases of the conflict, citing unverified figures to reinforce Azerbaijan’s narrative of victimhood. In contrast, Pashinyan did not address the destruction of Armenian religious and cultural sites, despite extensive documentation by satellite imagery and reports from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and other organizations.

Washington Accords and Baku’s Inconsistent Rhetoric

Both leaders underlined the role of U.S. President Trump in brokering the Washington Declaration and the initialing of the peace agreement. Earlier, they had jointly presented him as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Trump has repeatedly portrayed this mediation as evidence that he “established peace” between Armenia and Azerbaijan, framing it as a signature achievement of his peacemaking efforts.

Aliyev, however, used the UNGA podium to present Azerbaijan as the true architect of peace, crediting its military victories and equating peace with force. He also stressed the advantages Azerbaijan secured from the U.S. in return for the Washington Accords. He emphasized the U.S. decision to lift Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which had restricted direct American military assistance to Azerbaijan since the 1990s, and the prospect of a forthcoming U.S.–Azerbaijan strategic partnership.

Pashinyan struck a notably different tone. His speech demonstrated Armenia’s constructive approach and willingness to finalize the initialed agreement. Through careful narrative constraint, he avoided escalation and positioned Armenia as the party truly aligning with both the spirit and substance of the Accords.

Continuing Cognitive Warfare

The contrast between the two speeches at the UNGA was clear. Aliyev continued his narrative, aiming to legitimize past actions, perpetuate Armenophobia, indoctrinate audiences, consolidate domestic power, and maintain dominance in both cognitive warfare and lawfare. Rather than reinforcing the principles of sovereignty, mutual recognition, and renunciation of force he had endorsed in Washington, he instead revived narratives justifying military actions and reiterated preconditions that hinder the peace agreement’s signature.

Pashinyan, in contrast, presented Armenia’s constructive approach as grounded in law, reciprocity, and international integration. He reminded that the Washington Declaration rejects any attempt of revenge now and in the future, underlining Armenia’s own rejection of retaliation. Pashinyan warned that invoking outdated narratives only harms the peace process and undermines trust. He stressed that peace “is not a vacation but work”—requiring daily care and vigilance, much like nurturing a newborn, to guard it against neglect and decay. His strategy of restraint deliberately avoided mirroring resentment, signaling determination to pursue peace.

The advancement of the peace process depends on whether Azerbaijan aligns its rhetoric with the texts it has initialed—and whether the United States, the EU, and other actors hold Baku accountable for compliance. Without this alignment, any agreement risks becoming unsustainable, undermined by coercive rhetoric and cognitive warfare that perpetuate hostility.

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