Tag: South Caucasus

Armenian experts help make sense of the ongoing discussions surrounding a possible peace deal between Baku and Yerevan, and what developments can actually be expected in the coming months.

There are three scenarios of how the war in Ukraine might end for Russia and what this will mean for the three countries of the South Caucasus. Gaidz Minassian examines the strategies of the players in the region.

The interplay between two conflicts, one in Eastern Europe, the other in the Caucasus provides a global dimension to the issues they contain. Beyond the common space-time matrix, what can we learn from what lies at the nexus of these two conflicts?

After almost three decades of remaining on the sidelines of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict negotiation process, the EU has now stepped in, positioning itself as a mediator in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conciliation process.

Armenia hasn’t participated in any multilateral connectivity initiatives in the South Caucasus since independence, primarily due to the war with Azerbaijan. Since the 2020 Artsakh War, new projects are taking shape—again without Armenia’s participation.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has thrust the South Caucasus into a contest for control over transport routes. Despite being landlocked, Armenia remains at the center of Russian-Turkish ambitions to deepen cooperation.

In EVN Report’s news roundup for the week of July 22: Human Rights Watch criticizes new EU-Azerbaijan energy deal; CIA director in Yerevan as part of a regional visit to the South Caucasus; Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei announces that Iran will not tolerate efforts to block its border with Armenia and more.

Baku’s oil economy is not sustainable, as diminishing revenues in the long-term increase the probability of domestic instability in Azerbaijan, potentially triggering militarized interstate disputes.

Armenia’s Omicron cases may already be receding, though deaths continue to rise. How does it compare against Armenia’s previous COVID-19 waves and the government policy interventions they sparked?

As Armenia works to rebuild its positions following the 2020 Artsakh War, it must assess the challenges, threats and risks of the security environment and clarify a position that reflects state and national interests.

Western attempts to infiltrate into the sphere of Russian influence have meant to weaken Russia and maintain constant tension. Could this result in larger clashes with more unpredictable consequences, this time between large geopolitical players?

The opening of the Armenian section of the Transcaucasian Trail means hikers can now walk the length of Armenia along a specially-constructed footpath that connects the Iranian and Georgian borders, taking in some of Armenia’s most spectacular landscapes and cultural sites on the way.

A year after the end of the war in Artsakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan are far from a sustainable peace. Regardless of how many olive branches are gifted to the leaders of the two sides, we are once again back to a “no war, no peace” situation, writes Tatev Hayrapetyan.

Turkey is Georgia’s main source of imports and finances strategic infrastructure such as energy projects. The imbalanced arrangement provided Turkey with “strategic depth” and opportunities for power projection. Armenians are apprehensive about the repercussions of going in the same direction.

Since the end of the 2020 Artsakh War, Russia has enjoyed an effective monopoly over the negotiation process. Recent initiatives by the EU suggest that Europe may be taking a more proactive role in the South Caucasus.

This is not a story about war. This is the story of what happens after the bullets, missiles, bombs and drones no longer fly through the autumn air. Maria Titizian recounts her journey to Artsakh last year, two days after the signing of the trilateral statement ending the war.

A year has passed since the end of the 2020 Artsakh War. The ceasefire statement signed by the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan on November 9, 2020, brought a new geopolitical reality to the region.

Back in early October, a resident of Martakert was shot dead by Azerbaijani fire while he was driving a tractor. A Russian peacekeeper was sitting right beside him at the time. What is behind Azerbaijan’s provocations?

Armenia's bid to pursue an independent and sovereign policy as a democracy was perceived to have a geopolitical context. The danger was in not seeing that reality, not evaluating it, and not recalculating domestic, foreign and security policy accordingly.

Launched in 2005, DigiWeek is the marquee event for Armenia’s technology sector. The anchor event for DigiWeek is the Digitec Expo (the largest tech expo in the Caucasus) and the first ever Digitec Summit, an exclusive conference bringing together technologists from around the world. Raffi Kassarjian, the executive director of the Union of Advanced Technology Enterprises and Nerses Ohanian, founder of HyeTech speak to EVN Report about how the tech sector is turning challenges into opportunities.

A unique combination of causal factors at different levels made the 44-day war possible. Tigran Grigoryan presents a systematic and comprehensive explanation of the structural conditions and circumstances behind Azerbaijan’s large-scale offensive.

The UK embassy in Azerbaijan and British companies were very active during and after the 2020 Artsakh War. While the spilled blood was still fresh, British businesses were already focused on the profits to be made.

Back in the 2010s, Armenian policymakers were too short-sighted to assess the implications that the Arab Spring had for our own country. Does the recent American withdrawal from Afghanistan have any significance for Armenia?

Since the end of the 2020 Artsakh War, tensions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Azerbaijan have been escalating. Although an outright military confrontation seems unlikely, it would have devastating consequences for the region.

China considers Turkey a key strategic partner under the Belt and Road Initiative. It has also intensified economic relations with Azerbaijan and is keen to diversify its commercial routes to Europe. Was China a silent observer or did it have any role to play during the 2020 Artsakh War.

Following the 2020 Artsakh War, the creation of a new geopolitical reality in the region by Baku and Ankara opened a "Pandora's Box" forcing the main stakeholders to re-articulate their geopolitical agenda.

One of the most important dimensions of Armenian-EU cooperation is the energy sector. The EU has expressed a willingness to support Armenia in designing an energy strategy and policy, including security and diversification of the energy supply.

The 2020 Artsakh War highlighted the interests, strategies and positions of Iran and Russia, both regional powers, regarding the resolution of the Karabakh Conflict.

Following Moscow’s facilitation of the ceasefire agreement ending the 2020 Artsakh War, some are asking whether Armenia should pursue “more Russia or less Russia.” The reality of the matter is that geography is inescapable.

Azerbaijan increased its military spending by 17% in 2020; this was among the largest annual increases in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Ani Avetisyan breaks down the numbers of the military expenditures of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The 2020 Artsakh War put to the test long-held assumptions about the roles of neighbors and global players in the region. Some maintained and reinforced their significance and role in the region, others raised their importance and some were invisible.

The EU’s weak stance and incapacity to act during a time of great need for the Armenian people still reverberates. Today, Armenians are asking themselves if they can afford to trust the EU again.

The 2020 Artsakh War changed the geopolitical picture in the South Caucasus, impacting all the countries in the region. While there were clear winners and losers, some countries both won and lost.

From widespread collectivization of farms during the Soviet era to privatization after independence in 1991, the state of agriculture in the three countries of the South Caucasus.

More than 27 million people globally have contracted COVID-19 and almost 900,000 have died. For this installment of “Understanding the Region,” we look at how the three countries of the South Caucasus have fared in their response to the pandemic.

Innovative forms of activism emerged in different societies to overcome the limitations of physical distancing amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

The latest IRI poll shows that 71% are satisfied with how the Armenian government has handled the COVID-19 situation, but apprehension about future economic consequences remain.

The tourism industry has been particularly hard hit because of the COVID-19 pandemic. What does this mean for the three countries of the South Caucasus?

The South Caucasus is a region with three unresolved armed conflicts that began in the 1990s: Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh). What is the state of democracy in these three statelets?

Once-integrated energy channels were disrupted with the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia began rebuilding their impaired energy infrastructures. How have these countries with different degrees of European and Russian influence and different energy needs and natural oil and gas reserves fared so far and what do they have in common?

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three countries of the South Caucasus declared independence in 1991. This new instalment of “Understanding the Region” looks at the democratic trajectories of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Part II will look at the state of democracy in the statelets of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh), South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Writer and photojournalist Simone Zoppellaro writes that the moral and political responsibility of a conflict doesn’t rest solely on the actors, or those who arm them. It rests also on the nations that would have the power to intervene and stop the hostilities but prefer to keep themselves detached or indifferent.

Armenia is situated in a volatile region with 80 percent of its borders sealed. This article by Vahram Ter-Matevosyan examines the foreign policy programs of the nine political parties and blocs running in the parliamentary elections.