Armenia’s Balancing Act in a Multipolar World

Listen to the AI generated audio article. 

There is growing recognition among analysts that the world is moving toward some iteration of multipolarity, with major powers, and at a lesser level, regional powers, asserting themselves more strongly. This often translates into more uncertainty and instability, leaving small states like Armenia increasingly in a state of geopolitical flux. Following the dismantling and ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), facing a continued military disparity with Azerbaijan, and witnessing Russia’s relative retreat from the South Caucasus, Armenia has actively sought to adapt to these new realities. In recent years, Yerevan has pursued both the enhancement of existing partnerships and the establishment of new ones with varied intensity, depth and success.

As Yerevan and Baku made headlines with the White House ceremony of a joint declaration for normalization on August 8, analysts began assessing its practical implications. The prevailing view is that it has diminished the short-term likelihood of an Azerbaijani offensive. Whether it has also sown the seeds of long-term peace remains to be seen. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan insists that peace has already been established between the two countries. He suggests that the August 8 declaration is the “practical implementation” of his government’s “balanced and balancing foreign policy.” That is a phrase he has used on multiple occasions in the past year as Yerevan has attempted to diversify its diplomatic and security relations.

Ties With Russia in Transition

Pashinyan first used the “balanced and balancing” line in mid-September 2024, two weeks after it was revealed that Armenia will take part in the BRICS+ summit in Kazan, Russia. While it raised eyebrows, the move was aimed at easing tensions with Moscow and engaging with other non-Western powers.

While Yerevan has effectively frozen its CSTO membership, it remains reluctant to formally withdraw from the Russian-led military alliance, wary of heightening tensions with Moscow. Meanwhile, despite the general pro-Western shift in foreign and security policy, Armenian officials have repeatedly assured that Yerevan will not exit the Eurasian Economic Union. While Russian presence has been reduced with FSB personnel withdrawal from Yerevan’s international airport and the sole checkpoint on the Iranian-Armenian border, there is no substantive talk of closing the Russian base in Gyumri yet. In other words, Armenia’s ties with Russia have not reached a point of no return despite the visible waning of Russian presence in the region. Economic ties, especially trade, remain significant.

Following the BRICS summit, Yerevan continued to ease tensions with its former ally. In January, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan visited Moscow for the first time since July 2023, marking only the second direct exchange with Sergei Lavrov that year, following a single phone call. In Moscow, Mirzoyan called for an “open and constructive dialogue.” Lavrov reciprocated with a visit to Yerevan in May, followed by the visit of Russian Senate Speaker Valentina Matviyenko in June. By mid-July, Pashinyan described ties with Russia as being “in a transformation phase,” insisting relations “should be good […] much better than we had before.”

A recent IRI survey reflected the public’s mood in the slight ease of tensions. In June, 43% of respondents rated the state of ties with Russia as “good”, up from an all-time low of 31% in late 2023. The perception of Russia as a political threat has also gone down in the same period, from 40% to 27%.

Warmer With Neighbors

The day after Yerevan and Washington sealed a strategic partnership this January, Pashinyan remained reserved and continued to insist on his government’s “balancing” approach. In a social media post, he specifically listed ties with Armenia’s four neighbors (Iran, Georgia, Turkey, Azerbaijan), Russia, France, the EU, the U.S., India, China and the Middle East.

Normalization talks with Turkey, ongoing since 2022, have yet to yield concrete results. Days after signing the trilateral declaration in Washington, Pashinyan and Erdogan held a phone call in which the Armenian leader expressed optimism that the “atmosphere for the implementation of these agreements is more favorable than ever.” Erdogan suggested that discussions “will continue at a technical level to carry forward the normalization process.” Whether this apparent momentum will translate into the long-awaited border opening remains uncertain. The two countries had previously agreed in July 2022 to allow third-country citizens to cross their shared land border “at the earliest date possible.” It has yet to materialize.

Turkish envoy Serdar Kılıç visited Armenia on September 12 for a round of normalization talks. There was no breakthrough, but the sides reiterated previous agreements and committed to increase flights between the two countries. On the same day, Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan made it clear that normalization will proceed only after Armenia and Azerbaijan finalize the peace treaty. Meanwhile, Washington continues to exert diplomatic pressure on Ankara to normalize relations.

Armenia’s relationship with its southern neighbor Iran, while not without complications, remains healthy. Less than two weeks after the Washington accords were signed, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Yerevan, where he and Pashinyan issued a joint declaration agreeing to elevate bilateral ties to a strategic partnership. On the eve of the visit, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi characterized Yerevan and Tehran as “natural allies” whose interests have become “more intertwined than ever.” The Iranian response to Armenia’s Western engagement has been mixed. While moderate government figures, including President Pezeshkian, have largely welcomed both the Washington declaration and the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), they have simultaneously expressed concerns about increased American presence in the region. Iranian hardliners, predictably, have condemned the initiative entirely.

Armenia’s deepening engagement with Iran and Turkey influenced, as Pashinyan acknowledged, Yerevan’s decision to formally recognize Palestine in June 2024. This diplomatic gesture was designed to enhance Armenia’s standing across the Arab world. Recent diplomatic engagements indicate that Yerevan has indeed prioritized developing relations with Arab states, with particular focus on Gulf countries.

A Managed Orientation to Asia

A major aspect of Armenia’s efforts to diversify diplomatic and security ties has been a managed orientation towards Asia. Notably, India has emerged as an increasingly important partner in security matters, primarily for arms procurement. The growing alignment of Yerevan and New Delhi along with France and Greece makes quadrilateral cooperation increasingly likely.

Yerevan has made visible progress toward vastly improving ties with Kazakhstan, with Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan calling ties strategic. In a recent ambassadorial meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan stressed the importance of the Asia direction, specifically naming China, Japan, India and Kazakhstan and further highlighting the need for “activating” economic diplomacy with Southeast Asia. This further shows the growing understanding in Yerevan of the importance of the Asia direction.

Although Yerevan’s political relations with China had cooled in recent years, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan travelled to Beijing in late June to meet with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi to discuss establishing a strategic partnership. The Armenian ambassador to Beijing Vahe Gevorgyan told Public TV that China’s new role in a multipolar world “have created a favorable environment” for the development of ties. The strategic partnership was formalized by leaders Pashinyan and Xi on August 31 during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tjianjin, China.

Beijing’s ties with Washington may be tense, but much of the developing world has not been pressed to choose a side—so far, at least. If Yerevan does sign a strategic partnership agreement with Beijing, it will be the last of the three states of the South Caucasus to do so. Georgia signed in August 2023, and Azerbaijan a year later, in July 2024. Now Baku is seeking to formalize strategic ties with Washington, something Tbilisi did in 2009 and Yerevan formalized this January.

In July, Armenia’s Foreign Ministry announced that Yerevan has expressed desire to become a member of the SCO. Armenia is currently a dialogue partner within the organization, a status it officially achieved in 2016. Pashinyan attended the SCO summit in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1, but Armenia’s membership bid was blocked by Pakistan, despite the establishment of diplomatic ties on the sidelines of the summit. Baku’s bid in the same organization was blocked by India and Russia.

EU Still a Priority?

In March, Armenia’s parliament passed a law formalizing Yerevan’s intent to join the EU. Hailed as historic by supporters, Pashinyan called for talks with the EU on a roadmap for closer ties and added that until then, Armenia has no other action to take. He again framed it as part of the “balancing and balanced foreign policy” pursued by his government. While accession remains a long-term goal, Yerevan and Brussels are pushing forward visa liberalization. Within the bloc, France remains the most steadfast backer of Armenia, with plans to formalize the strategic partnership. Defense cooperation with Paris, like with New Delhi, is increasingly comprehensive.

When Pashinyan’s participation in the BRICS summit was confirmed last October, Armenian officials emphasized that it would not impede Armenia’s EU integration, noting that full membership in BRICS was not under consideration. In March 2025, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan further clarified Yerevan’s position, stating that Armenia seeks only observer status within the organization.

The Pashinyan government’s efforts at diversification are the most bold attempt since independence. Until around 2022, Russia had maintained its status of Armenia’s chief diplomatic and security ally with minor fluctuations. As Moscow remains preoccupied with Ukraine, Yerevan has engaged with the EU and the U.S. more actively than ever. 

This recalibration, despite the usual media portrayal, has not been solely Westward. As increasingly important ties with Iran and India, along with renewed engagement with the Arab world, Kazakhstan, and now China show, Yerevan also aims to maintain cordial ties with non-aligned and non-Western countries. Whether this “balanced and balancing” course can be sustained in the long term remains to be seen, and largely depend on external factors, from the war in Ukraine to escalating U.S.-China tensions that lie beyond Armenia’s control.

Also see