Iran’s Strategic Uncertainty and Armenia’s Security Challenges

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Following the Second Karabakh War, and particularly after Azerbaijan’s assault on Armenia’s sovereign territory in September 2022, many observers began describing Iran’s regional policy as increasingly pro-Armenian. While Tehran continues to pursue a broadly balanced approach in the South Caucasus, this perception has been reinforced by frequent high-level visits with Armenian officials, regular statements affirming Armenia’s territorial integrity, and a sustained “war of words” with Baku. Tensions deepened amid reports of Azerbaijani involvement in Israel’s strike on Iran. Both the recent 12-day Israeli-American-Iranian war and shifting Iran-Azerbaijan dynamics carry direct implications for Armenia’s security. As the risk of renewed escalation lingers, this article assesses those risks from the perspective of Armenia’s security.

Iran-U.S.-Israeli War and Its Outcome

After Donald Trump returned to the White House and declared his strategic goal of becoming a “peacemaker president“, mediated talks resumed between Washington and Tehran on Iran’s nuclear program.

Following five Oman-mediated meetings described as “successful“, the parties appeared close to reaching an agreement.

However, shortly before the sixth round of negotiations, Israel attacked Iran, killing key nuclear scientists and senior military officials. Israel subsequently convinced the U.S. to join in the military action against Iran, using “bunker buster” bombs to strike Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility. Though a ceasefire was established after 12 days of conflict, uncertainties about Iran’s nuclear program and the future of negotiations persist.

All sides declared “victory,” yet paradoxically, each fell short of its strategic objectives. This phase of the conflict left relations between the parties no clearer than before. Uncertainty over Iran’s nuclear program persists, as U.S. military strikes provided no conclusive evidence that it has been fully disrupted.

Iran has acknowledged significant damage to its nuclear infrastructure, likely delaying any potential nuclear weapon development by months or years (whether Iran intends to create such a weapon is a separate discussion). Reports suggest Iran preemptively safeguarded some of its enriched uranium, suggesting Tehran may have had advance knowledge of the U.S. strikes. Meanwhile, according to American sources, informal U.S.-Iran negotiations continued even during the strikes.

The war also exposed the vulnerability of Iran’s military and strategic infrastructure, which can be attributed to several objective realities: The once-united “Axis of Resistance“—the main pillar of Iran’s regional policy and security—is now fragmented. Syria no longer operates under pro-Iranian rule, Hezbollah has suffered significant losses, and Houthis forces face more direct threats and targeted U.S. strikes. Meanwhile, Iran’s strategic allies, Russia and China, offered nothing beyond condemnatory statements during the war.

Not all of Israel’s strategic goals materialized. Its expectation of regime change in Iran proved overly ambitious. While some Iranian ethnic minority movements receive external backing, foreign actors have used separatist rhetoric more as leverage than as a genuine push for Iran’s partition. Turkey and Azerbaijan, for example, have encouraged Turkic separatism among Iran’s Azeris, yet both understand that Iran’s fragmentation could also embolden Kurdish separatism—an outcome Turkey opposes. Likewise, Pakistan condemned the Israeli strikes, likely wary of unrest among its own Baluchi population.

Despite public discontent with the regime, Iranian society carries the traumatic memory of the Iran-Iraq War and the painful experience of a foreign-backed coup (the overthrow of Mossadegh). These historical wounds make expectations of a mass internal uprising against the backdrop of missile strikes unrealistic. While some social media voices portrayed the conflict as a war against the regime rather than the people of Iran, these perspectives were largely perceived as disconnected from actual Iranian sentiment.

Nevertheless, despite the regime maintaining its formal integrity, recent developments suggest the possibility of internal change. President Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi took on key decision-making roles during the war, emphasizing continued diplomacy and distinguishing between U.S. and Israeli approaches. Following the war, both officials gave interviews to American media highlighting their willingness to resume negotiations on Iran’s peaceful nuclear program. In an interview with Tucker Carlson, Pezeshkian stated that Iran would welcome American investors if sanctions were lifted, clarifying that “the slogan ‘Death to America,’ by no means refers to the American people, or even officials.” While Iranian conservatives  have severely criticized these positions, they will continue to shape Iran’s foreign policy as long as distrust in the president remains incomplete.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was absent from the public sphere during the military strikes and did not attend the funerals of military and political figures. The vulnerability of Iran’s airspace calls into question both the viability of holding mass public events and the regime’s ideological slogans of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.” These slogans are not just rhetoric but form the ideological backbone of the regime. The succession process of the Supreme Leader and the role of a weakened Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may determine whether Iran pursues ideological reorientation or further escalation with the United States. Rather than complete regime change, Iran may undergo a transformation of its political identity, shifting from the Shiite Islamic concept of “Velayate Faghih” toward a more national political strategy. This trend is already visible in Khamenei’s commissioning of a patriotic song during Ashura ceremonies, Pezeshkian’s emphasis on the need to start dialogue with the political opposition, and even in calls from conservative actors, saying “we need change.”

Thus, Iran’s policy in the near future faces strategic uncertainty due to both external conflict threats (with Israel and the U.S.) and internal leadership instability. Three possible scenarios emerge:

• New military escalation
• Diplomatic reintegration (perhaps with or without a new nuclear agreement)
• Or the continuation of the current status quo of strategic uncertainty

Iran’s Political Uncertainty and Its Impact on the South Caucasus and Armenia 

Developments around Iran could directly affect the security of the South Caucasus, particularly Armenia’s. Recent threats to Armenia included potential breakdown of negotiations with Azerbaijan, political conditions favoring military escalation, ongoing disagreements over the Syunik transit route, and the continuing blockade of Armenia.

An Israeli attack on Iran, especially with U.S. participation, could intensify these threats for several reasons:

• First, conducting negotiations while simultaneously planning what could be termed a “preemptive attack”, undermines established norms in international relations and encourages other actors to consider military options even during peace talks.
• Engaging Iran in a protracted war would shift the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Military operations near the region could embolden Azerbaijan to attack Armenia, particularly since a conflict with Iran would jeopardize the security of connections between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan.
• Israel’s plans for a protracted war include activating separatist forces inside Iran. This scenario would require using the Azeri-speaking population in northern Iran, with Azerbaijan playing a significant role. Such involvement would enhance Azerbaijan’s political importance to the West, especially Israel, potentially creating an additional threat for Armenia. If these plans were viable, the transit route through Syunik might become less urgent since Azerbaijan would already have a land border with Nakhichevan. However, there’s no guarantee that northern Iran would seek independence or unification with Azerbaijan, even during internal chaos. Consequently, in the medium term, Azerbaijan would likely still have additional political justifications for demanding a transit route through Syunik, similar to the situation described earlier.

On the very first day of the war, news spread in Iranian media that one of Iran’s neighbors had supported Israel’s attack on Iran. Azerbaijani officials denied these rumors. Nevertheless, the issue became a topic of discussion during a later telephone conversation between the presidents of Iran and Azerbaijan. During his subsequent visit to Azerbaijan, Iranian President Pezeshkian expressed satisfaction with the “responsible position” taken by member states of the Economic Cooperation Organization during the war. 

While some Iranian circles still advocate for a cautious approach toward Azerbaijan, officials are working to ease tensions through diplomatic engagements. The declaration adopted by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul—which referenced the right of return for “Western Azerbaijanis”—represents one such diplomatic effort. Despite the Iranian ambassador to Armenia stating, “The use of such wording should be avoided. The name ‘Western Azerbaijan’ is the name of one of the provinces of the Republic of Iran. It cannot be used to name any other geographical area, especially if it implies any form of territorial claims,” Iran maintained its signature on the document. Similarly, Pezeshkian did not cancel his visit to Karabakh and engaged in cordial discussions with Aliyev regarding destruction attributed to Armenians. 

The U.S.-backed Syunik Transit Route and Iran’s Response

Following the war, developments emerged regarding the proposed transit route through Syunik and the U.S. proposal for this route. While official details of the proposal, (or possibly multiple proposals) remained undisclosed, discussions about this possibility spread through both Armenian and international media after the Carnegie Endowment published an article and the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey issued a statement.

Iran remained silent for several days. Eventually, during a telephone conversation between the security council secretaries of Iran and Armenia, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity in any project implementation. In a subsequent interview with Iranian Public Television, Iran’s ambassador emphasized that Tehran would accept any project that aligned with Armenia’s security interests. Ali Khamenei’s foreign affairs advisor,  Ali Akbar Velayati, also reaffirmed Iran’s opposition to the “Zangezur corridor” though notably did not address potential American involvement in the transit road.

Despite Armenian officials’ announcement that Armenia would not “lease land” to America, it seemed unlikely that American proposals would end there. Indeed, the peace declaration initialed between Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 8 at the White House—in the presence of and witnessed by the U.S. President—included an important provision about the transit road through Meghri, to be named the “Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP).

Iran’s reaction to this event was twofold: First, even before the signing, an article by Ali Akbar Velayati published on August 8 described in harsh terms the path “to be given to a third party.” Second, Tehran’s official response came through a press release from the Foreign Ministry which welcomed peace efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan while expressing concerns about potential American presence in the region. In the days following the declaration, after telephone conversations between Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Pezeshkian, and between Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Abbas Araghchi, and particularly after Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan’s visit to Tehran, Pezeshkian and Araghchi issued several statements. They affirmed that Iran’s red lines were respected in the declaration, noting there was no mention of a third-party presence, especially armed forces, and that Armenia had assured them the declaration would not negatively impact the shared Iran-Armenia border. Both officials also highlighted the widespread disinformation circulating in the country about this issue. 

This dualism in Iran’s responses should be analyzed primarily through the lens of Iran’s domestic politics. President Pezeshkian’s government faces criticism for emphasizing the importance of U.S. negotiations after the war. Conservative circles are characterizing recent developments in the South Caucasus as consequences of Pezeshkian’s policy that work against Iran’s interests. However, these circles lack decision-making authority. When analyzing Iran’s response, one should rely exclusively on statements from those with foreign policy authority—namely, members of the government. I believe that President Pezeshkian’s August 18 visit to Armenia will provide an important opportunity to clear up existing misconceptions.

Iran’s balanced response to the fundamental shift that occurred on August 8 in the South Caucasus serves as an important indicator of Iran’s potential future role and the evolving Iran-U.S. relations in the broader region. 

While Iran continues to navigate its ties with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, its fraught relations with Israel and the U.S.—and the prospect of further clashes—pose potential security risks for Armenia. At the same time, the war exposed the vulnerability of Iran’s strategic infrastructure, and the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran engagement could trigger a broader regional realignment. Much will depend on whether the current ceasefire evolves into a lasting settlement through negotiations, rather than serving merely as a pause before renewed conflict.

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