The Unfinished Peace Deal: Armenia–Azerbaijan Agreement Initialed Yet Unsigned

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In March 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed on the text of the Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations. Yerevan accepted Azerbaijan’s proposals on the final two pending articles, breaking the negotiation deadlock. However, instead of proceeding to signature, Baku escalated its preconditions and rekindled border tensions, once again stalling the process.

On August 8, 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration mediated by U.S. President Donald Trump. The Washington Declaration established the broader political framework for peace, aiming to formally end 37 years of conflict, establish diplomatic relations, and promote regional cooperation. Its centerpiece is the creation of the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP). The two leaders also initialed the peace agreement and signed a joint appeal to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) requesting the closure of the Minsk Process and dissolution of the Minsk Group. The deal sparked conflicting reactions both within Armenia and internationally. 

The text of the peace agreement, finalized in March and publicized on August 11, is framed in reciprocal language. Yet it contains omissions and ambiguously phrased articles, lacks enforcement mechanisms and guarantees, and defers several key issues to other processes—vulnerabilities that Azerbaijan, as the stronger party, could exploit.

This analysis focuses on the peace framework provided by the Washington Declaration and peace agreement—examining its substance, omissions and status; the contested interpretations surrounding it; the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group; and the conduct of Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders since its initialing. An earlier article previously examined TRIPP.

The Washington Declaration: Political Weight and Strategic Linkages

This political statement establishes a framework for advancing peace between the two states. Although not legally binding, the Declaration carries significant political weight while Trump remains in power and engaged in the process. The peace agreement initialed on the same day must therefore be analyzed alongside this Declaration, which provides the broader political context and outlines the principles to which the parties committed under U.S. auspices.

The Declaration includes several key elements. It recognizes the need for further steps toward signing and ratifying the peace agreement while emphasizing the importance of maintaining peace. With Trump present, both countries jointly appealed to the OSCE to close the Minsk Process and related structures––effectively dismantling the last institutional legacy of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Declaration also reaffirms the importance of opening communications, including unimpeded connectivity between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan exclave through Armenian territory, grounded in reciprocity and sovereignty. Crucially, it introduces TRIPP, a U.S.-backed connectivity project in Armenia, as the centerpiece of regional integration.

Equally important is the Declaration’s normative framing. It situates Armenian–Azerbaijani relations within the Charter of the United Nations and the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, reaffirming the principle of inviolable international borders and rejecting the use of force for territorial acquisition. The Declaration calls for closing the chapter of enmity and explicitly excludes any notion of revenge, presenting the peace process as irreversible.

The Washington Declaration and the initialed peace agreement work on complementary tracks: the agreement establishes the technical and legal framework for bilateral relations, while the Declaration provides political legitimacy and a narrative of finality to the peace process. Its significance stems not from legal enforceability but from the political authority it carries while Trump’s administration remains actively engaged. This document between the Declaration and the peace agreement demonstrates that these documents must be considered together—their credibility and durability are mutually reinforcing.

Unresolved Challenges of De-occupation and Border Delimitation 

A key concern in the peace process is more than 200 square kilometers of sovereign Armenian territory under Azerbaijani control since its incursions in 2021–2022. In 2024, both sides agreed to address these territorial issues through the border delimitation and demarcation process—outlined in the regulations governing the joint border commissions and reiterated in the draft peace agreement. However, progress has been limited to a small section of Armenia’s Tavush region border that favored Baku, resulting in Armenia’s return of Azerbaijani exclave villages in May 2024. This selective approach has generated skepticism in Armenia about the process, its timeline, and whether it will apply to territories currently held by Azerbaijan.

After the agreement was initialed, PM Pashinyan reiterated that by affirming the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991, Armenia and Azerbaijan mutually recognized their present territories as corresponding to their former Soviet republic borders. He underlined that parts of Armenia’s sovereign territory remain under Azerbaijani control, while also acknowledging that some Azerbaijani lands are under Armenian control. Pashinyan stated these issues should be resolved through the demarcation process following the “logic of peace.” He added that any territorial exchange proposal—such as trading one square kilometer of Armenian land for one square kilometer of Azerbaijani land—would require public approval through constitutional means, likely through a referendum.

The territorial control imbalance between the sides is significant: Azerbaijan holds over 200 square kilometers of Armenian land, while Armenia controls only a few small strips of Azerbaijani territory. Azerbaijan’s September 2022 offensive in the Jermuk area was particularly severe, resulting in more than 200 Armenians killed, and documented war crimes against Armenian military personnel, including servicewomen. Additionally, the village of Artsvashen, a 40-square-kilometer Armenian exclave, has been under Azerbaijani control since the First Nagorno-Karabakh War and has been resettled with about 3,000 Azerbaijanis. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan periodically claims the so-called “Azerbaijani enclave villages,” which are roughly comparable in size to Artsvashen. These villages, however, did not exist when Soviet Armenia or Soviet Azerbaijan were established, nor during the First Republic of Azerbaijan, whose legal succession Baku claims. They were artificially created within Soviet Armenia between the 1930s and 1970s and were lost during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War.

These territorial fragments contradict contemporary principles of international order, as they resulted from Soviet administrative decisions rather than internationally recognized borders. Reverting to that system would create complications for both countries’ borders, infrastructure, and connectivity. Given these circumstances, territorial exchanges that maintain present-day realities—rather than reviving outdated arrangements—represent the most feasible solution for these enclaves.

The Washington Declaration and the initialed agreement established mutual recognition between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding the inviolability and territorial integrity of each other’s borders based on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration. However, the agreement lacks explicit language about the de-occupation of Armenian territories, instead ambiguously deferring this issue to the delimitation process. This absence of clarity weakens confidence in the peace agreement’s credibility. Nevertheless, if implemented in good faith, the Washington accords could revitalize the delimitation process and lead to fair and equitable outcomes.

Notably, the opening of regional communications for Armenia is not reflected but appears only in the Washington Declaration on TRIPP. This direction of both issues to mechanisms outside the peace agreement can be interpreted in two ways: negatively, as they might be bypassed or neglected; or positively, as they could progress even before, and independently of, the formal signing of the peace agreement.

Security Guarantees and Confidence-Building: The Potential Role of the U.S. and the EU

In March 2025, one of the final two articles on which Armenia conceded concerned the withdrawal of third-country forces from the mutual border. This draft peace agreement provision has sparked widespread debate in Armenia due to its implications for the EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia (EUMA). While Azerbaijan characterizes EUMA as a “force,” it is actually a civilian mission without combat capabilities. Since deployment, EUMA has served as an important soft deterrent against potential Azerbaijani offensives and enhanced human security in border regions.

Despite Azerbaijani pressure for EUMA’s withdrawal, the mission’s mandate was extended for two years in February 2025. With a peace agreement not expected before late 2026, Armenian authorities have announced plans to negotiate a modified mandate for an EU mission in Armenia. Ideally, following the peace agreement signing, EUMA could continue and even more fully realize its original mandate: serving as a confidence-building mechanism between the two parties. 

The Washington Declaration established the U.S. an indirect, soft guarantor of the peace process. While not legally binding, the Declaration carries political weight during President Trump’s administration. The U.S. has demonstrated commitment to the process by facilitating the Declaration, witnessing the peace agreement’s initialing, and promoting the TRIPP project—all without offering Armenia formal security guarantees. 

It would be important to ensure the continued presence of an EU mission in Armenia. The U.S. involvement, alongside the EU’s presence—is essential not only for deterring Azerbaijani coercion but can foster confidence-building and reconciliation between parties who currently lack mutual trust.

The Constitutional Precondition and Declaration of Independence Still Weaponized 

Azerbaijan’s decision to initial rather than sign the peace agreement signals its continued insistence on Armenia’s constitutional changes. Baku will likely not sign until Armenia completes its constitutional reform process, expected in late 2026 or 2027. Azerbaijan demands Armenia remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which mentions Nagorno-Karabakh, claiming these constitute territorial claims. In his interview with Saudi Arabia’s Al Arabiya TV on August 26, Aliyev reiterated that demand. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan maintains its own constitutional provisions implying claims to Armenian territory without acknowledging their controversy, or considering similar amendments to its constitution.

Armenia’s constitutional reform, though officially a domestic initiative predating the 2020 war, has recently aligned with peace negotiations. Pashinyan argues that the current Constitution, adopted during the Karabakh conflict, no longer serves Armenia’s strategic interests. In February 2025, Pashinyan reiterated the need for a new constitution as part of his “Real Armenia” ideology. At the Yerevan Dialogue in May 2025, Pashinyan stated that if the Constitutional Court finds the peace treaty incompatible with the current Constitution, he would personally lead reform efforts to enable its adoption. In August, he confirmed that while the drafting of the new constitution is underway and will eventually be put to a public referendum, the process remains technically separate from—though influential on—the peace agreement.

In his August 23, 2025 message marking the 35th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, Pashinyan identified the Declaration as the founding act of Armenian statehood. However, he also described it as shaped by the Karabakh movement and Soviet-era legacies. He argued that this conflict-centered paradigm constrained Armenia’s sovereignty and hindered state-building. Pashinyan called for reinterpreting independence through the “Real Armenia” ideology––defined by its internationally recognized 29,743 km² of territory and anchored in peace, stability, and development. He declared 2025 as the beginning of a new era in which Armenia is “more independent, more sovereign, and more promising than ever,” precisely because it is pursuing peace with neighbors and building statehood on its own terms rather than on conflict legacies.

This reinterpretation of independence has been widely understood as preparing Armenian society for constitutional change. However, the discourse surrounding the Declaration of Independence and plans to remove it from the new Constitution has triggered an identity crisis for many Armenians. This affects especially—though not exclusively—the displaced population of Nagorno-Karabakh, many of whom are applying for Armenian citizenship and will vote in Armenia’s elections. For them, such a change seems to validate Azerbaijan’s narrative and grant it a psychological victory in the broader struggle over identity and historical memory. The perception that Azerbaijan is exploiting Armenia’s domestic constitutional reform also intensifies fears about interference in the country’s sovereign decision-making. Armenia’s high threshold for passing the constitutional referendum further complicates matters, making the outcome uncertain and raising the risk that the process could backfire and jeopardize the peace process.

While Aliyev is now less likely to use a negative referendum outcome as a pretext for military action—which he would justify as countering Armenian “revanchism”—such an outcome would still delay finalizing the peace process. Aliyev cannot openly break his peace commitment made in front of Trump, one of the few figures with real influence over him. However, if Armenia’s constitutional referendum fails, Aliyev will probably use this to return to pressure tactics, gain concessions, and avoid signing the peace agreement—all to strengthen his authoritarian rule.

The Closure of the Nagorno-Karabakh Issue

The agreement definitively closes the Nagorno-Karabakh question. It eliminates consideration of self-determination for the former Armenian population, their right to return, and even human rights concerns—effectively normalizing the military takeover and forced displacement of Armenians. This results from both the absence of provisions on their rights and requirements that Armenia withdraw relevant international lawsuits, alongside the joint call to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group.

Human rights defenders argue that withdrawing Armenia’s ICJ and ECHR lawsuits would allow Azerbaijan to evade accountability for forcibly displacing Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Legal experts stress that Armenia’s case is strong and has a high chance of success. Withdrawing these lawsuits would mean abandoning a likely legal victory and allowing Azerbaijan to continue its lawfare unchallenged outside of international legal mechanisms. Human rights advocates argue that sacrificing justice for peace often raises concerns about whether peace can be sustained in the long term. Conversely, withdrawal supporters, taking a realpolitik approach, point out that ICJ provisional measures failed to prevent ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh, and international legal mechanisms have proven ineffective without enforcement capabilities. Meanwhile, Armenian authorities hint that Yerevan should shift from pursuing historical justice toward a more pragmatic approach focused on present-day realities.

This outcome causes deep dissatisfaction among many Armenians, particularly those from Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet the closure of the issue regarding Armenians’ return to Nagorno-Karabakh had been widely anticipated since 2024. The prospects for return became increasingly seen as unrealistic due to weak international condemnation of the forced displacement, Azerbaijan’s aggressive information warfare against every actor raising the issue, and the broader decline of human rights- and international law-based liberal world order. Recently, Armenian authorities have promoted the concept of “Real Armenia,” emphasizing national sovereignty as the primary national priority while portraying the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a factor that Russia exploited and that undermined Armenia’s state-building efforts. Armenia’s willingness to close this chapter resembles Finland’s post-World War II decision to accept the loss of Karelia in 1944—after military defeats and the forced displacement of its Finnish population—to strengthen national sovereignty and focus on long-term security.

Azerbaijan reportedly refused to include a provision protecting Armenian cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh. Following its 2020 victory, Azerbaijan has systematically destroyed, distorted, or appropriated Armenian heritage as part of its broader policy of ethnic hatred and historical revisionism. This safeguard’s omission from the agreement leaves these cultural sites vulnerable and indicates how the peace framework overlooks a key dimension of identity and memory, potentially undermining reconciliation.

From Delegitimization to Dissolution: Closing the OSCE Minsk Group

When Armenia and Azerbaijan announced their peace treaty agreement in March 2025, Baku set the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group as a precondition. Yerevan countered that this should happen only at the treaty’s and only if Azerbaijan stops promoting its “Western Azerbaijan” expansionist narrative.

During the Washington summit, both sides jointly appealed to the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office to close the Minsk Process and dissolve the Minsk Group. Armenia’s initialing of the peace agreement marked a shift in its position on this matter. Both France and Russia expressed no objections to the dissolution. The OSCE Secretary General has responded that “the OSCE stands ready to fulfil its task for the implementation of the August 8 Joint Declaration.” According to Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, the appeal has been circulated among OSCE participating states, with a decision expected on September 1, 2025.

In practice, the Minsk Group failed to mediate a negotiated settlement of the conflict between the two wars. Since the November 2020 ceasefire statement, Russia and Azerbaijan had delegitimized the format, and the rift deepened further when Russia’s war in Ukraine strained relations between Russia and its Western counterparts, the U.S. and France. While this had already rendered the group dysfunctional, its formal dissolution now closes the chapter on internationally mediated peace plans for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and Armenian human rights organizations argue that this closure contradicts OSCE principles and effectively legitimizes Azerbaijan’s unilateral military “solution” to the conflict and the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh.

It remains unclear whether Azerbaijan will abandon the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative. After the Washington summit, Azerbaijani outlets circulated claims that the “Western Azerbaijan Community” had been instructed to disband, which some Armenian media repeated. This later proved to be false—the organization’s website remains functional and its activities continue. Unconfirmed reports suggest the organization was merely told to temporarily scale back preserving Baku’s option to reactivate expansionist claims when politically expedient.

The Issue of Armenian Captives and Azerbaijani Peace Activists

The peace agreement doesn’t address the fate of Armenian captives, including former Nagorno-Karabakh leaders and civilians from both Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. While the agreement requires parties to address cases of missing persons and enforced disappearances from the armed conflict—an issue Baku has raised regarding missing persons following the first Karabakh war—it makes no mention of the 23 Armenian prisoners of war and other detainees in Azerbaijani custody, who are undergoing what are widely considered sham trials in Baku.

During his meeting with the Armenian delegation, President Trump acknowledged their plight and pledged to raise the issue with President Aliyev and request their release. However, Baku has shown no signs of goodwill. The ongoing detention of Armenian prisoners undermines confidence in Baku’s sincerity, weakens the peace process, and raises concerns about selective application of humanitarian obligations. On a related note, Azerbaijan also continues to hold Azerbaijani peace activists like Bahruz Samadov, in prison, highlighting a broader pattern of suppressing initiatives that could lead to genuine reconciliation. The continued prosecution of these activists for their involvement in peacebuilding initiatives, and contacts with Armenian counterparts raises doubts about the genuineness of Baku’s intentions for peace and leaves their release uncertain.

Intolerance Clause and the Risk to Democratic Pluralism

The agreement includes an article obligating both parties to “condemn and combat intolerance, racial hatred and discrimination, separatism, violent extremism, and terrorism.” In Armenia, concerns have emerged that this provision could suppress historical and political discourse, especially when paired with the definitive closure of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and discouragement of supporting its self-determination movement. This restriction might limit public debate and weaken democratic practices, civic movements, and independent analysis.

Armenia benefits from a pluralistic civil society environment where independent think tanks and diverse voices shape political debate and maintain multiple perspectives. This environment stands in stark contrast to Azerbaijan’s authoritarian system, where policy think tanks and experts are largely government-sponsored and function merely as extensions of state propaganda.

In conflict settings, each side typically develops its own interpretations and narratives of history, with school textbooks often presenting different versions of the past. This phenomenon is commonly observed in the Balkans and other conflict contexts. While Armenia’s history teaching has contained some distorted narratives influenced by Soviet and Dashnak party propaganda, these were relatively limited in scope. Their revision has progressed in recent years—sometimes raising concerns about shifting to the opposite extreme at the expense of historical memory and identity. 

Azerbaijan, by contrast, has institutionalized and implemented a systematic policy of historical revisionism and ethnic hatred for over three decades. These narratives are embedded not only in state propaganda and official institutions but also in school curricula and academia. They serve as tools to consolidate authoritarian control, glorify war and militarism, and justify Azerbaijan’s actions against Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and its expansionist claims against Armenia.

Despite some softening in President Aliyev’s rhetoric since the Washington summit, the shift is not consistent and hostile narratives continue to appear in his speeches and interviews. On August 22 he referred to Armenian society as “sick,” echoing previous Armenophobic language. It seems unlikely that intolerance or revisionist claims—such as the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative—will be completely abandoned. These narratives remain essential to Azerbaijan’s cognitive warfare strategy, which aims to control conflict narratives and undermine Armenia’s democratic resilience.

The intolerance clause in this context risks suppressing legitimate historical narratives in Armenia—under the pretext of preventing separatism and extremism—while questionably affecting Azerbaijan’s authoritarian propaganda machine. Armenia should maintain its  democratic approach, characterized by diverse viewpoints and civil discourse that allows the public to evaluate different narratives. 

Disparity in Rhetoric: Armenia’s Peace Messaging and Azerbaijan’s Triumphalism

The approaches to peace by Armenia and Azerbaijan diverge sharply: Armenia emphasizes reconciliation and societal transformation, while Azerbaijan continues to project itself as the victorious power. This systemic imbalance becomes even more apparent at the leadership level, where Armenia’s peace-oriented messaging stands in stark contrast to Azerbaijan’s triumphalism.

Even before the Washington summit, Armenian leadership—most notably Prime Minister Pashinyan and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan—consistently promoted rhetoric aimed at preparing society for peace. Pashinyan has repeatedly affirmed, “There will be no war, there will be peace.” After the Washington summit, both he and Mirzoyan have stressed that peace requires daily care and nurturing. 

In contrast, Azerbaijan’s narrative is characterized by triumphalism. Following the Washington summit, Presidential aide Hikmet Hajiyev stated: “President Ilham Aliyev won the war—now he wins the peace.” Later, he asserted that “The Republic of Azerbaijan is the author of the peace treaty text and initiative between Armenia and Azerbaijan.” These statements reinforce a narrative of dominance rather than reconciliation, positioning Azerbaijan as the architect of the peace process. In his August 26 interview, Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan could have captured parts of Armenia’s Syunik region in 2020. This approach reflects not only triumphalism but also Baku’s consistent aim to achieve cognitive victory by legitimizing its military gains, projecting itself as the uncontested victor, and discrediting alternative narratives. It stands in sharp contrast to Armenia’s messaging, which emphasizes mutual commitment and the effort required to sustain peace. 

While Armenia advances a narrative of trust and mutual respect in its peace efforts, Azerbaijan’s persistent triumphalist messaging creates asymmetric narratives. Combined with Azerbaijan’s institutionalized propaganda apparatus and the uncertainty surrounding the peace agreement, this disparity renders the deal fragile and incomplete.

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