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In its ongoing effort to diversify economic and political ties, the Armenian government has intensified diplomatic ties with the Arab world. The two most significant moves in this regard have been the establishment of diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia in November 2023 and Armenia’s recognition of Palestine in June 2024, which was widely welcomed by Arab states. Also noteworthy were the first-ever visits to Armenia of the presidents of Egypt and Iraq in 2023.
Despite emigration and decline, significant Armenian populations still reside in Lebanon and Syria, with smaller communities in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and more recently established ones in the Gulf. Settled largely by genocide survivors, Beirut and Aleppo were once the principal centers of the Armenian diaspora. Jerusalem’s Armenian Quarter is one of the oldest and best-known Armenian communities outside the historic homeland.
Diplomatic Ties
Since gaining independence, Armenia has established diplomatic relations with 19 Arab countries, excluding Palestine, which it officially recognized just last month. Diplomatic ties with that country will likely be established shortly. Armenia and seven Arab states—Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—have mutually set up embassies in each other’s capitals.
Armenia has ambassadors accredited in seven Arab states with residencies in neighboring countries, namely Cairo (for Algeria, Libya, Oman, and Sudan), Damascus (for Jordan) or Abu Dhabi (for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia), while Armenia’s ambassador to Tunisia and Morocco resides in Yerevan. Armenia has no ambassadors accredited to three Arab states: Mauritania, Palestine, and Yemen. Armenia has set up four consulates across the Arab world—in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan; Amman, Jordan; Aleppo, Syria; and Dubai in the Emirates.
Conversely, nine Arab countries have ambassadors accredited to Armenia with residencies in Moscow (for Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Oman, Tunisia), Rome (for Bahrain), Kyiv (for Morocco), and Tbilisi (for Saudi Arabia). Palestine, Sudan and Yemen have no ambassadors to Armenia. Morocco and Oman also have honorary consuls in Yerevan.
For nearly two decades, Armenia’s ambassador to Egypt has been accredited with the Cairo-based Arab League, effectively making Armenia an observer to that organization. In addition to the 19 aforementioned countries, the Arab League includes Comoros, Djibouti and Somalia. Armenia’s Foreign Ministry told EVN Report that according to a January 2005 memorandum, Armenia’s representative can attend Arab League summits and sessions (with no voting rights) and circulate official statements and documents.
In March 2023, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan attended the Arab League’s foreign ministers’ meeting in March for the first time at that level and delivered a speech praising the “centuries-old relations between Armenian and Arab nations,” who are linked “by strong bonds of historical and cultural ties.” Mirzoyan expressed Armenia’s readiness to “broaden the prospects of cooperation” with all Arab states. Last November, he met with the Arab League’s Secretary-General, with similar meetings having previously taken place in 2019 and 2020.
Visits
Based on the number of mutual official visits since independence, Armenia’s closest partners in the Arab world are the UAE (31), Lebanon (27), Egypt (21), and Syria (19).
The heads of state or governments of five Arab countries have visited Armenia: Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in January 2023, Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid in November 2023, Jordan’s King Abdullah II in February 2020, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in June 2009. Lebanon is the sole Arab country whose leaders have visited Armenia on more than one occasion. Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri visited Armenia three times, in 1997, 1998, and 2004, while presidents Émile Lahoud, Michel Suleiman, and Michel Aoun paid visits in 2001, 2011, and 2018, respectively.
In their official capacities, Armenia’s leaders have visited nine Arab states, with the UAE being the most frequently visited, having hosted Armenian presidents 11 times since 2002. Former President Armen Sarkissian alone visited the Emirates on six occasions between 2019 and 2022. Next in the list are Qatar, with five visits by Armenia’s leaders, followed by Lebanon (four), Egypt (three), Syria (three), Jordan (two), Kuwait, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia (each once).
(Geo)political Ties
Despite what Mirzoyan described as “friendly relations” between Armenia and the Arab states, Armenia’s interests naturally do not always align with such a diverse group of countries.
In March 2008, when Azerbaijan pushed for a non-binding resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh for a vote at the UN General Assembly, the majority of Arab states (12 out of 19) backed Azerbaijan’s position and demanded the withdrawal of all Armenian forces. The following “core” Arab countries voted in favor: Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the UAE and Yemen. The three non-Arab members of the Arab League (Comoros, Djibouti and Somalia) also supported the resolution. Algeria and Egypt abstained, while Lebanon, Mauritania, Syria and Tunisia were absent from the vote. This highlighted Armenia’s traditionally warmer ties with Lebanon, Syria and Egypt.
Azerbaijan has long used the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to promote its interests and garner Muslim (including Arab) sympathy over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). Consequently, the 2008 UN resolution was mostly backed by Muslim-majority states. In 2016, the OIC Contact Group “on the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan” was established with eight members, among them two Arab states (Morocco and Saudi Arabia) and two other members of the Arab League (Djibouti and Somalia).
During a meeting with his Lebanese counterpart Michel Suleiman, Armenia’s former president Serzh Sargsyan criticized Azerbaijan for presenting the conflict in “the light of religious disagreements,” calling it “extremely dangerous.” In his turn, Suleiman noted that Lebanon has never supported OIC statements on Karabakh.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia and Armenia did not establish official (or even unofficial) ties until recently due to the former’s strong support of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Saudi officials repeatedly backed Azerbaijan, including within the IOC as noted above. Things, however, started to change immediately before the 2020 war, at a time when Saudi-Turkey ties had become visibly tense. On September 21, the kingdom’s Foreign Ministry congratulated Armenia’s independence, while King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman did so in a letter to President Armen Sarkissian. Two days later, Armenia’s Foreign Ministry reciprocated by sending congratulations on Saudi National Day.
When Azerbaijan launched the war on September 27, 2020, the Saudis did not back the invasion. The Saudi government instead expressed “great concern and interest” in the conflict and called for a ceasefire, a position repeated in a cabinet session presided by the King and the Crown Prince the next day. A similar statement was released by the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council. In a letter, President Sarkissian appealed to Saudi leaders to “use their authority and connections at the international arena to stop the bloodshed and human suffering at once.”
Despite the lack of diplomatic ties, President Sarkissian became the first Armenian official to visit Saudi Arabia in October 2021 to participate in an investment conference. Sarkissian described his visit as “historic”. He was photographed sitting next to bin Salman at the conference. Sarkissian’s office said they talked “about the need to develop relations between the two countries and their future.”
In a later interview, Sarkissian said that establishing diplomatic relations with the kingdom was one of the “first goals” of his presidency. (Armenia’s office of the president is now a largely ceremonial role.) He began communicating with the Crown Prince “about religious, national or state events” and “special relations gradually began,” which culminated in his visit to Riyadh. Sarkissian called Saudi Arabia an “important, influential and promising country” and said there are “no good reasons not to have a relationship.” He said he and bin Salman agreed that his visit marked the beginning of diplomatic ties.
Then in February 2022, Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Faisal bin Farhan met for the first time on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. The Saudi MFA said they “reviewed aspects of bilateral relations in various fields of cooperation and ways to support and enhance them” and “exchanged views on many regional and international issues.” Mirzoyan stressed the potential for the development of cooperation in information and high technologies, health care, tourism and culture. In June 2022, Mirzoyan and Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (a supportive position to the Foreign Minister), discussed over the phone “the prospects of establishing bilateral and multilateral agendas on cooperation and development of relations” and highlighted the “importance of promoting trade and economic ties.”
Flynas, a Saudi low-cost airline, launched the first-ever direct flights from Saudi Arabia to Armenia in June 2023.
Foreign Ministers Mirzoyan and bin Farhan met again in New York in September 2023 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, while Azerbaijan had effectively taken over Nagorno-Karabakh. They discussed “enhancing bilateral relations in various fields and consolidating bilateral and multilateral work” and latest international developments. Mirzoyan briefed him on the Azerbaijani attack, “stressing the imperative to strongly condemn the use of force or the threat of force by the international actors and to prevent mass atrocity crime in Nagorno-Karabakh.”
The two countries officially established diplomatic ties on November 25, 2023. The protocol was signed in Abu Dhabi by the two countries’ ambassadors to the UAE. Mirzoyan visited Riyadh in April 2024, where he met with Faisal bin Farhan to discuss “ways to strengthen cooperation in various fields.” He also met with the Saudi ministers of economy and education, while Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan discussed development prospects with the Saudi Deputy Minister of Information Technologies. Mirzoyan said in an interview that both countries want to deepen their cooperation in education, sciences, advanced technologies, urban development, agriculture, tourism, people-to-people contacts, trade investments and infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia appointed a non-resident ambassador to Armenia in late May. Armenia reciprocated the move two months later.
Palestine
Armenia has long, albeit mostly quietly, backed the Palestinian cause. In 2020, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan stated that Armenia has an “established position on the Palestinian issue” in its support of a two-state-solution.
At the UN General Assembly, Armenia has since 1996, voted in favor of resolutions reaffirming the “inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan [Heights] over their natural resources, including land and water.” In 2012, Armenia voted for the resolution according Palestine an Observer State status in the UN and in 2017 Armenia voted in favor of a resolution asking nations not to establish diplomatic missions in Jerusalem after the U.S. moved its embassy there. In May 2024, Armenia voted for a resolution urging the UN Security Council to give “favorable consideration” to Palestine’s request for full membership.
Armenia’s non-recognition was likely tied to its formal non-recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh. Consequently, as a principle, Armenia did not recognize and establish ties with disputed areas, such as Palestine and Kosovo, but supported self-determination in principle.
Since the war in Gaza began in October 2023, Armenia has expressed concern and called for a ceasefire. Armenia backed a UN resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza in late October. When Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited Egypt this March, he again called for an immediate ceasefire and announced that Armenia will deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza via Egypt. Thirty tons of food and medicine was sent in late March.
Armenia officially recognized Palestine on June 21, 2024. In a statement announcing the recognition, Armenia’s Foreign Ministry said it “categorically rejects the targeting of civilian infrastructure, violence against the civilian population and the hostage-taking of civilians during armed conflict.”
The move was immediately welcomed by the Arab Parliament (Arab League), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Gulf Cooperation Council, and several Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan. Armenia’s recognition of Palestine was further welcomed by Turkey and Iran. Palestine said the recognition is “based on a historic friendship between the Armenian and Palestinian people.” Israel summoned Armenia’s ambassador Arman Hakobyan for a reprimand, while an adviser to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said it will have “serious long-term consequences” for Israel-Armenia relations.
The Emirates: Trade and Economic Ties
Armenia’s trade with Arab states in 2023 stood at $2.56 billion, with the UAE accounting for nearly 90% of the total and Iraq for much of the rest, at 7%, followed by Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Bilateral trade with other Arab states stood below $10 million. Driven by the Russo-Ukrainian War, trade with the Emirates has spiked 20-fold in two years, almost entirely due to (re)exports to that country.
The UAE has also been a significant investor in the Armenian economy. The state-owned renewable energy company Masdar has pledged to invest $174 million in Ayg-1, a 200 MW solar farm to be built near the town of Talin. Masdar will own 85% of the project company, while the Armenian government holds the rest. Masdar signed a government support agreement in November 2021 and the farm’s completion was initially planned for December 2023, but no construction has been done so far. The larger cooperation with Masdar includes another 200 MW solar farm, named Ayg-2. Initial plans estimated an investment of $150 million and a completion date of December 2024, but it has not yet entered the planning phase and it will likely be postponed.
Another joint venture was the national carrier Fly Arna, set up by the Emirati low-cost airline Air Arabia and the state-run Armenian National Interests Fund (ANIF) in July 2021. It collapsed earlier this year and lost its operating license and Air Arabia was reportedly preparing an arbitration case against the Armenian government, although no details of the case or damages sought have been revealed.
Despite significant economic and trade relations, the UAE has been cooler on the political front. It has forged closer political ties with Azerbaijan, with whom it signed a strategic partnership this January. In the four UN Security Council meetings in September and December of 2022 and August and September of 2023, the UAE remained neutral or tacitly sided with Baku. In fact, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to the EU thanked the UAE (along with Russia, the UK, and Albania) for stopping the adoption of a statement in December 2022 on the then-ongoing blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh.
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As mentioned towards the end of the article, Masdar’s plans to build 2 solar farms in Armenia have faltered. Simultaneously, they have built a 230 MW solar power plant in Garadagh, Azerbaijan, with plans to develop a further 1GW of clean energy projects in the country (https://masdar.ae/en/global-office-locations/azerbaijan). Azerbaijan also recently launched a bid to join BRICS. Not to mention the whole fiasco with AirArabia. So in some ways, it seems Armenia’s pivot to Arab countries, and specifically UAE, has been hijacked by Baku, which would explain their political stance as well.